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ABSTRACT
This dissertation exam ines discourses and experiences of reproduction in 
Virginia, 1630-1785. I define reproduction as an experiential reality that 
contoured wom en’s  lives in specific ways, a s  a central demographic 
phenomenon that shaped colonial populations, and as a discourse of power 
in the colonial project. Informed by feminist theory, queer theory, and 
postcolonial theory, the dissertation exam ines the relationship between  
reproduction and colonialism in the development of a plantation econom y in 
Virginia. I draw on a varied archive of court documents, colonial records, 
newspapers and other print culture, plantation records, diaries, letters, and 
medical texts. Chapter 1, ‘“A considerable parcel of breeders”: Reproduction 
and Discourses of Racial Slavery in Colonial Virginia,” exam ines the ways 
that development of racial slavery in Virginia w as based, in part, on the 
appropriation of black wom en’s  reproduction. I examine the roots of the 1662 
law that defined slavery a s  a condition of birth, finding the legal and cultural 
precedent for the law in the conflation of servitude and bastardy. I further 
examine the vernacular discourses of slavery that used reproduction to define 
enslaved people (especially women) a s  a kind of property legally similar to 
livestock. I c lose  the chapter with a discussion of the Virginia House of 
B urgesses debates around defining slaves as real or personal property, and I 
argue that th ese debates were a consequence of defining slavery a s  a status 
of birth. In Chapter 2, “Wicked, Dangerous, and Ungoverned: The 
Transgressive Possibilities of Reproduction,” I examine the ways that 
childbearing could transgress colonial hierarchies and boundaries, especially  
in c a se s  of bastardy and interracial birth. Throughout the chapter, I am 
particularly interested in understanding the relationship between domination 
and transgression, and the specific ways that reproduction could inhabit the 
space between those two poles. In Chapter 3, “Knowledge ‘not fit to be 
discust publiquely’: Colonialism and the Transformation of Reproductive 
Knowledge,” I examine the ways that colonialism transformed Virginians’ 
reproductive epistem e. I attempt to reconstruct knowledge about 
reproduction in this space and time, and I show how childbearing becam e a 
potent intimate zone for the negotiating of colonial power relations. In the 
final chapter, ‘“Sh e lives in an infant country that wants nothing but people’: 
Discourses of Reproduction, Print Culture, and Virginia’s  Colonial Project,” I 
examine the competing discourses of reproduction that informed Virginia’s  
colonial project. I argue that two competing discourses about reproduction -  
one that privileged “prolific reproduction” and another that privileged “rational 
reproduction” -  show the ways that the experience of colonialism transformed 
ideas about reproduction. This transformation occurred because the 
exigencies of the colonial project prioritized the maintaining of colonial 
boundaries and hierarchies over the early notion of peopling a “virgin” land.
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INTRODUCTION:
Outlaw Reproduction, Colonialism, and the History of Early Virginia
“Thomas son of Matthew Hubbard by Mary his wife was bom November the 25th 
1679.”
Charles Parish Records, York County, Virginia, 1679.1
“ 1 Blanket for the wench lying in [4 shillings].... To the Midwife for Negro Sarah 10 
[shillings]”
York County Court, Account o f  Orphan’s Estate, February 16, 1736.2
“Mr John Goodwin haveing this day in Court entered his information agt Judeth 
Clarke servant to Capt Joshua Slade of York parish & county for fornication with a 
negro, the sherr is therefore ordered to sumons her to the next Court for her personall 
appearance then & there to answer the same.”
York County Court, June 25,1694.3
Mary gave birth to a son named Thomas. Sarah had a baby and lay in, 
attended by a midwife. Judith bore a child and found herself a defendant in court. 
These three moments in Virginia’s colonial past point to the simultaneously ordinary 
and transformative moment of childbearing. The records are thin -  we will never 
know much detail about these births, much less how these three women felt about 
them. And yet, occurring in a colonial space marked by ever-shifting hierarchies of 
race, status, and gender, these three births are charged with meaning. All of these
1 Landon C. B ell, C harles Parish, York County, V irginia H istory an d  R egisters: Births, 16 4 8 -1 789, 
D eaths 1665-1787  (Richmond: Library o f  Virginia, 1996), vix, 111. (Hereafter abbreviated as CPR.)
2 York D eeds, Orders, and W ills 18: 271-2 . M icrofilm . Located at Library o f  Virginia. (A ll York  
County records hereafter abbreviated as “York D O W ,” with varying volum e numbers. For som e 
volum es, deeds and w ills were recorded separately from judicial orders; those volum es are abbreviated 
as “JO,” with the accom panying date.)
3 York D OW  10: 3.
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births, I will argue, challenged the ever-shifting colonial ideologies, hierarchies, laws, 
or social structures. And all of them, I will argue, simultaneously inform and 
challenge our ability to understand the colonial past. Difficult to pin down in the past 
or the present, all of these births were and are outlaw in some way.
In November 1679, Mary Hubbard gave birth to a son, Thomas. Mary would 
bear two more sons in the next four years: Matthew, Jr. in February 1682, and John 
in November 1683.4 Like other Anglo-Virginian women in this era before reliable 
contraception, Mary bore children in rapid succession.5 The slim records of Charles 
Parish in York County, Virginia give a small glimpse into the life -  and births -  of 
Mary Hubbard. In colonial Virginia, parish clerks were legally bound to keep careful 
birth and death records for the white inhabitants of their parish.6 Those records were 
handwritten into large ledgers -  formulaic and repetitive columns spanning decades. 
While parish records documented the birthdates of children, as legal documents and 
church documents, the ledgers cannot and do not reveal much about the experience or 
meaning of childbirth for women during this period -  childbirth itself remains outside 
the boundaries of parish birth records.
The Charles Parish records indicate that Mary Hubbard bore one more child 
after her three sons were bom: in the winter of 1689, she gave birth to a daughter,
4 CPR, i l l .
5 Birth intervals -  the length o f  time betw een full-term births -  w ill be discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
Since Charles Parish (unlike som e other parishes) did not keep marriage records, it is unknown how  
long Mary and M atthew were married before Thomas was born. He may have been their first child, or 
the Hubbards may have recently arrived to the parish with older children.
6 The recording o f  births during Mary Hubbard’s time was demanded by a Virginia law passed in
1658, which required ministers to keep records o f  births, baptisms, marriages, and deaths within their 
flock. W illiam  W aller H ening, ed., The Statu tes a t Large; Being a C ollection  o f  A ll the L aw s o f  
Virginia, from  the F irst Session  o f  the L egisla ture  (1823; facsim ile reprint, C harlottesville, V A , 1969), 
1: 433. (Hereafter, all references to the colonial Virginia statutes w ill be abbreviated as “H ening,” 
follow ed by volum e number and page number.)
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also named Mary, who would survive only one month.7 Baby Mary’s birth record 
differs from her brothers’. Colonial Virginia birth records, even in their succinctness, 
reveal the patriarchal assumptions of English culture. Babies were listed as the son or 
daughter of their father: Thomas Hubbard was listed as “the son of Matthew 
Hubbard” in 1679, as were his brothers.8 Mothers’ primary role in the records was as 
vessels for legitimate births: Thomas Hubbard was bom “by [Matthew’s] wife, 
Mary.”9 When baby Mary was bom, that formula was broken: Mary was listed only 
as the daughter of her mother, Mary Hubbard. Further culling of the record reveals a 
death record for Matthew Hubbard in November 1688, 13 months before the birth of 
baby Mary.10 The widow Mary Hubbard was never tried for bastardy (perhaps 
because her daughter died before Mary finished lying in); the birth record is the only 
surviving testimony of a moment of outlaw reproduction that broke Virginia law and 
custom.
While Mary’s births were recorded in the parish register, Sarah’s birth was
recorded only in an account of the estate in which she was held as property. In 1736,
the court-appointed guardians of John Burnham, an orphan, reported the value of his
assets, which included several slaves: “Old Jack,” Will, Sarah, and Phaeby.11
Among other expenses, the account lists two charges which point to the birth
practices of enslaved women in this time and place: a ten-shilling fee for “a midwife
1
for the negro Sarah,” and a blanket “for the wench lying in.” These records expose
7 CPR, 11 1 ,2 2 3 .
8 CPR, vix.
9 Ibid.
10 CPR, 223.
11 York DOW  18: 271-2.
12 Ibid. Sarah’s baby is not listed in the estate account: Sarah, W ill, Phaeby, and “Old Jack” are all 
listed along with the “w ages” they earned that are credited as profits to the estate’s account. Slaves
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the tension always present in inherited chattel slavery -  the birth of Sarah’s baby was 
simultaneously a form of profit (her child would also be a slave) and an expense 
(since Sarah required the attention of a midwife and whatever care that blanket might 
signify).
From these piecemeal records, we can begin to imagine Sarah’s birth. First, 
she had an English midwife: ten shillings was the usual fee for an English midwife at 
the time, and it is unlikely that a black midwife could have charged such a rate.13 It is 
possible that other women in the slave community attended Sarah in her labor and 
birth, but their presence is invisible in the document, as it had no explicit monetary 
value. Second, though enslaved, Sarah was afforded some time for recuperation, as 
indicated by the blanket bought “for [her] lying in.”14 Lying in was an English 
custom of rest and healing for up to a month following a birth; traditionally, lying in 
ended with “churching,” the first time a mother and her infant ventured into public 
after the birth.15 We can’t know what this translation of English custom meant to an 
enslaved woman of African descent. Possibly, she and the other women of the 
enslaved community reinterpreted the period of lying-in into a synchretic form that 
had particular meaning for them. Another possibility is that, in a small slaveholding
belonging to orphans were typically rented out until the orphan cam e o f  age, with the profits o f  that 
rent being credited to the orphan.
13 M idw ives’ rates and practices will be discussed in Chapter 3.
14 Ibid.
15 See chapter 2 for more on lying in practices and their potentially transgressive effects. On 
“churching,” see Adrian W ilson, The M aking o f  M an-M idw ifery: C hildbirth  in England, 1660-1770  
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard U niversity Press, 1995), 27-28 . On the English and A nglo-A m erican  
tradition o f  lying in, see David Cressy, Birth, M arriage an d  D eath: Ritual, Religion, an d  the L ife-Cycle  
in Tudor an d  S tuart E ngland  (NY: Oxford U niversity Press, 1997), 80-94; Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, A 
M idw ife's Tale: The Life o f  M artha B allard, B ased  on H er D iary, 1785-1812  (NY: V intage, 1990), 
188-93; W ilson, The M aking o f  M an-M idw ifery, 26-30.
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like this one, Sarah’s lying-in was defined in more English terms.16 Nevertheless, we 
see here a moment when customs surrounding birth, midwifery, and lying-in both 
complicated and were complicated by the intimate relations of colonialism. These 
sorts of moments can emerge only when our reading of the records recognizes that 
childbearing holds complex, contingent, contradictory, and contested meanings, and 
thus resists our ability to define it absolutely.
Another fragment of a record, this time from 1694: Judith Clarke was 
summoned before the York County court under suspicion of fornication, bastardy, 
and miscegenation. Three months later, the court decided against Clarke, ruling that 
she would suffer 20 lashes and serve her master, Captain Joshua Slade, for two more 
years.17 The court’s summons and decision are the only surviving record of Clarke’s 
life in York County. Even so, they reveal much about the colonial projects of racial 
division and status hierarchy in Virginia, as well as the ways that reproduction could 
interrupt, frustrate, and highlight those projects.18 Judith Clarke was an English
16 Phillip Morgan argues that because V irginia’s econom y was dominated by sm all farms, the world o f  
V irginia’s enslaved people was “as much a white as a black w orld.” Phillip D. M organ, Slave  
Counterpoin t: B lack Culture in the E ighteenth-C entury C hesapeake an d  L ow country  (Chapel Hill: 
University o f  North Carolina Press, 1998), 101.
17 York D O W  10: 28.
18 By “status,” I mean to indicate the hierarchy o f  white people (and free people o f  color) in this 
colonial context. At the bottom o f  this hierarchy were indentured people o f  European ancestry, and at 
the top were the elite slaveow ning planters. In the m iddle was a large group o f  free white people  
ranging in status from former servants to poor and middling farmers, artisans, and the em erging  
merchant class. W hile white interests were consolidated with the em ergence o f  plantation slavery by 
the end o f  the seventeenth century, these com plex status hierarchies fragmented those interests. 
Historians have debated the degree to w hich w hites in colonial V irginia were unified. On B acon’s 
R ebellion as a m om ent o f  consolidating white interests on basis o f  race and gender, see Edmund S. 
Morgan, A m erican S lavery, A m erican F reedom : The O rdea l o f  C olon ial V irginia  (NY: W .W . Norton 
and C o., 1975), 250-92; Kathleen M. Brown, G ood  Wives, N asty  Wenches, an d  Anxious P atriarchs: 
G ender, Race, an d  P ow er in C olon ial V irginia  (Chapel Hill: U niversity o f  North Carolina Press,
1996), 137-86. Rhys Isaac depicts a V irginia that used deference to promote unity despite 
stratification. Rhys Isaac, The Transform ation o f  Virginia, 1740-1790  (Chapel Hill: U niversity o f  
North Carolina Press, 1982). Anthony Parent depicts the consolidation o f  planter interests at the turn 
o f  the eighteenth century as a deliberate series o f  actions fueled by planters’ em erging class
5
servant, likely indentured to Joshua Slade for around seven years. Her sexual 
relationship with an unnamed man of African descent crossed racial boundaries, 
resulting in the birth of a child of mixed race and liminal status. That relationship 
also crossed boundaries of status, as servant women were expected to remain celibate 
during the course of their servitude, in part to protect their masters from lost labor 
during a woman’s pregnancy and lying in. No matter how calcified the racial order of 
colonial Virginia, it was easily permeated by sexual relationships and the children 
bom of them. Interestingly, it is records like these -  records of births that challenged 
racial boundaries, births that occurred outside of lawful marriages, births of servant 
women, births of free black women -  that are most visible in the colonial archive 
because these births were defined as criminal by the courts. The births about which 
the most detail survives are those deemed “outlaw” by the courts -  dangerous to the 
colonial order, threatening to the organization of power in the colony. Perhaps it is 
possible to see Judith herself as a sort of “outlaw” -  defying the law of both the 
colony and colonialism itself, and suffering for it when punished by colonial 
authority.
All of these births are examples of what I call “outlaw reproduction” -  births 
that occurred outside the law or that otherwise resist easy categorization. The concept 
of outlaw reproduction is useful in three ways. First, it suggests the ways that 
particular births -  ones that broke the law -  found their way into public view during a 
time when childbearing was a central aspect of women’s sphere and thus not often 
made public. Second, the concept of outlaw reproduction points to the limitations
consciousness. Anthony S. Parent, Jr., Foul M eans: The Form ation o f  a S lave Society  in Virginia, 
1660-1740  (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 2003).
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and the opportunities presented by the archive of early Virginia. Finally, it helps us 
to view the intersections between reproduction and the colonial project in colonial 
Virginia.
In colonial Virginia, it was the births that in some way broke the law -  either 
literally or figuratively -  that emerged into public view. Both the birth of the widow 
Hubbard’s daughter and the birth of Judith Clarke’s interracial child fit into this 
category. Births to unmarried women, or, in the parlance of the early modern world, 
bastard births, were the clearest form of outlaw reproduction, because they challenged 
lines of inheritance, rules about sexual morality, and hierarchies of social status. 
Bastardy was a crime taken seriously in colonial Virginia, punishable by fines, 
corporal punishment, jailing, or extended terms of service. Therefore, bastard births 
left considerable evidence; these court cases, sometimes including sworn testimony, 
are one time when women’s experiences and voices are present in the records. Other 
births that somehow challenged cultural assumptions or caused crisis -  cases of 
infanticide, monstrous births, and miscarriages or abortions -  could also be brought 
into public view for adjudication. It is births that were somehow exceptional -  births 
that created problems that needed to be solved by legal or cultural measures -  that 
became visible.
The second advantage of the concept of outlaw reproduction is that it begins 
to address the challenges presented by the colonial Virginia archive, as well as the 
formation of that archive, which, in the case of court records, was a reflection of the 
reach of the law itself. For the historian, childbirth is a somewhat hidden event: 
difficult to view, hard to wrangle because it occurred outside of the public eye and
7
was thus rarely committed to the documentary records from which most historians 
draw their conclusions.19 Most births in colonial Virginia were like Mary Hubbard’s 
earliest three births -  private, undocumented, and virtually silent save the cursory 
records of rudimentary colonial demography. Those taciturn parish records are 
embedded with even more silences, as births by enslaved women like Sarah, as well 
as women of Native American descent, rarely found their way into even these 
records. Therefore, the Virginia archive -  like all colonial archives -  is itself an 
artifact of Virginia’s politics of gender, race, and status.
The colonial Virginia archive privileges the voices and interests of elite white 
men -  the nascent slaveholding planter class that would achieve ascendancy by the 
second quarter of the eighteenth century.20 Doing women’s history with such an 
archive, lacking the women’s letters and diaries that are available for other times and
19 Judith W alzer Leavitt’s influential study o f  childbearing in Am erica begins after the rise o f  
physician-assisted labor in part because physicians’ records have survived. Judith W alzer Leavitt, 
B rought to B ed: C hildbearing in A m erica, 1750-1950  (NY: Oxford U niversity Press, 1986), 9-11. 
Catherine Scholten’s study o f  colonial-era childbearing is one o f  the only studies to focus on this 
period, and it is built exclusively  from the records o f  white, Christian, m iddling and elite w om en from  
the North. Catherine M. Scholten, C hildbearing in A m erican Society: 1650-1850  (N Y: N ew  York 
University Press, 1985). Laurel Thatcher U lrich’s deep reading o f  the diary o f  m idw ife Martha M oore 
Ballard is exceptional in that U lrich’s main evidence is the writing o f  a m idw ife herself; even  so, that 
diary had long been ignored by historians as being too ephemeral, repetitive, and lacking in detail to be 
useful. Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, A M id w ife ’s Tale, 8-9. Another exception is the work o f  Lisa Foreman  
C ody, w hose history o f  m idwifery in Britain is based on an eighteenth-century public debate about 
m idwifery in w hich m idw ives them selves participated (such a debate was not duplicated in Am erica). 
Lisa Forman C ody, ‘T h e  Politics o f  Reproduction: From M id w ives’ Alternative Public Sphere to the 
Public Spectacle o f  Man M idw ifery,” E ighteenth-C entury S tudies 32, no. 4  (1999): A ll-4 9 5 .
20 On the ascendancy o f  the planter class, see Isaac, The Transform ation o f  Virginia, 34-42; Alan  
Kulikoff, T obacco an d  Slaves: The D evelopm en t o f  Southern C ultures in the C hesapeake, 1680-1800  
(Chapel Hill: U niversity o f  North Carolina Press, 1986); Morgan, A m erican Slavery, A m erican  
F reedom ; Parent, Foul M eans. Revelatory histories have been produced by using planter diaries; I 
depend heavily on planter writings for this study. See, for exam ple, Rhys Isaac, Landon C arter's  
Uneasy K ingdom : R evolution an d  R ebellion  on a  V irginia P lantation  (N Y : Oxford U niversity Press, 
2004); Kenneth A. Lockridge, The D iary, an d  Life, o f  W illiam B yrd  II o f  Virginia, 1674-1744  (Chapel 
Hill: U niversity o f  North Carolina Press, 1987); Kenneth A. Lockridge, On the Sources o f  P a triarchal 
R age: The C om m onplace Books o f  W illiam B yrd  an d  Thomas Jefferson an d  the G endering o f  P o w er  in 
the Eighteenth C entury  (N Y: N ew  York U niversity Press, 1992); Daniel Blake Smith, Inside the G rea t 
H ouse: P lan ter F am ily Life in E ighteenth-C entury C hesapeake S ociety  (Ithaca, NY: Cornell U niversity  
Press, 1982).
places, one has to rely instead on court records and the personal papers of men. The 
gendered formation of this archive was part of the gendered epistemology and 
experience of the era. Laurel Thatcher Ulrich has argued that in the early modem 
world, women’s lives were constructed around a different economy and different
91centers of meaning and power than men’s lives. The archive, itself an artifact of 
men’s public world, frames women’s experiences as outside of the realm of the law 
itself until women’s experiences and knowledge were required by the public courts.22
Nevertheless, the elite white male authorship of the archive should not be seen 
as an absolute silencing of the voices, experiences, and presences of people who were 
not members of that small but inordinately powerful group. The disciplinary 
attention of the law fell most often on people who did not have access to elite 
privilege -  free blacks, servants, poor people. Therefore, a deep irony of the colonial 
Virginia archive is that while middling women’s voices and experiences are difficult 
(but not impossible) to ascertain, non-elite women are quite present in the archive. 
They were the accused in bastardy cases, they were the women whose births were 
considered profit by slaveowners, they were the women who bore children of mixed 
race that challenged the colonial color line. To hear those voices or uncover those 
experiences, the colonial archive must be read with care and attention.
This brings us to the last advantage of the concept of outlaw reproduction: it 
points to the particular intersections between colonialism and reproduction, and the 
ways that reproduction was always connected with discourses of power in the 
colonial world. Birth was a central means by which colonial power was made,
21 Ulrich, A M id w ife ’s Tale , 72-101.
22 This concept o f  gendered know ledge w ill be discussed more fully in Chapter 3.
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policed, and organized. As we see with the recorded births of Judith Clarke and 
Sarah, births which challenged the nascent organization of colonial power -  the 
deference of servant to master, the easy distribution of human property, the continuity 
of traditional cultures -  are also births that become visible in the records. This 
archival visibility of non-elite people points to the contested and contingent nature of 
the colonial project itself. Using the colonial record of Dutch Indonesia, Ann Laura 
Stoler has argued that the colonial archive records not only reflects elite men’s 
interests, but the archive itself participated in the ongoing project of negotiating, 
defining, and policing elite interests in the colonial economy. As such, we need to 
read colonial archives as “condensed sites of epistemological and political anxiety
‘J'Krather than skewed and biased sources.” Childbearing was central to the colonial 
project’s aim of populating supposedly “virgin” lands, even as it could interrupt and 
complicate the emerging discourses of race and power that colonialism created and 
upon which it depended.
This dissertation uses the framework of outlaw reproduction to examine the 
intersection of reproduction and colonialism in Virginia. I imagine reproduction and 
colonialism as mutually constituted discourses of power: discourses of reproduction 
impacted the colonial project and the colonial project transformed reproduction in 
ways that organized, categorized, and disciplined colonized bodies. I argue that 
reproduction was a crucial discourse of colonialism -  a language and a set of ideas 
emergent in both print culture and vernacular discourse meant to forward the nascent
21 Ann Laura Stoler, A long the A rch iva l G rain: E pistem ic A nxieties an d  C olon ia l Com m on Sense
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 9-10, 20. See also Antoinette Burton, “Introduction: 
Archive Fever, A rchive Stories,” in A rchive Stories: Facts, Fictions, an d  the W riting o f  H istory, ed. 
Antoinette Burton (Durham, NC: Durham University Press, 2005), 6.
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and changing English colonial project in Virginia. I also argue that the power 
relations of colonialism fundamentally transformed ideas, knowledge, and practices 
surrounding reproduction. Finally, I argue that the birthing room, as a zone of 
intimate contact, was a space that interrupted, created, challenged, and cemented 
colonial relations. In this introduction, I will discuss the theoretical foundations for 
my understanding of reproduction as a cultural phenomenon and then lay out the 
historiographical background for my work. I conclude with an outline of the chapters 
that follow.
The theoretical underpinnings of my work -  feminist theory, Foucauldian 
histories, and postcolonial studies -  provide the context for my understanding of 
reproduction as a concept and a category of analysis. I define reproduction as an 
experiential reality that defined the contours of women’s lives in specific ways, as a 
central demographic phenomenon that shaped colonial populations, and, most 
importantly, as a crucial and central discourse of power in the colonial project. By 
seeing reproduction in this expansive way, we can resist the urge to universalize the 
experiences of some women or assume an essentialism in which motherhood is 
definitive of women’s lives. As Kathleen Brown argues, we must recognize that “the 
experience of childbirth varies culturally, historically, and individually and is most 
meaningfully analyzed when situated within a particular culture’s discourse of 
reproduction, sexuality, bodies, and gender.”24 Certainly, in a world before the 
advent of reliable birth control, childbearing was more intensely constitutive of 
women’s lives than it is today; the point here is to recognize the differences between
24 Kathleen M. Brown, “Brave N ew  Worlds: W om en's and Gender History,” W illiam an d  M ary  
Q uarterly  50, no. 2  (1993): 314. See also Susan Bordo, U nbearable W eight: Feminism, W estern  
Culture, an d  the B ody  (Berkeley: U niversity o f  California Press, 1993), 230.
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our modem, post-contraceptive subjectivities and the subjectivities of women in the 
past. A study of reproduction does not reduce women’s experiences to their role as 
mothers, but instead asserts that if reproduction is a central discourse of power, then 
women’s varied experiences of reproduction (which, for some, includes not 
participating in it) can help us to understand the boundaries, trajectories, inclusions, 
and exclusions in that discourse.
An attention to reproduction in this expansive way helps us to see how 
women’s lives and discourses of gender, sexuality, and the body are actually 
foundational, not tangential, to the history of colonialism. First, British colonialism 
was particularly focused on concerns about population, since the colonies of British 
North America were settler colonies. As Joyce Chaplin argues, British colonialist 
discourse “suggested that it was [English] bodies that guaranteed overseas possession, 
both by creating a population that demonstrated territorial dominion and by 
generating many hands to improve ‘wilderness’ through labor.”25 Chaplin shows that 
this sense of British bodily colonialism was dependent on developing notions of 
Native American inferiority, specifically in terms of reproduction and population 
growth. This was intensified in the developing slave economies of the plantation 
south, where the growth of the laboring population was essential to the survival of the 
colonial economy, and that growth occurred increasingly through childbearing rather 
than through the importation of more indentured servants or slaves. Colonial Virginia 
existed at the nexus of these competing population discourses, where the decimation 
of the Native American population through disease, war, and the internal slave trade
25 Joyce Chaplin, Subject M atters: Technology, the Body, an d  Science on the A nglo-A m erican  
Frontier, 1500-1676  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U niversity Press, 2001), 117.
26 Chaplin, Subject M atters, 157-98.
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was coupled with the prioritization of growing the populations of both English and 
African descent.27
What does it mean to consider reproduction as not just experience or 
biological process, but as a discourse of power? For Michel Foucault, “discourse” is 
a specific concept -  specifically, the urge to transform experience into language as a 
means of organizing and disciplining that experience. Foucault defines discourse in a 
way that is always embedded in specific and complex relations of power:
Discourses are tactical elements or blocks operating in the field of force 
relations; there can exist different and even contradictory discourses within 
the same strategy; they can, on the contrary, circulate without changing their 
form from one strategy to another, opposing strategy.28 
Discourses compete with each other and they are internally contradictory, but 
ultimately they are about the consolidation of power around particular bodies of 
knowledge through the exclusion of other ways of being and thinking. For Foucault, 
the modem world obsessively transforms sexuality into discourse, repositioning 
sexuality within force fields of power and domination: “Sexuality must not be 
described as a stubborn drive... [but instead] as an especially dense transfer point for 
relations of power.” Foucault’s understanding of discourse is useful here because it 
reframes language as a terrain of power negotiations, domination, and resistance.
27 Chaplin, Subject M atters, 157-98. On the internal trade in Indian slaves and the creation o f  Southern 
culture, see Alan Gallay, The Indian S lave Trade: The R ise o f  the English E m pire in the A m erican  
South, 1670-1717  (N ew  Haven, CT: Y ale U niversity Press, 2002).
28 M ichel Foucault, The H istory o f  Sexuality: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (N Y: Vintage, 
1990), 101-2.
29 Foucault, H istory o f  Sexuality, 103.
30 In one reading o f  Foucault’s definition o f  discourse, “discourse is ‘where pow er and know ledge are 
jo in ed .’” Charles C. Lemert and Garth G illian, M ichel Foucault: Socia l Theory an d  Transgression
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Foucault’s framework of discourse operating within a field of power relations 
is useful to a study of reproduction for multiple reasons. First, Foucault’s focus is on 
sexuality, but reproduction is absolutely central to how he understands the boundaries 
of sexuality and its relationship to power. Importantly, in The History o f  Sexuality, 
Foucault is not attempting to understand sexuality as experience or identity (he in fact 
rejects both notions), but instead working to narrate the emergence of the modem 
world itself and the ways that sexuality, as a discursive construction, was central to 
that narrative. Modernity, for Foucault, was marked by the state’s increasing power 
to organize, discipline, and measure its people in terms of demography and 
population, which, at their root, are always about the organization of sexuality and 
reproduction.31 Second, Foucault’s understanding of power as a field of force 
relations demands analysis of power relations in intimate zones like the birthing 
room, helping us to understand the ways that emerging colonial categories of power, 
such as race, were enacted on an interpersonal level.32
Foucault’s narratives and methodologies do have limitations. Gayatri Spivak 
critiques Foucault for uncritically reifying the European intellectual as an arbiter of 
truth even as he fails to acknowledge his position of power within colonial
(N Y: Colum bia University Press, 1982), 55-6 , quoted in Emma Perez, The D eco lon ia l Im aginary: 
Writing C hicanas Into H istory  (B loom ington: Indiana U niversity Press, 1999), xvi.
31 This transformation and its application to colonial V irginia are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
32 Foucault focused on intimate relationships -  especially  fam ilial relationships -  as the locus for 
power relations. Foucault, H istory o f  Sexuality, 96, 110-4. On intimacy and colonialism , see Ann 
Laura Stoler, C arnal K now ledge an d  Im perial P ow er: R ace an d  the Intim ate in C olonial Rule 
(Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 2002); Ann Laura Stoler, “T ense and Tender Ties: The 
Politics o f  Comparison in North American History and (Post) C olonial Studies,” in H aunted By 
E m pire: G eograph ies o f  Intim acy in N orth Am erican H istory, ed. Ann Laura Stoler (Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2006), 23-67.
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discourses.33 Importantly, Foucault’s narratives fail to recognize the centrality of 
colonialism and race in the creation of European modernity. Nevertheless, his 
methodologies and concepts have been central to the creation of postcolonial critiques 
of colonialism, notably those of Edward Said, who saw Foucault’s understanding of 
the links between power and knowledge as absolutely central to the creation of 
European colonialism.34 Ann Laura Stoler acknowledges this critique, but takes a 
different approach -  one I find useful in my own work. Stoler argues that sexuality 
was a central discourse in the implementation of colonial projects, something that 
Foucault seemed to recognize after the publication of The History o f  Sexuality. For 
Stoler, this means that an attention to colonialism requires not a rejection of 
Foucault’s insights, but a shifting of his chronology -  colonialism’s bans on 
interracial sex, for example, “linked individual desires to social reproduction in ways 
that he dates for Europe a century later.”
Postcolonial theory also offers a critical intervention into the history of early 
Virginia, especially as I try to write a history that is centered on discources of power 
and the experiences of non-elite women. Postcolonial theory offers several important 
insights that fuel my project. First, postcolonial theory offers new and useful ways to 
view American history and the history of American colonialism. Second,
33 Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in C olon ial D iscou rse an d  P ost-co lon ia l 
Theory: A  R eader, ed. Patrick W illiam s and Laura Chrisman (NY: Colum bia U niversity Press, 1994), 
66-75 .
34 Edward Said, O rientalism  (N Y: Penguin, 1978).
35 Ann Laura Stoler, R ace an d  the E ducation o f  D esire: F oucault's History o f  Sexuality an d  the 
C olon ia l O rd er o f  Things (Durham, NC: Duke U niversity Press, 1995). Stoler argues that, in his later 
work, Foucault p laces the em ergence o f  race as a discourse at the end o f  the nineteenth century, but 
that an attention to European colonialism  show s that race and colonialism  were central dynam ics in the 
creation o f  modern bourgeois identities. Ladelle M cW horter argues that race and sexuality em erged as 
parallel discourses o f  power, functioning in similar w ays and mutually constitutive o f  each other. 
Ladelle M cW horter, “Sex, Race, and Biopower: A  Foucauldian G enealogy,” H ypatia  19, no. 3 (2004): 
38-62.
36 Stoler, R ace an d  the E ducation o f  D esire , 41.
15
postcolonial theory offers important insights into colonialism itself, specifically its 
attention to colonialism as both a system of power and a constantly shifting process. 
Finally, postcolonial theory’s attention to intimate zones offers a specific link 
between reproduction and colonial projects.
While scholars have debated the application of postcolonial theory to 
American history, especially early American studies, I find it a useful tool in 
understanding power relations in the time preceding the American Revolution.
United States history provides both an affirmation and a challenge to postcolonial 
narratives: as a collection of former settler colonies, the United States both threw off 
colonial rule and reengaged in colonialism in the new nation’s own imperial 
projects. Nevertheless, if we consider colonialism as an epoch that laid the 
foundation for high imperialism, then postcolonial theory’s insights into the meanings 
of coloniality can be extremely useful in understanding the British colonies in North 
America. Catherine Hall separates colonialism from imperialism in this way, arguing 
that the high imperialism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was the “apogee” 
of a colonial process best understood as:
...the European pattern of exploration and ‘discovery,’ of settlement, of 
dominance over geographically separate ‘others,’ which resulted in the uneven
37 M alini Johar Schueller and Edward Watts, “Theorizing Early American Studies and 
P ostcoloniality,” in M essy Beginnings: P ostco lon ia lity  and E arly A m erican S tudies, ed. M alini Johar 
Schueller and Edward Watts (N ew  Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 1-28; Jack 
Greene, “C olonial History and National History: R eflections on a Continuing Problem,” W illiam  and  
M ary Q uarterly  64 , no. 2 (2007): 235-50; David Armitage, “From Colonial History to Postcolonial 
History?” W illiam an d  M ary Q u arterly  64 , no. 2  (2007): 251-4.
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development of forms of capitalism across the world and the destruction 
and/or transformation of other forms of social organization and life.
This colonial chronology places British North American history, including that of 
early Virginia, squarely within the sights of a narrative of European expansion, the 
rise of plantation capitalism, and the transformations of colonialism on both native 
and immigrant subjectivities.39 Indeed, Ann Laura Stoler has argued that the 
exclusion of America from postcolonial narratives is less about American 
exceptionalism than the deeply politicized erasure of imperialism from the United 
States’ historical self-conception.40 Indeed, if colonialism was a process of creating 
colonized and colonial subjectivities -  for Europeans even more than for colonized 
others, according to Edward Said -  then this process began with Columbus (or 
earlier)41
Postcolonial theory offers an understanding of colonialism that unsettles 
smooth or easy historical narratives and decenters power in those narratives. Robert 
Blair St. George points out the breadth of postcolonial studies’ decentering project:
38 Catherine Hall, “Thinking the Postcolonial, Thinking the Empire,” in C ultures o f  E m pire:
C olon izers in B ritain  an d  the E m pire in the N ineteenth an d  Twentieth C enturies, ed. Catherine Hall 
(N Y: R outledge, 2000 ), 5.
39 M ichael Warner, “W hat’s Colonial about C olonial Am erica?,” in P ossib le  P asts: B ecom ing C olon ial 
in E arly A m erica , ed. Robert Blair St. G eorge (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 2000), 
49-70 . On the lim its o f  placing American settler colon ies within a postcolonial framework, see Anne 
M cClintock, ‘T h e  A ngel o f  Progress: Pitfalls o f  the Term ‘P ost-colon ialism ,’” in C olon ial D iscourse  
an d  P ost-C o lon ia l Theory: A R eader, ed. Patrick W illiam s and Laura Chrisman (N Y : Colum bia  
U niversity Press, 1994), 291-304.
40 Ann Laura Stoler, “Intimidations o f  Empire: Predicaments o f  the Tactile and U nseen,” in H aunted  
B y E m pire: G eograph ies o f  Intim acy in N orth A m erican H istory, ed. Ann Laura Stoler (Durham, NC: 
Duke U niversity Press, 2006), 1-22; Stoler, ‘T en se  and Tender T ies,” 26-27.
41 Said, O rientalism , 12. On the creation o f  colon izers’ subjectivities in early colonialism , see:
Chaplin, Subject Matters-, M yra Jehlen, “The Literature o f  C olonization,” in The C am bridge H istory o f  
A m erican L iterature, vol. 1: 1590-1820, ed. Sacvan Bercovitch (NY: Cambridge U niversity Press, 
1994), 13-168.
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[Postcolonial theory] attempts to describe the subject matter and circuits of 
social relations through which discourse works to shape relations of power 
and knowledge, hegemony and consent, resistance and ritual, and thus makes 
problematic any ethnocentric assumptions concerning center-periphery 
models o f empire, population movement, and the flow  o f capital?2 
According to postcolonial studies, colonialism must always be understood as a 
process -  one that was always contested, contingent, and questioned. Postcolonial 
theory’s attention to what Malini Johar Schueller and Edward Watts call the “messy 
beginnings” of American history is particular useful in parsing the kinds of shaky, 
halting transformations that colonial Virginia underwent, such as the much-debated 
shift from a dependence on English indentured labor to African enslaved labor and 
the concomitant transformation in racial ideology.43
Colonialism was a process that created new subjectivities for both colonized 
peoples and colonizers. Robert Blair St. George calls this process “becoming 
colonial” -  the self-conscious process by which European colonizers realized their 
new identities as separate from those who inhabited Europe itself.44 On the one hand, 
the subjectivities of those at the bottom of colonial hierarchies -  slaves, Native 
Americans, free people of color, and perhaps even indentured servants -  may usefully
42 Robert Blair St. George, “Introduction,” in P ossib le  P asts: B ecom ing C olon ia l in E arly  A m erica , ed. 
Robert Blair St. G eorge (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 2000), 13, em phasis mine. 
See also Peter Hulme, “Postcolonial Theory and Early America: An Approach from the Caribbean,” in 
P ossib le  P asts: B ecom ing C olon ia l in E arly A m erica , ed. Robert Blair St. G eorge (Chapel Hill: UNC  
Press, 2000), 33-48.
43 Schueller and W atts, ‘T h eorizing Early American Studies and Postcoloniality.”
44 St. George, “Introduction,” 4-5 . For the w ays that colonialism  remade English subjectivities, see  
Kathleen W ilson, “Citizenship, empire, and modernity in the English provinces, c. 1720-90,” in 
C ultures o f  E m pire: C olon izers in B ritain an d  the E m pire in the N ineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 
ed. Catherine Hall (N Y: R outledge, 2000), 157-186.
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be understood using the tools of subaltern and postcolonial studies.45 The intersection 
of power, silence, speech, and resistance inhabited by colonized people becomes a 
space where we can begin to understand the complex impacts of the colonial project 
on colonized bodies 46 On the other hand, it is important to be cognizant of the 
transformation of the subjectivities of all people impacted by colonialism, including 
white Virginians, whose subjectivities were qualitatively different from those who 
lived in Europe.47
The intimacies of colonialism brought the subjectivities of colonizer and 
colonized into contact with one another.48 It is here, in these intimate zones where 
people of all statuses interacted face-to-face, and therefore negotiated on an intimate 
level the hierarchies and power relations of the colonial world, that we can see the 
intersection of colonialism and reproduction. Ann Laura Stoler argues that the 
complexities of colonial relations can best be understood by examining the intimate 
spaces where subjectivities collided and differences were policed.49 Colonial contact 
complicated notions of racial separation, both in terms of sociability and identity.50 
Intimate spaces like the nursery, the birthing room, and even the courtroom were
45 Schueller and W atts, “Theorizing Early American Studies and Postcoloniality ,” 11. On the 
usefulness o f  comparative frameworks, see Stoler, “Intimidations o f  Em pire.”
46 Ania Loom ba, “Dead W om en Tell N o Tales: Issues o f  fem ale subjectivity, subaltern agency and 
tradition in colonial and post-colonial writings on w idow  im m olation in India,” in The Fem inist 
H istory R eader, ed. Sue Morgan (NY: Routledge, 2006), 309-322; Spivak, “Can the Subaltern 
Speak?” .
4 For an exam ple o f  this awareness o f  difference and the anxieties o f  colonial self-fashioning, see  
Lockridge, The D iary, an d  Life, o f  W illiam B yrd  II.
48 Mary Louise Pratt, “Arts o f  the Contact Z one,” P rofession  (1991), 33-40; St. George, 
“Introduction,” 19, 24-8; Richard W hite, The M iddle  G round: Indians, Em pires, an d  R epublics in the 
G rea t Lakes Region, 1650-1815  (N Y: Cambridge U niversity Press, 1991).
49 Stoler, “T ense and Tender T ies”; Stoler, C arnal K now ledge an d  Im peria l Pow er.
50 On the children o f  interracial couples as a challenge to colonial rule, see W inthrop Jordan, White 
O ver Black: A m erican A ttitudes T ow ard the N egro  (Chapel Hill: U niversity o f  North Carolina Press, 
1968), 167-78. For an exam ple o f  the com plications posed by liminal racial identities in early 
America, see James H. M errell, ‘“ The Cast o f  H is C ountenance’: Reading Andrew M ontour,” in 
Through a G lass D arkly: R eflections on P ersonal Identity in E arly A m erica , ed. Ronald Hoffman, 
M echal Sobel, and Fredrika Teute (Chapel Hill: U niversity o f  North Carolina Press, 1997), 13-39.
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where colonialism was enacted on a day-to-day basis. These spaces were 
transformed by the experience of colonialism, and the examination of those spaces 
becomes crucial to understanding the meanings of the colonial project. Reproduction 
is an especially potent site for these transformations: what did it mean when 
women’s experience of social childbirth that occurred in the towns of England, the 
villages of Africa, or the Native communities of pre-colonial Virginia shifted to occur 
in the new context of the tobacco plantation?
Therefore, these intimate zones must be understood not just in terms of 
contact or sociability but as spaces that literally created colonized bodies. Stoler 
argues that sexuality, as a central discourse of power, was a space where women’s 
choices were absolutely central to the colonial project: “[in colonialism] the sexual 
choices of white women were at issue: they are desired objects, but unruly desiring 
subjects as well.”51 I argue that along with their sexual subjectivities, women’s issue 
was “at issue” as well -  reproduction in colonial spaces was the literal creation of 
colonized bodies. It was not just sex and intimacy that challenged, transformed, and 
furthered colonial projects -  it was the creation of bodies, and the ability for colonial 
authorities to categorize those bodies into emerging racial hierarchies. The intimacies 
of colonialism embodied in interracial sex literally created new identities, crucially 
marked by race, which complicated European notions of self and other.52
Therefore, my concern throughout this dissertation is to understand 
experiences and understandings of reproduction in a space and time in which identity 
categories, subjectivities, and hierarchies of power were all transforming via the
51 Stoler, R ace an d  the E ducation o f  D esire , 41.
52 On the usefulness o f  postcolonial categories such as lim inality and hybridity in interrupting stable 
racial categories, see Hulm e, “Postcolonial Theory and Early A m erica.”
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colonial project. I draw on and participate in multiple historiographies, including but 
not limited to women’s history, histories of childbearing, histories of sexuality, and 
histories of colonialism in Virginia. The methodology of women’s history provides 
the foundation for my work: women’s history’s examination of gender discourses of 
power, its attention to the experiences of women, and its attention to the intersection 
of gender, race, class, and sexuality provide a way of seeing the past that interrupts 
dominant narratives and refocuses history away from centers of power. Second, 
cultural histories of the period have examined the ways that discourses of gender and 
race have intersected with ideas about the body and sexuality; these histories provide 
a sense of the ways that understandings of the body and sexuality undergirded gender 
and racial power relations, the creation of colonial spaces, and the framing of the 
colonial project. Third, as a subset of women’s history, histories of childbearing have 
examined the intersection of medicine, the body, sexuality, gender, and power. 
Finally, histories of colonial Virginia offer a context for the time and place that I 
study: the institutionalization of racial slavery, the expansion of the plantation 
economy and the rise of the planter elite, and the shifting British colonial project in 
this particular North American colony.
Women’s histories of early America have explored the meanings of gender as 
a social construct and discourse of power while simultaneously uncovering and 
working to understand the experiences and lives of women during this period.53
53 On gender as a discourse o f  pow er -  or, more specifically , a category o f  analysis -  see Joan Scott’s 
influential essay on gender. Joan Scott, “Gender: A  U seful Category o f  Historical A nalysis,” The 
A m erican H istorica l R eview  91 , no. 5 (1986): 1053-1075. See also Joanne M eyerow itz, "AHR Forum: 
A  History o f  ‘Gender,’” A m erican H istorica l R eview  113, no. 5 (2008): 1346-56; Jeanne Boydston, 
“Gender as a Q uestion o f  Historical A nalysis,” G en der an d  H istory  20, no. 3 (2008): 558-583 . W hile 
endebted to Scott, my approach differs slightly from hers. Scott was primarily concerned with how  
gender might be understood as a metaphor for understanding other topics that didn’t seem  to involve
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While reproduction has been present in women’s histories’ focus on motherhood and 
marriage, it deserves a focused analysis. The construction of motherhood, as well as 
the changing meanings of the role of motherhood, has been a central concern in 
women’s history, especially the history of women in Early America. Whether 
motherhood was a site of power, of duty, or of resistance depended on women’s racial 
identity, their status as free, servant, or enslaved, and the particular cultural meanings 
attached to different women’s motherhood.54 Further, in this era of the fem e covert, 
for women who married (or who could marry), their role as wives was absolutely 
central to their access to a public voice, their control over their own property, and 
their sexual subjectivities. In contrast, unmarried women’s lives were constructed 
fundamentally differently than married women’s.55 In their focus on the politics of
wom en -  military history, foreign relations, etc. W hile I am concerned with gendered discourses o f  
colonialism , I am more concerned with how  the experience and the power relations o f  colonialism  
transformed the relations, discourses, and experiences o f  reproduction (and, thus, gender). D iscourses 
o f  reproduction, like discourses o f  gender, are not permanent or unchanging; their historicity is the 
central concern m y work.
54 Linda K. Kerber, Women o f  the R epublic: In tellect an d  Ideology in R evolu tionary A m erica  (Chapel 
Hill: U niversity o f  North Carolina Press, 1980); Mary Beth Norton, Founding M others an d  Fathers: 
G endered  P ow er an d  the Form ing o f  A m erican Society  (NY: Knopf, 1996); Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, 
G ood  W ives: Im age an d  R eality  in the L ives o f  Women in N orthern N ew  England, 1650-1750  (NY: 
Vintage, 1980), 146-63. On the w ays that motherhood has been constructed differently for black  
wom en, especia lly  in slavery, see: Brown, G ood  Wives, N asty  Wenches, an d  A nxious P atriarchs, 126- 
36; Jennifer M organ, L aboring Women: R eproduction  an d  G ender in N ew  W orld S lavery  
(Philadelphia: University o f  Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
55 Lois Green Carr and Lorena W alsh, “The Planter’s W ife: The Experience o f  W hite W om en in 
Seventeenth-Century M aryland,” in A H eritage o f  H er O wn: T ow ard a N ew  S oc ia l H istory o f  
A m erican W om en , ed. Nancy F. Cott and Elizabeth H. Pleck (NY: Sim on and Schuster, 1979), 25-57; 
Brown, G ood  Wives, N asty  Wenches, an d  Anxious P atriarchs, 73-104; Ulrich, G ood  W ives. Karin 
W ulf argues that som e historians have inaccurately conflated “w om en” with “w ives,” seeing the figure 
o f  the unmarried wom an as “a nexus for cultural tensions” in early America; my focus on single  
motherhood and bastardy is indebted to this perspective. Karin W ulf, N ot A ll W ives: Women o f  
C olon ial P h iladelph ia  (Philadelphia: University o f  Pennsylvania Press, 2000), 9. On changing  
understandings o f  marriage over the course o f  the eighteenth century, see: Ruth B loch , “C hanging  
C onceptions o f  Sexuality and Rom ance in Eighteenth-Century Am erica,” W illiam an d  M ary Q uarterly  
60 , no. 1 (Jan. 2003): 13-42; Jay Fliegelm an, P rod iga ls an d  P ilgrim s: The A m erican R evolution  
aga in st P a triarch a l A uthority, 1750-1800  (NY: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Richard Godbeer, 
Sexual R evolution in E arly A m erica  (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins U niversity Press, 2002); Clare 
Lyons, Sex am ong the R abble: An Intim ate H istory o f  G en der an d  P o w er in the A ge  o f  Revolution, 
Philadelphia, 1730-1830  (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 2006); Paula A. Treckel,
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gender and the ability (or willingness) of women to abide by their roles as wives and 
mothers, women’s historians have shown how individual women might have chafed 
against their prescribed roles, even as they participated in them.56 One goal of this 
dissertation is to treat motherhood and wifehood as important social constructs of 
gender, imbued with particular political power, while paying careful attention to the 
ways that reproduction was both central and peripheral to those constructions.
Shifting the focus away from motherhood or wifehood as roles or relationships allows 
a focus on the experience of childbearing itself and the ways that reproduction was a 
gendered discourse of power.
Women’s histories are deeply concerned with gendered relations of power, 
and women’s histories of early America are specifically interested in the ways that 
patriarchal power was enacted in the British colonies.57 My concern here is less with
‘“ The Empire o f  my heart’: The marriage o f  W illiam  Byrd II and Lucy Parke Byrd,” Virginia  
M agazine o f  H istory an d  B iography  105, no. 2  (1997): 125-56.
56 On w om en’s resistance to prescribed roles, see: Hilary M cD . B eckles, N atura l R ebels: A Socia l 
H istory o f  E nslaved  B lack Women  (N ew  Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1989), 156-7; 
Brown, G o o d  Wives, N asty  Wenches, an d  A nxious P atriarchs, 88-104; Cynthia A. Kierner, B eyond the 
H ousehold: W om en’s P lace  in the E arly  South, 1700-1835  (Ithaca, NY: Cornell U niversity Press, 
1998); Cynthia A. Kierner, Scandal a t B izarre: R um or an d  R eputation in Jefferson ’s  Virginia  (N Y : 
Palgrave, 2004); M organ, L aboring Women, 166-195; Terri L. Snyder, B rabbling Women: D isorderly  
Speech an d  the L aw  in E arly  Virginia  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Linda L. Sturtz, Within 
H er P ow er: P ropertied  Women in C olon ial Virginia, (N Y: R outledge, 2002); W ulf, N ot A ll Wives.
57 Kathleen Brown makes the case that patriarchy is a “historically specific” concept, describing both 
early modern dom estic relations (the father’s authority over the household) and a primary discourse o f  
power. Brown, G o o d  Wives, N asty Wenches, A nxious P atriarchs, 4-5 . Other historians o f  this period 
(notably Mary Beth Norton and H olly Brewer) have focused on the contemporary m eanings o f  
patriarchy in the early modern world: Norton focuses on the gendered m eanings o f  patriarchy, and 
Brewer on the w ays that patriarchy impacted view s o f  children and childhood. Norton, Founding  
M others an d  Fathers', H olly Brewer, B y Birth o r  Consent: Children, Law, an d  the A nglo-A m erican  
R evolution in A uthority  (Chapel Hill: U niversity o f  North Carolina Press, 2005). W hile this attention 
to historical change is crucial, I find B row n’s definition especially  useful because it acknow ledges the 
interplay betw een social relations and cultural assum ptions. Further, Brown is deeply concerned with 
the relationship betw een gender, class, and race ideologies. Fem inist theorist bell hooks reminds us 
that a nuanced definition o f  patriarchy does not posit the absolute power o f  all men over all wom en, 
but instead, an understanding that patriarchal pow er is tightly linked to other discourses o f  power, such  
as capitalism , white suprem acy, and heterosexism , bell hooks, F em inist Theory: From  M argin  to 
C enter  (B oston, MA: South End Press, 1984), 24-5. T hese fem inist definitions o f  patriarchy are 
distinct from the early American historical conversation about patriarchalism -  the discourse o f
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whether women as a group gained or lost power over the course of the colonial era 
than with how colonialism itself transformed women’s knowledge, experience, and 
subjectivities.58 One advantage of this concern with the impact of colonialism is that 
it emphasizes the ways that discourses of power constructed different women’s 
experiences in profoundly different ways because the intensification, transformation, 
and creation of categories of difference such as race and status were central to the 
colonial project. The point is not simply to observe differences between women, but 
to examine the process by which differences were constructed in a colonial context.
As Jane Haggis, a historian of colonial India, argues, difference must be understood 
not as “deviance from the norm” but instead as a “concept disrupting the complacent 
authority of the dominant discursive presence.”59 Elsa Barkley Brown’s discussion of 
intersectionality is useful here. She points out that all women’s material lives were 
profoundly shaped by the intersection of race, class, gender, and status:
Middle-class white women's lives are not just different from working-class 
white, Black, and Latina women's lives. It is important to recognize that middle- 
class women live the lives they do precisely because working-class women live
fatherhood that justified absolute rule by fam ily patriarchs, slaveholders, and kings w hich was 
challenged by Revolutionary-era republicanism. That narrative o f  patriarchalism deserves a sustained  
fem inist critique. Fliegelm an, P rod iga ls an d  Pilgrims', Isaac, Transform ation o f  Virginia, 20-21; 
M organ, Slave C ounterpoint, 273-96; Parent, Foul M eans, 197-235.
58 On the question o f  whether w om en gained or lost power in the colonial period, especially  the notion 
that the early colonial period was a “golden age” for w om en, see Carol R. Berkin, “W hat an alarming 
crisis is this?: Early American W om en and their Histories,” in The W orld Turned U pside-D ow n: The 
State o f  E ighteenth-C entury A m erican S tudies a t the Beginning o f  the Tw enty-F irst C entury, ed. 
M ichael Kennedy and W illiam  Shade (Bethlehem , NJ: Lehigh University Press, 2001 ), 254-267; 
Kathleen M. Brown, “B eyond the Great Debates: Gender and Race in Early A m erica,” R eview s in 
A m erican H istory  26 , no. 1 (1998): 96-123 . This is not to say that w om en did not lose authority by the 
eighteenth century. Cornelia Hughes D ayton’s work on Connecticut show s the w ays that, as courts 
A nglicanized over the eighteenth century, w om en’s vo ices were less often transcribed into the official 
record; therefore, our understandings o f  the “golden age” are deeply impacted by the available archive. 
Cornelia H ughes Dayton, Women before the B ar: Gender, L aw  and Socie ty  in Connecticut, 1639-1789  
(Chapel Hill: U niversity o f  North Carolina Press, 1995).
59 Jane H aggis, “W hite W om en and Colonialism : Towards a Non-Recuperative H istory,” in F em inist 
P ostco lon ia l Theory: A R eader, ed. Reina L ew is and Sara M ills (NY: Routledge, 2003), 165.
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the lives they do. White women and women of color not only live different lives 
but white women live the lives they do in large part because women of color 
live the ones they do .60 
This was particularly true in the southern colonies, where the plantation economy and 
slavery defined the conditions of daily life and ideological framework for all 
women.61 Therefore, a major goal of my work here is to understand the ways that 
reproduction was used to define and police race and status boundaries at a time when 
those boundaries were being constructed.
This intersection between race, gender, and reproduction also links to 
discourses of sexuality and the body. Drawing on Foucauldian perspectives (as I 
discussed earlier in this introduction), historians of sexuality have shown the ways 
that sexuality should not be understood as a biological drive, but instead as a 
discourse of power and a site of conflict, especially in the contact zones of the 
colonial world. Changing sexual mores linked with new political theories to impact 
not just ideas about political and personal liberty, but to fundamentally transform 
ideologies of gender, marriage, and family. As part of a colonial project, these 
transformations also centered on colonial discourses of race, as black and Native
60 Elsa Barkely Brown, “W hat has Happened Here: The Politics o f  Difference in W om en’s History and 
Fem inist P olitics,” F em inist S tudies 18, no. 2 (1992): 298. On race, intersectionality, and 
interdisciplinary history, see Perez, The D eco lon ia l Im aginary, xiiv.
61 Brown, G o o d  Wives, N asty  Wenches, an d  Anxious P atriarchs, 187-211; Kirsten Fischer, Suspect 
R elations: Sex, Race, an d  R esistance in C olon ia l N orth C arolina  (Ithaca, N Y : Cornell U niversity  
Press, 2002); Sharon B lock, R ape an d  Sexual P o w er  in E arly A m erica  (Chapel Hill: U niversity o f  
North Carolina Press, 2006), 126-209.
52 B loch, “Changing C onceptions o f  Sexuality and Rom ance,”; Godbeer, Sexual R evolu tion  in E arly  
A m erica ; Lyons, Sex am ong the R abb le ; Susan E. Klepp, “Revolutionary Bodies: W om en and the 
Fertility Transition in the M id-Atlantic R egion, 1760-1820,” The Journal o f  A m erican H istory  85, no. 
3 (1998): 910-45; Joshua D. Rothman, N otorious in the N eighborhood: Sex an d  F am ilies across the 
C olor Line in Virginia, 1787-1861  (Chapel Hill: U niversity o f  North Carolina Press, 2003); Merrill D. 
Smith, Sex an d  Sexuality in E arly A m erica  (NY: N ew  York U niversity Press, 1998); Treckel, “ ‘The 
Empire o f  my heart’”.
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sexualities were interpreted by Europeans within a colonial framework, even as 
peoples of African and Native descent struggled against those interpretations.63 Too 
often, though, histories of sexuality have bypassed issues of reproduction, focusing 
instead on the pleasures and dangers of sexual and intimate contact.64 We must 
remember that in this pre-contraceptive world where childbirth brought the threat of 
death, sexuality was inarguably tied to danger for any woman who had sex with men. 
These dangers were compounded for women on the bottom of social hierarchies, such 
as women who had children outside of marriage or women who bore children in 
slavery. I argue in this dissertation that reproduction must be seen as absolutely 
central -  not peripheral -  to discourses of sexuality; indeed, as I argue later in this 
introduction, reproduction was absolutely central to the narrative of emerging 
discourses of sexuality that Foucault outlines in The History o f  Sexuality.
The early modem period and the Enlightenment saw tremendous change in 
cultural discourses of the body that transformed understandings of reproduction. 
Thomas Laqueur argues that changing understandings of the sexed body were 
constitutive of the emergence of a new gender ideology of innate gender difference in
63 Brown, G o o d  Wives, N asty  Wenches, and A nxious P atriarchs, 42-74; Chaplin, Subject Matters', 
Catherine Clinton and M ichele G illespie, The D ev il's  Lane: Sex and R ace in the E arly South  (NY; 
Oxford U niversity Press, 1997); Fischer, Suspect R elations, 59-97; Martha E. H odes, Sex, Love, Race: 
C rossing B oundaries in N orth A m erican H istory  (N Y: N ew  York U niversity Press, 1999); Jordan, 
White O ver Black, 32-40; M organ, Laboring Women, 12-49.
64 I borrow the phrase “pleasures and dangers” from the fem inist anthology on sexuality by the same 
name. Carole S. V ance, ed., P leasure an d  D anger: E xploring Fem ale Sexuality  (B oston, MA: 
Routledge, 1984). M ost histories o f  sexuality deal with childbearing only in the context o f  
contraception and illegitim acy. For such d iscussions focusing on early Am erica, see: John D ’Em ilio  
and Estelle B . Freedman, Intim ate M atters: A H istory o f  Sexuality in A m erica  (Chicago: U niversity o f  
Chicago Press, 1997), 11-4, 25-6 , 27-36; Godbeer, Sexual R evolution in E arly A m erica , 120-132. In 
the major anthology o f  histories o f  sexuality in early Am erica, Sex an d  Sexuality in E arly A m erica , 
only one essay addresses childbearing, again in the context o f  illegitim acy. E lse L. Ham bleton, “The 
Regulation o f  Sex  in Seventeenth-Century M assachusetts: The Quarterly Court o f  E ssex County vs. 
Priscilla W illson and Mr. Sam uel Appleton,” in Sex an d  Sexuality in E arly A m erica , ed. Merrill D. 
Smith (NY: N ew  York U niversity Press, 1998), 89-115.
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this period.65 These changing understandings of the body -  indeed, the very notion 
that the body itself was a changeable, mutable object -  were deeply tied to 
colonialism, such as emerging colonial subjectivities, understandings of the promises 
and perils of the environment of the New World, and explanations for gendered and 
racialized hierarchies of power.66 All of these transformations implicated discourses 
of reproduction, in particular the ways that the reproductive body was implicated in 
the transformation of gender ideologies and the forwarding of the colonial project.
Histories of childbirth in the early modem world -  especially the long 
transition from midwife-assisted childbirth to physician-assisted childbirth -  provide 
another historiographical bedrock for this dissertation. Historians have argued that 
the shift from midwives to doctors occurred for a variety of reasons, including a 
contemporary perception that physicians were better skilled, differential class- and 
race-based access to medical care, and gendered attacks on women’s knowledge and 
access to education.67 Increasingly, historians have focused on the cultural context
65 Thom as Laqueur, “Orgasm, Generation, and the Politics o f  Reproductive B io logy ,” R epresen tations  
14 (1986): 1-41; Thom as Laqueur, M aking Sex: B ody an d  G en der fro m  the G reeks to F reud  
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard U niversity Press, 1992). Mary Fissell offers a different perspective, 
show ing how  non-elite texts, such as dom estic medical texts, used different metaphors to understand 
the body, but follow ed a sim ilar path towards increasingly m ale-centered understandings o f  the body. 
Mary F issell, “Gender and Generation: Representing Reproduction in Early M odern England,” G ender  
& H istory  7 , no. 3 (1995): 433-456 . Susan Juster explores the intersections o f  gender, religion, and 
changing understandings o f  the body. Susan Juster, “M ystical Pregnancy and H oly Bleeding: 
Visionary Experience in Early Modern Britain and A m erica,” W illiam an d  M ary Q uarterly  57, no. 2 
(2000): 249-288.
66 Brown, G ood  Wives, N asty  Wenches, an d  Anxious P atriarchs, 347-51; Chaplin, Su bject Matters', 
Trudy Eden, “Food, A ssim ilation, and the M alleability o f  the Human Body in Early V irginia,” in A 
Centre o f  W onders: The B ody in E arly A m erica , ed. Janet M oore Lindman and M ichele L ise Tarter 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell U niversity Press, 2001), 29-42; Lockridge, On the Sources o f  P atriarch a l R age, 
33-7; Susan Scott Parrish, “The Female O possum  and the Nature o f  the N ew  W orld,” W illiam  an d  
M ary Q uarterly  54, no. 3 (1997): 475-514; Susan Scott Parrish, A m erican C uriosity: C ultures o f  
N atural H istory in the C olon ia l B ritish A tlan tic W orld  (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina 
Press, 2006).
67 David C ressy, Birth, M arriage, an d  Death', Jane B. Donegan, Women an d  M en M idw ives: M edicine, 
M orality, an d  M isogyny in E arly A m erica  (W estport CT: G reenwood Press, 1978); Barbara Ehrenreich 
and Deirdre English, Witches, M idw ives an d  N urses: A H istory o f  Women H ealers  (N Y : The Fem inist
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for changing medical practice, finding its roots in the cultural and epistemological 
shifts of the eighteenth century, such as the rise of the print public sphere, the cultural 
role of literacy and the creation genteel subjectivities, the rise of consumer capitalism, 
and the increasing importance of colonialism in British self-construction.68 Further, 
histories of midwifery have focused on the role of midwives in communities, in 
particular the ways that midwives, both black and white, were holders of knowledge 
not just about childbirth, but about general medicine, social structures, and the law. 
This knowledge made midwives especially important members of frontier 
communities and slave communities.69
General histories of childbirth have tended to focus on the American north, as 
well as on white women’s experiences; a shift in focus to the American south and the 
impact of slavery and race expands and complicates the narrative of midwifery and 
medicine.70 In the South, the power differential between midwives and physicians
Press, 1973, 2010); Clare Hanson, A C ultural H istory o f  P regnancy: Pregnancy, M edicine, an d  
Culture, 1750-2000  (NY: Oxford U niversity Press, 2004); Leavitt, B rought to  Bed; Scholten, 
C hildbearing in A m erican Society; Richard W. Wertz and Dorothy C. W ertz, Lying-In: A H istory o f  
C hildbirth  in A m erica  (NY: The Free Press, 1977, expanded edition N ew  Haven: Y ale U niversity  
Press, 1989).
68 Cody, “T he Politics o f  Reproduction”; Ludm illa Jordanova, “Interrogating the C oncept o f  
Reproduction in the Eighteenth Century,” in C onceiving the N ew  W orld  O rder: The G loba l P o litics o f  
R eproduction , ed. Faye D. Ginsburg and Rayna Rapp (Berkeley: U niversity o f  California Press, 1995), 
369-386; Ruth Perry, “C olonizing the Breast: Sexuality and Maternity in Eighteenth-Century 
England,” in B ritish L iterature 1640-1789: A C ritica l R eader, ed. Robert DeM aria, Jr. (M alden, MA: 
B lackw ell, 1999) 302-332; Adrian W ilson, The M aking o f  M an-M idw ifery.
69 Sharia M. Fett, “C onsciousness and Calling: African American M idw ives at W ork in the Antebellum  
South,” in N ew  S tudies in the H istory o f  A m erican S lavery, ed. Edward E. Baptist and Stephanie M. H. 
Camp (Athens: U niversity o f  Georgia Press, 2006), 65-86; Valerie Lee, G ranny M idw ives an d  B lack  
Women W riters: D ouble-D u tched  R eadings  (N Y : Routledge, 1996); Ulrich, A M idw ife's Tale; Laurie 
A. W ilkie, The A rch aeo logy o f  M othering: An A frican-A m erican M id w ife ’s Tale  (N Y : Routledge, 
2003).
70 Som e o f  the most influential histories o f  childbearing focus exclusively  on white w om en in the 
American north. See, for exam ple, Leavitt, B rought to Bed; Scholten, C hildbearing in Am erican  
Society; and Wertz and W ertz, Lying In. An exception to this geographical focus is the work o f  Sally  
M cM illen, w hich focuses on elite white w om en in the Antebellum  south. Sally G. M cM illen, 
M otherhood in the O ld  South: Pregnancy, Childbirth, and Infant R earing  (Baton Rouge: Louisiana  
State U niversity Press, 1990).
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was exacerbated by race, where midwives -  especially midwives of African descent -  
served the black community and physicians served the white master class.71 The 
racial division between midwives and physicians had extraordinary impact on 
enslaved women. By the Antebellum period, planter-physicians took advantage of 
their ownership of their patients, using black women’s bodies to experiments with
77new techniques, to debilitating or even deadly effect. On the other hand, so-called 
“granny midwives” were keepers of knowledge and holders of considerable authority 
in the slave community.73
This racial context was, of course, rooted in the fact that slavery was a status 
inherited at birth, so women’s reproductivity was a site of profit for slaveowners. 
Therefore, there was a deep tension for women in slavery between what Patricia Hill 
Collins calls the “motherwork” that created and nurtured the black community and a 
black subjectivity and the realization that motherhood was appropriated and exploited 
by the institution of slavery.74 This tension between motherwork and appropriation 
echoes the tension that existed between enslaved women’s reproductive role and their 
productive role as laborers. Social historians of slavery have pointed to the ways that 
enslaved women’s extraordinary labor demands led to higher rates of infant mortality
71 Marie Jenkins Schwartz, B irthing A S lave: M otherhood  an d  M edicine in the A ntebellum  South  
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard U niversity Press, 2006); Lee, G ranny M idw ives an d  B lack Women W riters.
72 Schwartz, Birthing A S lave, 225-56; Terri Kapsalis, P ublic P rivates: P erform ing G yn ecology from  
Both E nds o f  the Speculum  (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997), 31-59.
73 Y w one Edwards-Ingram, “African American M edicine and the Social Relations o f  Slavery,” in R ace  
a n d  the A rch aeology o f  Identity, ed. Charles E. Orser Jr. (Salt Lake City: U niversity o f  Utah Press, 
2002), 34-53; Lee, G ranny M idw ives an d  B lack Women Writers; W ilkie, The A rch aeo logy o f  
M othering.
74 Patricia Hill C ollins, B lack F em inist Thought: K now ledge, C onsciousness, an d  the P olitics o f  
E m pow erm ent (N Y: R outledge, 1990), 209. Sim ilar to C ollins, Jennifer M organ argues that 
motherhood was the vector by w hich creolization occurred, thus creating black subjectivities via the 
work o f  mothering. Morgan, Laboring Women, 105-43. On the appropriation and exploitation o f  black  
w om en’s reproductive role in slavery, see Hortense Spillers, “M am a’s Baby, Papa’s M aybe: An 
American Grammar B ook ,” in Fem inism s, 2nd ed. Ed. Robyn R. Warhol and Diane Price Herndl (N ew  
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997), 384-405; Morgan, L aboring Women, 81, 167.
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and maternal mortality.75 Jennifer Morgan’s expert study of the role of reproduction 
in the institution of slavery in Barbados and South Carolina explores all of these 
issues, connecting the ways that women’s reproductive role was central to early 
discourses of racial difference, deeply impacted women’s experiences as laborers and 
mothers, and directly shaped their understanding of their enslavement.76
Another intervention into the history of childbearing has been the introduction 
of cultural historical perspectives. As previously discussed, the eighteenth century 
saw radical changes in understandings of the sexed body. These changes in the 
epistemology of the body occurred simultaneously with the rise of man-midwifery, 
which itself was rooted in a notion of innate gender difference, where men claimed 
medical authority on the basis of masculine rationalism and an emerging 
understanding that childbearing had become newly important to the nation and the 
national economy.77 Further, changes in early modem understandings of the body 
had a direct impact on European and Euro-American women’s reproductive choices 
and practices, such as the use of emmenagogues and extended nursing to limit 
pregnancies.78 Susan Klepp has argued that these practices themselves had a cultural
75 Cheryll Ann C ody, “C ycles o f  W ork and o f  Childbearing: Seasonality in W om en’s L ives on Low  
Country Plantations,” in M ore than C hattel: B lack Women an d  S lavery in the A m ericas, ed. David  
Barry Gaspar and Darlene Clark Hine (Bloom ington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 61-78; W ilma 
King, “Suffer with them till death: S lave W om en and their Children in Nineteenth-Century A m erica,” 
in M ore than Chattel: B lack Women an d  S lavery in the A m ericas, ed. David Barry Gaspar and Darlene 
Clark Hine (B loom ington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 147-168; Richard Steckel, “W om en, W ork 
and Health under Plantation Slavery in the United States,” in M ore than C hattel: B lack  Women an d  
S lavery in the A m ericas, ed. David Barry Gaspar and Darlene Clark Hine (B loom ington: Indiana 
U niversity Press, 1996), 43-60 . For a counterargument, see Jerome T eelucksingh, “The ‘Invisible 
C hild’ in British W est Indian Slavery,” S lavery an d  A bolition  27, no. 2 (2006): 237-50.
76 Morgan, L aboring Women.
77 Jordanova, “Interrogating the Concept o f  Reproduction.”
78 Barbara Duden, ‘T h e  Fetus on the ‘Farther Shore’ : Toward a History o f  the Unborn,” in F etal 
Subjects, F em inist P ositions, ed. Lynn M. Morgan and M eredith W. M ichaels (Philadelphia:
U niversity o f  Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 13-25; Susan E. Klepp, “Colds, W orms, and Hysteria: 
Menstrual Regulation in Eighteenth-Century A m erica,” in R egulating M enstruation: Beliefs, Practices,
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and political meaning, as women consciously limited their pregnancies as an 
enactment of republican values.79
The third major body of historiography upon which I draw is the history of 
colonial Virginia, especially the emergence of the institution of slavery, the expansion 
of the plantation economy, and the rise of the planter elite. I make a theoretical 
intervention into Virginia’s colonial history, arguing that postcolonial theory is a 
useful tool for understanding the processes by which Virginia transformed from a 
military outpost to a settler colony to a plantation economy and slave society.
Edmund Morgan’s survey of Virginia’s colonial period narrates that history, arguing 
that the idea of freedom itself emerged as a result of the creation of the institution of 
racial slavery. As Anthony Parent argues, this process was one of consolidating 
planter interests through the control of land, political power, and, importantly, a 
growing enslaved population.81 Rhys Isaac and others have focused on how planters 
embodied their power and whether the authority they claimed was recognized.82
In terpreta tions, ed. Etienne van de W alle and Elisha P. Renne (Chicago: University o f  C hicago Press, 
2001), 22-38; Treckel, Paula A . “Breastfeeding and Maternal Sexuality in C olonial A m erica,” Journal 
o f  In terdiscip linary H istory  20:1 (1989), 25-51.
7 Klepp, “Revolutionary B odies.” For another perspective on the fertility transition, Kenneth  
Lockridge and Jan L ew is argue that the low ering o f  the elite  white birth rate w as less about an 
adoption o f  republican values by w om en and more about w om en’s increasing fear o f  childbirth and 
maternal death at the end o f  the eighteenth century. L ew is, Jan and Kenneth A . Lockridge, “Sally Has 
Been Sick: Pregnancy and Fam ily Limitation am ong Virginia Gentry W om en, 1780-1830 ,” Journal o f  
S ocia l H istory  22, no. 1 (1988): 5-20.
80 Morgan, A m erican S lavery, A m erican Freedom .
81 Parent, F oul M eans. Other studies o f  the consolidation o f  planter interests include Ira Berlin, M any  
Thousands G one: The F irst Two C enturies o f  S lavery in N orth A m erica  (Cambridge, M A: Harvard 
University Press, 1998), 109-141; H olly Brewer, “Entailing Aristocracy in Colonial Virginia: ‘A ncient 
Feudal Restraints’ and Revolutionary Reform ,” W illiam an d  M ary Q u arterly  54, no. 2 (April 1997): 
307-346; David W. Jordan, “Political Stability and the Em ergence o f  a Native Elite in M aryland,” in 
The C hesapeake in the Seventeenth Century: E ssays on A nglo-A m erican Society, ed. Thad W . Tate and 
David L. Ammerman (N Y : W .W . Norton and C o., 1979), 243-273; Kulikoff, Tobacco an d  Slaves.
82 Isaac, The Transform ation o f  Virginia; Brown, G ood  Wives, N asty Wenches, an d  Anxious 
P atriarchs, 319-66; Lockridge, The D iary, an d  Life, o f  W illiam B yrd II; Parent, Foul M eans, 173-94; 
Carole Shamm as, “E nglish-Born and Creole Elites in Turn-of-the-Century V irginia,” in The 
C hesapeake in the Seventeenth Century: E ssays on A nglo-A m erican Society , ed. Thad W . Tate and
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These questions of power and its consolidation and contestation in colonial spaces 
animate my work.
A major site of debate in Virginia history has been to identify whether the 
transition to racial slavery from indentured servitude was planned and deliberate (as 
Parent argues), or an “unthinking decision,” as Winthrop Jordan famously stated.83 
Absolutely central to these histories is the notion that Virginia’s colonial mission was 
inextricably tied with the creation and control of the unfree labor force, whether 
indentured, enslaved, male, female, white, black, or mixed-race; colonialism, as 
expressed in early Virginia, was about territorial domination and control over 
colonized bodies.84 Yet, postcolonial theory offers a different approach, focusing less 
on root causes (such as whether the move to slavery was motivated by racial animus) 
but instead on recognizing the contested processes by which colonial power was 
constructed and deployed.
The emergence of a gender analysis of Virginia’s colonial history has 
invigorated the field, offering fuller understandings of this history. Kathleen Brown’s 
comprehensive study of gender, race and power in early Virginia emphasizes the 
intersection of gendered discourses of power and English, Native, and African
David L. Ammerman (NY: W .W . Norton and Co., 1979), 274-296; Treckel, “ ‘The empire o f  my 
heart.’”
83 Parent, Foul M eans, passim; Jordan, White O ver B lack, 44 -100 . On the transition from indentured 
servitude to racial slavery and the im plication o f  race in that transition, see Berlin, M any Thousands 
G one, 17-28, 38-46; Brown, G ood  Wives, N asty  Wenches, an d  Arvcious P atriarchs, 109-10; Russell 
Menard, “From Servants to Slaves: The Transformation o f  the Chesapeake Labor System ,” Southern  
Studies  16 (1977): 355-90; Edmund M organ, A m erican S lavery, A m erican F reedom , 154-7; A lden T. 
Vaughan “The Origins Debate: Slavery and Racism  in Seventeenth-Century V irginia,” The Virginia  
M agazine o f  H istory an d  B iography  97, no. 3 (1989): 311-54.
84 Parent’s approach -  focusing on planters’ “land grab” as the root o f  their cultural and political power 
-  most em bodies this linking o f  territorial dom ination and labor relations as crucial elem ents o f  
colonialism  in Virginia. Parent, Foul M eans, 9-54.
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women’s experiences in the colony. Early studies of English women’s experiences 
in the colony focused on the role of women as wives and mothers, especially in the 
context of the emerging plantation economy.86 More recently, examinations of how 
some women’s experiences could move beyond those roles has shown the ways that 
those roles and gender discourses could be resisted, interrupted, and undermined by 
women of means.87
Reproduction is a useful interjection into these histories of early Virginia. 
First and foremost, the role of reproduction in the establishment of racial slavery 
shows how discourses of reproduction were absolutely central to Virginia’s colonial
oo
project. More importantly, a focus on reproduction in the history of Virginia is a 
continuation of the intervention women’s historians have made into the writing of the 
history of the colony. For example, social histories of the colony have emphasized 
the utility of demography in understanding the development of Virginia’s colonial 
society; some have made causal claims about Virginia’s demography on the type of 
society that emerged.89 Reproduction itself remains under-theorized in this 
demographic view where “natural increase,” “rate of replacement,” and sex ratios are
85 Brown, G ood  Wives, N asty  Wenches, and Anxious P atriarchs. Kirsten Fischer’s study o f  colonial 
North Carolina focuses on the centrality o f  sexuality and gender to the construction o f  race in that 
colony. Fisher, Suspect R elations. Mary Beth Norton also exam ines the function o f  gender discourses 
in colonial V irginia, but she is not concerned with the intersection o f  gender and race. Norton, 
Founding M others an d  Fathers.
86 Carr and W alsh, ‘T h e  Planter’s W ife” ; Smith, Inside the G rea t H ouse.
87 Brown, G o o d  Wives, N asty Wenches, and A nxious Patriarchs; Kierner, B eyon d the H ousehold; 
Snyder, B rabbling Women; Sturtz, Within H er Pow er.
88 Jennifer M organ’s study o f  reproduction and slavery focuses on Barbados and South Carolina, w hile 
gesturing towards the V irginia case throughout. Morgan, L aboring Women.
9 Kulikoff, T obacco and Slaves; M organ, A m erican S lavery, A m erican F reedom , 405-10; Morgan, 
S lave C ounterpoint, 27-101; Darrett B. Rutman, Charles W etherell, and Anita H. Rutman, “Rhythms 
o f  Life: Black and W hite Seasonality in the Early Chesapeake,” Journal o f  In terdiscip lin ary H istory  
11, no. 1 (1980); 29-53; Darrett B. Rutman and Anita Rutman, “‘N ow -W ives and Sons-In-L aw ’: 
Parental Death in a Seventeenth-Century Virginia C ounty,” in The C hesapeake in the Seventeenth  
Century: E ssays on A nglo-A m erican Society, ed. Thad W. Tate and David L. Ammerman (N Y: W .W . 
Norton and C o., 1979), 153-82.
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seen as causal agents rather than as cultural phenomena or bodily experiences worth 
exploring in and of themselves.90 In other words, by focusing on reproduction as both 
experience and discourse of power, ideas about demography are historicized, 
denaturalized, and made available for analysis. Further, an understanding of 
reproduction as a colonial discourse helps to place women, gender, and sexuality at 
the center of historical analysis and continues the exploration of the intersections 
between gender, sexuality, and the emergence of race.
This dissertation both depends on and intervenes in these historiographies, 
arguing that understanding reproduction as a cultural phenomenon and discourse of 
power is a useful means of understanding both women’s history and the colonial 
project in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Virginia. The chapters of this 
dissertation all seek to explore the intersections of colonialism and reproduction in 
early Virginia, each with a different focus and a slightly varying methodology. The 
chapters are organized conceptually, and roughly chronologically, beginning with the 
period preceding the 1662 law that made slavery a status inherited at birth, and 
ending with Thomas Jefferson’s colonial vision, published in Notes on the State o f  
Virginia in 1785. These chronological boundaries are in part created by my available 
archive -  for example, York County, Virginia, from which I gathered most of my 
data, was incorporated in 1634. These boundaries are also the result of historical 
exclusions to limit the scope and size of the project -  it is for this reason that I do not 
engage with the meanings of reproduction in rhetoric of the American Revolution, an
90 These demographic histories ultimately fail to acknow ledge that, in the words o f  S. Ryan Johansson, 
“...W om en’s individual bodies [are] the basic individual unit [and n]ations, provinces, counties, 
com m unities, occupational groups, households, or couples do not have babies, except by courtesy o f  
metaphor.” S. Ryan Johansson, “ ‘Im plicit’ Polity and Fertility during D evelopm ent,” Population  and  
D evelopm en t R eview  17 (Sept. 1991), 392; qtd. Klepp, “Revolutionary B od ies,” 913.
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era ripe for just such an analysis. Mostly, they are a result of thinking through history 
through the lens of a feminist and postcolonial analysis, which allows for the 
available archive, rather than received historical narratives, to shape the analysis.91
In the first chapter, “A Considerable Parcel of Breeders: Reproduction and 
Discourses of Racial Slavery in Virginia,” I examine the ways that development of 
racial slavery in Virginia was based, in part, on the appropriation of black women’s 
reproduction. The 1662 law of slavery by birth asserted that black women’s children 
would be enslaved or free according to their mother’s status. This law conflated 
blackness, slavery, and reproduction in order to naturalize slavery as an institution. It 
did so by rooting inherited slavery in two preexisting British legal discourses: 
bastardy law and inheritance law. I draw on Foucault’s understanding of the 
relationship between discourse and power to examine the ways that colonial legal 
structures, when enacted on an individual basis in the form of wills, deeds, and other 
transfers of property, were central in the creation of colonial discourses of 
reproduction.
In Chapter 2, “Wicked, Dangerous, and Ungoverned: The Transgressive 
Possibilities of Reproduction,” I examine the ways that individual women’s 
reproductivity could destabilize the seemingly solid, but always tenuous, discursive 
formations that constructed inherited racial slavery and colonial relations in Virginia. 
In the chapter, I draw on feminist, queer, and postcolonial theories of resistance and
91 On the w ays that w om en’s history questions and remakes canonical historical narratives, see Joan 
K elly, “D id W om en Have a R enaissance?” in B ecom ing V isible: Women in E uropean H istory, ed. 
Renate Bridenthal and Claudia Koontz (B oston, MA: Houghton M ifflin , 1977), 137-64; Perez, The 
D eco lon ia l Im aginary, 24. Som e exam ples o f  w om en’s histories rethinking or questioning  
chronologies in early American history include: B lock, R ape an d  Sexual P o w er in E arly  A m erica , 5-6; 
Juster, “M ystical Pregnancy and H oly B leeding” ; Clare Lyons, Sex am ong the R abble. For the w ays 
that postcolonial theory interrupts early American historical narratives, see Warner, “W hat’s C olonial 
about C olonial A m erica?”.
35
transgression in order to examine the ways that women’s reproductive lives could 
offer possibilities for crossing lines of power in this colonial space. I examine the 
ways that the reproduction of white servant women, free white women, enslaved 
women, and free women of color could all have particular transgressive meanings. 
The chapter concludes with an examination of the ways that free families of color 
transgressed lines of power through their liminal identities, extralegal marriages, and 
matrilineal geneaologies. Throughout the chapter, I am particularly interested in 
understanding the relationship between domination and transgression, and the specific 
ways that reproduction could inhabit the space between those two poles.
Chapter 3, “Knowledge “not fit to be discust publiquely”: Colonialism and 
the Transformation of Reproductive Knowledge,” discusses reproduction in Virginia 
through an intersection of colonialism and Foucault’s concept of power-knowledge. 
The chapter examines two parallel questions regarding reproduction and history: 
what knowledge did women (and men) have about reproduction in that place and 
time, and what can we, in the present day, know about such intimate experiences 
during that period? In this chapter, I argue that colonialism fundamentally 
transformed bodies of knowledge about reproduction: the intimacies of colonialism 
remade the relationship between reproduction, knowledge, race, gender and power, 
ultimately allowing masters and patriarchs to claim knowledge about and power over 
reproduction that had formerly been held by women. While I seek to reconstruct the 
reproductive knowledge held by women and men in this colonized space, I do so with 
the understanding that my knowledge is contingent upon an archive that is itself an 
artifact of colonization. These theoretical questions guide my analysis as I try to
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reconstruct the medical environment of colonial Virginia, the boundaries of 
midwives’ knowledge, the meanings of reproduction in women’s understanding of 
their worlds and lives, and the ways that colonialism transformed all of these.
In the final chapter, “She lives in an infant country that wants nothing but 
people”: Discourses of Reproduction, Print Culture, and Virginia’s Colonial Project,” 
I analyze the ways that the colonial project necessarily involved discourses of 
reproduction, as English colonizers imagined settling Virginia lands. I use Foucault’s 
concept of biopower -  the modem state’s project of developing rational population 
strategies -  to understand how colonialism transformed English discourses of 
reproduction. A varied archive of colonial writing (Virginia’s laws, colonial writers 
like William Byrd, Thomas Jefferson, and Robert Beverley, and the Virginia Gazette) 
shows that the colonial project was rooted in ideas about reproduction, but that those 
ideas were not stable or absolute. The early colonial project idealized prolific 
reproduction, a discourse in which English bodies were assumed to fruitfully multiply 
to populate the new land. The colonial project itself required a new understanding of 
reproduction -  a discourse of rational reproduction, in which ideal reproduction 
should be controlled, measured, and scientifically measurable. These two discourses 
of reproduction were distinct, but they were also competing and overlapping. The 
emergence of racial hierarchy in the colonial project inspired the discourse of rational 
reproduction.
* * *
Ultimately, this dissertation attempts a straightforward task: I work to make 
sense of the ephemeral and fragmentary references to reproduction that occur
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throughout Virginia’s colonial archive. When Mary Hubbard bore her four children, 
when an enslaved woman named Sarah gave birth with the help of a white midwife, 
when Judith Clarke was punished for bearing a mixed-race child, their reproductive 
lives came momentarily into the view of colonial record-keepers and thus are 
available, however fragmentarily, for us to consider. Each of their experiences 
marked them as outlaws in some way: these women bore bastard children, 
interrupted the easy distribution of property, complicated long-held midwifery 
traditions, and challenged boundaries of race and status. In examining these and 
other records of reproduction in the colonial archive, I’ve found that reproduction was 
absolutely central to the aims of colonialism in Virginia: the creation of a laboring 
population, the populating of lands claimed by the colony, and the organization of 
power and property in this developing society. I’ve found that by focusing on 
childbearing, the lives of non-elite women and the intersections of gender, race, and 
status come better into view. I’ve found that reproduction was both a discourse of 
power and a path for some women’s transgression of that power. For Mary Hubbard, 
Sarah, and Judith Clarke, their experiences of childbearing may have marked them as 
outlaws, but they also give us a glimpse, however fragmentary, into the meanings of 
reproduction in this colonial space.
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CHAPTER 1 
“A considerable parcel of breeders”:
Reproduction and Discourses of Racial Slavery in Colonial Virginia
William Fitzhugh was a young Virginia lawyer and planter in 1679, when he 
wrote to fellow Virginia planter Robert Beverley, expressing the absolute necessity of 
legitimacy in deciding lines of inheritance:
None can be begotten but of a father and a Mother, and he must have in him 
two bloods: Blood of the father and the blood of the mother, these bloods
Q 'S
commixed in him by lawfull Marriage, constitute and make him heir.
For Fitzhugh and his seventeenth-century peers in both England and Virginia, only a 
legitimate child could inherit, and that legitimacy was defined both socially and 
physically. First, a legitimate heir’s parents were bonded by “lawfull Marriage,” 
blessed by the church and sanctioned by the state. Second, a legitimate heir was the 
bodily offspring of the parents, whose “bloods [were] commixed in him.” Only 
children who fulfilled these two qualifications -  being what seventeenth-century 
writers called the “natural” child of legally married parents -  could inherit. This was 
one of the most basic rules that governed the inheritance of estates in Virginia.
At the same time that Fitzhugh defined the conditions of legal inheritance, he 
was amassing an enslaved labor force comprised of people who would never be able 
to lay claim to either their own legitimacy or the legitimacy of their heirs. Instead, 
the people who Fitzhugh enslaved would themselves be the property inherited by
92 Richard Beal Davis, W illiam Fitzhugh an d  his C hesapeake W orld, 1676-1701: The Fitzhugh L etters  
an d  O th er D ocum ents  (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina Press, 1963), 68-9.
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Fitzhugh’s own heirs. Enslaved people’s own family bonds -  the “bloods commixed” 
in their own genealogies -  were summarily severed as slaveholders organized and 
divided their own estates. We see the effects of this when Fitzhugh died in 1703.
The Fitzhugh estate included over fifty people -  men, women, and children, including 
infants -  listed as slaves in Fitzhugh’s will and estate inventory.93 Those enslaved 
people’s family bonds were ignored with impunity when the Fitzhugh estate was 
divided amongst Fitzhugh’s heirs.94 For example, the three children of one enslaved 
woman, Black Pegg, were divided amongst three separate heirs.95 Fitzhugh divided 
the world into two neat categories -  those who inherited, and those who would be 
inherited. This was a fundamental truth of the institution of slavery.
Embedded in the division of the Fitzhugh estate was a basic rule of chattel 
slavery, one which had been adopted during Fitzhugh’s own lifetime, and which 
enabled him to claim ownership over such a large number of enslaved people. In 
1662, the Virginia assembly ruled that slavery was an inherited status, passed from 
mother to child, such that the status of any child bom in the colony was determined at
93 Davis, W illiam Fitzhugh an d  H is C hesapeake W orld, 373-84.
94 I use the terms “enslaved people” and “slave” with som e specificity  here, and throughout this 
chapter. I use the term “enslaved” because I intend to em phasize the w ays that slavery was forced upon 
people o f  African descent by the people who enslaved them. Seen in this way, w om en (and men, and 
children) were not slaves -  they were forced into slavery by the people who w ould be their masters and 
m istresses. The use o f  the term “enslaved” helps to remind me that slavery was a p ro cess  (som ething  
done to people) through force and through law, as w ell as a status applied to som e people. On the 
other hand, in the law, as w ell as in inheritance docum ents such as w ills and inventories, enslaved  
people were reduced to inheritable objects. In those cases, I often refer to enslaved people as “slaves.” 
This division o f  terms echoes Robert Berkhofer’s distinction between “N ative Am erican” and 
“Indian.” Berkhofer used the term “N ative American” to refer to the actual native peoples o f  the 
Am ericas, and the term “Indian” to refer to European and Euro-American representations o f  Native 
A m erican people. Sim ilarly, I use “enslaved people” to connote the process o f  enslaving people against 
their w ill, and the term “slave” to refer to slaveholders’ representations o f  those people. Robert F. 
Berkhofer, Jr., The White M a n ’s Indian: Im ages o f  the A m erican Indian fro m  Colum bus to the P resen t 
(N ew  York: V intage B ooks, 1979), xvii.
95 D avis, W illiam Fitzhugh an d  His C hesapeake W orld, 382.
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birth by the status of their mother.96 Thus, in Fitzhugh’s will and inventory, the 
enslaved people themselves were often identified in terms of their familial 
relationships, especially between mother and child, since the children of enslaved 
mothers were themselves enslaved, because that familial relationship conferred
07ownership onto the slaveholder. With the 1662 law of slavery by birth, slavery and 
reproduction would become tightly intertwined. By determining slave status as a 
condition of birth, slaveholders were able to capitalize upon and exploit the 
reproductive lives of enslaved women, as any child bom to any enslaved woman was 
the property of the woman’s master. This was an extraordinary legal move. As 
Jennifer Morgan argues, with the 1662 law of slavery by birth:
Slaveowners appropriated [black women’s] reproductive lives by claiming 
children as property, by rewriting centuries-old European laws of descent, and 
by defining a biologically driven perpetual racial slavery through the real and 
imaginary reproductive potential of women whose ‘blackness’ was produced 
by and produced their enslavability.98 
Morgan’s analysis here points to the centrality of women’s reproductive lives not 
only to the development of the institution of slavery, but to the invention of race. The 
1662 law of slavery by birth attempted to naturalize the institution of slavery by 
attaching it specifically to the bodies of infants bom to enslaved women of African
96 Hening 2: 170.
97 For exam ple, Black P egg’s children, in both the will and the inventory, are identified as such. Davis, 
W illiam Fitzhugh an d  H is C hesapeake W orld , 382.
98 Morgan, L aboring Women, 1.
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descent. Thus, Virginia’s slaveholders conflated blackness, slavery, and reproduction 
in their efforts to naturalize the institution of slavery."
To recognize the centrality of reproduction to the invention of race and 
slavery, we must examine the context for and the impact of the passage of the law of 
slavery by birth. This analysis, while centered on the discursive production of 
slaveholders (and the colonial government that served as their representatives), is 
aimed at understanding some of the meanings of enslaved women’s reproductive 
lives in this colonial space. As Hazel Carby succinctly argues, “within the economic, 
political, and social system of slavery, women were at the nexus of its 
reproduction.”100 Following from this understanding of the centrality of women’s 
reproductive lives to the making of racial slavery, I aim to both expose the creation of 
the institution of slavery as a discourse of power, and to, as much as possible, 
understand the meanings those discourses would have on enslaved women’s lives. 
Thus, William Fitzhugh’s legalistic understanding of inheritance rubs up against the 
impact that understanding would have on Black Pegg, her children, and the other 
people he enslaved.
The development of the institution of slavery is one of the central debates of 
American historiography. Was the turn to slavery an “unthinking decision,” in the 
words of Winthrop Jordan, the last step in a long process of dehumanization of 
blackness, Africa, and Africans?101 Or, was the institutionalization of racial slavery a
99 On the conflation o f  race and slavery with the law o f  slavery by birth, see M organ, L aboring  
Women, 3-4. See also Brown, G ood  Wives, N asty  Wenches, an d  Anxious P atriarchs, 133.
100 Hazel Carby, Reconstructing W om anhood: The E m ergence o f  the A fro-A m erican N ovelis t (NY: 
Oxford U niversity Press, 1987), 24.
101 Jordan, White O ver  Black, 44-98 . Jordan’s analysis is especially  useful because it acknow ledges  
the power o f  language and ideology in the developm ent o f  social system s. James C am pbell and James 
Oakes, “T he Invention o f  Race: Rereading White O ver B lack,” R eview s in A m erican H istory  21, no. 1
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I O')strategic move meant to quell class conflict, as Edmund Morgan argues? Anthony 
Parent argues that the development of slavery in Virginia was a conscious effort of 
the emerging planter elite in an effort to consolidate their power and influence.103 
While these have been compelling questions for generations of historians, my goal in 
this chapter shifts this debate slightly. I attempt to uncover the process by which 
planters decided to link discourses of slavery, race, and reproduction in order to 
solidify slavery as an institution. By tracing the complex and often contradictory path 
by which slavery became a status inherited from one’s mother, I am attempting to 
understand how planters conceived of owning, and capitalizing on, reproductive 
human property. In so doing, I hope to better understand the meanings of 
reproduction in this colonial space.
In trying to uncover these meanings, I offer in this chapter an analysis of the 
emergence of the law of slavery by birth. Virginia’s slave laws were a legal 
contradiction. Chattel slavery was not part of English common law, though English 
common law did not explicitly ban the practice. Instead, slavery’s legality was rooted 
in other legal practices -  the taking of prisoners in war and the accepted practice of 
extracting labor as payment for debt were two such examples.104 Both of these long- 
held practices allowed for the claiming of others’ labor by force. Yet, the other
(1993): 172-83; Karl E. W esthauser, “R evisiting the Jordan Thesis: White O ver  B lack  in Seventeenth- 
Century England and A m erica,” The Journ al o f  N egro  H istory  85, no. 3 (2000): 112-22.
102 Morgan, A m erican S lavery, A m erican F reedom , 295-315 . Slavery, Morgan argues, was not 
adopted until it was econom ically  advantageous to planters. Morgan argues that a desired side effect 
o f  the adoption o f  slavery was the reduction o f  the population o f  formerly indentured freedmen, w hose  
rage was expressed during B acon’s Rebellion.
103 Parent, Foul M eans, 55-71.
104 David Brion D avis, The P roblem  o f  S lavery in W estern Culture (N Y: Oxford U niversity Press, 
1966), 62 -90 , 181-6; Thom as D. Morris, Southern S lavery an d  The Law, 1619-1860  (Chapel Hill: 
University o f  North Carolina Press, 1996), 41-3; Orlando Patterson, Slavery an d  S ocia l D eath: A 
C om parative  Study  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 105-31.
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primary aspect of chattel slavery -  that slave status was a status inherited from one’s 
mother -  had no precedent in English common law.105 In fact, the law of slavery by 
birth directly contradicted English common law, especially the laws governing 
patriarchal inheritance. In this chapter, I argue that the law of slavery in Virginia 
found its roots in other parts of English law, specifically laws that defined bastardy, 
inheritance, and property law. First, English bastardy law ruled that any child bom to 
an unmarried mother was legal the “child of no man.” By defining slaves as legal 
bastards, Virginia law was able to deny enslaved children the legal protections 
offered by legitimacy and paternal identity. Second, English property law 
categorized slaves as reproductive property. Like livestock, the owner of a 
reproducing female was assumed to own also the “issue” of that female. We see in 
these twin definitions of inherited slavery -  in which the slave is by definition 
illegitimate and in which the slave is by definition a form of reproductive property -  
the ways that reproduction was central to the development of an emerging local 
discourse of slavery and race.
My analysis emerges from the reading of two main bodies of evidence: first, 
the written laws that governed the colony, and second, the wills and other documents 
that governed the inheritance of property. English colonial laws were notoriously 
contradictory, both between colonies and within colonies. Colonial leaders exercised 
considerable autonomy in interpreting and applying English common law to their 
own colonial environment. Jack Greene suggests that these internal contradictions 
were central to the English colonial project: “this [contradictory] legal inheritance
105 Brown, G o o d  Wives, N asty Wenches, an d  A nxious P atriarchs, 128-35; Fischer, Suspect R elations,
124; April Lee Hatfield, A tlan tic Virginia: In tercolon ial R elations in the Seventeenth Century  
(Philadelphia: U niversity o f  Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 157; Morgan, L aboring Women, 72.
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gave settlers enormous flexibility in adapting the law to local conditions while 
marking them as resolutely, even militantly, English.”106 Warren Billings’ analysis of 
the 1662 law of slavery by birth illustrates this sense of colonial lawmakers’ 
flexibility in their reading of English common law. Billings argues that the Virginia 
Assembly “ransacked” English Common Law in order to find a precedent for slavery 
by birth “which satisfied the yearning to remain faithful to tradition while resolving a 
problem for which tradition afforded no remedies.”107 It seems that English common 
law was flexible enough that it could justify whatever legal practice was needed in 
developing colonial societies.
This “ransacking” of English law to fit colonial context was, in part, an effort 
by lawmakers to create and uphold colonial discourses of power. Robert Blair St. 
George, examining the usefulness of postcolonial theory in the study of early 
America, calls local languages, ideas, discourses, and legal interpretations a 
development of a colonial “vernacular theory.”108 He emphasizes that power, 
especially in a colonial space, can be “creative as well as coercive,” and that these 
colonial vernacular theories were always embroiled in the creation of discourses of 
colonial power.109 Therefore, if we understand Virginia’s legal structures as an 
emerging vernacular theory of race and servitude, we can begin to understand the 
process by which slavery was institutionalized in a colonial space.
Such an analysis must take into account the ways that race, gender, and status 
operated in the colonial world, as well as in the development of colonial legal
106 Greene, “C olonial History and National History: R eflections on a Continuing Problem ,” 241.
107 Warren M. B illings, ‘T h e  C ases o f  Fernando and Elizabeth Key: A  N ote on the Status o f  Blacks in 
Seventeenth-Century V irginia,” W illiam an d  M ary Q uarterly  30, no. 3 (1973): 473.
108 St. George, “Introduction,” 5, 26.
109 St. George, “Introduction,” 10.
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structures. In her analysis of rape cases in British colonial North America, Sharon 
Block emphasizes that these local iterations and applications of the law were essential 
to the process of creating and maintaining hierarchies of gender, race, and status, as 
incidents and narratives of rape became the locus around which early American 
identities were inscribed, racial hierarchies were constructed, and gendered structures 
of power were maintained.110 In the Virginia case, Anthony Parent argues that the 
emerging planter class, who dominated the colonial legislature, used the law to 
forward their own economic interests, and therefore, the laws they passed reflected 
their own priorities.111 If this is the case, then the Virginia law was not just an 
expression of gentry rule, but of gentry desire.
Michel Foucault draws this connection between the law and desire. Foucault 
concedes that the law and power have been, of course, tightly linked: “In western 
societies since the Middle Ages, the exercise of power has always been formulated in 
terms of law.”112 Even so, Foucault argues, the law always masks its origins, and 
thus its own power: despite beliefs in the fairness and rationality of law, the law is 
“the code according to which power presents itself and prescribes that we conceive of 
it.”113 This understanding of the law certainly lines up with Parent’s observation that 
class power and legal power were very nearly identical in the Virginia colony. Yet 
Foucault warns us not to rely on juridical discourses for our understanding of the 
mechanisms of power, because actual human interactions existed outside of and 
beyond the realm of the law -  the law may have tried to construct desire by
110 B lock, R ape an d  Sexual P ow er in E arly A m erica , 126-162. Race is central to B lock ’s argument 
here: “the racialization o f  rape was the primary A m ericanization o f  British com m on law regarding 
rape.” B lock , R ape an d  Sexual P ow er in E arly A m erica , 148.
11 Parent, Foul M eans, 30-8.
112 Foucault, The H istory o f  Sexuality, 87.
113 Foucault, The H istory o f  Sexuality, 87-8.
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forbidding particular actions, but people still engaged in them.114 Foucault argues 
“that power in modem societies has not in fact governed sexuality through law and 
sovereignty” but instead power acts through “a multiplicity of force relations.”115 
What is useful here is the recognition that juridical discourses expressed the desire of 
state power for control and hegemony, but it was in intimate relations that power is 
exercised, shaped, and wielded.
This reading of Foucault would seem to discount his ideas as being useful to a 
reading of the legal structures of colonial Virginia. But if we recall Anthony Parent’s 
argument that the legislature and the planter class were nearly identical in colonial 
Virginia, we realize that the Burgesses’ writing and rewriting of the English common 
law was not a disembodied act -  it was an attempt for them to create control over the 
world that they created. In the case of slave law, juridical discourses, as much as they 
masked the interests of power, were an expression of desire by individual planters to 
assert control over the lives, bodies, and sexualities of the people that they enslaved. 
This becomes even clearer when we include wills and other inheritance documents in 
the field of juridical discourse -  these were hand-drawn documents in which 
individuals made and unmade families, relationships, and identities.116 Ann Laura 
Stoler, in her rereading of Foucault in a postcolonialist framework, argues that it was 
in these intimate spaces -  especially sites of interracial sex and desire and the banning 
of interracial sex -  that colonialism was enacted.117
114 Foucault, The H istory o f  Sexuality, 90.
115 Foucault, The H istory o f  Sexuality, 9 0 ,9 2 .
116 Jennifer Morgan calls the language o f  w ills the “moral grammar” o f  slavery. M organ, L aboring  
Women, 69.
1171 exam ine later the relationship between the law o f  slavery by birth and law s banning interracial 
sex. Stoler, “Intimidations o f  Empire,” 2-4. See also Perez, The D eco lon ia l Im aginary, 101-4.
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In the first section of the chapter, I examine the law and elite discourses of 
power, in the ways that bastardy law and slavery law were intertwined and co-defined 
in the emerging legal structure of the colony. In the second section, I examine the 
day-to-day enacting of power by individual slaveholders, as masters used the 
language of animal husbandry to assert their dominion over enslaved women and 
children. In the third and final section, I examine the ways that slaveholders’ power 
was incomplete and inconsistent: even as planters’ laws would seem to establish 
absolute control over the reproduction of enslaved peoples, we see the ways that 
reproduction and sexuality could not be contained by those structures. Ultimately, as 
Foucault makes so clear, attempts to exert absolute power can crumble under their
t  1 Q
own weight. Overall, I argue that colonial power structures were rooted in twin 
goals: the exploitation of black women’s reproduction and the disciplining of white 
women’s reproduction.
Bastardy and Servitude 
According to English common law and inheritance practices, children 
inherited their property, status, and name from their father. Inheritance practices had 
deep cultural and political meanings: in the status society of early modem England, 
legitimate inheritance was the basis for the social order and of the monarchy itself."9
118 Foucault, The H istory o f  Sexuality, 95-6.
119 Marylynn Salm on, Women an d  the L aw  o f  P roperty  in E arly A m erica  (Chapel Hill: U niversity o f  
North Carolina Press, 1986); Carole Shammas, “English Inheritance Law and Its Transfer to the 
C olon ies,” The A m erican Journal o f  L egal H istory  31, no. 2 (1987): 145-163. H olly Brewer contends 
that arguments over inheritance formed the basis o f  England’s political contests in the seventeenth  
century; ultimately, primogeniture system s were transformed to uphold patriarchal power over and 
above the aristocratic status power that justified the monarchy. Brewer, B y Birth o r  C onsent. Kathleen 
Brown discusses the irony o f  the 1662 law o f  slavery by birth in relation to patriarchal inheritance. 
Brown, G o o d  Wives, N asty Wenches, an d  A nxious Patriarchs, 129.
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These inheritance practices and ideologies were imported to England’s colony in 
Virginia: testators, whether they followed the practice of primogeniture or divided 
their estates among their children via entail or other legal means, assumed that 
legitimate children were the rightful primary heirs of all that their father had amassed 
during his life. Legitimacy was built into the language of inheritance, as testators 
willed property to their “natural” children, bom “of my body.”120 By the middle of 
the seventeenth century, this inheritance tradition was taking on new meaning in the 
English (and Anglo-American) ideology of patriarchal power, where the power of the 
patriarch (whether literal father, God, or King) was duplicated in the family, religion, 
and the state.121 In the British colonies, fatherhood conferred full personhood to the
120 For exam ples o f  testators referring to “natural” children, see York D O W  2: 405; York D O W  3: 28; 
York D O W  3: 48; York D O W  3: 77; York D O W  4: 189. For testators referring to the children “o f  
their body,” see York D O W  3: 48; York D O W  4: 189.
121 Kathleen Brown em phasizes that “dom estic” patriarchy, or “the historically specific authority o f  the 
father over his household” was continually being constructed and contested throughout the colonial 
period. Brown, G o o d  Wives, N asty  Wenches, an d  Anxious P atriarchs, 4 -5 . This dom estic patriarchy 
was mirrored in political patriarchy, in which “universal fem ale subordination [w as used] to establish  
and explain the naturalness o f  the political order.” Political patriarchy, expressed m ost clearly in 
Robert Film er’s 1642 political treatise, P atriarcha, infused political, religious, and colonialist 
discourses both in England and the colon ies. Brown, G ood  Wives, N asty  Wenches, an d  A nxious 
P atriarchs, 15-7. Mary Beth Norton argues that because o f  its uneven sex ratio, the C hesapeake was 
never able to live up to the Filmerian ideal. Instead, seventeenth-century V irginia’s dem ographically  
m ale-dom inated society anticipated a Lockean ideal in w hich the state did not mirror the pow er o f  
fathers over children, but instead operated through the consent o f  the governed (as with husbands and 
w ives). Unfortunately, Norton elides race in her analysis, and her discussion o f  the C hesapeake 
functions m ostly to illum inate the w ays that N ew  England was able to live up to the Filmerian ideal. 
Norton, Founding M others an d  F athers, 3-14. H olly Brewer argues that seventeenth-century  
patriarchalism justified  not m en’s power over w om en, or even fathers’ pow er over children; instead, 
patriarchalism was expressed in the system  o f  primogeniture, in which inherited status dictated all 
social hierarchies, from the fam ily to the church to the monarchy. For Brewer, gender hierarchy and 
the hierarchy o f  adults over children were new concepts that needed to be justified in a post-Lockean  
world. Brewer, By Birth o r  C onsent, 21-4 . A ll o f  these definitions are useful here: B row n’s em phasis 
on gendered power helps us to center w om en in the analysis, w hile N orton’s d iscussion , how ever  
flawed, o f  how  Virginia failed to live up to the Filmerian ideal helps us to focus on the w ays that the 
experience o f  colonialism  would make and remake political theories and discourses. Brewer’s 
analysis, w hile it overem phasizes the power o f  w om en in the Filmerian m odel, historicizes the 
discussion o f  patriarchy in connection to primogeniture and inheritance, reminding us that status, 
defined by inheritance structures, was a primary expression o f  hierarchy before the em ergence o f  
patriarchalism. M y interest is in both exploring the developm ent o f  patriarchal pow er in Virginia, and 
in recognizing the w ays that patriarchy was expressed through discourses o f  race as w ell as gender and 
status.
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extent that, as Mary Beth Norton has argued, mothers qua mothers are virtually
122absent from the colonial statutes, while fathers qua fathers are nearly omnipresent.
In Virginia’s colonial context, patriarchal inheritance and power would take 
on especially potent meanings, especially regarding the labor relations of the 
plantation economy. For property-holding men of Virginia’s eighteenth century slave 
economy, the possession of servants and slaves was considered evidence of one’s 
patriarchal authority. In 1726, planter William Byrd II embraced this view when he 
described his position: “Like one of the patriarchs, I have my flocks and my herds, 
my bond-men, and bond-women, and every soart of trade amongst my own servants,
171so that I live in a kind of independence on every one, but Providence.” For Byrd, 
Virginia’s colonial labor hierarchy created for him a position akin to the biblical 
patriarchs -  complete authority, endowed by God, and answerable only to God.
Yet the transfer of the English patriarchal tradition to Virginia was not 
immediate or absolute, and the development of racial slavery actually challenged the 
tradition of patriarchal inheritance in important ways. Most notably, the 1662 law 
that declared that any child in the colony should be free or enslaved “according to the 
condition of the mother” overturned the centuries-long tradition in which one’s status 
was inherited from one’s father.124 In other words, the law that solidified inheritable, 
life-long, racial slavery by birth was a direct affront to the English tradition of 
patriarchal inheritance and authority. Since the 1662 law of slavery by birth ran
122 Mary Beth Norton, F ounding M others an d  Fathers, 143-4. D espite a comparative framework that 
includes the Chesapeake region, Norton’s argument ignores an important exception: the 1662 law o f  
slavery by birth defined an entire class o f  people not in terms o f  their fathers, but in terms o f  their 
mothers.
123 Marion Tinling, ed. The C orrespondence o f  The Three W illiam Byrds, o fW estover , Virginia, 1684- 
1776  (Charlottesville: U niversity o f  Virginia Press, 1977), 1: 354-5.
124 Hening 2: 170.
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counter to patriarchal inheritance, Virginia’s lawmakers would draw upon another 
legal and discursive precedent to solidify inherited slavery: an already-present 
linkage between bastardy and servitude in colonial law. This section will examine the 
complex and contradictory relationship between the logic of black servitude and 
patriarchal inheritance, and will then trace the linkages between bastardy and 
servitude in Virginia law during the colonial period. Ultimately, by rejecting the 
precedent of patriarchal inheritance, the 1662 law of slavery by birth and its 
reiterations into the eighteenth century drew legal and discursive connections between 
illegitimacy, servitude, female sexuality, and race with the ultimate goal of extracting 
ever more labor from women (especially, but not exclusively, black women) and their 
children.
The 1662 law of slavery by birth did not institute a new practice; evidence 
exists that some children were held in slavery from their birth well before 1662. 
Instead, what made the law remarkable was its disjunction from the precedent of 
patriarchal inheritance, which, until the passage of the law, was understood to include 
at least some African servants and slaves. As we will see, as late as the 1650s, some 
English planters treated African laborers as indentured servants, who, when freed,
1 I Swere entitled to own property as patriarchs in their own right. Further, the courts, 
both on the county level and the colonial level, acknowledged black paternity in 
multiple ways. In other words, prior to 1662, we can see ways that African and 
mixed-race servants were included in the English tradition of patriarchal inheritance
125 On the transition from indenture to slavery, and the treatment o f  Africans and people o f  African  
descent as indentured servants, see: Berlin, M any Thousands G one, 17-28, 38-46. Brown, G o o d  Wives, 
N asty Wenches, an d  Anxious P atriarchs, 109-10; Menard, “From Servants to Slaves: The 
Transformation o f  the Chesapeake Labor System ,” 355-90; M organ, A m erican S lavery, Am erican  
F reedom , 154-7; Vaughan, “The Origins D ebate,” 311-54.
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of both property (in the transfer of property to African men as freed indentured 
servants) and status (in the assumption that mixed-race children’s status was inherited 
from their fathers).
One way to understand the manumission of male indentured servants 
(whatever their race) was as the conferring of the status of “patriarch” onto a former 
dependent.126 The property (including land, clothes, and com) distributed to freed 
male servants was, in part, an effort to create independent households (headed by 
these newly landowning men) in the colony’s hinterland. Property transferred to 
female indentured servants also fed into this tradition of patriarchal property 
ownership. During the seventeenth century, English female indentured servants were 
expected and largely able to immediately marry upon the completion of their term of 
service; therefore, their property was absorbed into their husband’s estate,
1 97augmenting his status as patriarch and property holder.
For some masters, this conferring of patriarchal status -  i.e., ownership of 
inheritable property and authority over dependents -  included male servants of 
African descent as well. For example, in 1656, two black men, Phill and Nicholas, 
were freed from temporary servitude and given the basic tools of life so that they 
could support their children. When Nicholas Martiau died, his will decreed that “my 
Two Negroes Phill & Nicholas shall...be free” and that they should receive land, a 
cow, com, clothes, and building supplies for houses, “for the good of them and their
126 M organ, Am erican S lavery, A m erican F reedom , 223. Morgan em phasizes the abuses o f  freedom  
dues by masters, arguing that masters knew w ell that custom ary freedom dues would elevate a former 
servant to householder status. Sim m ering anger about these and other abuses, M organ argues, erupted 
in B acon’s R ebellion in 1676. Kathleen Brown argues for this connection betw een servitude, 
patriarchy, and B acon’s R ebellion, making clear that the consolidation o f  white, male planter power 
after the R ebellion was about reframing a new definition o f  m asculine honor that exp licitly  excluded  
men o f  African descent. Brown, G ood  Wives, N asty Wenches, an d  Anxious P atriarchs, 174-86.
127 Carr and W alsh, “The Planter’s W ife,” 28-31.
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children.”128 This explicit acknowledgement of Phill’s and Nicholas’s status as 
fathers was not accidental. The mention of Phill and Nicholas’s children implies an 
intention of patriarchal authority as well as patrilineal inheritance -  Phill and 
Nicholas’s property would provide for the support of their children, and, in time, 
would become the property of those children. In another case, in 1660, Thomas 
Whitehead willed his clothes, two cows, a horse, and a house and land to “my negro 
man John.”129 Not only did Whitehead confer upon John the property to establish 
himself as a patriarch, he entrusted John with a patriarch’s responsibility as well, 
naming him as guardian to Whitehead’s orphan goddaughter.130 In both of these 
cases, newly freed men of African descent were understood to be, to use Mary Beth 
Norton’s term, “fathers qua fathers.”131 If, as black feminist theorist Hortense 
Spillers argues, enslavement was “a cultural situation that was father-lacking,” the 
cases of Phill, Nicholas, and John point to a brief period during which at least some 
black men were understood to be fathers, and their children were not “father-lacking” 
at all.132
Along with property, status also was inheritable from one’s father, even by 
people of African descent in seventeenth-century Virginia.133 In 1655, the court of 
Northumberland County declared that Elizabeth Key, a mixed-race woman (variously 
called a “Negro” and a “mulatto” in the court records) who claimed she was being
128 This was more property than a freed indentured servant typically received, but Martiau seem ed to 
intend that the property be shared between Phill and N icholas. York D O W  1, 337-9.
129 York D O W  3: 82.
130 Ibid.
131 Norton, Founding M others and Fathers, 143-4.
132 Spillers, “M am a’s Baby, Papa’s M aybe,” 403.
133 Brewer, B y Birth o r  Consent, 23. Brewer em phasizes that primogeniture was about the inheritance 
o f  not only property, but also title. By extension, primogeniture was the basis for all status 
relationships in seventeenth-century England, both in terms o f  ideology and practice.
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held as a “pretended Slave,” should be free.134 The court ruled in Elizabeth’s favor 
after hearing several depositions that asserted that Elizabeth was the daughter of a 
black woman and her English master. The court relied on the English patriarchal 
precedent to make its decision: “by the Comon Law the Child of a Woman slave 
begott by a freeman ought to bee free.”135 The court decided that Elizabeth Key’s 
status, like her name, should be inherited from her father. Elizabeth Key’s case is 
significant in its difference from what would become standard practice in the colony 
- ju s t  ten years later, her status would never have been determined along paternal 
lines.
Yet colonial Virginia was marked by competing practices. Simultaneously 
with these cases that explicitly included African and mixed-race people in the English 
tradition of patriarchal inheritance, other cases show an exclusion of Africans and 
mixed-race people from that tradition. Significantly, before the passage of the 1662 
law of slavery by birth, there is evidence that many children were, in fact, considered 
slaves from birth. A case from 1657 shows the ways that this new practice -  the 
enslavement of children from birth -  competed with the old tradition of affording 
freed indentures with patriarchal status. Anne Barnhouse formally freed Mihill 
Gowan, a “Servant” man of African descent.136 Along with granting his freedom, 
Barnhouse gave Gowan “a male childe bom ye 25th of August in ye year of our Lorde 
God 1655 of ye body of my negro Prosa being baptised by Mr Edward Johnson the 2d
134 Warren M. B illings, ed. “The C ase o f  Elizabeth Key, 1655-56,” in The O ld  D om inion in the 
Seventeenth Century: a  D ocum entary H istory o f  Virginia, 1606-1689  (Chapel Hill: U niversity o f  North 
Carolina Press, 1975), 165-9; B illings, ‘T h e  C ases o f  Fernando and Elizabeth K ey,” 467 -74 . Brown, 
G ood  Wives, N asty  Wenches, an d  Anxious P atriarchs, 132.
135 B illings, “The C ase o f  Elizabeth K ey,” 167.
136 York D O W  3: 16.
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of September 1655 & named William.”137 Only later in the document is it made clear 
that the child, William, was not intended to be Mihill’s servant or slave, but was in 
fact Mihill’s own son. That the property transfer was intended as a manumission was 
given further weight by the mention of William’s infant baptism: while the law was 
ambiguous at this point, it was still customary in Virginia that Christians could not be 
enslaved.138 While the intent of this case would seem to follow the logic of 
patriarchal inheritance -  the son is freed along with the father -  the legal mechanism 
by which the boy was freed was a deed, which transferred moveable property from 
one owner to another. Rather than relying on the assumption that the child’s status 
would be inherited from his father, Mihill Gowan and Anne Barnhouse used property 
law to achieve their aims, thus transferring ownership of the boy from Barnhouse to 
Gowan. The competing practices of seventeenth-century Virginia’s treatment of 
servants and slaves of African descent comes clear in the different ways that father 
and son were understood to be held in service: Mihill was considered a free man, 
temporarily in servitude, but his son was considered a slave from birth.
Unfortunately for William’s mother Prosa, her freedom was not assured by this deal. 
No record survives of her fate.
The fact that Mihill Gowan had to jump through legal hoops to invent a way 
to free his son (rather than, as with Elizabeth Key, have the authorities assume that 
the child’s status was the same as the father’s, once paternity was determined) is just 
one example of how the emerging logic of slavery by birth had begun to percolate. 
Other cases point to a growing practice in Virginia, even before 1662, in which both
137 Ibid.
138 In 1667, Virginia formally declared that baptism w ould not free an enslaved person. Hening 2: 260.
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slaveholders and the courts assumed that the children of enslaved women were 
enslaved from birth. The 1644 inventory of Thomas Ludlow’s substantial estate 
included “Tom a negro boy about 5 yeares old.”139 Similarly, William Stafford’s 
inventory, also from 1644, included several “Negro” children: 4-year old Mary, 3- 
year-old Elizabeth, an unnamed one-year old boy, and a 2-week-old baby boy, also 
unnamed.140 The fact that some people of African descent were treated as indentures, 
while others were treated as slaves from birth, reveals not just contradictory practices 
in the ascribing of servant versus slave status. It also reveals the simultaneous 
existence of two contradictory understandings of the relationship between servitude 
and patriarchy. In the case of indenture, the indenture contract may have established 
temporary servitude, but it also guaranteed that the servant bore the right to 
participate in and benefit by the social legitimacy afforded by patriarchal
139 York D O W  3, 108-9. The Ludlow  inventory is itse lf evidence o f  the am biguity o f  status amongst 
black servants even  as early as the 1640s. Five-year-old Tom  is the only one o f  eighteen “negroes” in 
the inventory for whom  an age is unam biguously listed. N evertheless, many o f  the other servants, 
black and white, are listed with amounts o f  time (ranging from six  months to tw elve years) after their 
names. W ere these units o f  time referring to the person’s remaining tim e to serve (as seem s clear with  
an aging E nglish servant, “W illiam  lies  an auntient man seasond abt 3 yrs”), or did they refer to the 
person’s age (w hich w ould clearly indicate inherited slavery if  such was the case for “B esse  a negro 
abt six m onthes”)? M ost o f  the time, the unit o f  time is listed only for children in the inventory: the 
“negro b oys” or “negro girls” were listed with time, w hile m ost “negroe w om en” and “negro m en” 
were not. This w ould seem  to imply that the tim es listed were ages, and not remaining tim e to serve. 
On the other hand, the case o f  B esse is again am biguous, since she is not listed as being a “girl”. 
A ssessed  values for the servants are also ambiguous. B esse has the second low est value o f  any servant 
listed (4 0 0  pounds tobacco): w as this because she was an infant, or because she had only a short time 
left to serve (as with A lice  C ooke, who had 10 months to serve and w as therefore valued at just 100 
pounds)? The ambiguity and m ultiple possible readings o f  the Ludlow inventory make clear the 
challenges for any modern reader w ishing to ascribe singular meaning or clear intent to these 
docum ents, much less to use these docum ents as absolute evidence o f  extant racism or perpetual 
slavery.
140 York D OW  2: 185. For a 1655 marriage agreem ent w hich included a 5-year-old boy, along with 
another boy w hose age is unlisted, see York D O W  1: 265. For a 1660 sale o f  a black w om an along  
with her children, see Palmer, Wm. P. ed. C alen dar o f  Virginia State P apers an d  O th er M anuscripts , 
1652-1781  (Richm ond, 1875), 1: 2-3.
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inheritance.141 In the case of racial slavery, some people were defined by servitude 
as a fact of their birth -  these slaves by birth would be specifically denied 
participation in patriarchal inheritance.
With these competing practices in place, it is perhaps not surprising that, when 
the House of Burgesses passed the 1662 law of slavery by birth, they did so because 
“some doubts have arrisen whether children got by any Englishman upon a negro 
woman should be slave or free.”142 The Burgesses’ solution to these doubts -  that a 
child should be free or enslaved “according to the condition of the mother” -  ran 
counter to the principle of patriarchal inheritance upon which English property law 
was based.143 Thus the question arises: if the law of slavery by birth contradicted the 
tradition of patriarchal inheritance, upon what precedent was the new law based? 
British colonial law, including Virginia law, was at once conservative and creative: 
the lawmakers reacted to existing conditions and legal precedents, while still needing 
to provide interpretations and new laws that fit their new context. Living in this 
collision of old precedents and new conditions, the Burgesses created new ways to 
expand their own interests as property holders and masters over unfree labor. As we 
will see, the Burgesses used other existing English laws -  specifically, bastardy law -  
to make sense of their novel departure from English property law in 1662.
Lisa Zunshine, commenting on historians’ demarcating the Euro-American 
long eighteenth century as “the age of illegitimacy” (because illegitimacy rates 
increased significantly during that period), argues that the era is better labeled “the
141 Winthrop Jordan argued that indenture was understood as a temporary cessation o f  o n e’s birthright 
o f  freedom through consensual contract, because, from the sixteenth century, “personal freedom had 
becom e the normal status o f  Englishm en.” Jordan, White O ver  Black, 49.
142 Hening 2: 170.
143 Ibid.
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age of illeg itim acy” because of “the multiplicity of cultural meanings of 
bastardy.”144 As a concept, bastardy was and is an exploding category, imbued with 
multiple meanings and conveying multiple discourses. In other words, “illegitimacy” 
is more than just the birth of a child to unmarried parents -  instead, it encompasses all 
of the cultural meanings, anxieties, and discourses attached to illicit sexuality and 
outlaw reproduction. In seventeenth-century Virginia, the concept of bastardy 
became inextricably linked with the concept of servitude, and particularly female 
servitude. As we will see, bastardy was inextricably connected in seventeenth- 
century legal discourse with servitude, sexuality, and, increasingly, race. As such, 
bastardy became the legal and discursive basis for slavery by birth. Starting with the 
first local fornication law, passed in 1643, continuing to the passage of the 1662 law 
of slavery by birth, and repeated in laws throughout the rest of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century, Virginia’s legal system connected and even conflated bastardy, 
servitude, sexuality, and, increasingly, blackness.
Early modem English jurists recognized the internal contradictions of English 
inheritance traditions and bastardy laws. In his seminal treatise on English
144 Lisa Zunshine, B astards an d  Foundlings: Illegitim acy in E ighteenth-C entury E ngland  (Columbus: 
The O hio State U niversity Press, 2005), 2. W hile they are archaic, I use the terms “bastard” and 
“bastardy” because those were the terms used in the courts -  and, as I argue, they had specific  
m eanings in their specific cultural context. I do not intend for those terms to be d ism issive o f  or 
disrespectful towards unmarried w om en or their children. On the “age o f  illeg itim acy,” see Peter 
Laslett, Karla Oosterveen, and Richard M. Smith, eds. B astardy  an d  Its C om parative  H istory: S tudies 
in the h istory o f  illeg itim acy an d  m artia l nonconform ism  in Britain, France, Germ any, Sweden, N orth  
A m erica, Jam aica an d  Japan  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U niversity Press, 1980). E lsa Hambleton  
argues that Puritan N ew  England was able to avoid an increase in illegitim acy because o f  the rightful 
authority o f  the church: E lsa Ham bleton, D aughters o f  E ve: P regnant B rides an d  U nw ed M others in 
Seventeenth-C entury M assachusetts  (N Y: Routledge, 2004). Like Zunshine, other historians resist the 
idea o f  an “age o f  illegitim acy.” Ann Twinam  finds “the age o f  illegitim acy” to be an inappropriate 
concept for colonial Spanish America: Ann Twinam , P ublic Lives, P riva te  Secrets: G ender, honor, 
Sexuality, an d  Illeg itim acy in C olon ia l Spanish A m erica  (Stanford, CA: Stanford U niversity Press,
1999). Clare A. L yons sees an explosion  o f  illegitim ate births in eighteenth-century Philadelphia, but 
attributes them to a local embrace o f  democratic values, rather than a universalized “age” : Lyons, Sex  
A m ong the R abble.
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inheritance law, Henry Swinburne wrote that, like property, even the degraded status 
of slavery should follow the paternal line of inheritance: “Of all men which be 
destitute of libertie or freedome, the slave is in the greatest subjection.... even his 
Children also are infected with the Leprosy of their Father’s Bondage.”145 This 
would indicate that the 1662 law of slavery by birth countered English patriarchal 
precedent. Nevertheless, Swinburne went on to note that the English law itself was 
contradictory: the civil law stated that children’s status followed the mother, while the 
common law held that the child’s status followed the father’s. Later in his treatise, 
though, Swinburne offered a clue as to why the Virginia Burgesses decided to make 
slavery inherited from the mother: “A Bastard shall not be bound, though the Father 
were a Bond-slave, because the Law doth not acknowledge any Father in this Case: 
For by the Law a Bastard is sometimes called filius nullius, the Son of no Man; 
sometimes filius vulgi, the Son of every Man.”146 In other words, a bastard child’s 
status as a servant could follow only the mother’s status, because a bastard child was 
“the son of no man.” That child could claim neither the father’s property nor his 
status, and so defaulted to the mother’s status. The Virginia law of slavery by birth 
would follow the same logic, though it distilled that logic through the lens of race -  
the children of (free) white men and (enslaved) black women were not their father’s
145 Henry Swinburne, A trea tise  o fte stem en ts  an d  last wills, C om piled  ou t o f  the L aw s E cclesiastical, 
C ivil an d  Canon, a s  a lso  ou t o f  the Comm on Laws, Custom s an d  Statu tes o f  this Realm. 5 th ed.
London: n.p., 1728. Eighteenth Century C ollections Online. Gale. 5 June 2013. 
< http://find.galegroup.com .proxy.library.vcu.edu/ecco/infom ark.do?& source=gale& prodId=ECCO& us 
erGroupNam e=vi va_vcu& tabID =T 001 & docId=C W 125320327& type=m ultipage& contentSet=EC C O  
A rticles& version= 1.0& docLevel=FA SCIM ILE>. Several historians have drawn the connection  
between Sw inburne’s treatise and V irginia’s slave law. Morris, Southern S lavery an d  The Law, 43-44 . 
B illings, “The C ases o f  Fernando and Elizabeth K ey,” 472. M y point is not to argue that Swinburne’s 
essay was the basis  for V irginia’s law, but instead was part o f  the legal print culture from w hich the 
law sprang. On the A nglo-A m erican legal print culture, especially  legal treatises, see Brewer, By Birth  
o r  Consent, 369-75.
146 Swinburne, A trea tise  o fte stem en ts  an d  la s t w ills, 76.
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children, but instead, fatherless. The law implied that all enslaved women’s children 
were legal bastards, having no recourse to their father’s property or status -  and, that 
as such, they were also slaves themselves.
The 1662 law of slavery by birth was rooted in a local precedent that linked, 
both legally and discursively, illicit sex, bastardy, and servitude. This linkage 
emerged gradually and locally in Virginia; significantly, the earliest bastardy cases in 
the colony were not linked to servitude. Virginia’s first fornication laws were passed 
in 1643; prior to 1643, the courts followed English common and ecclesiastical law 
when adjudicating fornication and bastardy cases. Therefore, in the earliest decades 
of the colony, fornication and bastardy were treated as moral crimes and were 
punished with corporal punishment and public penance. For example, in 1627, when 
John Ewins and Jane Hill were charged with fornication by the Virginia General 
Court, Ewins suffered 40 lashes, and Hill was required to confess her sins while 
standing before the parish wearing a white sheet.147
By the middle of the seventeenth century, with the growth in the servant 
population, the enforcement of fornication law had shifted from concern over 
morality and religious purity to control over servants.148 In 1643, two local
147 ‘‘D ecisions o f  the General Court,” Virginia M agazine o f  H istory an d  B iography  4 , no. 1 (1896): 27. 
For a similar case, see “D ecisions o f  the General Court,” Virginia M agazine o f  H istory an d  B iography  
4 , no. 3 (1897): 251. Public penance and the wearing o f  a white sheet was the practice o f  the English  
ecclesiastical courts, a practice adopted by the county courts in Virginia. John Ruston Pagan, Anne 
O rth w o o d ’s B astard: Sex and L aw  in E arly Virginia  (N Y : Oxford U niversity Press, 2003), 7, 11 -2, 
119-23.
148 On the growth o f  the E nglish servant population in V irginia, see: W esley Frank Craven, White, 
Red, an d  B lack: The Seventeenth-C entury Virginian  (Charlottesville, VA: U niversity o f  Virginia 
Press, 1971), 16. R ussell Menard argues that the seventeenth-century peak o f  migration for 
indentured servants from England to V irginia occurred between 1650 and 1670; this grow ing servant 
population inspired the passing o f  increasingly strict regulations on servants. R ussell R. Menard, 
“British M igration to the Chesapeake C olonies in the Seventeenth Century,” C olon ia l C hesapeake  
Society, ed. L ois Green Carr, Philip D. Morgan, and Jean B. Russo (Chapel Hill: U niversity o f  North 
Carolina Press, 1988), 112-3.
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fornication statutes, the first passed in the colony, addressed the crime in two ways. 
The first of these fornication laws formally established British ecclesiastical law for 
morality crimes in the colony. The statute grouped fornication together with 
drunkenness, and framed both as crimes against God and nature: these were “high and 
foule offences” that amounted to “the abuse of God’s creatures.” 149 While this law 
was passed, it was little exercised: in York County, penance and ducking (the 
punishments meted out in moral trials) were used only a handful of times after 1643, 
and never after 1661.150 Throughout the colonial period, few cases involving solely 
fornication charges were brought before the county courts: the clearest evidence of 
fornication was the birth of an illegitimate child, and those cases involved bastardy 
charges. Those cases of fornication that were brought before the court typically 
crossed some social boundary. For example, in 1646, the York County court 
summoned Edward Wright because he “did lye with Joane Evans his servant 
mayde.” 151 The case against Wright was never pursued -  perhaps his public 
humiliation in court was deemed punishment enough.
If the first 1643 fornication statute had little impact, the second 1643 
fornication statute, which outlawed marriage and fornication by servants, proved 
foundational to how the colony would deal with servant sexuality. The servant
149 Hening 1:240. W hile this statute focused on servant marriage, its enforcem ent took the form o f  
bastardy indictments.
150 After 1643 in York County, penance and ducking were sentences in a total o f  seven cases involving  
fornication. Four o f  those cases involved irregular marriage -  marriages not recognized by the church, 
so that the couple was said to be both married and living in fornication. York D O W  2: 350, 387. On 
the prevalence o f  informal marriages in the southern colon ies, see Godbeer, Sexual R evolution in E arly  
A m erica , 120-22. T w o o f  the seven cases involved extraordinary circum stances -  one was a case o f  
interracial sex, and the other involved an accusation o f  infanticide. York D O W  3: 2, 120, 125, 128. 
Only one o f  the seven  cases -  the 1657 bastardy and fornication trial o f  Elizabeth Turner -  involved  
the kind o f  cases that w ould dominate the court’s register after 1643: a servant w om an accused o f  
bearing a bastard child. B esides penance, Turner was also sentenced to double her term o f  service. In 
other words, for Turner, both statutes were applied to her case. York DOW  3:1.
151 York DOW  2: 188.
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marriage law introduced two new priorities in the disciplining of sexuality in the 
colony, both of which focused on servant sexuality. First, the fact that there were two 
separate statutes was significant: from the first passage of local fornication and 
bastardy laws, the law treated servant sexuality differently than the sexuality of free 
people. Framed as servants’ crimes, fornication and secret marriage were seen to 
cause “many great abuses & much detriment...against the law of God and likewise to 
the service of man ye masters.”152 Second, the statute punished servant women 
convicted of fornication or secret marriage with more service, effectively 
compounding servants’ indentures as punishment for illicit sex. This made the 
surveillance and disciplining of servant sexuality a site of potential profit for masters. 
With the 1643 fornication laws, the Virginia Assembly began to create a legal 
environment that conflated illicit sexuality, illegitimate births, and servitude.
The 1643 laws regulating servant marriage would be passed again, with minor 
adjustments, in 1652, 1658, and 1660.153 Undergirding the multiple laws barring 
secret marriages in the mid-seventeenth century was a desire to limit the birth of 
bastard children by servants. Tellingly, the Assembly referred to the 1658 version of 
the law as “[the act] touchinge Secrett marriages and Basterdizinge.” 154 The birth of 
a child by a servant woman could be seen as virtually cataclysmic: in a 1661 case, 
the hiding of a bastard child bom to an indentured woman was decried as a crime 
“sufficient to ruine a Countrey.”155 The consummation of an illicit marriage
152 Hening 1:252-3.
153 Hening 1: 252-3 , 438-9 . Warren M. B illings, ed. “Som e A cts N ot in H ening’s Statutes: The A cts o f  
A ssem bly, April 1652, N ovem ber 1652, and July 1653,” Virginia M agazine o f  H istory an d  B iography  
83, no. 1 (1975): 37-8. Jon Kukla, ed. “Som e A cts N ot in H ening’s Statutes: The A cts o f  A ssem bly, 
October 1660,” Virginia M agazine o f  H istory an d  B iography  83, no. 1 (January 1975): 83.
154 Kukla, “Som e A cts not in H ening’s Statu tes,” 83.
155 York DOW  3, 128.
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(culturally defined not just by elopement, but by the pregnancy and childbirth of the 
woman involved) or birth of a child to an unwed indentured mother signaled a loss of 
control by the master over his servant, and a loss of time and labor during the 
servant’s pregnancy and lying-in.156
The enforcement of the various secret marriage and fornication laws exposes 
the assumptions the undergirded the laws. First, despite the existence of laws barring 
fornication by free women and men, prosecutions focused almost exclusively on 
servant women and their partners.157 Following the passage of the 1643 fornication 
and servant marriage laws (and their multiple reiterations), the overwhelming 
majority of cases tried in York County involved servant women: as early as the
1SR1650s, every single bastardy trial of that decade involved a servant woman. That
156 Mary Beth Norton has argued that seventeenth-century V irginia marriages were considered  
legitimate only when they were fertile. B y extension, then, pregnancy was a critical marker o f  a “real” 
marriage: “In the eyes o f  contem poraries, the best evidence o f  a proper marriage was provided by its 
offspring.” Mary Beth Norton, “Communal D efin itions o f  Gendered Identity in Seventeenth-Century  
English Am erica,” in Through a  G lass D ark ly: R eflections on P erson al Identity in E arly  A m erica , ed. 
Ronald Hoffman, M echal Sobel, and Fredrika J. Teute (Chapel Hill: University o f  North Carolina 
Press, 1997), 60-61 . M asters’ loss o f  servant w om en’s labor during pregnancy and lying-in w ill be 
discussed extensively  in Chapter 2.
157 Mary Beth Norton has found that, in the seventeenth century, the C hesapeake co lon ies saw  a far 
greater number o f  bastardy cases than were tried the N ew  England colon ies. She argues that this was 
because single w om en held very different statuses in the two regions: in the Chesapeake, single  
w om en were typically indentured servants, w hile in N ew  England (w ith its more traditional fam ily  
structures), single wom en were free daughters. W here pregnant single w om en in N ew  England could  
expect to get married (thereby conferring legitim acy on their child), pregnant single w om en in the 
Chesapeake were charged with bastardy. Norton does not discuss the political im plications o f  these 
different patterns: I argue here that, in the context o f  indentured servitude, illegitim ate births had not 
just social im plications but political and cultural im plications as w ell. Mary Beth Norton, Founding  
M others an d  F athers, 336-7 . For another discussion o f  master’s anxiety over servant w om en’s 
sexuality, see Brown, G o o d  W ives, N asty  Wenches, an d  A nxious P atriarchs, 94-104 .
158 In the cases brought before the York County court between 1640 and 1700, there is a distinct 
pattern o f  targeting servant w om en for fornication and bastardy prosecutions. In the 1640s, only  
16.66% o f  the 6  cases involved servant w om en (note that 5 o f  the remaining cases involved  irregular 
marriage -  couples said to be living in fornication because their marriages w eren’t recognized by the 
church). But, after the passage o f  the 1643 laws, the court’s prosecutions shifted to servant wom en. In 
the 1650s, fully 100% o f  the 7 total fornication and bastardy cases were brought against servant 
wom en. In the 1660s, 84.21%  o f  the 19 cases were brought against servant wom en. In the 1670s, it 
w as 94.73%  o f  19 cases. In the 1680s, it was 75.86%  o f  29 cases, and in the 1690s, it was 86.36%  o f  
22 cases. In the 1700s, the numbers skew  very differently: only 38.63%  o f  the 44  cases were brought
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bastardy would be construed as a problem exclusive to unfree women reflects 
Virginia authorities’ assumption that single free women who became pregnant would 
marry the father of the child.159
Second, the enforcement of the fornication and servant marriage laws over the 
years show that the actual focus of the courts was the birth of bastard children, not 
illicit sex. If illicit sex were the primary concern, then fornication would have caused 
greater apprehension among the authorities than it actually did. In reality, starting 
with the first York County court records in the 1640s, fornication was treated as a 
pro-forma charge, punishable only when a pregnancy was confirmed or a child was 
bom .160 Further, there was not a single prosecution for secret marriage in the history 
of York County, meaning that secret marriage was either a vanishingly rare 
phenomenon, or that it was not considered a meaningful threat. Instead, the secret 
marriage law effectively barred any woman (or man) serving an indenture from 
marrying; therefore, servant women’s children were automatically considered 
bastards. It seems clear that curbing or punishing illegitimate births by servants was
against servant women; over the course o f  the eighteenth century, the numbers w ould continue to 
dw indle. One reason for this is the shift in the laboring population from white servants to slaves o f  
African descent. Further, as w ill be discussed further in this chapter, this shift in prosecutions away  
from servant w om en can be explained by a shift in priorities by the courts: free white and m ixed-race 
w om en’s childbearing would becom e the focus as the courts becam e ever more focused on the status 
o f  m ixed-race children.
159 Indeed, premarital pregnancy rates were high in the seventeenth-century Chesapeake. L ois Green 
Carr and Lorena W alsh found that 1/3 o f  Maryland brides were pregnant during this period. Carr and 
W alsh, ‘T h e  Planter’s W ife,” 32. Brown, G ood  Wives, N asty  Wenches, an d  A nxious P atriarchs, 194.
160 The York County records make clear that fornication was a pro-forma charge. O f 379  total 
bastardy, fornication, and m iscegenation cases betw een 1648 and 1789, 100 included a specific charge 
o f  fornication (often com bined with other charges). O f those 100 fornication cases, in only 9  cases 
w as there definitely no child born. Furthermore, 4  o f  those 9 cases were cases o f  irregular marriage, 
all occurring in 1648, where each man was accused o f  “liv ing in fornication” with a wom an that the 
court specifically  referred to as the man’s “w ife” (i.e ., their marriages w eren’t recognized by the 
colonial governm ent, either for religious reasons or because the marriages were performed casually by 
the participants). O f the remaining 5 cases, 2 were dism issed, 2 were left incom plete, and one w as a 
case o f  m iscegenation. Clearly, in the overw helm ing majority o f  cases, the evidence o f  fornication  
was pregnancy or birth.
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the real focus of these statutes, as the number of bastardy charges increased with each 
passing decade.
Finally, as Virginia framed fornication and bastardy as servants’ crimes, it 
simultaneously whittled away at paternal accountability for the care and support for 
the illegitimate children bom of those unions, virtually guaranteeing that children 
bom to servant women would themselves become indentured servants into adulthood. 
In all of the secret marriage statutes, as well as later bastardy statutes, men fathering 
bastard children were held responsible for those children’s support. Nevertheless, the 
actual prosecutions show that a decreasing number of men were named in bastardy 
prosecutions or held responsible in any way.161 For all intents and purposes, after 
1650, bastardy became not just a servant crime, but a female crime. In York County, 
fathers were named in bastardy cases at a decreasing rate, and, more significantly, by
161 The fo llow ing chart show s the precipitous decline o f  the court’s determination o f  paternal 
responsibility for bastardy. N ot all o f  the men punished were named as the purported fathers -  som e 
were, according to a 1723 statute, the ow ners o f  houses in w hich unreported births o f  bastard children 
occurred (though it is possible that the tw o categories overlapped). C ases were left incom plete for a 
number o f  reasons: they may have been inconclusive, the case may have been dropped, the mother 
may have been able to support the child alone, or the case may have ended in the marriage o f  the 
parties or som e other settlem ent outside o f  court. Acquittals are counted as com pleted cases.
Decade Total
number of 
cases
Total cases 
completed 
in records
Men punished (includes 
purported fathers and 
other men punished)
Percentage of completed 
cases in which a man 
received punishment
1640s 6 5 5 100%
1650s 7 6 4 66%
1660s 19 14 5 36%
1670s 20 19 6 32%
1680s 29 22 6 27%
1690s 22 20 3 15%
1700s 43 37 3 8%
1710s 27 23 3 13%
1720s 30 21 2 10%
1730s 32 28 0 0
1740s 31 28 0 0
1750s 26 26 2 8%
1760s 27 25 0 0
1770s 7 5 2 33%
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the 1690s, only 15% of bastardy cases resulted in any man being punished or 
otherwise held responsible for the support of the child, even if a father was named. 
This pattern would hold throughout the eighteenth century, so that, by the 1730s and 
continuing through the 1760s, virtually no men received any punishment for bastardy.
In March of 1662, Virginia’s fornication laws were rewritten again, this time 
outlining specific bastardy statutes and making abundantly clear the discursive links 
between bastardy, servitude, and female sexuality. The Virginia statutes were 
overhauled that year, as the colony’s leaders realigned with the crown during the
I
Restoration. The Restoration-era laws would cement these existing practices in 
legal language that focused even more clearly on servant women. Once again, secret 
marriages were banned, but the new law not only banned fornication, but also laid out 
specific punishments for the birth of bastard children. These new statutes 
represented a culmination of the process begun in 1643, transforming fornication 
from a moral crime punishable by penance to a servant’s crime punishable by the 
extension of service.
Despite being written during the Restoration overhaul of Virginia’s statutes, 
the new laws would build upon the long-standing conflation of servitude with illicit 
sex and illegitimate births. First, the new punishments for bastardy would 
specifically target servant women. Further, in the new statutes, fathers were 
nominally held responsible for child support, but, in practice, men were rarely named
162 Pagan, A nne O rth w o o d ’s  B astard , 44 -8 . Jon Kukla outlines the process by w hich Virginia redrafted 
its law s in the wake o f  the Restoration, beginning in 1660. Kukla, “Som e A cts N ot in H ening’s 
Statu tes ,” 76-97. M any o f  the law s passed in 1662 -  including the law o f  slavery by birth -  seem  to be 
an effort to make the law match up with current practice. This helps to explain the delay betw een the 
courts’ focus on servant w om en in bastardy cases and the passage o f  an actual bastardy law.
163 Hening 2: 114-5.
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as responsible in the court records.164 Finally, in the new statutes, service was again 
the primary punishment for all involved in bastardy cases -  mothers, fathers, and 
infants. The 1662 statutes cemented the relationship between bastardy and servitude, 
and rationalized that relationship through clear sentencing structures.
While servant women’s bearing of bastard children had been punished by an 
extension of terms of service since 1643, the Restoration-era rationalization of 
Virginia’s laws created a standard which guaranteed that women bearing bastard 
children would be sentenced to two more years of service. Prior to 1662, servant 
women who bore bastard children were punished by the county courts with varying 
amounts of extra service, ranging from no service at all to a year of added labor to 
“double the time of service.”165 After 1662, punishment by extension of service 
became far more cut and dried: servant women convicted of bastardy saw two years 
added to their indenture.166 For example, when Mary Bell was convicted of bastardy 
and fornication in 1674, she was ordered to serve her master, Edward Baptist, “2 
compleat years at the expiration of her first time.” 167 Some women saw extension 
piled on top of extension. Sarah Paskins was convicted of bastardy in 1673 and 
sentenced to two extra years of service.168 When she “had a second bastard child in
164 Hening 2: 115, 166. A ccording to the law, if  a purported father was a servant, he could be required 
to serve extra time in lieu o f  paying for the support o f  the child.
165 Troth Ebbs was convicted  o f  bastardy in 1658, but served no extra time because the infant died. 
York D O W  3: 43 . Mary Gunnell served one year for bearing a bastard child in 1660. York D O W  3: 
78, 88, 91, 92, 94. On the other hand, in 1657, both Ellianr Bray and Elizabeth Turner were required 
to serve double their original time o f  service. York D O W  2: 324; D O W  3: 5. The 1662 cem ented the 
preexisting practice o f  dem anding labor as punishment for bastardy, even w hile establishing tw o years 
as the standard punishment for each bastard birth. For more on why tw o years was seen as an 
appropriate sentence, see chapter 2.
1 Hening 2: 114-5. Free w om en convicted o f  bastardy paid a fine.
167 York D O W  5: 68. The two-year sentence was observed by the Council and General Court o f  the 
colony as well. See the 1670 case o f  W illim ot Rogerman: H.R. M cllw aine, ed., M inutes o f  the Council 
an d  G enera l C ourt o f  C olon ial Virginia, 2nd Ed. (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1979), 238.
168 York D O W  5: 54, 56.
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the time of her first service,” she was sentenced to yet another two years of service.169 
Free women were to be fined or whipped, but, significantly, after the passage of the 
1662 bastardy laws, not a single free woman was convicted of bastardy in York 
County until 1694.170 Because it was meted out primarily to women serving 
indentures, the punishment for bearing bastard children was, in practice, a means of 
extracting ever more labor from servant women.
In practice, the requirement of service extended to servant women’s children 
as well as to the woman herself. If, in Swinburne’s term, the bastard child was filius 
nulius (the child of no one), then women bearing illegitimate children had little 
recourse to gain financial or moral support from the father of their children. Further, 
as we have seen, in shifting focus in bastardy cases to servant women, the courts 
made little effort to establish paternity or to gamer paternal support in these cases. 
Therefore, if bastard children could not be supported by the mother and in the likely 
absence of paternal support, that child would be promptly indentured out until 
adulthood (even as early as the age of weaning).171 Infant indenture seems even more 
likely if the woman was a servant and still had time left to serve her master or 
mistress -  the courts would consider her unable to support the child. For example, 
when Mary Denham was convicted in 1665 of bearing a bastard child while she was 
indentured to Ashaell Batten, not only was she sentenced to two extra years of 
service, but her child was “kept under the charge” of the churchwardens of Maston
169 York D O W  5: 91.
170 Significantly, the first free woman convicted  o f  bastardy after the passage o f  the 1662 law s w as a 
free wom an o f  color, Mary Catilla, w hose stepfather paid her fine in 1694. York D O W  9: 341.
171 On the indenture o f  bastard children during infancy or im m ediately fo llow ing w eaning, see: Pagan, 
Anne O rth w ood 's B astard, 108-10; Carr and W alsh, “The Planter’s W ife,” 30.
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Parish until the age of 2 1.172 Servant women’s children were routinely separated 
from their mothers, considered wards of the parish, and sold into indentures until they 
reached the age of majority. If, as Edmund Morgan remarked, the practice of 
indentured servitude taught Virginia masters to “treat men as things,” it certainly 
taught them to separate mother and child as well as to claim the labor of children as a 
result of their birth.173
This was the context into which the 1662 law of slavery by birth was passed. 
Since 1643, Virginia’s legal structure had forged a legal and discursive link between 
servitude, illicit sex, and illegitimate births. Servant sexuality was treated as 
fundamentally different from -  and more harmful than -  the sexuality of free people. 
The courts targeted servant women especially, both by prosecuting them at a much 
higher rate than free women, and by ceasing to demand paternal responsibility for 
children’s support. Finally, the extension of service became the standard punishment 
for bastardy. This was true for children as well as for servant women: bastard 
children were destined to a life of service, at least until adulthood, as a result of the 
conditions of their birth. Bastardy had become synonymous with servitude, both in 
the targeting of servant women and in demanding service from women and children 
as punishment for the crime.
The 1662 law of slavery by birth was passed just six months after the new 
bastardy statutes, also as a part of the Restoration-era overhaul of the colony’s laws. 
Seen in this context, where servitude and illegitimacy were inextricably linked, the 
law of slavery by birth was an extension of existing colonial law, even as it was a
172 York D O W  4: 28, 52. A s we w ill see later in this chapter and in Chapters 2 and 3, E nglish servant 
w om en fought hard -  against considerable odds -  to maintain ties with their children.
173 Morgan, Am erican S lavery, A m erican F reedom , 129.
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repudiation of the tradition of patriarchal inheritance. The law of slavery by birth 
specifically targeted black women and their children: “Negro womens children,” the 
title of the law stated, were “to serve according to the condition o f the mother ”174 
The law’s explanation, though, drew the connection between this new definition of 
slavery and the bastardy and fornication laws which preceded it: “If any Christian 
shall commit fornication with a negro man or woman, hee or shee soe offending shall 
pay double the fines imposed by the former act.”175 Fornication and bastardy were 
inherent to the makeup of the law of slavery by birth.
It is important to remember that the 1662 law of slavery by birth did not 
invent the idea of inherited slavery; nevertheless, the law stands as the first time the 
practice was actually enshrined in the legal code of an English colony, and its impact 
should not be underestimated.176 Further, because the law was not the first to treat 
black women as a fundamentally different from white women, it also must not be 
construed as having originated racial slavery or racial difference.177 Indeed, as with 
bastardy law, the law of slavery by birth was passed to standardize existing practice, 
as conflicting opinions arose as to the status of mixed-race children: the law was
l74H en in g2: 170. Italics in original.
175 Ibid. The im plications o f  this new legal concept -  the banning o f  interracial sex  -  w ill be discussed  
in more detail later.
176 Morris, Southern S lavery an d  the L aw , 43 . Morris acknow ledges the roots o f  the 1662 law o f  
slavery by birth in bastardy law, but argues that, ultimately, the law o f  chattel property w as more 
important in the practice o f  slavery as an institution. The treatment o f  slaves as chattel property w ill be 
discussed in the second and third sections o f  this chapter; I argue that even  treating slaves as chattel 
was rooted in enslaved peop le’s reproductivity.
177 Kathleen Brown argues that, by taxing black w om en’s labor differently than white w om en’s labor, 
the 1643 tithing law was a significant step in the creation o f  racial slavery via the deploym ent o f  
gender ideology. Brown, G o o d  Wives, N asty Wenches, an d  A nxious P atriarchs, 116-128.
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passed because, according to the Burgesses, “some doubts have arrisen whether
178children got by any Englishman upon a negro woman should be slave or ffree.”
There were clear connections between the law of slavery by birth and the 
existing conflation of servitude and illegitimacy. Legally, bastard children were 
children without fathers; the appellation of enslaved children as “negro women’s 
children” (in other words, as children who had only mothers) framed those children as 
bastards. In the absence of fathers, white bastard children had been required to serve 
into adulthood; such was the case for children of enslaved black women, except those 
children’s service, by virtue only of their mother’s race, would be life-long. The 
colony’s bastardy laws had asserted a hierarchy between free and servant women’s 
sexuality and reproduction, had punished servant women’s breaking of the law with 
even more service, and had demanded service from children as a consequence of their 
birth. The targeting of black women and their children in the 1662 law of slavery by 
birth was an extension of these practices. In this way, the law followed a perverse if 
comprehensible logic: Kathleen Brown points out that it was simply not possible to 
extend the term of service of women who were “already understood to be serving for 
life.”179 The law of slavery by birth, by explicitly targeting “negro women” and their 
children, racialized the hierarchy of women’s sexuality: if white servant women’s 
sexuality was to be disciplined, enslaved black women’s sexuality would be exploited 
by this law.
178 Hening 2: 170. The fact that the 1662 law was passed amidst the Restoration-era overhaul o f  
V irginia’s law s, many o f  w hich were out o f  date or contradictory, further im plies that the practice was 
already in effect prior to the law ’s enactment. It is significant, though, that w hile the overhaul o f  
Virginia law s was aim ed (and largely succeeded) at making V irginia’s statutes hew more c lose ly  to 
English law, the law o f  racial slavery by birth stood outside o f  English precedent. Pagan, Anne 
O rth w ood 's B astard , 47-8 .
179 Brown, G o o d  Wives, N asty Wenches, and Anxious P atriarchs, 131.
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The key difference in the 1662 law of slavery by birth was the expansion of 
the discursive link between servitude and bastardy to include race as well. Three 
laws passed concurrently with the 1662 law of slavery by birth make clear that the 
intent of the new law was to conflate race and servitude -  in other words, to use the 
regulation of reproduction and sexuality in order to create a new definition of racial 
slavery. First, a new tithing law specifically targeted black women’s labor, asserting 
a fundamental difference between black and white labor and laborers. Second, the 
Assembly designed specific punishments for masters who fathered bastards by white 
servant women. And, finally, within the body of the law of slavery by birth itself, 
Virginia passed its first law barring interracial sex. An examination of these three 
laws reveals the attempt by the Assembly to define racial slavery through the 
regulation of sexuality and reproduction.
The 1662 tithing law overturned a 1643 law that taxed black women’s labor 
equally with men’s. The new tithing law would seem to be unrelated to the question 
of slavery by birth, but in fact it shows the ways that Virginia’s master class was 
reframing plantation labor in terms of race and birth. The intent of the original tithing 
law was to tax planters for all of their laborers, defined in 1643 as all men and all 
“negro women” over the age of 16.180 Kathleen Brown argues that the 1643 tithing 
law was a crucial initial step in defining racial slavery, significant in its particular 
focus on gendered labor: “The tax levied on African women in 1643 was the earliest 
distinctive and clearly unfavorable treatment of African people to be enshrined in law 
in Virginia.”181 According to the new 1662 tithing law, some masters had been
180 Hening 1 :242 .
181 Brown, G o o d  Wives, N asty W enches an d  A nxious P atriarchs, 116.
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employing white women in their tobacco fields, in order to capitalize on their tax-free 
labor. The new law would tax not only black women, but any and all women who 
“worked in the ground.”182 While the new taxation law would be short-lived, it 
reveals the inner workings of the nascent ideology of racial slavery. With slavery by 
birth, slave status (and therefore taxable labor) was defined not as a category of labor 
and laborers, but as a status inherited at birth. It did not matter what kind of labor one 
did; what mattered was one’s birth status. The law of slavery by birth had made the 
1643 tithing law obsolete.
Second, during that same session in December 1662, the Virginia legislature 
disallowed masters from claiming servant women’s extra labor if the woman named 
them as the father of their child.183 The law did limit masters’ ability to abuse their 
power: “late experiente shew that some dissolute masters have gotten their maides 
with child.”184 Nevertheless, the law was intended to protect masters as a class, while 
still punishing servant women for bearing children: concerned that “if a woman gott 
with child by her master should be freed from that service it might probably induce 
some loose persons to lay all their bastards to their masters,” the Burgesses required 
that the woman’s extra service be sold to the parish.185 To further illustrate the ways 
that this law actually protected masters, very rarely in York County’s colonial history 
was a master named as fathering a servant woman’s child, and no such cases were
182 Hening 2: 170. Kathleen Brown argues that the 1662 taxation law  was rescinded because it was 
unenforceable: “crafting individual definitions o f  tithability based on labor performed rather than on 
the sex o f  the laborer” proved too onerous a task for county courts. Brown, G o o d  Wives, N asty  
Wenches, Anxious P atriarchs, 120-2.
183 Hening 2: 167.
184 Ibid.
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heard after 1700.186 One of those rare cases illustrates the gender, race, and status 
politics imbedded in the 1662 law. In that 1687 case, a recently freed servant named 
Phillis named her former master, Daniel Taylor, as the father of her child.187 While 
Phillis was punished with 18 lashes, Taylor was not punished at all.188 Since Phillis is 
listed in the court records without a surname, it is likely that she was a free woman of 
African descent. If this is the case, it is possible that the court heard the case as a way 
to censure Taylor for having a sexual relationship and fathering children with a free 
woman of color. Ultimately, that the law nominally protected white women from 
sexual abuse by their masters only underscores the fact that black women had no such 
legal protection from their masters.189 Masters not only claimed the labor of black
186 There are five extant cases in the York County records o f  masters being named as the father o f  their 
servants’ children after the passage o f  the 1662 law. In tw o o f  those cases, the court did hold the 
master responsible for the bastardy. See the 1662 case o f  Mary M inshall (York D O W  3: 175, 176) and 
the 1680 case o f  Elizabeth Morgan (York D O W  6: 236). T ellingly, tw o o f  the five cases are actually 
disputes betw een masters, both occurring in 1697: the w om en, now  indentured to new masters, 
accused their former masters o f  fathering their bastard children. In other words, these cases were not 
exam ples o f  masters being punished for fathering bastard children, but disputes over w ho would  
provide support for the child. See the law suit betw een Francis C allow hill and the estate o f  W illiam  
Kinard (York D O W  10: 360, 3 6 9 ,4 0 4 ,4 3 3 -4 )  and the bastardy trial o f  Sarah W ood (York D O W  10: 
406). The last case is the case o f  Phillis and D aniel Taylor, d iscussed  below .
187 York D O W  8: 43 . W hile Phillis was indentured at the time o f  conception, she had been freed by 
the time o f  the suit. Therefore, since Taylor could not claim  to have lost any labor during her lying in, 
Phillis was not subjected to additional years o f  service.
188 Ibid.
189 Sexual access was part o f  the very definition o f  slaveownership. Sharon B lock  em phasizes the way  
that “mastery” was constructed in early American meant that fem ale servants and slaves were “prime 
targets for sexual coercion by their masters.” B lock, R ape an d  Sexual P o w er  in E arly  A m erica , 64-74. 
Kirsten Fischer notes that the v iolence meted against slaves (including rape) was far greater than that 
suffered by white servants; sexualized violence itse lf was a powerful shaper o f  racial ideology. Fischer, 
Su spect R elations, 160, 189. Kathleen Brown points out that the law  did not recognize the rape o f  
enslaved w om en (as opposed to free and indentured white w om en) because “no man was recognized as 
being injured by the offense.” Brown, G o o d  Wives, N asty  Wenches, an d  A nxious P atriarchs, 210. 
Black w om en’s historians and black fem inists have em phasized the constant threat o f  rape against 
enslaved w om en and girls was a fundamental aspect o f  life both during and after slavery: Darlene 
Clark H ine, “Rape and the Inner L ives o f  Southern Black W omen: Thoughts on the Culture o f  
D issem blance,” in Southern Women: H istories an d  Identities, ed. Virginia Bernhard, Betty Brandon, 
Elizabeth F ox-G enovese, and Theda Perdue (Columbia: U niversity o f  M issouri Press, 1992), 177-89; 
bell hooks, A in 't I  a  Woman: B lack Women an d  Fem inism  (Boston: South End Press, 1981), 24-9; 
Thelm a Jennings, ‘“ U s Colored W omen Had to G o Through a P lenty’: Sexual Exploitation o f  African- 
American S lave W om en,” Journal o f  W om en’s H istory  1 (W inter 1990): 45-74; Brenda Stevenson,
74
women who they impregnated, whether by rape or by coercive sexual relations, but
100they also gained the life-long labor of her child.
The most important legal addendum to the 1662 law of slavery by birth was 
embedded in that law itself: the introduction of the first anti-miscegenation edict in 
the entire body of English law.191 The law of slavery by birth had two parts. The 
first, which and defined inherited slavery, declared that “all children borne in this
|Q 2
country shalbe held bond or free only according to the condition of the mother.”
T h e  s e c o n d  p a r t  o f  th e  la w  d e c la r e d  th a t  “ i f  a n y  C h r is t ia n  s h a l l  c o m m i t t  f o r n ic a t io n  
w i th  a  n e g r o  m a n  o r  w o m a n ,  h e e  o r  s h e e  s o e  o f f e n d in g  s h a l l  p a y  d o u b le  th e  f in e s
1Q-}imposed by the former act.” As we will see, if the law of slavery by birth was 
intended to create a dualistic racial system, in which whites were assumed to be free 
and blacks were assumed to be enslaved, then interracial reproduction was newly 
problematic.
Prior to 1662, there was no legal bar against interracial sex or interracial 
reproduction. There is some evidence that interracial sex was considered an 
especially egregious form of fornication before 1662. For example, in 1630, Hugh 
Davis was whipped “for abusing himself to the dishonor of God and shame of 
Christians, by defiling his body by lying with a negro.”194 On the other hand, in
Life in B lack an d  White: Fam ily an d  Com m unity in the S lave South  (N Y : Oxford U niversity Press, 
1996), 236-7 .
190 Sharon B lock argues that master-slave sexual relationships, even when consensual, alw ays included  
an elem ent o f  coercion. B lock, R ape an d  Sexual P ow er in E arly A m erica , 64-74 .
191 Jordan, White o v e r  Black, 139.
192 Hening 2:170.
193 Ibid.
194 Hening 1: 145. This often cited case has been interpreted as som e o f  the first evidence o f  racism in 
the colony. M organ, A m erican Slavery, A m erican F reedom , 333.
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1643, Thomas Tiemer fathered a child with an unnamed free woman of color.195 The 
case was treated as a moral crime. Tiemer was required to do public penance, and the 
woman was unpunished, a sentence no different than any other free couple convicted 
of bastardy at the time.196 The Tiemer case would indicate that interracial sex and 
reproduction was not problematic as late as the 1640s. The 1662 antimiscegenation 
law ended these competing legal practices, but it did not end interracial relationships, 
of course.
The 1662 anti-miscegenation law, because it was coupled with the law of 
slavery by birth, linked bastardy and sexuality to race in the creation of inherited 
racial slavery. The effect of this linkage was manifold. First, white women’s 
reproduction would be increasingly disciplined as a means of maintaining the color 
line. As we will see, after 1662, the courts would focus on punishing (increasingly 
harshly) white women who bore interracial children. The advent of slavery by birth 
and the institution of antimiscegenation laws required the disciplining of white 
women’s sexuality. This discipline took the form of bastardy and miscegenation 
prosecutions for white women who dared to cross the color line. As Ann Laura Stoler 
argues, in a colonial context, “the sexual choices of white women were at issue; they 
are desired objects, but unruly desiring subjects as well.”197 More importantly, white 
women’s “issue” was at issue as well: the children that were products of these 
relationships needed to be categorized, accounted for, and, in a colonial labor 
economy, exploited.
195 York D OW  3: 2.
196 A case in 1640, involving Robert Sw eat and an unnamed “negro servant w om an” follow ed  the same 
pattern. M cllw aine, M inutes o f  the C ouncil an d  G enera l Court, 483.
97 Stoler, Race an d  the E ducation o f  D esire, 41.
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Second, the color line was permeable in the other direction, as white men 
were able to father children with enslaved women with impunity, knowing that those 
children would inherit the status of their mother. Cases like Thomas Tiemer’s -  
where white men were held responsible for the birth of interracial children -  would be 
virtually unheard of after 1662. This permeability of the anti-miscegenation law must 
not be underestimated: references to so-called “mulatto” slaves occur throughout the 
colonial record. Examples abound of these children, the daughters and sons of 
enslaved black women and unknown white men, such as in 1718, when Thomas 
Jones sued for ownership of “negro Women 4 mulatto Children & a parcell of 
Plate.”198 Ann Laura Stoler points out that discourses about interracial sex “were not 
discourses designed to find a solution.”199 In other words, antimiscegenation laws 
were not meant to end the practice outright, but instead to police the boundaries of 
European group identity by defining outsiders as dangerous, polluting, and 
“abominable.” The law of slavery by birth did not end interracial sex, but instead 
created two categories of interracial children: the interracial children of enslaved 
women were chattel slaves, while the interracial children of white women were 
dangerous challenges to racial purity.
After 1662, the rule that one’s status was determined by the status of one’s 
mother was repeated, solidified, and expanded in the statutes, and, even as the 
transatlantic slave trade flourished, the principle of slavery by birth became the
198 York D O W  15, 340. That these w om en and their children had been reduced to the status o f  objects 
is clear in this example: arranged in a series, they were the linguistic equivalent to “a parcell o f  Plate.”
199 Stoler, R ace an d  the E ducation o f  D esire , 46 . In fact, Stoler’s Foucauldian reading o f  
antim iscegenation statutes suggest that the law s crea ted  desire, rather than curtailing it. W rites Stoler, 
“A basic tension in the sexual politics o f  colonial states was the promise o f  new  possib ilities for 
desiring male subjects and objects for them, but im plem ented policies that sim ultaneously closed  those 
possibilities dow n.” Stoler, R ace and the E ducation o f  D esire , 178-9. See also Parent, Foul M eans, 
116.
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central logic of creating and growing the laboring population. The language of the 
1662 statute would be repeated frequently throughout the colonial period. In 1667, a 
statute declaring that baptism did not automatically free a slave referred to “slaves 
from birth.”200 A 1696 fornication law repeated the 1662 language of slavery by 
birth: “all children bom in this country be bond or free, according to the condition of 
their mother.”201 The omnibus slave code of 1705 also declared, “all children shall be 
bond or free, according to the condition of their mothers.”202 The 1705 language was 
repeated in the 1748 and 1753 slave codes.203 Finally, in 1785, the Virginia 
Assembly defined slavery for the new state, defining slaves as “such as were so on 
the first day of this present session of assembly, and the descendants of the females of 
them.”204 The language was different, but the logic was the same: slavery was 
perpetual, and it followed the line of female descent.
Beyond simply repeating the law of slavery by birth, these statutes further 
emphasized and intensified the discursive and practical connections between 
servitude, illegitimacy, and, increasingly, interracial sex. Fornication and bastardy 
would continue to be criminalized throughout the colonial period in Virginia; further, 
interracial births would be subject to increasingly stringent penalties. The slave laws 
of 1691, 1705, and 1723 intensified the connection between bastardy, servitude, and 
interracial sex by creating what eventually amounted to a quasi-inherited slavery for 
mixed-race illegitimate children. In all of these laws, legitimacy and freedom were 
conflated -  a legitimate child was, by definition, a child born free -  while illegitimacy
200 Hening 2:260.
201 Hening 3: 137-40.
202 Hening 3: 447-62 .
203 Hening 5: 547-58; Hening 6: 356-7.
204 Hening 12: 182-3.
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and servitude were linked. Children born to unfree women (whether servant or slave) 
were, by definition, illegitimate, and were subject to some level of servitude, based on 
the status of their mother. Race, of both mother and child, was the factor by which 
the extent of that child’s servitude would be defined.
This connection between miscegenation, bastardy, and servitude was made 
clear in 1691, when Virginia passed a new fornication law, as well as the slave code 
entitled “an act for the suppression of outlying slaves.”205 Like the original 1662 law 
of slavery by birth, the 1691 laws were especially concerned with the birth of mixed- 
race bastard children to white women (especially servant women), and the intention 
of the law was to extract ever more labor from those women and children. The new 
laws expanded punishment for mixed-race bastardy from the double fine laid out in 
1662 to five years extra service or a £15 sterling fine (a prohibitively high fine for any 
but the wealthiest Virginians to pay). Furthermore, any mixed-race children bom 
to white women would be subject to 31-year indentures, rather than the traditional 21 
years. In other words, in cases of interracial bastardy, both women and children were 
subject to even greater amounts of increased servitude.
The 1691 anti-miscegenation law made clear that the problem of 
miscegenation was not just illicit sexual contact, but the birth of babies who blurred 
the color line: the law was labeled as a law “for the prevention of that abominable 
mixture and spurious issue.”207 Here, race and bastardy are linked in a language that 
signalled monstrous reproduction: sexual contact, or “mixture,” between races was
205 Hening 3: 71-5 , 86-7.
206
For an exam ple o f  the double fine, see the m iscegenation case o f  Elizabeth Banks, w ho was 
sentenced to 39 lashes and four years o f  service for bearing a mixed-race bastard child  in 1683. York 
DOW  6: 498.
207 Hening 3: 86-7.
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“abominable,” and the “issue” bom of these unions was “spurious,” or illegitimate, 
illegal.208 These babies were monstrous not just because of their skin color, but 
because their birth was a threat to the emerging racial order of the colony. To term 
these infant bodies as “abominable” or “spurious” also points to the belief that the 
black body itself was monstrous, and that contact with black bodies made white 
bodies dangerously vulnerable. We see a manifestation of this emerging discourse 
of racial danger in the actions of the county courts, which increasingly focused on 
policing interracial sex. The York County quarterly court presentments from 
February 1695 provide a potent example: that month, every single criminal case that 
the court heard was somehow concerned with interracial sex.210
The York County courts interpreted the 1691 anti-miscegenation law as an 
expansion of the bastardy statutes, wherein illicit sex and illegitimate births were 
punishable by increased service by white women, and lengthening that service even 
more for the “abominable” crime of interracial sex. For example, Elizabeth Owell, a
208 M idwifery manuals o f  the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries included much d iscussion  o f  the 
birth o f  so-called  “monsters.” See, for exam ple, A ris to tle ’s  C om plea t M aster P iece in Three Parts: 
D isplaying  the Secrets o f  N ature in the G eneration  o f  M an  (1755), E arly Am erican Im prints no. 40735 , 
76-77. Eucharius R osslin, The B yrth o f  M ankynde, O therw ise N am ed the W omans B ooke  (Facsim ile  
o f  1545 edition. N ew  York: The C lassics o f  M edicine Library, 1994), 12, 50. See chapter 4 fo ra  
discussion o f  the m eanings o f  monstrous births in V irginia’s print culture.
209 Black fem inist scholars and historians have deconstructed racist d iscourses o f  black fem ale 
monstrosity. Jennifer Morgan argues that ideas o f  black fem ale monstrosity were inextricably linked 
with anxieties about sexuality and reproduction. M organ, L aboring Women, 12-50. Londa Schiebinger 
discusses the w ays that ideas about the monstrous black fem ale body informed scientific d iscourses in 
Europe during this sam e period. Londa Schiebinger, N a tu re ’s B ody: G en der in the M aking o f  M odem  
Science  (Boston: B eacon Press, 1993). These discourses continue today in popular culture, continuing  
to tie black fem ale sexuality with dehum anizing notions o f  monstrosity and anim alism , bell hooks 
argues that these discourses were and continue to be central to an ideology o f  hierarchical racial 
separation, by “a llo w in g ] w hites to sexualize their world by projecting onto black bodies a narrative 
o f  sexualization disassociated with w hiteness.” bell hooks, “Selling Hot Pussy: Representations o f  
Black Fem ale Sexuality in the Cultural M arketplace,” in The P o litics o f  W om en's B odies: Sexuality, 
A ppearance, B ehavior, ed. R ose W eitz (NY: Oxford, 1998), 112-122. A s I d iscuss later in this 
chapter, this discourse o f  black fem ale anim alism  can be seen in the daily casual and legal language o f  
slaveownership.
210 York D O W  10: 106-7.
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servant of Mary Tinson, was convicted of “haveing comitted the sinn of fornication 
with a Negro,” and bearing “a molotto child” in 1695.211 She was sentenced to two 
years service for bastardy (which was meant as a repayment to her mistress for her 
lost labor and other costs incurred during her lying in), and another two and a half 
years to repay her mistress for paying her fine. In another case brought to court in 
1700, Ann Winball was brought to court because she “had a molatto chid borne of her 
body.”212 Her case was not decided until 1703, when her indenture was set to end. 
Sarah Starkey, Ann’s newly widowed mistress, sought to extend Ann’s service, 
explicitly referring to the 1691 act. The court took Winball into custody, and sold her 
for 5 years more service. The proceeds of the sale went to Winball’s mistress.
Embedded in the 1691 anti-miscegenation law were enforcements that further 
cemented the discursive intertwining of bastardy, color, and labor: mixed-race 
children bom to white women were subject to 31 years, rather than 21 years, of 
forced labor. Illegitimate birth doomed a child to a form of servitude by birth -  
temporary, but still inherited as a matter of course by virtue of the circumstances of 
one’s birth. The automatic 31-year indenture of the mixed-race children of white 
women more closely linked illegitimacy and race to nearly perpetual labor: their 
indenture had them serve well into adulthood, especially with the still-low life 
expectancies of the Virginia colony. The mixed-race children of black women, of 
course, served for life: theirs was a fully inherited perpetual slavery.
The 1705 slave code, which had repeated the language of the 1662 law of 
slavery by birth, also repeated the 1691 language of “abominable mixture and
211 York DOW  10:106-7, 121, 152.
212 York DOW  11: 365, 374; York DOW  12: 80.
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spurious issue.”213 The law linked interracial bastardy with servitude, not just by 
targeting servant women, but by punishing free women with 5-year indentures if they 
could not pay their fine. Servant women saw their time of service extended greatly 
for bearing bastard children.214 Free white women were routinely sold into 5-year 
indentures following their conviction, and their children indentured out for 31 years. 
In 1706, Rebecca Stephens, a free white woman unable to pay the £15 sterling fine, 
was sold for 5 years to the parish.215 Women struggled to raise the £15 fine, in order 
to avoid being auctioned off into service by the parish. Mary West, recently widowed 
in 1722, was charged with “having a Mulatto Bastard.”216 In concurrent lawsuits 
regarding debts owed by her deceased husband, she struggled to retain as much of the 
value as possible from her husband’s estate. Eventually, she was able to pay the £15 
fine and avoid 5 years of service.
Mulatto children of white women were already required, since 1691, to serve 
to the age of 31. In 1723, the linkage between birth, inheritability, servitude, and race 
was intensified, as the Burgesses decreed that if any woman serving a 31-year 
indenture herself had a bastard child, that child would also serve to the age of 31.
The new law was aimed at extracting the maximum amount of labor possible, based 
on birth and racially-marked illegitimacy. Kirsten Fischer emphasizes that the result 
of the law was that “mixed-race children, though nominally free, effectively spent
2,4 Hening 3: 453-4 .
214 Rachel W ood was convicted on three separate occasions for interracial bastardy, each tim e finding  
her service extended. York D O W  13: 72, 115, 137, 216, 228, 235, 263. See also the case o f  Mary 
Hanson and the enslaved man named D ick, York D OW  12: 4 1 4 ,4 2 4 ; York D O W  13: 17.
215 York DOW  13: 19. See also: the case o f  Mary Bryan, York D O W  13: 66; the case o f  Elizabeth  
Cunnears, York DOW  14: 41; the case o f  Cleopatra B ee, York D O W  19: 45 , 56, 62 , 72, 79 , 89; and 
the case o f  Elizabeth Dutchficld, York JO 1: 141, 146, 157, 365.
216 York D O W  16: 101, 120, 134, 153, 156, 162, 169, 179, 197.
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their most productive and reproductive years as servants.” As such, this new rule 
amounted to a sort of quasi-inherited slavery, in which mixed-race people, already 
serving well into adulthood and therefore more likely to bear children while 
completing their term of service, passed on that same extended servitude to their 
children for no reason other than their mixed-race background.218 This was a de facto 
(if not de jure) form of inherited slavery.
This 31-year indenture was like slavery in another way: women saw their 
children sold away from them, for what may have been their entire lives. Mothers 
serving indentures struggled to maintain relationships with their children. Martha 
West was a mixed-race woman who bore two sons, Charles and James, during her 
own 3 1-year indenture to Sarah Walker.219 In 1732, Sarah Walker petitioned the 
court to bind the two boys to her for their 31-year indenture, rather than having their 
labor sold by their parish. Martha must have been pleased by this agreement: it 
assured that her children would remain near her during their lives. Cases like Martha
217 Fischer, Suspect R elations, 125. D ouglas D eal points out that this law  capitalized on the fact that 
the first generation o f  31 -year indentured servants were them selves approaching adulthood. D ouglas 
D eal, “A  Constricted World: Free Blacks on V irginia’s Eastern Shore, 1680-1750,” in C olon ial 
C hesapeake Society , ed. L ois Green Carr, Philip D. M organ, and Jean B. Russo (Chapel Hill: 
University o f  North Carolina Press, 1988), 278.
218 The notion that extended indentures would make som e servants more likely to bear bastard children 
seem s to echo Peter Laslett’s concept o f  the “illegitim acy-prone sub-society.” Laslett im plied that the 
“illegitim acy-prone sub-society” was a group within a society that w as more likely to have children  
outside o f  w edlock because o f  their different moral standards than the dominant culture. Those 
illegitim ate children, then, would be likely to have illegitim ate children o f  their ow n. In fact, I argue 
that quite the opposite process was occurring in Virginia. The conditions for illegitim acy were 
cem ented into law  by the Virginia government. V irginia law, by extending indentures w ell into 
adulthood, and also by refusing to recognize interracial marriages, literally created the conditions in 
w hich large numbers o f  children would be born to parents who were either unmarried or whose  
marriages were not recognized by the state. W hile servants, slaves, and free blacks may have indeed  
held different sexual mores than the dominant culture, the conditions for illegitim acy were created by 
the state itself. Peter Laslett, “Long-term trends in bastardy in England,” in Fam ily life an d  illic it love  
in ea r lie r  gen era tion s ( NY:  Cambridge U niversity Press, 1977), 102-159.
219 York D OW  17: 295. This is one o f  the few  cases that I’ve found in w hich white m istresses actively  
aided their fem ale servants and slaves. A s w ill be discussed later, propertied white w om en were 
com plicit or actively involved in the exploitation o f  black w om en’s reproductivity.
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West’s were the exception -  most mixed-race servants were not able to assert such 
control over their relationships with their children.
Two patterns emerged after the passage of the 1662 law of slavery by birth. 
First, illegitimacy and servitude continued to be discursively linked, as the laws for 
each overlapped well into the eighteenth century. Second, as servitude was 
racialized, so was illegitimacy: punishments for bastardy were gradated in terms of 
race, as mixed-race illegitimate children were expected to complete indentures that 
stretched well into their adult years. Childbearing was at the center of both these 
patterns. Slavery by birth was the central logic defining the entire servant population 
of the colony, regardless of color. The enforcement of slavery by birth created a 
gradated system of race and servitude, ranging from the inescapable lifelong servitude 
of black women’s children to the temporary servitude (treated as a temporary 
aberration from innate freedom) of white servant women’s white children. By 
appropriating the reproductive lives of black women, the slaveowning class found an 
economic boon in the law of slavery by birth.
In so doing, Virginia lawmakers created several overlapping classes of 
laborers who stood outside of the logic of patriarchal inheritance upon which the 
colony’s wealth and laws were based. The children of enslaved women were, in 
Swinburne’s terms, “children of no man” -  legally fatherless. In a world in which 
everything -  property, status, name -  was inherited from one’s father, the bastard 
child stood outside of the lines of inheritance, able to inherit neither from their fathers 
or their mothers.220 Enslaved children had a similar status, unable to claim any link to
220 T hese law s w ould be liberalized only after the Revolution. In 1785, Virginia declared that bastard 
children could inherit from their mother “as if  they had been law fully begotten o f  such mother.”
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either father or mother. This was an obvious protection for the white men who 
fathered enslaved children: the enslaved children of white men had no claims on their 
father’s property, thus protecting the all-important patriarchal lines of inheritance that 
resulted in the solidification of the estates and power of the planter class. Whether 
the mixed-race children of enslaved women were the sons and daughters of their 
master, or another white man, and whether they were the products of rape or 
consensual sex, the effect was the same: slavery may have been marked by race, but it 
was a product of birth. It is not an exaggeration to argue that, in the seventeenth- 
century Anglo-American world, this legal fatherlessness was a method of systemic 
dehumanization. Enslaved people were denied a patronymic, and thus denied a 
recognized genealogy. Not only were they unable to inherit property, they became 
property themselves. Legal fatherlessness was the basis for slavery in Virginia law; 
reproductivity would be central to how slaves were understood as a category of 
property as well.
Property and Slavery 
By the eighteenth century in the Anglo-American colonies, slavery was a 
system of life-long servitude, marked by race, wherein the slave was defined as the 
property of the master. Virginia’s adoption of life-long slavery by birth had 
capitalized on the pre-existing legal context of English bastardy law. That life-long 
labor was racially coded: slavery was inherited exclusively by the children bom of 
enslaved black and mixed-race women. In other words, reproduction was central to
Notably, bastard children’s right to inherit was not extended to their fathers’ property. Hening 12: 
138-9.
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defining slavery as both life-long and race-based. Similarly, the adoption of the 
principle of chattel slavery -  the ownership of enslaved bodies as property -  was 
itself rooted in pre-existent English property law. Further, like the linking of slavery 
to bastardy law, the principle of chattel slavery exploited enslaved women’s 
reproductivity. As we will see, if bastardy law had made it possible for slaveholders 
to claim the life-long labor of enslaved people by birth, then property law made it 
possible for slaveholders to imagine a racial hierarchy in which white slaveholders 
could literally own black bodies. Here, we’ll see again the emergence of a racial 
ideology in Virginia simultaneous to the development of slavery as an institution. In 
the long process of inventing race in the Americas, reproduction was both a central 
discourse and a means by which race was codified in social practice.
In defining enslaved people as property, Virginia’s slaveholders once more 
used the law to advance their own interests. As we have seen, colonial Virginia law 
was simultaneously reactive and creative. The 1662 law of slavery by birth serves as 
a potent example of this dualism. The law of slavery by birth was reactive in its 
codification of pre-existing practices -  enslaved women’s children were clearly 
enslaved before the passage of that law. Even if the law was reactive, it was also 
creative: by drawing on pre-existing bastardy law, Virginia’s planter-legislators 
maximized their own wealth by constructing new discursive connections between 
sexuality, race, illegitimacy, and labor. As when they defined slavery by birth via 
discourses of illegitimacy, Virginia’s lawmakers would define their slaves as property 
via existing notions of property ownership. Again, existing law -  here, the property
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law regulating livestock ownership -  would become the basis by which the emerging 
planter elite would solidify and maximize their economic holdings and their power.
The last quarter of the seventeenth century saw the amassing of vast 
plantations by an emerging planter class. Aided by access to slave labor, a legal 
system written by the planters themselves, inheritance laws that favored the amassing 
of large estates, and a headright system that offered free land to planters who 
purchased imported slaves, the planters who were best able to capitalize on these 
resources found great wealth in the tobacco economy.221 But prior to the rise of the 
so-called “great planters” Virginia’s inheritance system was in crisis. High mortality 
rates interrupted the primogeniture patterns that organized property in England: 
property-holding widows held far greater power than their sisters in England, minor 
children had a depressingly high chance of being orphaned, and second and third 
marriages called lines of inheritance into question.222 Surviving records evince 
property-holders’ anxiety over proper inheritance in a world where mixed families 
were the norm. For example, the lawyer William Fitzhugh’s letters are full of his 
explications of complicated patterns of inheritance where simple parent-to-child 
inheritance was not possible. Fitzhugh feared the “Confusion & uncertainty” that
221 Kulikoff, Tobacco an d  S laves , 263-7; M organ, A m erican S lavery, A m erican F reedom , 271-292 . 
Parent, Foul M eans , 9-79; Carole Shammas, “English Born and Creole E lites,” 274-96.
222 On mortality rates and their effect on inheritance, see M organ, A m erican Slavery, A m erican  
Freedom , 158-179. On w idow s, see Carr and W alsh, “The Planter’s W ife,” 25-57; Snyder, B rabbling  
W omen , 117-139; Sturtz, Within H er P ow er, 24-29. On orphans, see Rutman and Rutman, “N ow - 
W ives and Sons-in-L aw ,” 153-182. Allan K ulikoff argues that the im provement o f  these conditions 
was essential to the rise o f  the planter class at the turn o f  the eighteenth century, Kulikoff, Tobacco and  
Slaves, 60-3 , 171-2, 167-8.
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Virginia’s complex family structures meant for what were intended to be orderly lines 
of inheritance by primogeniture.223
Within this uneasy context, property ownership and property law were central 
to emerging discourses of power in Virginia. Therefore, property law was a potent 
site for constructing the emerging legal framework for racial slavery. In tying labor 
to illegitimacy, Virginia’s planter elite had created a legally fatherless laboring 
population without claims to inheritance. Instead, laborers would themselves be 
defined as objects to be inherited by others. In this section, I will argue here that 
what specific type of property slaves would be considered would be a result of their 
reproductivity. Indeed, enslaved women’s reproductivity -  a key feature of their 
humanity -  would become the means by which they would be dehumanized as 
property, since livestock was the category of property to which slaves seemed the 
most similar.
Even as tobacco dominated the Virginia economy, livestock was a key 
category of property and wealth in the colony. April Lee Hatfield has argued that if 
tobacco was Virginia’s major export to England, livestock were Virginia’s major 
export to the other colonies -  for example, the counties of the Eastern Shore and 
Southside depended on livestock even more than tobacco for their income.224 
Plentiful livestock (meaning breeding livestock) were a sign of colonial success,
223 D avis, W illiam Fitzhugh an d  his C hesapeake W orld, 68-9 . C om m enting on the children o f  second  
marriages (a com m on phenom enon), Fitzhugh makes clear that the m ixed fam ilies and step-children o f  
the typical seventeenth-century A nglo-V irginia fam ily posed a distinct challenge to E nglish inheritance 
patterns. Another seventeenth-century Virginia writer, W illiam  B ullock, argued against this practice, 
claim ing justifiably that it meant that half-siblings could have w ildly different inheritances or be 
disinherited com pletely. W illiam  B ullock, Virginia Im partia lly exam ined, an d  left to publick  view, to  
be con sidered  b y  a ll Judicious an d  honest men (London, 1649), E arly  English B ooks O nline, 15. By  
necessity, V irginia’s county courts (including York County) focused a great deal o f  time and energy on 
deciding com plicated inheritance disputes.
224 Hatfield, A tlan tic Virginia, 45.
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frequently reported in British colonial booster texts. In his pamphlet extolling the 
virtues of the Chesapeake colonies, Leah and Rachel, or, the Two Fruitful Sisters 
Virginia and Mary-Land, John Hammond remarked that Virginia’s abundant 
livestock were a resource to other colonies: “From this industry of theirs and great 
plenty of Com, (the main staff of life) proceeded that great plenty of Cattel and Hogs, 
(now innumerable) and out of which not only New England hath been flicked and 
relieved, but all other parts of the Indies inhabited by Englishmen.”225 Trudy Eden 
argues that beyond their economic value, livestock had significant cultural value: 
plentiful domesticated livestock were a sign of Virginia’s Englishness, and therefore 
its civilization.226 Other colonial boosters, such as William Bullock, recounted the 
presence of “English Provisions” as a sign not only of the success of farmers, but of 
the essential inhabitability of the New World.227
Besides their productivity (i.e., their production of wool, milk, or meat, or 
their labor in tilling fields or transportation), livestock were profitable because of 
their reproductivity. Some of the earliest Virginia laws were aimed at expanding the 
numbers of cattle and hogs -  especially breeding females -  in the colony. A 1630 
law “for the better increase and multiplying of cattell in this colony” demanded that 
“all the female increase of neate cattell bee with all care and diligence preserved and 
kepte.”228 The law made it a criminal act (punishable to whatever extent the 
Governor and Council saw fit) to kill any female cattle “unlesse they bee such as are
225 John Hammond, Leah an d  Rachel, or, the Two Fruitfull S isters V irginia an d  M ary-land: Their 
P resen t C ondition, Im partia lly s ta ted  an d  re la ted  (London, 1656), E arly English B ooks O nline, 5.
226 Eden, “Food, A ssim ilation, and the M alleability o f  the Human B ody,” 29-42 . See also Chaplin, 
Subject M atters, 149-51.
227 B ullock, Virginia Im partia lly E xam ined, 7-8.
228 Hening 1: 152.
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eyther past breedinge, or are likely to dye by some infirmity.” Female livestock 
were especially valuable because their young automatically belonged to their owner 
as well. The famous eighteenth-century jurist William Blackstone confirmed this in 
his description of the legal principle of partus sequitur ventrem: “of all tame and 
domestic animals, the brood belongs to the owner of the dam or mother.” Virginia 
wills are full of language acknowledging the reproductivity, and therefore the 
profitability, of female livestock. From the earliest recorded wills in York County, 
testators designated not only livestock but the “increase” of that livestock to their 
heirs.231 Such inheritances were especially valuable, because they offered not just 
immediate income but the potential for future income -  this was property that literally 
grew in value.
Following the 1662 law of slavery by birth, planters transferred their 
understanding of inheritable wealth from livestock to slaves: enslaved human 
property began to be listed along with their so-called “increase.” This linguistic shift 
was not just accidental or convenient: through this discursive coupling of livestock 
with human property, individual planters enacted their power over enslaved people.
In a colonial world where print was rare and wills were often the only written 
documents that individuals ever produced, these wills, in the words of Jennifer
229 Ibid.
230 W illiam  Blackstone, C om m entaries on the L aw s o f  England, vol. 2, (Oxford, 1765-69), Eighteenth  
Century C ollections O nline, 390. Interestingly, B lackstone goes on to state that “for the m ost part in 
the human species [English law] d isallow s that m axim .” Clearly, the exception to w hich he alluded 
was the humans who were enslaved in the British colon ies and in Britain itself.
231 For just a few  exam ples o f  the “increase” o f  livestock see the 1637 will o f  Joseph Ham (“Cattle 
with their increase,” York D O W  1: 50), the 1670 w ill o f  James M oore (“all my Cattle fem ale...& their 
fem ale increase”, York D OW  4: 368), a 1691 deed o f  gift by Susanna G oodw yn (“ 1 heiffer...w / all her 
increase (vizt) male & fem ale together,” York D O W  9: 87), and the 1713 w ill o f  James Purvis (“one 
young mare & her increase,” York DOW  14: 222). Virtually every colonial w ill that included  
livestock guaranteed ow nership o f  the “increase” o f  that livestock to future heirs.
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Morgan, were key sites for the development of an emergent “moral grammar” of 
slavery.232 Wills were personal documents, and as such they demonstrated the ways 
in which white Virginians fashioned and adopted ideologies of racial hierarchy in 
their daily lives. In these wills, we see the development of an ideology of racial 
slavery that first conceived of humans as reproductive property, by discursively 
connecting those humans to livestock. In other words, the wills provide a window 
into the ways that individual Anglo-Virginians enacted emerging discourses of race, 
slavery, and power in their daily lives and in the ways they imagined their futures. 
Analysis of these documents produces, in a sense, a cultural history of common, daily 
language.
Wills and other legal documents drew a connection -  sometimes oblique and 
sometimes incontrovertible -  between the “increase” of livestock and the childbearing 
of enslaved women. In 1668, Frances Harrison inherited both livestock and slaves 
from her father, Robert Harrison. Frances received not only “the first mare foal...with 
her increase” of his “great Bay mare” but also Harrison’s “negro woman called 
[Betsy?] & the children that have or may come on her.”233 In 1669, when Mary 
Ludlowe, the wealthy widow of Thomas Ludlowe, married the Reverend Peter 
Temple, she distributed her inheritance from her first husband among her children.234 
Throughout the marriage agreement are glimpses of enslaved women and girls whose 
reproductive lives had been transformed into economic gains for Mary’s children.
232 M organ, L aboring W omen , 69. Jennifer Morgan has also com m ented on the frequent use o f  the 
language o f  “increase” in Bermuda in the 17Ul and 18th centuries. She writes: “Terms such as 
‘pickaninies’ were rare -  the more com m on terms such as ‘increase’ and ‘produce’ suggest that 
slaveow ners understood quite early the value o f  the reproductive lives o f  laboring w om en in their 
evolv ing  conception o f  them selves as owners o f  human property.” M organ, L aboring W om en , 82.
233 York D OW  4: 180.
234 York D OW  4: 258.
91
“Molatto Moll” (likely the daughter of a black woman and a white man, whose life­
long enslavement was made possible by the 1662 law) and her “whole Increase male 
and female forever” were transferred to Mary’s son George.235 Nanne, the six-year- 
old daughter of a man Mary called “old Lawrance” would be transferred to Mary’s 
daughter, Elizabeth, along with “her whole increase.” Nanne’s five-year-old sister,
Besse, would be transferred to Mary’s daughter, also named Mary, “with her whole 
Increase male & female forever.”237 Each of Mary Ludlowe’s children also received 
livestock along with these enslaved women and girls; the livestock were listed, just 
like the slave women and girls, along with their “increase.” Colonial Virginia court 
records -  in wills, inheritance disputes, probates, marriage agreements, deeds, records 
of the sale of slaves, estate divisions, and other cases -  affirmed the ownership as 
chattel not only of enslaved women, but of their future children, or their “increase,” 
as well.238 Livestock had provided a ready-made legal language for the ownership of 
reproducing enslaved bodies.
Indeed, that these two categories of property -  livestock and slaves -  were 
understood to be equivalent, and that their sameness was rooted in their 
reproductivity, can be seen in the frequent cases in which the separation between the 
“increase” of livestock and the “increase” of slaves is blurred in the records. In these 
examples, a modem reader cannot easily determine whether the offspring or the 
families of enslaved women are the “increase” to which the records refer; more likely,
238 The York county records are full o f  references to enslaved w om en’s “increase,” a language that 
persisted into the eighteenth century. More exam ples: D O W  5: 81 (1674), D O W  11: 4 0 8 -1 0  (1701), 
D OW  14: 107 (1711), D O W  14: 396  (1714), D OW  16: 483  (1727), D O W  19: 245 (1743), DOW  19: 
313-4  (1744), D O W  19: 337 (1745), DOW  19: 4 2 7 -8 ,4 3 9  (1746), JO 2: 415-7  (1754), JO 3: 19-20  
(1759).
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these references to “increase” include both the children and the livestock. Some of 
these examples occur in the years preceding the 1662 law of slavery by birth, 
indicating yet another way in which enslaved women’s status (and the status of their 
children) were in question before the passage of that law. In the 1651 prenuptial 
agreement between John Chew and Rachel Constable, the blurring of slaves and 
livestock was clear when John promised to Rachel “Two Negro Men servants called 
Tony and Sampson Two Negro Women called Ann and Kate one old Gray Mare with 
all and every their Increase.”239 When Surrey, England resident John Cheesman 
appointed Virginian Lawrence Smith his attorney, he gave Smith control over all of 
his Virginia property, except for “two negroes Vizt one named Missce and Margaret 
and two mares, that the sd John Cheesman wholly reserves with the Encrease 
thereof.”240 Such blurring between the increase of livestock and the increase of slaves 
continued after 1662. When William and Mary Stark married in 1714, William 
granted to Mary both cattle and enslaved women, listed as “Jenney, Nanney, Sarah, 
Lucy & six young heifers of about three or four year old & the increases.”241
The conceptual connection between livestock and enslaved people was more 
than just a linguistic one. The notion that slaves and animals were fundamentally 
similar was foundational to slaveholders’ sense of themselves as owners of human 
property, and therefore had a deep impact on the lives of enslaved people. As we will 
see, the slave-as-livestock connection can be seen in slaveholders’ most basic 
practices of property ownership. First, slaves, like livestock, were seen as
239 York D OW  1:132.
240 York D OW  3: 162-3. For more pre-1662 exam ples o f  such blurring betw een the increase o f  
livestock and slaves in York County, see: DOW  3: 32 (1657), D OW  3: 64  (1659), and D OW  3: 69  
(1659).
241 York D OW  14: 333.
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investments that grew in value. Second, female slaves, like female livestock, were 
differently valued than male slaves. Finally, slaves’ economic value, like that of 
livestock, was central to the support of white children. Ultimately, I will argue that 
the slave-as livestock connection had tremendous impact on the lives of black women 
and their children: whether conceived as a mother/child dyad or separated from one 
another, the impact of slavery on black families was rooted in the notion that enslaved 
property was fundamentally similar to property in livestock. In all of these practices, 
slaveholders enacted the idea that slaves and livestock were fundamentally similar 
sorts of property because they were reproductive.
Slaveholders saw black women’s reproductivity as an opportunity for 
economic investment: this was property that literally grew in value as it grew in 
numbers. Jennifer Morgan has argued that, because wealth in slaves depended on 
black women’s reproductivity, slaveholders saw black women’s wombs as “the site of 
venture capitalism.”242 This speculative economy in black babies extended even to 
enslaved girls, long before they were of childbearing age. In 1713, John Rogers gave 
an enslaved girl named Lucy to his granddaughter, Eliza Goodwyn, herself a young 
girl. Rogers had clearly thought through the economic value of Lucy’s future 
reproductive life. Lucy’s first child would also be Eliza’s property, but Lucy’s 
children thereafter would be distributed amongst Eliza’s siblings. Rogers even 
considered the possibility that some of Lucy’s children might not survive infancy: if 
her first child should die, Lucy’s second child was to belong to Eliza. What is 
remarkable, though not uncommon, about this case is that Lucy was only two years
242 Morgan, L aboring W omen , 167. Jerome Teelucksingh has made a similar observation, pointing out 
that, by the end o f  the seventeenth century, “[British Caribbean] planters v iew ed the purchase o f  slave 
w om en as a capital investm ent.” Teelucksingh, “The ‘Invisible C hild’,” 238.
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old -  probably only recently weaned -  when Rogers was speculating on the value of 
her future children. Her children, too, would be separated from her as toddlers, for 
the benefit of Rogers’ white progeny.243
In this merchant-capitalist world, slaveholders used language of capitalist 
investment to refer to enslaved women and their children.244 This was a practice 
rooted in the ownership of livestock. While “increase” was the most common term 
used to refer to the future offspring of cattle or hogs, the language of some wills 
reveals that reproductivity was seen as a form of capital investment or a sort of 
banking relationship. Wills referred to calves as “increase & p[ro]fits,” to cattle and 
their calves as “principall and increase,” and to the future offspring of a calf as 
“p[ro]fitts.”245 This language of banking, interest, and profits would be extended to 
enslaved women as well. When Maree, a “Negro wench,” was willed by William 
Felgate to his wife, Felgate noted that “what proffitt shall be made of hir” should be 
delivered to his daughter, Mary Bassett. As it would be virtually impossible for a 
holder of multiple slaves to determine exactly the value of the labor of one slave, it is 
clear that the “proffitt” to which Felgate referred was the future children of Maree.246
Because enslaved women’s reproductivity was seen as an investment in future 
values, whites valued enslaved women differently than enslaved men. Enslaved 
women had a dual value, both productive (as laborers) and reproductive (as bearers of
243 York D O W  14: 309. Exam ples o f  young girls being w illed along with their future “increase” 
abound. Som e exam ples include: York D O W  4: 258 (the L udlow e-T em ple marriage agreement 
discussed earlier), York DOW  8: 411-2 , York D O W  11: 76. C ases o f  toddlers and infants being 
separated from their mothers are discussed later in this chapter.
2 Morgan, Laboring Women , 82, 91.
245 York D OW  2:124, York D OW  2: 180-1, York DOW  4:322.
246 York D OW  3: 92.
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future slaves).247 Admittedly, the demographic picture for Virginia would seem to 
belie the notion that planters valued or priced women for their reproductivity. The 
enslaved population in Virginia would not be self-reproducing until after the 1730s -  
until then, the growth of the slave population depended on purchase, via the 
transatlantic slave trade, not reproduction.248 It was not until the 1750s that lowered 
infant mortality rates, higher birth rates, and an equaling of the sex ratio allowed the 
enslaved population in Virginia to grow via reproduction, as opposed to importation 
(though, of course, the international slave trade would continue in Virginia until 
1785).249 Even with women’s dual value as producers and reproducers, planters were 
more likely to buy male slaves and purchase those male slaves at higher prices. 
Nevertheless, even in the context of this demographic picture, reproduction was still a 
considerable factor in the institutionalization of slavery. Although slaves were not 
self-reproducing, evidence suggests that whites understood reproduction to be a 
significant means of growing the enslaved population. The discrepancy between 
social practice and demography, therefore, indicates that the cultural understanding of 
enslaved women as a form of reproductive capital took hold even as the enslaved 
population was too sick, too traumatized, and too overworked to enable self­
reproduction.250
While women were not more highly priced than men -  though, as we will see, 
they were similarly priced -  women were differently valued than their brothers, sons, 
and husbands. Jennifer Morgan’s research on the Caribbean indicates that even in the
247 M organ, L aboring W omen, 144, 154. King, “Suffer with them till death,” 147-168; Steckel, 
“W om en, Work, and Health,” 43-60.
248 Kulikoff, T obacco an d  Slaves, 67-70.
249 Hening 12:182-3. Kulikoff, T obacco and S laves, 69-74.
250 Kulikoff, T obacco an d  S laves, 67-70.
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deadly sugar colonies of the late seventeenth century, planters saw value in women’s 
reproductivity. She argues that, even as men outnumbered women as laborers, 
Caribbean planters began to value women “more systematically as potential 
reproducers.”252 She has found that, from early in the colony’s history (also before 
slaves were self-reproducing in that colony), Bermuda planters listed slaves in male- 
female pairs, indicating slaveholders’ interest in reproduction. Anthony Parent argues 
that similar practices in Virginia were intended to express masters’ control over the 
enslaved population: ‘The pairing of male and female enslaved was less about 
benevolence than social control. Planters wanted to maintain a reproducing, tractable, 
and healthy workforce.”253 Similar social pairings exist in the York County records 
in Virginia. For example, when the estate of Pinkethman Eaton was divided upon his 
death, the slaves were listed in quasi-familial groups, with each group valued at 
between 160 and 170 pounds: “Joe Lucy Matt & Lett,” “Jack Temp. Fanny & Matt,” 
“James Jake Mary & Nell,” “Michael Cate & Hannah,” “David Frank Judith & 
Child,” and “George Sarah Nanny & Tom.” The exact relationship (if any) of the 
slaves in each of these groups is unknown; nevertheless, the presence of at least one 
woman in each group indicates that reproduction may have been a consideration in 
the division of Eaton’s slaves, as it was for the Caribbean estates that Morgan 
examined.254
251 Morgan, L aboring Women, 84-5. By exam ining N ev is w ills between 1650 and 1675, Morgan also  
found that 79% o f  slaveow ning households held at least one enslaved woman, im plying that 
reproduction was an interest in purchasing slaves, even  if  wom en were outnumbered by men. I have 
not undergone a similar quantitative exam ination o f  York County w ills to be able to assert the 
numerical frequency o f  w om en in slaveholder holdings, but I can attest anecdotally to a frequency in 
the presence o f  w om en in seventeenth-century wills.
252 Ibid.
253 Parent, Foul M eans, 232.
254 York JO 1768-1770: 404. Other earlier exam ples include York D O W  5: 81, York D O W  11: 408-10.
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Examination of one wealthy planter’s purchases clarifies the ways that women 
were differently valued because of their reproductivity. Throughout William 
Fitzhugh’s letters, we see that the reproduction of his enslaved labor force was a 
concern as Fitzhugh sought to purchase a youthful labor force that included female 
slaves. In 1681, Fitzhugh sought to buy between six and eight “boys or girles, men or 
women.”255 He directed Ralph Wormeley to purchase five or six slaves, “whereof 
three or four to be boys, a man & woman or men & women, the boys from eight to 
seventeen or eighteen, the rest as young as can procure them.”256 In his instructions 
to Wormeley, Fitzhugh allowed that he would be willing to pay more for boys and 
men: “boys according to their age & growth are valued in price.”257 Fitzhugh desired 
to have more boys, who he saw as strong laborers and knew would be more 
expensive. In the context of extremely high mortality for imported slaves, young men 
and boys were the most expedient purchase: they could do more labor before their 
likely premature death. Nevertheless, Fitzhugh also specified that he wanted women 
“as young as can procure them.”258 We can surmise that while these women would 
be effective laborers, he also likely hoped that their youth would make them more 
likely to bear more children. In 1683, Fitzhugh again was seeking to buy slaves, and 
outlined for John Jackson what prices he was willing to pay. Interestingly, he 
specified the same prices for slaves regardless of gender -  3000 pounds of tobacco for 
boys or girls aged seven to eleven, 4000 for boys or girls aged eleven to fifteen, and 
5000 for “every young man or woman that shall be above 15 years of age, & not
255 D avis, W illiam Fitzhugh an d  his C hesapeake W orld, 105-6.
256 Ibid.
257 D avis, W illiam Fitzhugh an d  his C hesapeake W orld, 104.
258 Ibid.
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exceed 24 ”259 As always, youth was Fitzhugh’s primary concern -  he ascribed the 
greatest value to teenagers and young adults, as both women and men could do labor, 
but only young adult slaves were likely to bear children.
In a later letter, written in 1686, Fitzhugh describes the fruits of his 
investments. He had amassed four separate plantations, totaling almost 25,000 acres. 
He described the plantation where he lived to Doctor Ralph Smith: the thirteen-room 
house was “furnished with all accomodations for a comfortable & gentile living,” 
numerous outbuildings including “a Dairy, Dovecoat, Stable, Bam, Hen house, 
Kitchen & all other conveniencys,” an orchard, a garden, numerous livestock, and a 
palisaded yard. He also described his slaves: “a choice crew of Negros at each 
plantation, most of them this Country bourn, the remainder as likely as most in 
Virginia, there being twenty nine in all.” “Country bourn” slaves, of course, 
referred to the slaves that had been born in Virginia, the children of the women he 
enslaved.261 For Fitzhugh, his country-born slaves were of the highest value: they 
were more likely to survive, did not have to be purchased, and also symbolized the 
health and reproductivity of the adult slave population.262 Fitzhugh’s country-bom 
slaves also marked his success as a planter: his aims of creating a youthful,
Ofi'Kreproductive enslaved population had been met. For planters like Fitzhugh, the
259 D avis, W illiam Fitzhugh an d  His C hesapeake W orld, 127.
260 Davis, W illiam Fitzhugh an d  his C hesapeake W orld, 175-7.
261 This particular Fitzhugh letter is d iscussed further later on in this chapter. A s w ill be discussed
then, it is clear from a later section o f  the letter that the reference to “Country bourn” slaves indicates
the children o f  w om en that Fitzhugh h im self enslaved, not locally  born slaves he purchased from other 
Virginians.
262 Other slaveholders also held this view , especially  in the eighteenth century. Eighteenth-century  
issues o f  the Virginia G azette  are full o f  advertisem ents for slaves and slave auctions. Like W illiam  
Fitzhugh’s letters, these ads often em phasized that “V irginia born” slaves were valuable slaves. See, 
for exam ple, Virginia G azette, Purdie and D ixon, M ay 12, 1768, page 2.
263 In her analysis o f  the acquisition o f  slaves by G loucester County planter L ew is Burwell II in the 
1690s and 1700s, Lorena W alsh identifies a similar pattern in purchases o f  enslaved w om en and men.
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purchase of slaves had a dual goal: procuring enough laboring hands to maximize 
tobacco production and provide an increasingly comfortable standard of living to the 
planter, while still including enough women to ensure steady reproduction.
This dual function for slaves -  both productive and reproductive -  was a 
major consideration in the support of Virginia’s large population of white 
“orphans.”264 Because slaves, like livestock, were reproductive, they were seen as 
providing long-term, accretive value to support these white children until they 
reached adulthood. Livestock had long been used in Virginia to support the large 
numbers of orphaned white children that populated Virginia in the seventeenth 
century. The county courts held regular hearings aimed at assessing the proper care 
and support for orphans’ estates -  especially their property in livestock. Parents 
regularly included language in their wills indicating that livestock and their increase 
were intended to support the upkeep and education of surviving minor children, as 
well as those children’s children.266 In agreements drawn up before they entered into 
second marriages, widows typically specified that particular livestock would be the 
property of their children from their first marriages (thereby assuring that those
W hile the overall population o f  B urw ell’s slaves had a skew ed sex ratio, with more men than wom en, 
w om en’s childbearing greatly expanded the enslaved population on the plantation. W alsh argues that 
the larger enslaved populations seen on large plantations (like B urw ell’s and his contemporary 
Fitzhugh’s) were more able to sustain slave fam ily life during this period. Im plicitly, W alsh’s analysis 
duplicates those o f  Jennifer Morgan and m yself: even  if  planters sought male slaves as laborers, their 
acquisition o f  fem ale slaves in significant numbers indicates their desire to create a reproductive 
enslaved population. Interestingly, W alsh finds that by the m id-eighteenth century, harsher working 
conditions had actually decreased the rate o f  childbearing am ongst the enslaved people on the Burwell 
plantation. Lorena W alsh, From C a labar to  C a r te r ’s G rove: The H istory o f  A Virginia S lave  
C om m unity  (Charlottesville: U niversity o f  Virginia Press, 1997), 29-31.
264 These “orphans” were most often the property-owning children o f  deceased fathers, w ho had been 
w illed  property in the form o f  land, livestock, and slaves. Until children reached the age o f  majority 
(in the case o f  boys) or married (in the case o f  girls), their property was managed by court-approved  
guardians, often a male relative. A s Linda Sturtz argued, when w idow s remarried, they used this 
system  to protect their and their children’s estates from absorption by the w om an’s new husband. 
Sturtz, Within H er P ow er, 19-29. See also Norton, Founding M others an d  Fathers, 147-56.
265 See, for exam ple, York D O W  2: 399-403.
266 See, for exam ple, York DOW  1: 145, D O W  2: 201, D OW  3: 98, D OW  3: 106-7, D OW  4: 327.
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children would have financial support, even as the widow’s estate was absorbed by 
her new husband).267 For example, in 1655 Margery Griggs assured that, even if the 
livestock she had owned were sold by her new husband, William Hay, Margery’s son,
‘J f . Q
John, would receive the proceeds from the sale. Orphaned children who could not 
be supported by family members were typically assigned to indentures or 
apprenticeships that were overseen by the courts. In these cases, livestock were used 
to fund those apprenticeships and, since the orphan legally owned the animal as well 
as its increase, assure that when these orphans reached adulthood, they would have a 
continuing source of income beyond the skills they learned during their indenture.
Support of white orphans and other white children was yet another area where 
Virginians used ownership of livestock and their increase as a model for the 
ownership of slaves and their children. As valuable reproductive property, enslaved 
people were regularly given or willed to white children, in order to assure that child’s 
future income. In 1715, William Wise gave to his young granddaughter, Frances 
Wise, “one negro woman named Frank.” William saw the dual value in giving Frank, 
who was 20 years old at the time of the will, to his granddaughter. He stipulated that 
“the labor of this negro woman to be for the maintenance of my sd grandaughter 
Frances” and that Frances also would receive “all [Frank’s] increase male &
97 nfemale.” Wise also stipulated that Frank and her future children should be
267 See, for exam ple, York D O W  2: 120, D O W  2: 162, D OW  2: 279.
268 York D O W  1:265 .
269 See, for exam ple, York D OW  2:144, D O W  3:42.
270 York D O W  14: 396. For similar cases, see York DOW  11: 76  , D OW  13: 197, 206.
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inherited by Frances’s heirs: the reproductive lives of Frank and Frances would be 
perversely linked by ownership, inheritance, and labor.271
It is vital to recognize that, especially in the transfer of human property to 
their children, white women were active in the exploitation of black women’s 
reproductive lives. Early American women’s historians have argued that property 
law was an advantage for white women in the seventeenth century: much more than 
their English peers, or women of the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, white widows 
of seventeenth-century Virginia were able to wield public and private power by 
means of their ownership of property.272 In a way, the high mortality rates of the 
seventeenth-century Chesapeake offered to women a legitimate, but exceptional, form 
of matrilineal inheritance, as widows directed the disposal of their estates for the 
protection of their children. This power for white widows to protect their children, 
though, came at the expense of black women’s and children’s lives. As Linda Sturtz 
argues, slaves were, in a sense, feminized property in eighteenth-century Virginia: 
widows worked hard to retain their dower rights to slaves, and wealthy families were 
more likely to give their daughters slaves (and give land to their sons). As a result,
271 The W ise will entailed Frank to Frances. B y  directing that Frank and all o f  her descendents 
belonged to Frances, W illiam  W ise intended to create a virtually unbreakable bond betw een Frank’s 
fam ily and Frances’s fam ily throughout the generations. The process o f  entail and its specific  
connection to V irginia slavery is discussed later in the chapter.
272 Norton, Founding M others an d  Fathers, 153-6; Carr and W alsh, “The Planter’s W ife,” 34-40; 
Sturtz, Within H er P ow er, 19-29. On the decline o f  w id ow s’ pow er in the eighteenth century, see  
Brown, G o o d  Wives, N asty  Wenches, an d  Anxious P atriarchs, 287-291; Sturtz, Within H er P ow er, 29- 
34. Focusing on Connecticut, Cornelia Hughes Dayton argues that the A nglicization o f  the law  
(m aking legal structures more formal, increasing the use o f  professional lawyers in court) was a 
precipitating factor in w om en’s loss o f  power at the end o f  the seventeenth century, not least because 
w om en’s vo ices were no longer heard in the public space o f  the court. A s w ill be discussed further in 
Chapter 3, the conscious A nglicization o f  V irginia’s law , beginning with the Restoration in 1662, was 
having a sim ilar effect on w om en in Virginia. Dayton, Women B efore the B ar, 8.
273 Sturtz, Within H er P ow er, 52. S laves were an especially  attractive addition to a dowry because they 
could be easily  m oved onto a husband’s land when young w om en married. See, for exam ple, York 
D O W  14: 13, 17-8.
102
white women were frequent agents (and benefactors) in the appropriation of black 
women’s reproductivity. In an early example, Frances Jones, a widow, directed in 
1657 that her son, Francis Townshend, should receive a large share of her property, 
which she had inherited upon her husband’s death. Townshend received land, 
livestock including oxen, horses, hogs, and cattle, household goods, and the labor of 
white servant men. He also inherited “one negro woman named Sarah and her child 
Francis two yeares old.”274 Frances Jones was clearly a powerful, wealthy woman 
who protected her property in order to support her son. She also was part of the first 
generations of Anglo-Virginian slaveholders who chose to exploit, for their own 
benefit, black women’s reproductive lives.
We have seen the ways that, by connecting slaves to livestock both 
discursively and legally, Anglo-Virginians were able to conceive of slaves as a 
particular kind of reproductive property. This legal-linguistic construction would 
have devastating effects on the fragile families that enslaved women and men were 
building in the colony. Since whites held absolute ownership over the children of 
black women, they were able to dispose of that property as they saw fit -  including 
separating families at will. Whether keeping mothers and children together, or 
separating them through inheritance or sale, slaveholders sought to maximize the 
reproductive potential of enslaved women while still claiming the labor of both them 
and their children. Such was the absolute power of the slaveholder: both the fostering 
and the destruction of slave families were forms of reproductive exploitation.
Perversely, the choice by a slaveholder to keep mothers and children united 
was a way that slaveholders actively exploited enslaved women’s reproductivity and
274 York D OW  3: 32. See also: York D O W  8: 411-2 .
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dehumanized enslaved women as property similar to livestock. In their wills and 
other legal documents, Virginians signaled the value, health, and profitability of 
reproductive animals by noting when animals were pregnant, nursing, or recently 
weaned. Doing so indicated the greater value of an animal (the value of a pregnant 
animal needed to account for the value of the offspring), and it also indicated that 
newborn animals needed special care in order to make good on their investment. 
Therefore, pregnant cattle or pigs might be described as “breeding” and cattle and 
horses might be listed as “sucking,” or nursing. 275 Mare colts were considered more 
valuable after they had first “foaled.” Nursing cattle were milking cattle, and were 
therefore especially valuable. Most commonly, individual cattle and other livestock 
were listed “with calves” or “with colt sucking,” therefore indicating not only the 
reproductive value of the adult animal but the inseparability of the mother and its 
young.276
Once again, this was a language that bled into the language of slaveownership, 
emerging not only in wills (documents composed by individuals) but also in 
inventories and other court-produced documents (indicating that the state also 
participated in the development of this slave-as-livestock construction). When Major 
Joseph Croshaw died in 1670, his large estate was divided amongst his heirs. As was 
the convention, female livestock were listed with their young and according to their 
reproductive status: cows listed with “sucking” calves, and highly valued mares with 
“sucking” colts. Along with those cattle and horses were listed people. Two 
enslaved women, Moll and Rose, were listed along with “One Negroe Girle Sucking
275 York D O W  3: 148, D O W  4: 322, DOW  4: 288.
276 York D O W  2: 379, D O W  4: 224, D O W  4: 288.
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May.” While it is not clear whose daughter May was, it seems reasonable to assume 
that either Moll or Rose was nursing May as the inventory was being compiled. 
Similarly, another enslaved woman named Moll was listed along with three children: 
“One Negroe Girle sucking One Negroe Girle three years old Named [Han?] One 
Negroe Girle named Besse.”277 It is unclear whether Han and Besse were Moll’s 
daughters, but it is likely that the unnamed girl who was still nursing was Moll’s 
daughter. The identical language was used to describe Moll and her daughter, and 
little May and her mother, as had been used to describe cattle.
In the Croshaw inventory, mothers and daughters were listed with the same 
language as cattle and calves. Other documents show a persistent urge to link 
mothers and infants; this linkage discursively connected the reproductive value of 
livestock to the reproductive value of enslaved women. Like cattle and calves, which 
were frequently listed with combined values rather than individual values, enslaved 
women and their children were listed with a single value. Such was the case of Anne 
and her daughter Hager, who were listed for a combined value of 40 pounds sterling 
in 1667.278 Nan and her son Sam, and Sew and her daughters Jane and Dina were all 
sold in 1706; their values were calculated in terms of mother-child units, not as 
individuals.279 Enslaved women were very frequently listed in court documents (such 
as deeds of sale and estate inventories) along with their children.280
Lacking more detailed evidence, are we to read these as examples of 
slaveholder benevolence in keeping children with their mothers, or examples of
277 York D OW  2: 294, D O W  4: 288.
278 York D O W  4:143.
279 York D OW  12: 437.
280 York D OW  2:63, D OW  3:32, D OW  4: 258, D OW  4: 370, D OW  6: 26-8 , D O W  11: 76, D OW  14: 
309, DOW  16: 483 , D O W  19: 167, D OW  19:245, D OW  19: 250, JO 1: 331-2 , JO (1768-70): 402, JO 
3: 227-8.
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slaveholders capitalizing on enslaved women’s reproductive labor in nursing and 
raising their children? Even as these women were fortunate to stay united with their 
children, that unity was marked by the discourses of power and ownership of white 
slaveholders who must have seen themselves as maximizing the value of their 
reproductive property. While these listings may seem to affirm the mother-child 
relationship, because that language is part of owners’ wills, the language is still an 
artifact of the slaveholder’s power (or the power of the slave state, in the case of 
state-produced inventories). Hortense Spillers argues that that perverse linkage 
(between mother and child) by the owner (who may indeed have been the father of 
the child) underscores enslaved women’s inability to “claim” their own children. In 
this world where some children were chattel property, Spillers argues, “The offspring 
of the female does not ‘belong’ to the Mother.”281
The all-too-frequent separation of mothers from their children and siblings 
from one another exposes the heartlessness of the enterprise of enslavement. This 
practice, also, seems to be rooted in understandings of the ownership of reproductive 
livestock. Inventories included considerations of whether or not calves were 
“weanable,” or able to be separated from their mothers in order to be sold.282 To 
separate mother and young too early would endanger the young, and therefore 
endanger the investment. On the other hand, once physically independent from their 
mothers, livestock’s “increase” was easily divisible, and was sold to settle debts and 
balance inheritances.283 This convention informed the practice of dividing slave 
families for the purposes of balancing inheritances; the practice required a
281 Spillers, “M am a’s Baby, Papa’s M aybe,” 395.
282 York DOW  2: 275, 395, DOW  3: 34.
283 York DOW  4: 132.
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dehumanization of the families being divided. In 1741, Daniel More, an heir of 
James Sclater, requested that the executors of Sclater’s estate meet and officially 
divide the estate amongst Sclater’s heirs. The court ordered the executors to “divide 
the Negroes wch [Sclater] dyed possessed of together with the Increase thereof since 
his death into 3 equal parts and that they assign one equal third part thereof to each of
‘J Q A
the Children of the sd. [Sclater] and the other third part to the sd. Danl. More.” In 
other words, all of the slaves were to be either distributed amongst the heirs or sold 
(and the proceeds distributed equally amongst the heirs), including the children that 
had been bom since Sclater’s death. That this would undoubtedly require the 
separation of families was par for the course, as enslaved women and their children 
were reduced to mere “increase.”
If livestock were salable as soon as they were weaned, then so were enslaved 
children. Western African women typically nursed their children for up to two years; 
this choice both improved the health of their babies and helped women to actively 
space their pregnancies.285 Enslavement in the Americas interrupted these patterns.286 
The result was that toddlers and even newborn infants were sold or inherited 
separately from their mothers. Two-year-old Tom was given to Peter Goodwyne by
284 York D O W  19: 17. Other exam ples o f  the division o f  so-called “increase” include: D O W  14: 107, 
DOW  14: 396, D OW  16: 475 , D O W  17: 274, DOW  18: 337, DOW  18: 632-3 , D OW  19: 337.
285 M organ, L aboring Women, 66-7; Barbara Bush, “Hard Labor: W om en, Childbirth, and R esistance 
in British Caribbean Slave Societies,” in M ore than C hattel: B lack Women an d  S lavery in the 
A m ericas, ed. David Barry Gaspar and Darlene Clark Hine (B loom ington: Indiana U niversity Press, 
1996), 202-203.
286 Shorter periods o f  breastfeeding were required if  enslaved w om en were to m eet slaveholders’ labor 
expectations. That this w ould result in more frequent births might have been seen as an advantage by 
the slaveholders, even if  it resulted in unhealthy babies. Richard Steckel has found that, because o f  
w om en’s work requirements on A ntebellum -era cotton plantations, breastfeeding could be reduced to a 
mere three-month period. Steckel, “W om en, W ork and Health,” 50. Nursing, especia lly  as it related to 
the frequency o f  pregnancies for black and white wom en, w ill be discussed in Chapter 2.
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his mother, Blanch Goodwyne, with no reference to the fate of Tom’s mother.287 
Judith was only nine months old when she was separated from her mother to be given 
to Ann Morris.288 When Mary Moss and her children divided the estate of Mary’s 
deceased husband, the court ruled that “the Increase” of the slaves (i.e., the children 
bom since the official inventory had been done) be sold, and the proceeds divided and 
shared amongst the heirs.289 That “Increase” was “a Child of about a Month old 
(Toney by name) which we [the court] value to £6.”290 It’s unclear in the court order 
who Toney’s mother was -  indeed, to the court, it did not matter, as Toney was sold 
to equalize the inheritances of the Moss family. The dehumanizing logic of slaves-as- 
livestock was apparent whenever children were sold or inherited separately from their
t 291parents.
Real Property and Personal Property 
Even as slaveowners discursively constructed the ownership of slaves as 
fundamentally similar to the ownership of livestock, the House of Burgesses would 
persistently debate the question of slaves as a legal category of property. Should 
slaves be considered personal property (also termed chattel property and moveable 
property), like livestock? Or, should slaves be considered real estate -  tied to the land 
as the feudal serfs of English precedent? These debates exposed the fractured 
colonial consciousnesses of the planters, who themselves made up the Burgesses, as 
they sought to work both in their own interests as slaveholders and in the interests of
287 York D O W  8 :4 1 1 -2 .
288 York D O W  16: 180.
289 York JO 3: 19-20.
290 Ibid.
291 Som e exam ples include: York D OW  4: 114-5, DOW  4: 189, DOW  4: 190, D O W  4: 254, D O W  4: 
337, DOW  9: 204, DOW  12: 277, D OW  16: 316, D OW  19: 250, D O W  19: 427-8 .
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the crown.292 These legal debates complicated the everyday practices that had 
governed slaveholding since the seventeenth century, especially the treatment of 
slaves as livestock. Ultimately, it was the reproductivity of slave property that would 
decide the debate and define slaves’ legal status. I argue in this section that in their 
debate over what kind of property to label slaves, the Burgesses defined what they 
called the “nature” of slaves via racialized discourses of reproduction.
In the debate over whether slaves were real or personal property, slaveholders 
sought to structure inheritance law to best serve their own interests. As Thomas 
Morris has argued, the real versus personal estate debate “defined, if anything, the 
status of the owner and not the slave.” While the debate had little effect on the 
daily lives of slaves (slaves were, after all, still defined as property, and subject to the 
wills of slaveholders), the Burgesses were seeking ways to protect the economic 
interests of property holders and their heirs. Defining slaves as real estate held two 
primary advantages for slaveholders. First, when a property holder died, their 
moveable property could be sold off to pay off any of the estate’s outstanding debts. 
By defining slaves as real estate, property owners sought to protect their estates, of 
which slaves were the most valuable property other than land. Second, when slaves 
were defined as real estate, testators could choose to place slaves in entail -  
permanently transferring ownership of those slaves (and their children -  thus ensuring 
ownership in perpetuity) to a new line of heirs outside of the direct line of
292 A ccording to Anthony Parent, the actions o f  the H ouse o f  B urgesses were an enactm ent o f  the 
em erging class consciousness o f  planters. Anthony S. Parent, Jr. Foul M eans. The B urgesses’ desire 
to please the Crown had becom e one o f  the defining features o f  that body after the 1660s, when the 
new ly reinstated governm ent o f  Governor B erkeley had overhauled V irginia’s law s follow ing  
V irginia’s prom ise o f  allegiance to the Crown after the Restoration.
293 Morris, Southern S lavery and the Law, 65.
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primogeniture.294 This option was attractive to large planters, who used entail to 
divide their large holdings amongst multiple heirs, while still ensuring that those 
plantations would remain intact and productive. Furthermore, as Linda Sturtz and 
Holly Brewer have both argued, entail was a primary means by which elite white 
women in Virginia could own and hold onto property. As such, by defining slaves as 
real estate, the House of Burgesses made it possible for propertied white widows to 
control even more wealth, even after they remarried.295 The debate over personalty 
and realty was protracted (lasting over forty years) precisely because it was centered 
on the foundational questions of power in a slave society: how should human 
property be legally defined, how should that property be distributed amongst heirs, 
and how could the disbursement of property be used to expand the power of the 
planter elite?
For modem readers, the debate over realty and personalty is one of legal 
esoterica. Even so, we must be cognizant of the ways that these legal debates could 
preoccupy elite Virginians’ minds and time in the eighteenth century. A primary 
priority of the Burgesses was to create a body of statutes that furthered the interests of 
the great planters with the least amount of controversy, confusion, or internecine 
conflict. The statutes written by the House of Burgesses were designed to expedite
294 H olly Brewer has argued that, contrary to earlier interpretations, vast amounts o f  property was 
entailed in colonial Virginia: she calculates that, by the time o f  the Revolution, up to 15%  o f  
V irginia’s land was held in entail. Brewer argues that the decision  to define slaves as real property 
(and thus subject to entail) was an attempt by Virginia planters to recreate a form o f  feudalism  in the 
colony, where planters were lords and slaves were vassals. N onetheless, Brewer does not discuss the 
attempt by the Burgesses to rescind the real estate law in 1748. If planters were interested in form ing a 
feudal society in 1705, why w ould they change their minds in 1748, w ell before the Revolutionary-era  
dism antling o f  entail? Brewer, “Entailing Aristocracy,” 307-46.
295 Brewer, “Entailing A ristocracy,” 342-3 . Sturtz, Within H er P ow er , 52-7. Sturtz makes a 
convincing argument that the realty/personalty debate centered on the question o f  w id ow s’ property 
ownership. Significantly, though, because her focus is on white propertied wom en, Sturtz does not 
take into account the m eanings o f  slavery itse lf or the specific meanings o f  the enslavem ent o f  w om en  
when she d iscusses these laws.
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inheritance processes and reduce the “law suits and controversies” (labeled by the
7QBurgesses as “many mischiefs”) that clogged up the county courts. The realty 
versus personalty debate, though, was more than just a procedural dispute: at the 
heart of the debate was the question of how best to capitalize on the value of slaves’ 
bodies as reproductive property.
The Burgesses passed the first Virginia law that defined slaves as real estate 
in 1705, along with the passage of the first comprehensive slave code in the colony. 
The real estate law duplicated much of the language of a similar Barbadian law, as the 
sugar colony’s dependence on slave labor and development of a unified gentry class
7Q7had preceded that of the tobacco colony. Virginia’s 1705 law ruled that “all negro, 
mulatto, and Indian slaves...shall be held, taken, and adjudged, to be real estate (and 
not chattels)” for the purposes of inheritance.298 As was discussed earlier, slaves 
were conceived as a category of property especially profitable for the support of 
surviving spouses and children. By defining slaves as real estate, slaves would be 
inherited via the same processes devised for land, processes that were aimed at 
keeping estates as consolidated as possible while still providing for multiple heirs.
By legally tying slaves to the land upon which they worked, the Burgesses hoped to 
ensure that heirs would inherit both land and the laborers to work that land. Further, 
the law provided the legal basis for a practice we’ve already discussed: the inventory, 
valuation, and division of slave property (including the increase of those slaves)
296 Hening 4: 222.
297 Morris, Southern S lavery an d  the L aw , 66. Unlike Virginia, Barbados would not attempt to rescind 
its real estate law. The connections between the planters o f  Barbados and the planters o f  Southside and 
Eastern Shore Virginia planters have been explored by April Lee Hatfield -  it is possible that these 
business and fam ilial connections were a vector for the application o f  Barbadian law in Virginia. 
Hatfield, A tlan tic Virginia, 137-68.
298 Hening 3: 333-5.
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amongst heirs. Several exceptions were built into the law. For example, sales of 
slaves would not be regulated like land sales, slaves could be claimed as return for the 
debts of an estate, and slaveholders would not be extended the right to vote unless 
they also owned land.
By 1728, the Burgesses confirmed that defining slaves as real estate had been 
“very beneficial for the preservation and improvement of estates in this colony.”299 
That year, the Burgesses expanded the language of the 1705 law, making clear that 
the “true design” of the 1705 law was to ensure the productivity of inherited lands, a 
goal which “[could not] be done, according to the custom and method of improving 
estates in this colony, without slaves.”300 By considering slaves as real estate, the 
Burgesses argued, the state could “establish a method for settling slaves, and their 
increase.”301 In other words, by declaring slaves to be real estate, the Burgesses 
sought to capitalize not just on the slaves’ labor, but on their reproductivity as well. 
By entailing slaves to the estates upon which they worked, the Burgesses sought to 
guarantee that the owners of those lands would have claims to slave labor far into the 
future: the “slave or slaves, and their increase, so long as any of them shall be living, 
shall descend, pass, and go, as part of the freehold” to an unending line of white
299 Hening 4: 222.
300 Hening 4: 224. By one measure, the B urgesses were correct in their observation: the 1705 entail 
law had been one o f  many law s written by landowners to expand and solid ify their holdings. By  
com m anding slave labor and taking advantage o f  inheritance law s that favored the nascent gentry 
(those law s, it should be noted, were written by the slaveholders and landowners them selves), property 
holdings in the first quarter o f  the eighteenth century were consolidated into vast fam ily estates. 
A nthony Parent has called this process (o f which the 1705 law was one o f  the last steps) “the land 
grab,” and argues that the gentry consolidation o f  estates via the law was a conscious, deliberate 
process o f  increasing their ow n power. Anthony Parent, Foul M eans, 9-54.
301 Hening 4: 224.
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owners, their children and heirs.302 To declare slaves to be real estate guaranteed to 
heirs not just land, but ownership of human property in perpetuity.
In 1748, the Burgesses revisited the issue of slaves as real estate with a 
striking turnaround: the 1705 and 1728 acts “having been found inconvenient, and 
not to answer the ends thereby intended,” were summarily repealed.303 “For the 
future,” stated the Burgesses, “all slaves whatsoever shall be held, deemed, and taken, 
to be chattels personal.”304 Indeed, claimed the Burgesses, to consider slaves as real 
estate was to indulge in a dangerous fiction: “slaves are in their nature personal 
estate, and not real.”305 This language of slaves’ “nature” is exceptional in the 
colonial Virginia statutes -  rarely, if ever, did the Burgesses consider slaves’
“nature,” either as people or as property. Therefore, this invocation of “nature” 
should be considered as an intentional rhetorical choice. The idea of “Nature” had 
powerful, multiple meanings in the eighteenth century. Nature and Nature’s God 
were sites of absolute truth, and to make claims about an object or person’s nature 
was to make claims about their core meaning and identity. To make claims about 
slaves’ “nature” as property was both to state an undeniable truth claim and to assert a 
racialized notion of slaves as salable objects. What had caused a legal reversal that 
required such potent language?
The problem lay in the very reproductivity that had made the entailed estates 
so advantageous. Entailed estates had become more problematic than profitable,
302 Hening 4: 225.
303 Hening 5: 436.
304 Hening 5: 438-9 .
305 Hening 5: 440. Later in the law, the B urgesses argued that personal estate was slaves’ “natural 
condition.” Hening 5: 441.
306 Schiebinger, N a tu res’ B ody ; Chaplin, Subject M atter, Parrish, Am erican C uriosity.
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according to the Burgesses. The Assembly described the ways that the real estate law
had harmed planters:
Because in time [the slaves] overstocked the plantations, and often the tenant 
was the proprietor of fee simple land, much fitter for cultivation than his 
intailed lands, where he could work his slaves to a much greater advantage. 
But on the other hand the frequent removing and settling them on other lands 
in other counties and parts of the colony, far distant from the county court, 
where the deeds or wills which annexed them were recorded, and the intail 
lands lay; the confusion occasioned by their mixture with fee simple names of 
the same name and sex, and belonging to the same owner; the uncertainty of 
distinguishing one from another, after several generations, no register of their 
genealogy being kept, and none of them having surnames, were great michiefs 
[sic] to purchasers, strangers, and creditors.307
Here, the Burgesses imagined a “typical” aggrieved planter, who might own slaves
both in fee simple and in entail, and his entailed slaves could not be moved (without
considerable legal wrangling) from the estate to which they were entailed.
But why had the entail of slaves become a problem for the Burgesses’
idealized planter? This section of the law makes clear that, for slaveholders, the
unruly reproduction of enslaved people had made the real estate law untenable. By
defining slaves as real estate, the Burgesses had made a core aspect of the
profitability of slavery -  that slaves were self-reproducing property -  unprofitable.
The slaves had “overstocked the plantations” and were, in the eyes of the slaveowner,
sitting idle rather than laboring in his interests. The term “overstocked” is itself a
dehumanizing one, implying the uncontrolled reproduction of livestock animals. The
law created, in the view of slaveholders, artificial categories amongst their human
property: if some slaves on an estate were entailed, and others were not, how should
their “mixture” be categorized? The birth of such “mixed” enslaved children became
legal problems, rather than an expansion of the slaveholders’ property. We see the
307 Hening 441-2 .
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discourses of bastardy, slavery, race, and reproductivity intertwining here: it is no 
coincidence that this language of “mixed” children recalls the language used to 
describe the free mulatto children of free mulatto, black and white women, or the 
enslaved children of black mothers and white fathers. There was also the issue of 
bureaucracy: slaveholders bristled at the notion that they’d have to carefully record 
the complex genealogies of slave families.308
Most egregiously, the law that defined slaves as real estate forced slaveowners 
to recognize the family relationships of their slaves. The very practices used to 
dehumanize slaves, from denying surnames to separating families, were made 
problematic by the real estate law. Since at least 1662, slaves had been denied 
surnames (slaves, after all, were children of enslaved mothers -  a surname would link 
them to fathers, and therefore to legitimacy or even to whiteness). By extension, the 
process of enslavement meant that slaves were denied genealogies (slaves’ natal 
alienation -  to use Orlando Patterson’s term -  denied them links to the past and the 
future).309 Finally, the real estate law denied slaveholders the opportunity to move or 
sell individual slaves at will. Instead, slaves were tied to the land upon which they 
were bom, and therefore connected to their families of birth.310 The problem of the 
entail law was that, by forcing slaveholders to recognize the familial relationships of 
slaves, it forced slaveholders to confront the humanity of their human property.
308 It should be pointed out that, when involved in law suits over the ow nership o f  the increase o f  
slaves, slaveholders were more than w illing to reconstruct the very genealogies that were deem ed so  
egregious in this 1748 statute. See, for exam ple, York JO 2: 416 -7 , and D O W  19: 172-3.
3 Patterson, Slavery an d  S ocia l D eath , 7.
310 Lorena W alsh has pointed out that, by entailing slaves, slaveholders “unintentionally afforded their 
bondspeople more generational continuity and for a time more settled places o f  residence than was the 
lot o f  most slaves.” W alsh, From C a labar to  C arter's  G rove, 45.
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Ultimately, the 1748 statute was disallowed by the King in 1751, and slaves
were again considered real estate.311 While it was in the interests of slaveholders to
categorize slaves as personal estate, ultimately, the Crown’s interests (not the least of
which was the upholding of primogeniture, the justification for monarchy itself) won
out.312 Slaves would continue to be considered real estate until the outlawing of the
entail system in the 1770s.313 All the while, slaveholders were able to hold and
control their estates, whatever category of property slaves were considered. This is
not to say that the debate did not matter. If this was the case, what are we to make of
planters’ complaints so-called “overstocked” plantations? Entailing slaves could only
“work” if planters were willing to record slaves’ geneaologies, allow families to live
and grow together, to take seriously both the maternal and paternal lineages of
enslaved children. In other words, required planters to recognize that enslaved people
were not livestock: slaveholders were forced to confront the humanity of enslaved
peoples’ reproductivity. The attempt to define slaves as personal estate was not just
about maximizing planter profits and holdings. Like the discursive connection drawn
between slaves and livestock, the personal estate law was an attempt by planters to
deny the humanity of their property.
* * *
In 1686, William Fitzhugh (the planter discussed earlier who placed the 
highest value on so-called “Country bourn” slaves) trumpeted his wealth and
3,1 Hening 5: 567.
312 Brewer, B y Birth o r  C onsent, 22-4. B ecause primogeniture (including entail) w as the basis for 
monarchy, any interruption was a threat. N evertheless, it is important not to misinterpret the 1748 
Virginia statute as an attempt at dem ocratizing inheritance. Instead, the 1748 statute was an attempt to 
make inheritance practices work in the interests o f  the crown.
313 Brewer, B y Birth o r  C onsent, 22-4.
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financial solvency. After describing his extensive plantation in a letter to Doctor
Ralph Smith, Fitzhugh concluded:
Thus I have given you some particulars, which I thus deduce, the yearly Crops 
of com & Tobo. together with the surplusage of meat more than will serve the 
family’s use, will amount annually to 60000 lb. Tobo. wch. at 10 shillings P 
Ct. is 300 L annum, & the Negroes increase being all young, & a considerable 
parcel of breeders, will keep that Stock good for ever. 14
By reducing enslaved black women to “breeders” and their enslaved children to
“increase,” Fitzhugh revealed the logic of racial slavery which exploited black
women’s reproductivity for profit. This reproductive exploitation was part of an
emerging ideology that demanded the dehumanization of enslaved Africans as a
justification and explanation for their enslavement. By calling women “breeders,”
Fitzhugh implied that black women were little more than animals, like the livestock
he owned and bred for profit. By calling children “increase,” Fitzhugh asserted that
his slaveownership was a for-profit venture, and that claiming black women’s
childbearing was a crucial means of becoming wealthy in the new world. Fitzhugh
saw his wealth, like slavery itself, as perpetual -  able to support him and his heirs “for
ever.”
When William Fitzhugh called black women “breeders,” or when Mary 
Ludlowe referred to the “brood” of one of her slaves, or when William Byrd II urged 
settlers of the malarial Great Dismal Swamp to buy “both sexes, that their Breed may 
supply the loss [should older slaves die],” these slaveholders made clear the end result 
of the logic of slavery by birth.315 In their personal documents, their legal documents,
314 Davis, W illiam Fitzhugh an d  H is C hesapeake W orld, 177.
315 York DOW  5: 82. W illiam  Byrd II, “Petition for W astelands in V irginia and North Carolina 
C om prising the D ism al Sw am p [ 17 2 9 |,” Brock C ollection, 256  (29), Huntington Library, qtd. in 
Parent, Foul M eans, 232.
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and their state documents, Virginia’s slaveholders defined enslaved people as legally 
and linguistically similar to livestock. Did that logic extend to coercive sexual 
exploitation of black women for the purposes of breeding? There is every reason to 
assume that it did. The fact that explicit textual examples of slave breeding don’t 
seem to exist for this period should not give a false sense of the realities of slavery by 
birth. Indeed, the commonplace use of language such as “brood,” “breeder,” 
“increase,” and “profit,” makes clear that, far from such practices lacking specific 
evidence, they were part of the foundational logic of slavery.316 The fact that such 
casual language of livestock and breeding so permeated whites’ writing makes clear 
that breeding intentions (if not outright coercion) were the rule, not the exception. 
Anglo-Virginian culture was so saturated with the idea of slave breeding that the 
practice was barely worth articulating. Seen in this light, all slaveholding in the 
colonies should be considered a form of slave breeding, since all slaveholding was 
predicated on the idea of ownership not just of enslaved women, but of their 
childbearing capacity as well.
If this was the case, did Fitzhugh, Ludlowe, and Byrd literally think of black 
women as animals? Jennifer Morgan has argued that categorizing enslaved people as 
livestock was about humiliating black women, not about a literal belief in black 
women’s lack of humanity: “An enslaved person was branded ‘like’ an animal in
■y |  7
order to humiliate, not because she was an animal and was insensate.” This may be 
the case, but it should be noted that the documents where the language of livestock
316 Jennifer Morgan argues that w hile no one in the Caribbean “articulated a position on the logic o f  
‘breeding’ the enslaved,” the logic o f  breeding was an “inherent supposition” o f  racial slavery.
M organ, L aboring Women, 128. See also, Fischer, Su spect R elations, 165-6 and Parent, Foul M eans, 
232.
317 Morgan, L aboring Women, 105.
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and breeding appeared (letters, wills, legal documents) were meant exclusively for 
white readers. Instead, the language of livestock and breeding was just one of the 
ways that whites desensitized themselves to the humanity of those they enslaved. 
Because that language was part of the day-to-day exigencies of slaveownership, it 
exposes the ways in which emerging understandings of innate racial hierarchy were 
inherent in the very basis of slaveowning as an institution and as a practice.
Nevertheless, if reproductivity provided slaveholders a language with which 
to deny the humanity of the people they enslaved, the debate over real and personal 
estate shows us that that same reproductivity forced slaveholders to confront that 
humanity as well. Ultimately, the language of livestock used by slaveholders reveals 
the deep dualities and contradictions inherent in the exploitation of black women’s 
reproductivity. For enslaved women, childbearing could be an act of extraordinary 
hope and agency -  literally a visceral means of creating humanity in the midst of 
inhumanity.318 On the other hand, enslaved women’s childbearing contributed to the 
profits, and ultimately the power, of their oppressors.319 How did women make 
choices about childbearing in this context? Were there ways that women could 
exercise their agency within their reproductive lives? If reproductivity was 
foundational to the coercive power of slavery, could it also be a site of resistance?
318 Jennifer Morgan em phasizes this hopefulness. Morgan, Laboring Women, 116-19.
319 Dorothy Roberts em phasizes the w ays that, both during and after slavery, black w om en’s 
childbearing “profited the system  that subjugated [them ].” Dorothy Roberts, K illing the B lack B ody: 
Race, R eproduction, an d  the M eaning o f  L iberty  (NY: Vintage, 1997), 40-1 .
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CHAPTER 2 
Wicked, Dangerous, and Ungoverned:
The Transgressive Possibilities of Reproduction
In 1692, years after Mary Walters was freed by her former master, Isaac 
Collyer, Walters sued Collyer’s widow, Mary Bennit, “for the unjust detention & 
withholding” of Walters’ child.320 Now a free black woman, Walters had been freed 
by Collyer some time previously. Mary Walters’ claim to her child’s freedom was 
rooted in the 1662 law of slavery by birth: Mary claimed that her child had been bom 
after she had been freed. Corroborating this claim, Mary’s husband Joseph testified 
that his wife “was with child when she was freed from Collyer.”321 Mary Bennit 
disagreed, arguing that the child “was borne in the time of its mother 
being.. .Collyer’s slave.”322 Indeed, Bennit claimed, the child was bom “a long time 
before” Collyer freed Mary Walters.323 Several witnesses corroborated Mary 
Bennit’s testimony, and ultimately the court sided with Bennit. Because Mary 
Walters’ child was bom to an enslaved mother (regardless of her current status), that 
child was rightfully a slave for life. Mary and Joseph Walters went home without 
their child.
Mary Walters was summoned back to court a year later. This time, Mary was 
the defendant in an assault and battery case. Mary, the court claimed, “hath most 
notoriously & wickedly abused [Elizabeth Sampson] not only by words but alsoe by
320 York D O W  9: 155. The child was never named in the court records. Mary (C ollyer) Bennit had 
remarried after the death o f  Isaac Collyer.
321 York D OW  9: 179.
322 Ibid.
323 Ibid.
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blows & offered great violence upon her.”324 Mary was punished with “29 lashes on 
her bare back” and then imprisoned until she could “give sec[urity] for her future 
good behavior.”325 However, the court was not satisfied with this straightforward 
punishment. The justices argued that Mary’s life, which they described as “wicked & 
dangerous” and “ungoverned,” would “prove of dangerous consequence if some 
cause be not speedily taken to prevent her.”326 Therefore, the court determined, Mary 
Walters’ bond would not be collected to guarantee her good behavior -  it would 
instead finance her “transportation out of this colony.”
The deportation order against Mary Walters was rooted in the court’s newly 
adopted belief that Mary was not in fact a free woman. The justices accused Mary of 
fraud, saying that her “pretence of being a free Negro” was unsustainable because 
Mary was “not.. .in the least capable of maintaining the same.”328 Just a year 
previously, the court, based on the testimony of Mary, her husband, and her former 
mistress, had implicitly believed that Mary had been freed from slavery. Ultimately, 
this former stance changed because since that ruling, Mary Walters had become a 
problem -  a violent, angry, unpredictable problem. Mary’s racial status, along with 
her inability to prove her history of slavery and freedom, gave the court an 
opportunity to literally make that problem go away.
Mary Walters’ story is one of transgressing the lines of power that organized 
colonial Virginia society. It is also a story of how those transgressions were met by a 
colonial court willing to reverse its own decisions in order to enforce the racial social
324 York D OW  9: 270.
325 Ibid.
326 Ibid.
327 Ibid.
328 York D OW  9: 297.
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order. As a free black woman, Mary challenged her former mistress in court at a time 
when the rights of free black people were being increasingly curtailed in the 
colony.329 The court, of course, held the upper hand: no matter how convincing 
Mary’s testimony, the court decided in the favor of Mary’s white mistress. The 
language of the later case, in which Mary is described as “wicked,” “dangerous,” and, 
significantly, “ungovemed,” shows the ways that Mary’s life and actions transgressed 
the increasingly calcified racial hierarchy of the colony. Mary’s violence was 
interpreted by the court as a lack of proper discipline and deference -  as a lack of 
mastery. For the court, the answer to Mary’s lack of govemability was to reverse its 
own decision and recategorize Mary as a slave. Fascinatingly, the court did not 
attempt to actually re-enslave Mary: she was so “ungovemed” that they banished her 
altogether. This reversal by the court, ironically, exposed the fallibility of that 
institution and the limits of their power. As we will see, this was a prerogative 
claimed more than once by the court: met with a black or mixed-race free person 
who transgressed lines of racial and gendered power, the court was more than willing 
to change course in order to maintain dominance.
Mary Walters’ story also shows the centrality of reproduction to women’s 
lives and subjectivity in this colonial space. The cmx of Mary Walters’ lawsuit 
against Mary Bennit was a dispute over Mary Walters’ reproductive history, 
specifically whether the birth of her child occurred before or after she was freed.
From the distance of centuries, we can’t discern what caused the conflicting timelines 
in the testimonies of Mary Walters and Mary Bennit. Nor can we assert that the rage
329 D ouglas D eal, “A  Constricted World: Free Blacks on V irginia’s Eastern Shore, 1680-1750,” in 
C olon ia l C hesapeake Society, ed. Lois Green Carr, Philip D. Morgan and Jean B. R usso (Chapel Hill: 
U niversity o f  North Carolina Press, 1988), 275-305.
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that boiled over in Mary Walters’ fight with Elizabeth Sampson was in any way 
related to the Mary’s loss of her child. Nonetheless, Mary Walters’ violent rage -  a 
rage that so shocked the colonial authorities that they demanded she leave the colony 
-  calls to mind Frantz Fanon’s observation that “the violence which has ruled over the 
ordering of the colonial world... that same violence will be claimed and taken over by 
the native.”330 It is hard to imagine that Mary Walters’ rage was not in some part 
fueled by the violent injustices she had endured, one example of which was the loss 
of her child to the exploitation of colonial slavery by either an accident of that child’s 
birth or a misrepresentation of that birth by Mary’s former mistress.
In creating and enforcing the law of slavery by birth, Virginia’s lawmakers 
sought to erect an absolute legal and social structure: slavery and freedom were 
linked to race, and race was marked by birth. By building this legal structure on the 
foundation of bastardy law, the planter elite had created a system in which 
illegitimacy laws were enforced on the basis of race. White women’s illegitimate 
children were subject to some labor, enslaved black women’s children (all of whom 
were treated as illegitimate) were subject to lifelong, inherited slavery, and mixed- 
race children were subject to ever increasing amounts of unfree labor. This link 
between illegitimacy and servitude also impacted white women and free women of 
color, who were punished with forced servitude for the crime of bastardy. Seen in 
this light, the creation of racial slavery was an exercise of patriarchal power: slavery 
was the ability of a particular group of men to define, claim, discipline, and capitalize 
upon the reproductivity of women. As was discussed in Chapter One, the effect this
330 Frantz Fanon, The W retched o f  the E arth  (NY: Grove Press, 1963), 40.
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system had on women varied by their race and status, but, because all women’s births 
were on some level suspect, all women were subject to these laws.
Even as Virginia’s patriarchs, via their colonial government, sought to create 
an airtight system, cracks still appeared. Hidden in the court documents are stories of 
women who defied authority, either intentionally or not, and sought to create lives for 
themselves and their children: their outlaw reproduction is the focus of this chapter. 
My goal here is to understand how some women could make power work in their own 
interests even in the face of the overwhelming discursive power of colonialism and 
racial slavery. Ultimately, the process of creating colonialism and racial slavery in 
Virginia inadvertently created possibilities for the transgression of those very 
systems. First, even in attempting to create an absolute legal structure, Virginia’s 
lawmakers created spaces for individual women to find ways to use the law and the 
culture to protect themselves and their children. W e’ve seen this in Mary Walters’ 
case, when she tried (albeit unsuccessfully) to sue her former mistress. Second, on a 
cultural level, the assertion of patriarchal power through colonialism and racial 
slavery, in a sense, created its opposite: patriarchal Virginia created a world in which 
reproduction could carry the keys to freedom, personhood, and familial stability. 
Specifically, free black families like the Walters family, who existed outside of the 
dualistic framework of racial slavery, challenged the notion that blackness and 
slavery were absolutely linked. In some cases (like Mary Walters’), the court would 
reassert its power and authority; in others, free black families found ways to continue 
their lives outside of the boundaries set by colonial elites. While these patterns of 
transgression should not be overestimated -  the power of colonialism, especially in
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the form of racial slavery, was devastating on both an individual and a systemic level 
-  the actions of women who transgressed lines of power and authority must be 
recognized.
This chapter aims to uncover outlaw reproduction in the context of 
colonialism and racial slavery. How could reproduction be a site for transgression in 
a culture of overwhelming domination? First, I will explain the theoretical 
underpinnings for my understanding of transgression within systems of domination. 
Second, I will explore the meanings of transgression in the reproductive lives of 
women in Virginia’s colonial culture. Finally, I will attempt to reconstruct the lives 
of two women and their families who straddled the color line in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century Virginia. These two family histories emphasize the ways that 
marginalized women’s reproduction could unsettle the foundations of early Virginia’s 
systems of racial hierarchy and racial slavery.
From resistance to transgression
In this discussion thus far, I have tried to avoid using the term “resistance” in
favor of another term and another framework: transgression. Attention to people’s
resistance to structural power has been absolutely central to the development of
1
histories “from the bottom up,” especially histories of slavery. Historians of 
women in slavery, in particular, have focused on understanding the ways that 
resistance, accommodation, and domination were intertwined in a complex matrix.
331 For exam ples o f  the centrality o f  resistance to the historiography o f  American slavery, see: John W . 
Blassingam e, The S lave Comm unity: P lantation  Life in the A ntebellum  South  (NY: Oxford University 
Press, 1972); Eugene G enovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The W orld the S laves M ade  (N Y : Vintage, 1976); 
Morgan, Slave Counterpoint', Sterling Stuckey, Slave Culture: N ationalist Theory an d  the 
F oundations o f  B lack A m erica  (NY: Oxford U niversity Press, 1987).
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Women’s resistance to slavery ran the gamut from nonviolent protest (such as work 
slowdowns) to armed rebellion, but women’s role as the primary caretakers for 
children made them differently invested than men in preserving their safety and their 
children’s safety.332 Because of their role as mothers, women’s resistance often took 
on different forms and had different priorities than men’s resistance. Acknowledging 
the complexity not only of enslaved women’s resistance but of historians’ debate 
about that resistance, Jennifer Morgan argues that historians must avoid seeing 
resistance and accommodation as an absolute binary, as such a dualism “suggests an 
ability to clearly delineate the meaning of various behaviors and does so while 
suggesting that there is consensus about the terms in play.” For Morgan, resistance 
is a meaningful concept only if we understand it fully in the context of the domination 
of slavery. Otherwise, well-meaning historians run the risk of reducing enslaved 
people to “imaginary automatons” forever trapped in a “vacuum of perpetual 
resistance.”334 In other words, resistance itself -  as a way to understand agency, as a 
way to understand the relationship between individuals and power, as a way to 
understand change in social and historical systems -  is a concept under debate.
In this chapter, I draw on three bodies of theory to provide a framework for 
understanding the relationship between power and women’s resistance to that power 
in the context of the law of slavery by birth, where reproduction was understood as
332 On the variety o f  forms o f  w om en’s resistance in colonial slavery, see B eckles, N atural R ebels, 
156-7. See also: Stephanie M. H. Camp, “The Pleasures o f  Resistance: Enslaved W om en and Body  
Politics in the Plantation South, 1830-1861,” N ew  Studies in the H istory o f  A m erican S lavery, ed. 
Edward Baptist and Stephanie Camp (Athens: University o f  Georgia Press, 2006), 86-124; M organ, 
Laboring Women, 166-195; Deborah Gray W hite, A r ’n ’t I  a  Woman ? F em ale S laves in the P lantation  
South  (NY: Norton, 1985), 76-84; Betty W ood, “Som e A spects o f  Fem ale R esistance to Chattel 
Slavery in L ow  Country G eorgia, 1763-1815,” The S lavery R eader, ed. Gad Heuman and James 
W alvin (NY: R outledge, 2003), 551-68.
333 Morgan, L aboring Women, 166-7.
334 Morgan, L aboring Women, 167.
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part of a nexus of sexuality, race, and servitude. Michel Foucault’s definition of 
power -  as emerging from multiple points within a discursive field -  demands that we 
acknowledge the power held by all actors within a structure, even those with less (or 
seemingly no) formal authority. Readers of Foucault in feminist and queer theories 
have offered possibilities for rethinking the ways that transgressive lives or actions 
that expose the artificiality of structures of power can weaken, or at least expose, the 
foundations of that power. Finally, postcolonial theorists have grappled with the 
relationship between the academic and the historical subject, questioning whether 
historians and other academics can recover the lives and voices of those at the bottom 
of hierarchies. This chapter is informed by a reading of all of these bodies of theory.
Foucault reminds us that discursive structures of dominance contain within 
them the means for their own transgression: resistance is rooted in, springs from, and 
therefore reflects the very power it counteracts. For Foucault, power “must be 
understood...as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which
lie
they operate and which constitute their own organization.” Foucault’s 
poststructuralist understanding of power, in other words, frames power as not held by 
or embodied in those at the top of hierarchies, but instead as emanating from and 
between (and thus able to be claimed by) people at all levels of society. The point 
here is not to deny the existence of hierarchy, but instead to recognize the ways that 
power is made, remade, and exchanged in the intimate zones where individuals 
interact.336 Foucault alerts us that, if power is understood as intimate or multiple 
(i.e., not simply held by rulers), then resistance to power is simultaneously as
335 Foucault, H istory o f  Sexuality, 92.
336 Foucault, H istory o f  Sexuality, 44-6; Stoler, “Intimidations o f  Empire,” 3.
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universal and as multiple as power itself. Again, Foucault’s poststructuralist stance 
allows for a rethinking of power and resistance as emanating from individuals, rather 
from classes. Foucault argues:
[Power relations’] existence depends on a multiplicity of points of 
resistance.... These points of resistance are present everywhere in the power 
network. Hence there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, 
source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a
1T7plurality of resistances, each of them a special case.
In this context of multiple power relations, even people at the bottom of hierarchies 
influenced the cultural systems in which they lived.338
Foucault’s definition of power and understanding of resistance have been 
critiqued, reframed, and expanded by other theorists, notably feminist theorists and 
post-colonial theorists. Some feminist critics have argued that Foucault’s discussion 
of the multiplicity of power relations denies the existence of structural power, and 
thus would seem to deny the reality of men’s oppression of women (or even, we 
might surmise, slaveholders’ oppression of those they enslaved). However, 
Foucault’s critique of totalizing theories of power still acknowledged that power was
337 Foucault, H istory o f  Sexuality, 95-6.
338 Kirsten Fischer frames w om en’s resistance in colonial North Carolina in just these Foucauldian 
terms, arguing that “far from being passive recipients o f  a new  social order, [w om en’s] resistance and 
accom m odations to the ex igen cies o f  bio-power fundam entally influenced race relations in the colonial 
setting.” I address Foucault’s notion o f  biopow er in Chapter 4. Fischer, Suspect R elations, 6-7.
339 Som e radical fem inist and socialist fem inist theorists sharply critiqued this aspect o f  Foucault’s 
theories, arguing that by denying structure, Foucault made it im possible for oppressed groups to 
organize for their ow n liberation. See, for exam ple, N ancy Hartsock, “Foucault on Power: A  Theory 
for W om en?” in F em inism /Postm odernism , ed. Linda J. N icholson (N Y: Routledge, 1990), 157-175. I 
find more convincing the more measured critique o f  Susan Bordo, who praises the attention to 
com plexity, heterogeneity, and resistance by Foucault and other poststructuralists and postmodernists, 
w hile still cautioning against a “m ethodologism ” w hich w ould elevate his theories to a new canon. 
Further, Bordo suggests that postm odernism ’s attention to heterogeneity and difference is rooted in 
similar attention paid by fem inism  and other social justice m ovem ents. Susan Bordo, “Fem inism , 
Postm odernism , and G ender-Skepticism ,” in F em inism /Postm odernism , 133-156.
128
focused in the hands of the few. Foucault’s theories allow that power can and does 
coalesce into systems of domination through the repetition of particular discourses of 
power. Importantly, though, because they emerge in a discursive field, these systems 
of domination are never absolute: for Foucault, power is “a multiple and mobile field 
of force relations, wherein far-reaching, but never completely stable effects of 
domination are produced.”340 Rather than seeing power as a result of domination, 
Foucault sees domination as the effect of power.
Foucault reminds us that even as discourses are repeated, they are tenuous and 
unstable -  indeed, the incessant repetition of discourses exposes their instability. In 
Chapter One, we have seen how this operated in the creation of a culture of inherited 
racial slavery in early Virginia: repeated discursive patterns created the possibility 
for particular kinds of reproduction to be tied to perpetual labor, and for particular 
kinds of property ownership to be tied to certain women’s reproductivity. The system 
of racial slavery in early Virginia, while clearly a system of domination, was also an 
unstable one in significant ways. We have seen this in the debates over realty and 
personalty discussed in Chapter One: power had coalesced in the hands of planters 
through their exploitation of black women’s reproductivity. The debate over real and 
personal property revealed the inability of the elite to control the very discourses of 
reproductivity, servitude, and race upon which racial slavery depended. Drawing on 
this foundation, this chapter explores the ways that women could exploit these sites of 
instability for their own and their children’s benefit.
If systems of power are inherently unstable, then resistance to power can take 
myriad forms. Feminist theorist Johanna Oksala uses the twin concepts of
340 Foucault, H istory o f  Sexuality, 102.
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transgression and limit-experiences to understand some of the forms resistance can 
take in a Foucauldian framework. Oksala’s reading of Foucault’s theory offers a 
compelling model for thinking about how bodily experiences can pose challenges to 
discourses of power. Drawing on Foucault, Oksala argues that:
Limit and transgression are irrevocably tied to each other; they constitute each 
other and constantly reaffirm and contest each other. Transgression creates a 
limit that exists only in the movement that crosses it. It literally crosses over 
the limits and thus brings and explicit experience of limits into being.341 
In other words, the relationship between limit and transgression is parallel to the 
relationship between domination and resistance. Limits are unknown before they are 
crossed; attempts at domination are resisted. But what do these transgressions look 
like, and why do they matter?
Oksala outlines three modes of transgression that she terms “limit- 
experiences,” or experiences that exist on the edges of discourse and, as such, 
transgress cultural boundaries.342 These limit-experiences are useful to us here in 
understanding the relationship between resistance and domination. First, and most 
obviously, limit-experiences transgress lines of power, crossing over from what is 
perceived as normal, legal, or permissible, to that which is deemed abnormal, illegal, 
or impermissible. In terms of this discussion of reproduction in colonial Virginia, 
illegitimate births, by definition, transgressed lines of power by standing as 
undeniable evidence of sexuality outside of the narrow boundaries of patriarchal 
marriage. Second, Oksala discusses limit-experiences that transgress lines of
341 Johanna Oksala, “Anarchic Bodies: Foucault and the Fem inist Q uestion o f  Experience,” H ypatia  
19, no. 4  (2004), 110.
342 Oksala, “Anarchic B od ies,” 112.
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knowledge, crossing over from the intelligible and understandable to the unspeakable 
and unknowable. In this study, we’ve already seen how cross-racial births pushed the 
boundaries of knowledge, as lawmakers struggled to categorize and make sense of 
babies that challenged boundaries of race, servitude, and freedom. The birth of free 
interracial children challenged the dualistic framework of racial slavery, in which 
slavery and blackness were co-defmed. Finally, limit-experiences transgress 
boundaries of subjectivity, as people move from understanding their place in social 
categories and hierarchies to being “[thrown] outside of ourselves,” and outside of 
normativity.343 Again, cross-racial births provide an example of this kind of limit- 
experience, but this time, we must imagine or discern what it meant to individuals to 
live outside or in the liminal spaces of the rigid hierarchies of colonial Virginia’s 
racial discourse.344
Oksala’s framing of limit-experiences as transgressing various boundaries 
trains our eye away from mass revolution (the mythical “soul of revolt,” in Foucault’s 
acerbic phrasing) to the meanings of individual interactions. Understanding the 
meanings of transgression requires attention to local spaces, intimate zones, and 
individuals in a discursive field. But are these individual interactions meaningful in a 
political sense? Biddy Martin argues that, if neither power nor resistance emerges 
from a central locus, then “a very different form of political organization and struggle
343 Oskala, “Anarchic B odies,” 113.
344 Greg D ening em phasizes the liminality o f  colonial identities, since colonial spaces were “places o f  
am bivalence and unset definition.” Greg D ening, “Introduction: In Search o f  a M etaphor,” Through a  
G lass D arkly: R eflections on P ersonal Identity in E arly A m erica  (Chapel Hill: U niversity o f  North 
Carolina Press, 1997), 2. In his introduction to P ossib le  P asts, Robert Blair St. G eorge em phasizes 
that this lim inality was part o f  a process o f  “becom ing co lon ia l,” a process that was alw ays occurring 
for all people, as they shaped and were shaped by the colonial project. St. George, “Introduction,” 4-5.
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suggests itself.”345 For Martin, seemingly fragmented, individual, incoherent, or 
under-theorized transgression may indeed be deeply effective, because it is the local 
struggle that undermines the repetition of discourses of power. Martin’s recognition 
of local struggles is profoundly useful in recognizing the complex political meanings 
of women’s lives and choices in the context of colonialism. For example, even as 
New World slavery was an Atlantic phenomenon, its myriad local formations (such 
as Virginia’s conflation of illegitimacy with labor) demonstrate the ways that even 
global phenomenon had specific local iterations. Early American historian Robert 
Blair St. George uses the term “vernacular theory” to describe the development of 
local discourses of power, authority, and resistance in colonial American spaces -  a 
concept strikingly parallel to Martin’s discussion of a localized feminist politics.346 
Our task here, then, is to uncover the ways that transgressive lives or experiences 
challenged the emerging vernacular theory of colonialism in Virginia, or may have 
created alternative vernacular theories themselves.
My point is not to exaggerate the power of individuals, but to recognize the 
ways that individuals can destabilize the cultural systems that frame their lives.
Indeed, queer theory and lesbian history’s analysis of queer lives within the context of 
heteronormativity allows that, for marginalized people within discursive power 
structures, simply living -  if living is understood as occurring within and against a 
constructed framework of gender and sexuality -  might be understood as a form of 
subversion. Judith Butler argues that “heterosexuality must be understood as a
345 Biddy Martin, “Fem inism , Criticism , and Foucault,” in Fem inism  an d  F oucault: R eflections on 
R esistan ce , ed. Irene Diam ond and Lee Quinby (B oston, MA: Northeastern U niversity Press, 1988), 
9-10.
346 St. George, “Introduction,” 10.
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compulsive and compulsory repetition that can only produce the effect of its own 
originality.”347 If this is the case, then queer performances (like drag or 
butch/femme) destabilize heterosexuality by emphasizing its repetition. There is an 
analogy to be made here: if, like heterosexuality, racial hierarchy and separation 
were compulsively reiterated (as we’ve seen with the discursive repetitions that 
created slavery), then outlaw reproduction could expose this anxious repetition. 
Martha Vicinus argues for the centrality of lesbian histories precisely because lesbian 
sexualities pose a threat to the dominant culture by pointing to the “social danger 
inherent in women’s economic and sexual independence.”348 Again, an analogous 
reading is necessary here: outlaw reproduction exposed the limitations and 
boundaries of the cultural and legal culture of inherited racial slavery.
This reading of queer theory intends to show possibilities for foregrounding 
the transgressive possibilities of women’s experiences in colonialism. The intention 
of my reading of Butler and other queer theorists is not to argue that all lives lived are 
transgressive. Instead, I wish to emphasize that lives lived (and babies bom) in 
liminal, marginal, or outlaw spaces give the lie to the racial and gender categories and 
hierarchies that slaveholders’ discourse labored to create and naturalize. To connect 
this discussion of queer theory to Oksala’s framework of limit-experiences, the limit- 
experiences of queer and transgender sexualities transgress boundaries of power, 
knowledge, and subjectivity by rejecting what is seen as “normal,” forcing the 
unspoken to be spoken, and creating spaces for identities outside of rigid categories.
347 Judith Butler, “Imitation and Gender Insubordination” in The Second W ave: A R eader in F em inist 
T heory , ed. Linda N icholson (N Y: Routledge, 1997), 307.
348 Martha V icinus, “Lesbian History: A ll Theory and no facts or all facts and no theory?” in The 
F em inist H istory R eader, ed. Sue Morgan (N Y : Routledge, 2006), 220-1 , 228.
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To be clear: I am not arguing that race and sexuality are/were constructed by 
identical processes, but instead that queer theory offers a particularly compelling 
insight into the power of transgressive identities by focusing on the ways that daily 
interactions can destabilize cultural systems.349
In his study of interracial marriages in nineteenth-century Virginia, Joshua 
Rothman argues that formally illegal relationships were tolerated by neighbors and 
the authorities, so long as the participants did not push the boundaries of their status, 
claim power that the community defined as undue, or allow their relationships to 
become too publicly known.350 This reading of early American community relations 
points to a way for us to understand the relationship between people’s transgressive 
lives -  whether defined by illegal marriages or outlaw reproduction -  and community 
norms. Transgressions like illegitimacy or interracial births could be tolerated or 
even absorbed by the community when such absorption was in the interest of colonial 
power structures: the clearest example of this is the ways that black women’s 
interracial children were absorbed into slavery because planters profited from this 
form of interracial birth. White women’s interracial births, on the other hand, were 
too transgressive, and were punished harshly. On the other hand, we will see the 
many ways that other forms of transgressive births -  births by white servant women,
349 For a fem inist d iscussion o f  the parallels between the em erging discourses o f  race and sexuality, see  
M cW horter, “Sex, Race, and B iopow er,” 38-62 . M cW horter argues that the discourse o f  race em erged  
in a manner parallel and sim ultaneous to the em ergence o f  a discourse o f  sexuality as described by 
Foucault. For another Foucauldian reading that parallels the em ergence o f  race and the em ergence o f  
sexuality, see Stoler, R ace an d  the E ducation o f  D esire. Stoler argues that outside o f  The H istory o f  
Sexuality, Foucault considered deeply the politics o f  racial discourses, and that by rereading The 
H istory o f  Sexuality  via Foucault’s ow n ideas and the history o f  empire, we can com e to a fuller 
understanding o f  the formation and transformation o f  the bourgeois discourses that have marked the 
modern world.
350 Rothman, N otorious in the N eighborhood.
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births by free white women, and so on -  might be tolerated so long as they did not 
pose too much of a challenge to colonial power.
The project here, then, is to recover the transgressive possibilities of women’s 
reproductive experiences in colonialism, even while understanding the limits of such 
a knowledge-project. If poststructural feminist and queer theories are concerned with 
recognizing transgressive power within systems of domination, postcolonial theories 
are engaged in a similar project -  and particularly interested in the difficulties of 
recognizing and naming those transgressions. Homi Bhabha emphasizes that in the 
discursive field of colonialism, where colonial power depended on the construction of 
a subaltern “other” in order to justify its own dominance, “subaltern social groups 
were also in a position to transgress the authority of those who had hegemonic 
power.”351 Understanding the politics of subaltern transgressions requires 
reconstructing colonized subjectivities, a task that Gayatri Spivak has both demanded 
and problematized in her influential essay, “Can the Subaltern Speak?”352 Spivak’s 
framing is useful here for two reasons: her critique of the Western intellectual, and 
her understanding of colonized subjectivities. Spivak points out that if colonial 
power was constantly being reinscribed in the local context, it continues to be 
reinscribed by the intellectual (or, in this case, the historian). Her critique is aimed 
squarely at Foucault, who, she argues, reinscribes his own position as a Western 
intellectual even as he critiques the notion of a unified subjectivity.353 Significantly, 
Spivak does not reject Foucault wholesale, but instead forces us to consider the
351 Homi Bhabha, “Unsatisfied: N otes on Vernacular C osm opolitanism ,” in Gregory Castle, ed. 
P ostco lon ia l D iscourses: An A nthology  (M alden, MA: W iley-B lackw ell, 2001), 50.
352 Indeed, Spivak problem atizes the very notion o f  the “subaltern” as a category o f  identity or 
experience at all. Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 66-111.
353 Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?” 67.
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limitations of his (or any theorist’s) ideas and subjectivity. Spivak requires a constant 
intellectual vigilance on the part of the intellectual to divest themselves from colonial 
power even as they recognize that they are imbricated in that same power.
Second, Spivak’s discussion of colonized subjectivities points to ways that we 
might consider and understand the transgressive experiences of colonized peoples, 
even while recognizing the limitations of our understandings. She points to the 
“epistemic violence” of colonization, which repetitively elides the subjectivities and 
experiences of the subaltern (a process we’ve already seen in the deployment of 
discourses of livestock in the creation of chattel slavery in Virginia).354 The point is 
not that the subaltern cannot speak, but that her voice is so hard to hear across the 
distances of differing experiences, chasms of time, and the purposive violence and 
silencing characteristic of colonialism and slavery. Further, embedded in Spivak’s 
concept of “epistemic violence” is the crucial understanding that colonized people’s 
subjectivities did exist within colonization, however silenced by the colonial archive 
and transformed by the experience of colonization itself.
Therefore, recognizing these silencing processes requires a hopeful reading of 
the archive: in the words of historian Ania Loomba, we must “suppose a presence 
which at first cannot be found."255 For Loomba, reading intently for the subjectivities 
of women who “survived to tell the tale” allows us to get closer to understanding 
those subjectivities within the context of the structures that silenced them.356 My
354 Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 76.
355 Loomba, “Dead W om en T ell N o T ales,” 319, em phasis in original.
356 Loomba, “Dead W om en T ell N o T ales,” 319. L oom ba’s radical contextualization o f  subaltern 
w om en’s subjectivities has much in com m on with Linda A lc o f f  s concept o f  a historicized  
“positionality” in her rethinking o f  fem inist identity politics in a poststructuralist framework: “The 
positional defin ition ...m akes [w om an’s] identity relative to a constantly shifting context, to a situation 
that includes a network o f  elem ents involving others, the objective econom ic conditions, cultural and
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approach here is inspired by the hopefulness of Loomba, but tempered by the 
cautiousness of Spivak. The early Virginia archive, made up of court records and 
other elite documents, is itself an artifact of domination. One unarticulated but 
present purpose of these documents was to do epistemic violence to colonized 
subjects, be they women, enslaved or free African-Americans, or Native Americans -  
a silencing of these voices and experiences via framing those subjectivities in the 
terms of the dominant culture. Even so, for the women whose reproductive lives 
crossed boundaries or complicated categories, these documents record that 
transgression, not least because this boundary-crossing posed a challenge to power. 
My examination may not necessarily reconstruct subaltern subjectivities, but it does 
aim to make sense of the transgressive effects of those subjectivities.
To summarize, my goal in this chapter is to understand the ways that 
individual women’s reproductivity could destabilize the seemingly solid, but always 
tenuous, discursive formations that constructed inherited racial slavery in colonial 
Virginia. Foucault’s poststructuralist understanding of power within discursive fields 
reminds us that, even as power was consolidated in particular groups (read: the 
slaveowning planter class in colonial Virginia), individuals at the bottom of 
hierarchies could exercise power to influence their worlds. Indeed, as Virginia’s 
planters tried to construct a society based on the twin dualisms of race (black vs. 
white) and labor (slave vs. free), people who defied or blurred those dualisms could 
pose a challenge to the system as a whole. This challenge could take as simple but 
profound a form as the birth of a child. To seek out these transgressions is not to
political institutions and ideologies, and so on.” Linda A lcoff, “Cultural Fem inism  versus Post- 
Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Fem inist Theory,” in The Second W ave: A R eader in Fem inist 
Theory, ed. Linda N icholson  (N Y: Routledge, 1997), 347.
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ascribe to marginalized people some universal resistant subjectivity, but to try to 
recognize the fissures in the system that allowed marginalized people to live their 
lives. Further, the goal is not to underestimate the overwhelming power of systems of 
domination like slavery, but instead to recognize how incredibly difficult 
marginalized lives within those systems could be.
Recovering the stories of the women who “survived to tell the tale” in early 
Virginia’s culture of inherited racial slavery is a complex task. This is further 
complicated by the exigencies of reproduction in early Virginia. The events of 
women’s reproductive lives -  the birth of a child, the outlaw pregnancy, the intent to 
limit one’s reproduction -  are not so easily categorized as “resistance” or 
“accommodation.” Instead, I tend to see these events as examples of transgression 
rather than resistance. As was described in Chapter 1, Virginia’s intersecting 
hierarchies of race, labor, gender, and status were framed by discourses of 
reproduction; lawmakers tried to use reproduction to create and police race and labor 
categories. Simultaneously, reproduction also complicated those very categories: 
interracial children, bastard births, and other births that crossed categories 
destabilized hierarchies and blurred divisions. My focus here is to understand the 
effects of the choices that women (both enslaved and not) made that transgressed or 
complicated the structures of power in which they lived. In this way, my concern is 
less about resistant intent than with transgressive effect. I seek to uncover the limit- 
experiences of women whose lives transgressed boundaries of power, of knowledge, 
and of subjectivity, in a colonial space in which those boundaries were constantly 
being constructed and reconstructed. The particularities of reproduction within
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colonialism -  especially in a culture defined by inherited racial slavery -  meant that 
all women’s reproduction had political meaning. Because status (whether in terms of 
race or labor) was marked by birth, birth itself carried significant potential political 
power.
Transgressive Reproduction 
An examination of the transgressive possibilities of reproduction in early 
Virginia is undoubtedly attenuated by the available archive: the surviving court 
records and plantation documents are, by definition, artifacts of the systems of 
domination in the colony. This does not mean that all of the births recorded in the 
archive transgressed social and cultural boundaries. For example, the required birth 
records submitted by parishes recorded all white women’s births, both legitimate and 
illegitimate (parishes were not required to record the births of slaves, though some 
did). Nevertheless, the county courts’ records of births did focus on outlaw 
reproduction -  those births that caused problems, created legal crises, or challenged 
social hierarchies. Indeed, it was because these births transgressed social and cultural 
boundaries that they produced discursive effects. Further, planters’ records 
sometimes provide clues for how enslaved women’s reproductivity could interrupt the 
plantation economy. Therefore, the character of the early Virginia archive makes an 
attention to transgression (rather than resistance) especially useful. In all but the 
rarest of cases, I can’t begin to assert the intent of the women who bore these children 
-  their subjectivities are assiduously elided by the men who wrote the documents. 
Nevertheless, some women’s transgressive actions left traces in the court records.
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In the following section, I will examine how the Virginia court documents 
(and, in some cases, other records) offer up some ways that women’s reproductivity 
transgressed the lines of the increasingly calcifying systems of domination of early 
Virginia. My analysis is organized, with some blurring and a few exceptions, by 
women’s status: the pathways to and meanings of transgressive reproduction were 
profoundly different if a woman was white, black, or mixed race, as well as whether 
she was indentured, enslaved, or free. I first focus on the transgressive reproductivity 
of white women, whose experience was complicated and defined by their status as 
servants or free women. Then, I examine the possibility that black women’s 
reproductivity in slavery could have transgressive meanings. The transgressive 
reproductivity of free women of color, especially mixed-race women and their 
families, is examined in depth in the next section.
White women’s reproductivity was transgressive of colonial systems of 
domination in a number of ways. As we will see, for white women, transgressive 
reproductivity took a number of forms depending on whether they were free or 
indentured. Some free women simply defied the disciplinary power of the court by 
escaping trial or punishment when they bore children outside of marriage. For 
English servant women who bore bastard children, the rituals of childbearing, 
especially the tradition of lying-in, challenged household hierarchies. Further, as we 
will see, for both free and servant white women, the bearing of a bastard child could 
allow some women to live outside of the strict hierarchical norms of colonial 
patriarchy. As was outlined in Chapter 1, the establishment of racial slavery in the 
colony was founded on the appropriation of black women’s reproductivity along with
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the disciplining of white women’s reproductivity: legitimate white reproduction 
could occur only within marriage, and could not cross increasingly calcified racial 
barriers. For many white women, both free and indentured, the record of their bastard 
births stands as evidence of some unlikely (and tenuous) paths to transgressing the 
disciplinary power of the colonial courts and elites.
For some women, their defiance of the court’s power over their reproductivity 
was explicit: they evaded the court. An example of intentional resistance, escaping 
the court’s punishment also shows ways that women charged with bastardy 
transgressed social and cultural boundaries. First, these women transgressed lines of 
power by disobeying the court’s orders and outwardly challenging the court’s 
authority. In 1662, after being sentenced to ten lashes each for bearing bastard 
children, Elizabeth Holloway and Anne Roberts enraged the court when they together 
“escap[ed] from the Court without punishment.”357 This transgression of power was 
also a transgression of knowledge, when women used their knowledge of the law and 
the masculine public sphere to their own advantage. In 1708, Judith Moody’s 
bastardy case was dropped because she “hath absented & gone out of the County,” a 
move that suggests that Moody understood the boundaries of the court’s jurisdiction 
and used that knowledge to plot her escape.358
No matter the intention of women who evaded the court, women’s defiance of 
the courts’ power had transgressive effects. Some women simply refused to show up
357 York D O W  3: 161, 168. In another case, Margaret George was tried sim ultaneously for bastardy 
and running away. D OW  5: 11, 109.
358 York D O W  13: 1 2 0 ,1 2 5 . For similar cases, see the 1759 bastardy cases o f  Martha Driver,
Elizabeth Robertson, and Mary B ayley, w hich were d ism issed “the D efts not being to be found in this 
County.” It is possible that the three w om en escaped together. York JO 3: 66, 73. See also the case o f  
Elizabeth Hughes, w hose case was d ism issed from the York Court because the offense occurred in 
another county: York D O W  3: 151, 175.
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to court when summoned for bastardy. When Mary Hubbard was charged with 
bastardy in 1745, the court had to dismiss the case when she failed to obey her 
summons and could not be found.359 When Barbara Hutton refused to obey her 
summons for bastardy in 1707, her case was dismissed, and her accusers, George 
Baskerville and Thomas Mountfort, were each fined 500 pounds of tobacco as 
punishment for her nonappearance.360 Later that year, Mountfort was denied a
Ilicense to open an ordinary because the court thought him “insufficient.” Was his 
failure to detain Hutton evidence of his insufficiency? These cases indicate that free 
white women were willing and able to frustrate the court’s attempts to discipline their 
reproductivity and sexuality. And these cases caused a problem for the courts -  
bastardy cases often clogged up the court’s dockets for months at a time as women 
either refused or otherwise failed to show up to hearings. Whatever women’s 
intent in defying the court, the effect of their actions was to subvert the power of the 
court, and, by extension, the colonial patriarchy it represented.
For other women, especially English servant women, the transgressive 
possibilities of their childbearing were more implicit. These implicit meanings
359 York D O W  19: 365-6 , 372. Interestingly, on the sam e day that Driver, Robertson, and B ayley left 
the county, another woman, Elizabeth G odffy, was fined for bastardy despite the fact that she did not 
appear in court. This suggests that sim ply skipping court w as not enough to escape punishment -  one 
needed to escape the court’s jurisdiction altogether. York JO 3: 3 2 ,6 6 .
360 York D OW  13: 40, 58, 66, 75, 76, 85, 93.
361 York D O W  13: 94.
362 Mary Clay evaded court for 16 months before finally being sentenced: York D OW  8: 300, 512. See  
also the 1731-2 bastardy case o f  Anne Banks (13 months betw een initial charge and eventual 
dism issal): York D O W  17: 253, 260, 265, 273, 296, 308, 314, 338; York D O W  18: 5; the 1741-2  
bastardy case o f  Cleopatra B ee (9 months between initial charge and guilty decision): York D O W  19: 
45, 56, 62, 72, 79, 89; the 1745 bastardy case o f  Hope Drewitt (6  months betw een initial charge and 
guilty decision; Drewitt never show ed up to court and w as found guilty in absentia): York D O W  19: 
365-6, 372, 381, 386, 391; the 1751 bastardy case o f  Mary Hughes (7 months betw een initial charge 
and eventual dism issal): York JO l: 507, 517; JO 2: 13, 2 7 ,4 7 ;  the 1731-2 bastardy case o f  Elizabeth  
Jones (6  months between initial charge and last mention o f  case, w hich was never com pleted): York 
D OW  17: 248, 253, 260, 265, 273, 313.
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require a reading of the Anglo-Virginian cultural context of those births. The 
relationship between women servants and the master class reveals a tug-of-war over 
power in cases of servant women’s bastard births. Undoubtedly, white servant 
women’s pregnancies and births posed difficulties to the master class: a pregnant 
servant couldn’t work as hard, and bastardy cases had to be investigated and tried in 
the courts. In some ways, the colony’s appropriation of servant women’s 
reproductivity was an attempt to reclaim that power. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
Virginia lawmakers used bastardy law as a discursive foundation for the colony’s 
culture of servitude and slavery: bastardy law was the basis by which Virginia’s 
planter class extracted ever-increasing terms of service from women based on race. 
Even so, preexistent English customs surrounding childbirth complicated those labor 
demands. A close reading of the intent of Virginia bastardy law as it was applied to 
English servant women’s bastardy cases indicates some of the ways servants’ 
reproductivity unsettled the social hierarchies of the master’s household.
As was discussed in Chapter 1, beginning in 1643, servant women were 
treated differently, and increasingly punished more harshly, than free women for the 
crime of bastardy. By 1696, punishments for bastardy had been rationalized in a way 
that would stay more or less intact until the Revolution.363 All women convicted of 
fornication were to be punished one of three ways: they were to be fined 500 pounds 
of tobacco, or severely whipped, or (if a servant) forced to serve six more months. 
Servant women who bore bastard children were to serve an additional two years. 
Since fornication cases were rarely brought to court unless a bastard child was bom, 
the result of the statute was that free women were fined or whipped for bastardy,
363 Hening 3: 137-40.
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while servant women could serve anywhere between six and twenty-four extra 
months and could be whipped and/or fined as well. For example, in 1674, when 
Mary Bell was found guilty of bearing a bastardy child while indentured to Edward 
Baptist, she was ordered both to serve and extra two years and to be whipped “until 
the blood come.”364 County courts exercised considerable leeway in assigning 
punishments, but, as we will see, the reasoning for those punishments was remarkably 
consistent.
Ann Elmes’ 1679 bastardy case demonstrates well the ways that the law was 
applied by the York county court to English servants accused of bastardy. Elmes was 
a 24-year old servant of William Wade when she was brought to court for bearing a 
bastard child. Elmes was ordered to receive “20 lashes upon the bare back” for the 
crime of fornication, unless Wade conceded to paying Elmes’ fine for her.365 Cases 
like Elmes’ reveal a potent power held by masters in these cases: essentially, it was 
up to Wade whether or not he would be generous enough to protect Elmes from the 
whipping by paying her fine (for which he could demand extra labor for repayment). 
Besides the fine or lashes, Elmes received a separate punishment for the birth of the 
bastard child: she was ordered “to serve for same according to law.” In other 
words, besides being whipped (or serving extra as repayment for a fine), Elmes was 
required to serve Wade for two additional years.
Why were servants like Ann Elmes required to serve the extra time for 
bastardy? On one level, this question has an easy answer: as community members 
with very little authority, white servant women were at the mercy of the law and those
364 York D OW  5: 68.
365 York D OW  5: 89; York D OW  6: 94.
366 Ibid.
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who applied it. With Virginia’s high demand for labor, why wouldn’t planters extend 
their servants’ terms of service as much as they could? This answer, while self- 
evident and undoubtedly true, doesn’t tell the whole story. The language of the 
statute and the individual cases indicates that the extended labor had a very specific 
function: “If it happen a bastard child to be gotten in such fornication then the 
woman if a servant in regard o f the losse and trouble her master doth sustaine by her 
haveing a bastard shall serve two years after her time of indenture is expired.” The 
extra labor demanded from servant women was intended to repay the master for “the 
losse and trouble” he had sustained, but what was this “losse and trouble” exactly? 
The answer to this question lies in the potentially transgressive power of the early 
modem European practice of lying in.
In his discussion of women’s culture of midwifery in eighteenth-century 
England, Adrian Wilson notes that the tradition of lying-in could overturn the basic 
hierarchies of the patriarchal household. 368 In early modem England, as well as the 
colonies, recently delivered women were attentively cared for by other women for up 
to a month as they recovered from childbirth.369 This highly ritualized process of 
“lying-in” allowed women to recover from the strain of childbirth, enjoy female 
sociability, and begin the process of nursing and infant care. The connection between 
lying-in and resuming labor was clear in practice. Laurel Thatcher Ulrich points out 
that recovery from childbirth was defined by women’s ability to return back to their
367 Hening 2: 114-5, em phasis mine.
368 1 do not assum e that birth practices translated w holesale from England to Virginia. Indeed, the 
argument that fo llow s indicates som e w ays that the servant econom y in Virginia interrupted and 
problem atized English birth practices. The differences betw een English and Virginian birth practices 
w ill be discussed more fully in Chapter 3.
369 W ilson, The M aking o f  M an-M idw ifery, 25-30. David Cressy, Birth, M arriage, an d  D eath: Ritual, 
R eligion, and the L ife-C ycle in Tudor and Stuart E ngland  (NY: Oxford U niversity Press, 1999), 82-84.
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usual labors after lying-in: “It wasn’t the size and position of the woman’s uterus but 
her ability to make her own bed that signified recovery.”370 Wilson emphasizes the 
political ramifications of this tradition, which essentially removed the postpartum 
woman from the household sexual economy and labor structure:
The ceremony of childbirth inverted the normal pattern of conjugal relations; 
the wife’s bodily energies and sexuality now, for the space o f ‘the month’, 
belong to her; what marriage had taken from her, the childbirth ritual 
temporarily restored.371 
In this way, childbirth traditions could be seen as functioning in the same way as did 
celebrations of carnival (or May Day in England) -  both were a temporary 
overturning of social hierarchies.372 Lisa Foreman Cody argues that the single-sex 
environment of the birthing room and the lying-in chamber created an alternative 
public sphere that challenged both gender and status hierarchies:
Whereas the culture of lying-in -  like the ideal coffeehouse -  was marked by 
ignoring class differences and hierarchies, both the birth chamber and the 
developing institutions of the public sphere often excluded on the basis of 
gender. Whereas the Royal Society, for example, explicitly forbade women 
from membership, the early modem lying-in chamber also prohibited men 
from entering.
370 Ulrich, A M idw ife's Tale, 189.
371 W ilson, The M aking o f  M an-M idw ifery, 29.
372 Mikhail Bakhtin, R abela is an d  H is W orld, transl. Tvorchestvo Fransua Rable (B loom ington:
Indiana U niversity Press, 1984). W hile the lying-in tradition cannot be said to embrace the intentional 
hilarity o f  the Renaissance carnival discussed by Bakhtin, it did, in this reading, offer a m om ent where 
hierarchies were overturned and the patterns o f  daily life were reversed.
373 C ody, ‘T h e  Politics o f  Reproduction,” 480.
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At its core, the tradition of lying-in transgressed both gender and status hierarchies. 
Those transgressions were intensified in the intensely stratified colonial culture of 
early Virginia.
As practiced in Virginia, white servant women’s exercise of their right to lie 
in after giving birth transgressed boundaries between master and servant and 
complicated hierarchies of class and status. This means that the court’s demand that 
servant women serve extra time to repay “the losse and trouble of her master” was a 
repayment for the social upheaval signaled by lying-in. An early case shows the ways 
that the court saw bastardy cases as an opportunity to reimburse women’s masters for 
the costs incurred by their pregnancy, delivery, and lying in. Phoebe Hardy, a servant 
to Thomas Mann, bore a bastard child in 1667. During her labor, Hardy named James 
Clarke as the father of her child (later cases would not be concerned with such prosaic 
information). Mann sued Clarke for the costs he had incurred due to Hardy’s 
pregnancy and birth.374 Mann’s award from the court included 100 pounds of tobacco 
and a barrel of com to repay the midwife, as well as “six pds sterling” for his 
“troubles care & charge abt Phebe Hardy in the tyme of her lying in” -  all to be paid 
by Clarke, the father of the child.375 Mann agreed to keep the child, so long as Clarke 
paid him another eight pounds sterling for support of the infant. This custody 
arrangement did not last long: by 1669, Mann was relieved of responsibility for the 
child when Charles and Alice Gratham offered to take custody.376 This case makes 
clear that the court considered the lying-in period to be a significant cost to the 
master, worth being repaid for a large amount of cash. The equivalencies here are
374 York D OW  4: 164.
375 Ibid.
376 York DOW  4: 273.
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fascinating and revealing: the cost of lying-in was considerably more than the 
charges for the midwife, and nearly equivalent to the costs of supporting a child for
1 7 7
several years.
Phoebe Hardy’s case helps us to understand the deeper threat posed by white 
indentured servant births in early Virginia: at least temporarily, the birth of a bastard 
child overturned status hierarchies in the household. Significantly, even in the 
intensified hierarchy of the master-servant relationship, English servant women still 
expected -  and received -  the traditional month-long lying-in period after their 
births.378 The specific language used by the county courts in adjudicating bastardy 
cases elucidates the ways that white servant women’s lying-in was seen as a cost 
bome by the master or mistress. The court records show that the extra term of service 
was demanded as repayment by the servant woman for the transgressive social 
upheaval of her lying-in.379 By extending the terms of service for servants who bore 
bastard children, the court’s aim was to set right the social hierarchy.
As legal responsibility for bastardy shifted to mothers in the eighteenth 
century, this repayment for lying-in was extracted through extra labor from the 
mother, rather than cash or labor from the father.380 Furthermore, throughout the 
record, the extra labor demanded from English servant women for bastardy was 
framed by the York county courts in terms of repayment for lying-in. When, in 1712,
377 The 1699 bastardy trial o f  indentured servant Margaret Stringer also points to these equivalencies. 
Stringer is sentenced to one extra year, and she forfeited her allotm ent o f  corn upon her freedom  (part 
o f  typical freedom dues) rather than being whipped for the crim e o f  fornication. In other words, 
whipping was the punishment for fornication, but the extra labor was the punishment for bastardy and 
the loss o f  labor suffered by the master. York D O W  11: 235.
378 For exam ples, see: York DOW  3: 34 and York DOW  3: 43.
379 Karin W ulf has found a similar pattern in colonial Philadelphia, where the financial loss o f  servants’ 
and slaves’ labor during pregnancy and lying-in was reclaimed by masters as soon as possible. W ulf, 
N ot A ll W ives, 105.
380 See Chapter 1 for a d iscussion o f  this shift in responsibility.
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Ann Green bore a child during her term of service to Elizabeth Brookes, the court 
demanded that Green serve “her sd mistress two years fo r  her fine & trouble o f  her 
house in the time o f  lying m”.381 In 1714, after she gave birth to twins, Frances Lee 
was sentenced to twenty-five lashes as well as a year of service “for the trouble of 
[her master’s house] in the time of her lying in.”382 Benjamin Catton appeared in the 
York county court in 1743 “praying relief’ because his servant, Jane Tomson, had 
borne a bastard child: “he hath been at great expense and Trouble thereby.”383 
Tomson paid her own fine, but was still sentenced to serve an extra year to Catton.
Even as the court records became increasingly perfunctory over the course of 
the eighteenth century, clerks made clear why servants were required to serve extra 
time: the extra time was repayment “for the trouble of [her master or mistress’s] 
house in the time of her lying in.”384 These frequent and specific references to lying- 
in make clear that, at least discursively, the court did not consider itself to be 
attempting to regain the labor lost during pregnancy and nursing. The court’s 
calculus is also significant here: the “losse and trouble” that the master incurred for 
one month was equal to, in the eyes of the law and the justices of the county court, up 
to two years of a woman’s labor. This further emphasizes that the punishment for 
servant bastardy was intended to symbolically right the social order: the labor 
demanded from servant women far outweighed the actual time and labor lost by the 
master. This inequity between crime and punishment may be explainable by the 
specific language that the courts repeated. That lying-in was considered not just a
381 York D O W  14: 217, em phasis in original.
382 York D O W  14: 348.
383 York D O W  19: 2 0 9 ,2 1 0 .
384 The quoted language is repeated verbatim in the fo llow ing cases in York County: D O W  7: 7, 16; 
D O W  14: 138; D OW  15: 59, 60; DOW  15: 124, 137; DOW  15: 110; D O W  15: 523 (1719); D O W  15: 
536; D OW  16: 75; DOW  16: 38; D O W  16: 75; D OW  16: 247; D O W  16: 513.
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financial burden but a social transgression is apparent in the repeated language of 
“losse and trouble”: servant women’s lying-in may have equaled just a month of 
“losse,” but the “trouble” that it caused was worth two years of labor.
A rare document filed with the York county court elucidates how masters and 
mistresses framed the bearing of a child by a servant woman as transgressive of social 
norms and status hierarchies. In 1680, Elizabeth Mullins gave birth to a bastard child 
while serving an indenture to Elizabeth Vaulx. Mullins was set free before the case 
was tried, but Vaulx hoped to retain Mullins and extract her labor nonetheless.
Unable to appear at court for Mullins’ trial, Vaulx sent word to the court that she 
hoped Mullins would serve out her extra time, since Vaulx asserted that “the childe 
was bome in [Mullins’] servitude.”385 But the real problem, Vaulx intimated, was 
that since the birth Mullins had ceased to observe the social deference demanded of 
servants by masters and mistresses. Vaulx complained of Mullins: “she is grown soe
' l O Z
high and soe parantory, that I can scarce speake to her.” Ultimately, the court fined 
Mullins 500 pounds of tobacco for fornication; because Mullins could not pay that 
fine, the court extended her service to Vaulx by six months. Significantly, the court 
offered no reprimand at all for Mullins’ “high and parentory” behavior. Vaulx 
expected deference from her former servant. Having been freed and having 
experienced the social leveling of lying-in, Mullins was no longer compliant.
385 York D OW  6: 279, 288.
386 The O xford English D ictionary  lists “parantory” as an alternative spelling for peremptory, and lists 
among its 17th-century definitions “obstinate, stubborn, w ilfu l.” O xford English D ic tion ary  O nline, 
s.v. “parantory,”
http://dictionary.oed.com .proxy.library, vcu .edu/cgi/entry/50175256/50175256spg 1 ?single= 1 &query_t 
ype=m isspelling& query word=parantory&first= 1 & m ax_to_show = 10& h ilite= 50175256spg  1 (July 24, 
2009).
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For most servant women, the effects of transgression were temporary: 
Elizabeth Mullins and the other servant women discussed so far all received extended 
indentures for their crimes. The transgressive power of outlaw reproduction existed 
in concert and in contest with the extraordinarily dominating power of Virginia’s 
servant and slave economy. This is especially clear for servant women who bore 
multiple children during their time of indenture. For example, Sarah Paskins, an 
English servant woman indentured to Charles Dunn, was charged with bastardy in
' I Q ’J
April 1673, for which she was sentenced to two extra years of service. As it turns 
out, Paskins was pregnant during that first bastardy case: by November 1673, she had 
bome another bastard child. She was again ordered to serve an additional two years, 
and the confessed father of the children, fellow servant William Lane, was sentenced
1 Q Q
to a year of extra service as well. Exactly a year later, in 1674, Paskins was again 
brought to court for bastardy, and again sentenced to two years of extra service.389 
The court did not address the fate of Paskins’ children, but the law required that they 
themselves were indentured until the age of 21. Even as we acknowledge the ways 
that Paskins’ births, lying-in, and long-term relationship with her children’s father 
might have had transgressive effects in the Dunn household, the fact remains that she
387 York D O W  5: 44 . W hile the timing between Paskins’ three cases was extrem ely tight, it w as not 
im possible that she was charged in such quick succession  for these three cases. This first, April 1673, 
case was likely brought to court a significant period o f  time after the birth o f  the child. The 
seventeenth century York county court only met quarterly, and masters on far-flung plantations may 
have delayed bringing their servant woman to court. The discovery o f  Paskins’ second and third 
pregnancies may have inspired Dunn to quicker action for the later cases.
88 York D OW  5: 56. W illiam  Lane was accused o f  fathering Paskins’ child in this case, but not in the 
other tw o cases. Even so, it is possible that he was the father o f  all three o f  her children: as was 
discussed in Chapter 1, bastardy was increasingly framed as a fem ale crim e by the 1670s. At any rate, 
it is possible that Paskins and Lane shared a com m itted relationship even within their indentures.
389 York DOW  5: 91.
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had to serve 6 additional years, and her relationship with her children was likely 
severed as a result.
Paskins was one of many women, servant and free, who were accused 
multiple times of bastardy in York county.390 We know exceedingly little about these 
women -  indeed, the records of their bastardy cases are often the only trace that exists 
of their lives. It is impossible for us to know the specific circumstances of those 
births. For English servant women, lying-in may have represented a temporary 
respite from labor, a rare moment when the servant was the one who was served. 
Nevertheless, it also typically meant an extension of their indentures and a separation 
from their children. If childbearing offered servant women a moment to transcend 
their status, the punishment of extended service certainly cemented their lower status 
anew.
In Virginia’s intensely stratified colonial society, the transgressive 
possibilities of reproduction were far different for free white women than for white 
servant women. For some free white women, bastardy charges may stand as unlikely 
evidence of a measure of independence enjoyed by some women during this period. 
Take the case of Mary Cosby. Cosby was charged with bastardy in 1765; though she 
never appeared at court, she was fined 500 pounds of tobacco in absentia.391 Cosby 
disappears from the records until 1774, when, surprisingly, that 1765 case again 
emerged as a question. It seems that Cosby, counter to the law which required 
bastard children to be bound out, had managed to provide for her children herself for
390 O f the 380  cases o f  bastardy I’ve uncovered in the York County court records and the Charles 
Parish, York County birth register, fully 30% (or 116 cases) were com m itted by repeat offenders.
Those 116 cases involve 48  separate women; o f  those wom en, 29 were free wom en, 15 were servants, 
and 4  saw  their status change betw een their cases (i.e ., they were servants for one case, and had been  
freed by the tim e o f  their later charges).
391 York JO 4: 3 7 4 ,4 4 7 .
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those nine years. Cosby herself brought the case to the attention of the court -  she 
finally named John Holt as the father of her children, in an attempt to demand some 
financial support from him.392 The court recognized that Cosby’s financial 
circumstances had changed, and the children were “likely to become chargeable to 
the.. .Parish.”393 The court stepped in, required Holt to provide financial support for 
the children (six pounds annually for each child), and arranged for the children to be 
apprenticed when they each turned ten years old. Thereafter, both John Holt and 
Mary Cosby were understood to be the children’s parents: in the subsequent court 
records that manage the boys’ indentures, Mary Cosby’s sons are alternately referred 
to as “Thomas Holt and Matthew Holt” and “Matthew and Thomas Cosby Bastard 
children of John Holt and Mary Cosby.”394 Was Mary Cosby a single mother, 
independently supporting her children during the early years of their lives? It seems 
likely. Indeed, it seems clear that Cosby steadfastly held onto her independence only 
until she was sure that her actions would best benefit her children: her actions in 1774 
guaranteed not only financial support for her sons, but the promise of an education, in 
the form of an apprenticeship. That the court continued to recognize her parenthood 
after the fact indicates the authority that she had carved out for herself.
Mary Cosby’s bastardy and custody cases give us a window into the ways that 
some individual women could create independent lives for themselves and their
392 For other cases in w hich w om en approached the court for support only when they were unable to 
support their children on their own, see: York D O W  11: 476 , York JO 3: 103.
393 York OB 4: 21, 48. W hile these and subsequent records make clear that C osby had tw o sons, there 
is no record that C osby ever faced a second bastardy charge. (It is unlikely that the boys were twins. 
Bastardy cases for multiple births clearly com m unicated that fact, and the 1774 custody case  
indentures the boys when “the[y] severally arrive to the age o f  ten years,” im plying that they had two  
different birth dates.) For other cases in w hich the court stepped in when mothers were unable to 
support their children, see: York D OW  6: 22, York J04 : 450, York OB 4 (1774-1784): 77.
394 York OB 4: 3 2 1 ,3 3 3 .
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children, even in the patriarchal culture of eighteenth-century Virginia. Significantly, 
it is only because these women broke both the law and social norms that we have any 
record of their lives: their outlaw reproduction is the reason they appear in the 
colonial records. Another example of some women’s transgression of the boundaries 
of patriarchal culture is the ability of some free women to pay their own fines when 
they were charged with bastardy. When Ann Bayley confessed to bastardy in 1738 
and “agree[d] to pay the fine...at the laying the next Crop,” this could mean that 
Bayley had access to her own crop, and therefore her own cash, to pay her fine and by 
extension support her child.395 Martha Lester also paid her own fine when she was 
charged with bastardy in 1735. It is clear that the court held her solely responsible for 
her fine -  and did not consider her under the protection or authority of any male 
guardian, husband, or master -  when the clerk recorded a year later that she herself 
had paid the remainder of her fine.396 When free women could pay their own fines 
for bastardy, they were able to sidestep the custom of infant indenture, thereby 
transgressing both the discursive link between bastardy and servitude and the 
assumption of a patriarchal household.
Single motherhood was an option not just for propertied women. The diarist 
John Harrower, himself an indentured servant who worked as a schoolmaster for his 
master, Colonel Daingerfield, observed a fellow servant with a child by her side: 
“Yesterday came her Mary Fitsgyls to spin flax. She is an Irish girle and has now 
been Nine year in Virginia. She is still unmarried but has had a Child to one Dolton a
395 York DOW  18: 4 3 5 ,4 4 0 ,4 4 7 . Elinor H ayw ood also paid her ow n fine for bastardy: D O W  18: 155, 
160, 167, 333. Linda Sturtz argues that propertied w om en - f e m e  so les  who were m ostly w idow s -  
had access to much more pow er and influence in colonial Virginia than married wom en. Sturtz, Within 
H er P ow er, 20-24.
396 York DOW  18: 268, 274 , 280.
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Taylor in Fredricks[bur]g. The boy is with her & is now two years old.”397 When 
read in the context of the journal as a whole, Harrower’s observation takes a 
paternalistic tone: an educated man, Harrower tended to place himself above the 
other servants whose paths he crossed. To be sure, Mary Fitsgyls’s story is a 
heartrending one, especially considering Dolton was himself likely married and 
already a father at the time.398 Further, it seems likely that Fitsgyls had originally 
signed a seven-year indenture, but that it was extended upon the birth of her son. But 
we also see the unlikely power of this young woman: somehow, she had arranged to 
keep her son with her. Still working in her master’s house, Fitsgyls’ son was an ever­
present reminder of her own subjectivity, her own sexuality, and her own family.
The construct of the feme covert was a legal fiction in which women were 
considered legally “covered” first by their fathers and then by their husbands.399 
Some women, though, held a liminal position according to the law. For example, 
English servant women had no legal standing outside of their masters (and thus were 
similar to children), but they had independently signed contracts, and, as we have 
seen, were held responsible for crimes. Women’s historians have noted that widows, 
temporarily independent, could act as feme sole, representing themselves in the
397 Edward M iles R iley, ed. The Journal o f  John H arrow er: An Indentured Servan t in the C olony o f  
Virginia, 1773-1776  (N Y: Holt, Rinehart and W inston, 1963), 121. Probably, M ary’s last name was 
Fitzgerald -  Harrower frequently abbreviated and m isspelled words and names.
398 R iley, The Journal o f  John H arrow er, 187nl 15.
399 Brown, G o o d  Wives, N asty  Wenches, an d  Anxious P atriarchs, 287-90; L ois Green Carr, 
“Inheritance in the Colonial Chesapeake,” in Women in the A ge  o f  the A m erican R evolution, ed. 
Ronald Hoffm an and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville: U niversity o f  Virginia Press, 1989), 155-208; 
N ancy Cott, P ublic  Vows: A H istory o f  M arriage an d  the N ation  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
U niversity Press, 2000), 11-12. Kierner, B eyon d the H ousehold, 11; Salm on, Women an d  the Law  o f  
P roperty  in E arly A m erica , 147-60, 168-75; Julia Cherry Spruill, W om en's Life an d  Work in the 
Southern C olon ies (N Y : Norton, 1972), 340-66.
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courts. This public authority would be whittled away by the eighteenth century.400 
These cases of women retaining control over their children hint another category o f 
women who acted as fem e sole -  single women with children, who lived under the 
radar as much as possible in order to maintain their independence, but who still used 
the law when it could come to their defense or the defense of their children. Women 
who supported their bastard children alone lived outside of social norms and the law, 
which may indicate why the evidence of their lives is so sparse.
Perhaps because their lives were transgressive of patriarchal norms, single 
mothers’ ability to maintain independence and control over their children was tenuous 
at best. The case of Mary Meade shows the ways that women’s fragile independence 
was counterbalanced by a court system which could assert patriarchal power 
seemingly at will. Mary Meade appeared in court three times for bastardy, in 1741, 
1744, and 1750. The charges for the first case were dropped (which indicates either 
that the court was operating on false information or that Meade paid the fine).401 In 
the second case, the court sentenced her to 25 lashes.402 In the third case, Meade was 
ordered to pay 500 pounds of tobacco as punishment for fornication 403 A free 
woman, the court punished Meade only for the crime of fornication in both the 1744 
and 1750 cases.
Throughout this period, Mary Meade was, for all intents and purposes, treated 
as a feme sole by the courts. She inherited money from the estate of John Bale in
400 Snyder, B rabbling Women, 122-7; Brown, G ood  Wives, N asty Wenches, an d  Anxious P atriarchs, 
97; Sturtz, Within H er P ow er, 20. For a similar analysis for Connecticut, see Dayton, Women Before  
the Bar.
401 York D O W  19: 9, 2 2 ,4 3 , 52, 56, 64, 72, 79.
402 York D O W  19: 331-2.
403 York JO 1 :307 , 326.
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1743 and acted as a sole defendant in a lawsuit in 1748.404 More importantly, for our 
purposes, Meade retained custody of her daughters, Ann and Frances, even though 
she was unmarried. Her lenient punishments indicate that the court was confident in 
Meade’s ability to support her children: there is no mention made of protecting the 
parish from being charged with the girls’ support. Yet, in 1751, the court stepped in 
to check Meade’s power and assert its own patriarchal authority: Ann and Frances 
were bound out as indentures. The court explained its decision to split up the family: 
Meade was an unsuitable mother for the children, “by reason of her idle, dissolute, 
and disorderly course of life.”405 While the court record leaves to the imagination 
exactly what Meade had done to merit such a description, it remains that Meade’s 
outlaw reproduction had put her in the view of the court, which held the power to take 
away her children. Meade’s outlaw reproduction was tolerated only as long as she 
displayed proper deference -  that Meade was punished for being too transgressive is a 
tantalizing interpretation.
Kirsten Fischer reminds us that, in a culture in which illegitimacy was seen as 
sinful, having a child outside of wedlock could be seen as “a conscious act of 
resistance to authority, a specialized form of nose-thumbing.”406 All of these cases 
show not only these women’s defiance of the law but their willingness and ability to 
transgress early Virginia’s intertwining status and gender hierarchies. The sexual and 
labor economies of early Virginia demanded that white women’s sexuality and 
reproductivity be confined to marriage: legitimacy (and therefore freedom and 
community membership) was conferred by birth. Even so, those same economies
404 York WI 19: 152; JO 1:69 .
405 York JO 1 :435 .
406 Fischer, Suspect R elations, 113.
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created populations of white women -  especially servant women and unmarried 
women -  whose reproductive histories challenged the notion that white women’s 
reproduction could be so unremittingly disciplined. Those economies which confined 
white women’s legitimate reproduction to marriage were, ultimately, based on 
slavery.
As was discussed in Chapter 1, the institution of slavery reproduced itself via 
the appropriation of black women’s reproduction. Within this context, enslaved 
women’s reproduction -  and its transgressive possibilities -  took on very different 
forms and meanings than did white women’s outlaw reproduction. We have seen the 
ways that servant and free white women’s outlaw reproduction could be transgressive 
on an individual level: challenging household economies, offering possibilities for 
individual autonomy outside of the patriarchal household. Reproduction could be a 
site for enslaved women to transgress limits of power, knowledge, and subjectivity. 
For enslaved women, reproduction could be a transgressive means of both asserting 
their own cultural frameworks and challenging slavery itself as a culture of 
domination and exploitation.
Even within the context of inherited racial slavery defined by the law of 
slavery by birth, slave women’s motherhood could be an assertion of self, of hope, 
and of relationship to others.407 Jennifer Morgan points to the existential hopefulness 
of childbearing in the context of enslavement: “After the Middle Passage and during
407 Black w om en’s historians and black fem inists have em phasized the com plexity o f  the institution o f  
motherhood for enslaved w om en, especially  during the Antebellum  period, when black w om en were 
explicitly  excluded from the dominant culture o f  sentimental maternity for white wom en. B eckles, 
N atural R ebels, 115-40; hooks, A in 't I a  Woman, 71-82; King, ‘“ Suffer with them ‘til death’,” 147-68; 
Roberts, K illing the B lack B ody, 22-55; Stevenson, Life in B lack and White, 95-139; W hite, A r ’n ’t I a 
Woman, 91-118. For an examination o f  how  this process o f  exclusion impacted w om en’s medical 
practices, see W ilkie, The A rch aeo logy o f  M othering, 55-74.
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the interminable reality of forced labor, reproduction could afford women and men an 
opportunity to ground themselves, to manifest strength and persistence through 
children.”408 Deborah Gray White notes that motherhood had very specific cultural 
meanings for slaves who traced their roots back to west Africa, for whom ideas about 
motherhood and childbearing traditions were an important assertion of culture in the 
face of slavery.409 In this way, reproduction could be seen as both an assertion of self 
and an assertion of community -  both transgressive effects in the dehumanizing 
conditions of chattel slavery.
While birth and motherhood could be read as transgressing the logic of 
slavery, refusal to give birth was another form of subversion: if an enslaved woman 
refused to have children, she was tacitly denying the master’s claim to ownership 
over her body and reproductivity, and also denying him a key means of expanding his 
property holdings.410 In 1773, the governor’s council recorded a rare case of 
infanticide by an enslaved woman named Sail who was executed for “Feloniously 
Murdering her own child.”411 We have no way of knowing Sail’s state of mind about 
her actions. Further, assuming that women in similar situations either hid their births, 
disguised the infanticide, or were disciplined by masters instead of the courts, there is 
no way to know how common actions like Sail’s were. While there is a fair amount 
of textual evidence attesting to the existence of abortion techniques amongst English 
and Indian women during this period (as will be discussed in Chapter 3), there is
408 M organ, L aboring Women, 116-9.
409 W hite, A r ’n ’t I  a  W oman?, 106-9.
410 David G eggus, focusing on the Caribbean, has found that infanticide was recognized and feared by 
masters as a threat to their property holdings. D avid P. G eggus, “Slave and Free C olored W om en in 
Saint D om ingue,” in M ore than C hattel: B lack Women an d  S lavery in the A m ericas, ed. D avid Barry 
Gaspar and Darlene Clark Hine (B loom ington: Indiana U niversity Press, 1996), 271-2 .
411 H.R. M cllw aine, ed. L egisla tive Journals o f  the C ouncil o f  C olon ia l Virginia, vol. 3 (Richmond: 
Virginia State Library, 1918), 1598.
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considerably more silence on the issue for enslaved black women. We must 
remember, though, that the textual evidence for this period, like the records of the 
governor’s Council, was created by white (usually male) hands. We could interpret 
the textual silences as evidence that black women did not seek to limit their 
pregnancies and births. Conversely, could we instead interpret those silences as a 
remarkable example of the ability of enslaved people to keep some parts of their lives 
private, even in the face of tremendous social control?412 Darlene Clark Hine, writing 
of black women’s strategies of resistance against the long history o f rape of black 
women by white men, argues that “black women as a rule developed a politics of 
silence and adhered to a cult of secrecy, a culture of dissemblance, to protect the 
sanctity of the inner aspects of their lives.” 413 This secrecy provided black women 
with “the psychic space and.. .the resources needed to hold their own in their often 
one-sided struggle to resist oppression.”414 In other words, lack of textual evidence 
may not indicate a lack of agency or power -  indeed, it may indicate the opposite.
Furthermore, the work of historians Jennifer Morgan and Barbara Bush points 
to the possibility that enslaved women drew on their African cultural heritage to limit 
their pregnancies, and, in some cases, to justify infanticide. Jennifer Morgan notes 
that enslaved women had “transferred knowledge of fertility control from Africa to 
the Americas,” including knowledge of plants (both African and American) that could
412 B lack w om en’s historiography on abortion and infanticide
413 Hine, “Rape and the Inner L ives o f  B lack W om en,” 915. H ine’s argument focuses on the culture o f  
dissem blance as it was expressed in northern black w om en’s organizations in the twentieth century, 
but she em phasizes that the roots o f  dissem blance can be found in the com plex and often violent 
relationship betw een enslaved w om en and white masters. Indeed, Hine makes clear that the culture o f  
dissem blance was one that m oved from the South to the North during the Great M igration o f  the early 
twentieth century.
414 Ibid.
160
be used as abortifacients and emmenagogues.415 Barbara Bush argues that fertility 
control went beyond medical knowledge to cosmology. She presents a fascinating 
interpretation of the demographic impact these traditions might have had on the sugar 
colony of Jamaica. Historians have long noted that the nineteenth-century Jamaican 
slave population precipitously dropped, even as conditions improved. Bush explains 
this demographic paradox by arguing that enslaved women (many of whom were new 
imports to the colony) drew on West African cosmologies that saw fetuses and infants 
as inhabiting a liminal space between the human world and the spirit world. Bush 
argues that enslaved women actively participated in a sustained pattern of abortion 
and infanticide (or infant neglect), rather than submit their children to the injustices of 
enslavement.416 Ywone Edwards-Ingram, investigating the archaeological evidence 
for slave sites in British North America, including Virginia, describes similar rituals 
and cosmologies in the mainland colonies.417 Interestingly, in her examination of 
Carter’s Grove Plantation in York County, Virginia, Lorena Walsh has noticed a 
similar phenomenon: increased importation of Africans was accompanied by a drop 
in fertility.418 Did those newly-enslaved Africans resist their slavery by reinterpreting 
and acting upon their ideas about the personhood of infants and fetuses? Bush warns 
against portraying enslaved women as “passive subjects” of demographic trends 
rather than “active agents with a degree of control over their own bodies”: the
415 Morgan, L aboring Women , 113-4. The African plants aloe and okra, both used as abortifacients, 
had been brought to the colon ies by the eighteenth century.
416 Bush, “Hard Labor,” 193-217.
417 Edwards-Ingram, "African American M edicine and the Social Relations o f  Slavery,” 38-40.
418 W alsh, From C a labar to  C a r te r ’s G ro ve , 30-1.
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limiting of childbearing may have been not only a rational response to abhorrent 
conditions, but a response rooted in long-held cultural traditions.419
One irony embedded in the appropriation of enslaved women’s reproductivity 
was that childbearing represented both an economic profit and an economic loss to 
the master class: while an enslaved pregnant woman’s child would ultimately be 
claimed as a master’s property, pregnancy and nursing also limited her ability to work 
in other ways.420 Masters, such as the planter Landon Carter, recognized this tension 
between enslaved women’s reproductive and productive value. Carter’s diary is full 
of his references to women who transgressed his power by turning his own economic 
interests against him. Carter’s frustration was rooted in these women’s transgression 
of the limits of his power and his ability to discipline them, but it was also rooted in 
their transgression of the limits of his knowledge about the body, about reproduction, 
and about the lives of people he purported to own.
Enslaved women’s pregnancies represented the promise of another child but 
also the loss of a woman’s labor during her pregnancy and birth. In July 1775, Carter 
complained of losing several pregnant women’s labor because “the Bellyed women 
have been 5 in number good 5 months idle.”421 Then, the tobacco harvest was 
delayed because “our Wenches have all taken it into their head to cry out at this busy 
time.”422 Were the women’s labors triggered by the backbreaking work of the 
tobacco harvest? Or was Carter correct -  did the women “cry out” in order to avoid
419 Bush, “Hard Labor,” 201, 208.
420 Morgan, L aboring Women, 4.
421 Jack P. Greene, ed. The D iary  o f  C olonel Landon C arter o f  Sabine Hall, 1752-1778, V ol. 1 
(Charlottesville: U niversity o f  Virginia Press, 1965), 919.
422 Ibid. Enslaved w om en’s births were remarkably seasonal. Cheryll Ann C ody observes that, in 
South Carolina, births peaked at the height o f  summer and the dead o f  winter, the two m ost dangerous 
tim es in terms o f  infant mortality. Cody, “C ycles o f  Work and o f  Childbearing,” 61-78.
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harvesting in the heat of summer? Ultimately, these five pregnancies and births are 
notable for their transgressive effects, even if we cannot discern the intent of the 
women. Importantly, the pregnancies and births were understood by Carter to be 
transgressive. For Carter, the loss of women’s labor during pregnancy was not just an 
economic loss, but a sign of rebellion and conspiracy.
These were not the only women whom Carter believed took advantage of their 
reproductive role to thwart his power. Carter often suspected that enslaved women 
faked or exaggerated the symptoms of pregnancy in order to avoid other labors, even
A 'J 'i
openly pretending pregnancy in order to avoid work. The bodily privacy of 
women’s reproductive lives -  the simple fact that only they knew if they were 
pregnant, what symptoms they experienced, and when the pregnancy might end -  
stymied Carter’s ability to control the enslaved population on his plantations. We see 
this frustration when, in 1770, Carter complained that one enslaved woman “pretends 
to be big with Child and perhaps may be so.”424 He also grew frustrated at the length 
of women’s pregnancies, complaining once that a woman “seemed to be near her time 
about 2 months,” implying that he believed either that she had announced her 
pregnancy before she was actually with child or that she was somehow obstinately 
refusing to give birth.425 One enslaved woman named Wilmot “pretended to be too 
heavy to work” for a full year before Carter caught on 426 It is entirely possible that 
these women were, in fact, pregnant, and were suffering repeated miscarriages or
423 Greene, The D iary  o f  C olonel Landon C arter, 371-2 , 389.
424 Greene, The D iary  o f  C olonel Landon C arter , 389.
425 Greene, The D iary  o f  C olonel Landon C arter, 204. A s w ill be discussed in Chapter 3, Carter’s 
understanding o f  pregnancy seem ed to assum e that w om en had som e level o f  control over the length o f  
their pregnancies and the timing o f  their births. This control was a source o f  considerable frustration 
for Carter.
426 Greene, The D iary  o f  C olonel Landon C arter, 372.
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stillbirths. Or, they were lying about being pregnant in order to lessen their workload. 
Either way, one transgressive potential for pregnancy was that it challenged Carter’s 
assumption that, as a master, he could expect to be omnipotent over every aspect of 
enslaved people’s lives.
The women Carter describes found ways to use their role as mothers to 
undermine the slave economy and carve out opportunities for themselves and their 
children. Once again, we see the conflict between Carter’s desire to claim women’s 
productive labor and their reproductive labor as well. Breastfeeding mothers openly 
and collectively defied the limits Carter placed on their ability to nurse their children, 
convincing the plantation’s overseers to allow them to nurse their babies five times a 
day, rather than Carter’s prescribed three times.427 Pregnant women not only refused 
to work in the fields but stayed in the slave quarter, the closest thing they had to their 
own domestic space: the women “not only fall behind, but come in, stay as long as 
they please, and care not ever to go out though close by their homes.”
Reproduction offered women an opportunity to transgress lines of power by laying 
claim to their own time and their own space.
Importantly, the transgressive possibilities of enslaved women’s reproduction 
had limits; Carter’s frustration with the women often boiled over into rage. Carter 
was more than willing to use violence against enslaved people, including pregnant 
women. Wilmot’s pretended pregnancy ended when Carter “broke her.”429 When an 
enslaved woman named Sarah pretended to be pregnant, Carter “had her corrected,”
427 Greene, The D iary  o f  C olonel Landon C arter, 496.
428 Greene, The D iary  o f  C olonel Landon C arter, 554.
429 Greene, The D iary  o f  C olonel Landon C arter, 372.
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and threatened to sell her.430 When another woman named Criss ran away during her 
pregnancy, she was caught and suffered “a severe whipping.”431 Transgression and 
domination existed in a tug-of-war: enslaved women’s transgressions were met with 
violence, and that violence was met with further transgressions. Notably, even after 
being whipped, Criss continued to transgress Carter’s power, “making her Children 
milk [Carter’s] Cows in the night.”432
Enslaved women’s reproduction, embedded and appropriated as it was by the 
law of slavery by birth, points again to the complex matrix of transgression and 
domination in early Virginia. As we see in the multiple examples of the transgressive 
possibilities of reproduction in Landon Carter’s diary, the particularities of slavery as 
a system of domination created spaces for its own transgression. The law of slavery 
by birth fostered the dehumanization of black women, even as those same women’s 
childbearing was a site for human expression and connection. Indeed, this conflict 
between domination and transgression ultimately was a process of cultural 
production. Jennifer Morgan argues that creolization -  that process by which 
enslaved Africans created a creole African-American culture -  happened via 
women’s childbearing: “children.. .made explicit the process of literal and symbolic 
reeducation that is at the heart of creolization.”433 In other words, even as 
childbearing in slavery was fraught with danger and dehumanization, it was also a site 
for cultural creation. Slavery created deep tensions between violence and creativity, 
domination and subversion.
430 Greene, The D iary  o f  C olonel Landon C arter , 389.
431 Ibid.
432 Ibid.
433 Morgan, Laboring Women, 108.
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The context of racial slavery demanded that white women’s and black 
women’s reproduction be disciplined in profoundly different ways. Where white 
women’s reproduction was aimed at creating legitimate heirs for the transfer of 
property, black women’s reproduction was appropriated into creating that very 
property. This disciplining of reproduction required racial separation, but mixed-race 
people and mixed-race families existed. Indeed, the creation and flourishing of 
mixed-race families was an unlikely result of Virginia’s legal attempts at racial 
separation. Again, domination and subversion existed in unlikely tension.
Transgressive Families 
The lives of free black and mixed-race families, who by their very existence 
challenged the notion that slavery and blackness were utterly linked, transgressed 
lines of both race and servitude. The unplanned result of Virginia’s attempt to create 
inherited slavery and regulate sexuality through bastardy and miscegenation law was 
the creation of a vast category of liminal people -  neither black nor white, slave nor 
free -  that challenged the entire logic of inherited racial slavery.434 These 
transgressions existed on a number of levels. Here, I will discuss three of these 
transgressions of Virginia’s absolutist logic of racial slavery: liminal identities (the
434 For d iscussions on liminal identities in early Am erica, see M errell, “ T h e  Cast o f  His 
Countenance’,” 13-39; James H. M errell, ‘“ A lthough I am dead, I am not entirely dead. I have left a 
second o f  m y se lf:  Constructing S e lf and Persons on the M iddle Ground o f  Early A m erica,” in 
Through a G lass D arkly: R eflections on P ersonal Identity in E arly A m erica , ed. Ronald Hoffman, 
M echal Sobel, and Fredricka J. Teute (Chapel Hill: U niversity o f  North Carolina Press, 1997), 404- 
418. Robert Blair St. George adopts from postcolonial theory the concept o f  hybrid ity, arguing the 
com plex identities o f  early Am erica, defined as they were by contact with percieved others, demands a 
m ethodological attention to vernacular expressions o f  hybrid identities. St. George, “Introduction,” 23- 
5. I find the concept o f  lim inality as more useful than hybridity in describing free black fam ilies 
because their status was defined so  fully as “in betw een” -  between black and white, betw een slave  
and free.
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ways free people of color moved between white and black identities), extra-legal 
marriages (the ways free people of color created marriage traditions and families in 
defiance of the law) and matrilineal genealogies (the ways that free people of color 
remembered their maternal ancestors in an effort to solidify their freedom). I will 
then analyze the ways that those three transgressions appear in the lives of two free 
mixed-race families, the Jewell-Catillas and the Inscows, who transgressed Virginia’s 
absolutist racial and sexual policies. Through these case studies, we will see the twin 
trajectories of power and transgression: while the race, sex, and status hierarchies 
assigned at birth curtailed their lives, for Virginia’s free people of color, birth could 
also be a pathway to transgressing lines of power, knowledge, and subjectivity in the 
colony.
Since Virginia’s laws attempted to create a dualistic framework of black and 
white, slave and free, the first challenge that free black and mixed-race families posed 
was that of liminal identities. Throughout the colonial period, Virginia’s lawmakers 
sought to preserve racial difference through ever-increasing sanctions on 
miscegenation, especially on interracial births. The presence of mixed-race people, 
both free and enslaved, points to the ultimate unenforceability of those laws. As 
Foucault argued, the expression of juridical power in the form of bans on particular 
kinds of sex (here, interracial sex) is always doomed to fail:
Power can ‘do’ nothing but say no to [pleasure]; what it produces, if anything,
is absences and gaps; it overlooks elements, introduces discontinuities,
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separates what is joined, and marks off boundaries. Its effects take the general 
form of limit and lack.435 
In other words, anti-miscegenation laws could never actually put an end to interracial 
sex or mixed-race births. To be sure, the fact that the mixed-race children of enslaved 
mothers would also be enslaved illustrates that the intention of the law was never to 
end all interracial sex. Conversely, the mixed-race children of white women or free 
black women represented real threats to racial absolutism. Therefore, any 
enforcement of racial dualism in the colony extended beyond the ban on interracial 
sex, ultimately attempting to control and discipline the mixed-race population as 
much as possible 436
The Virginia courts enacted this discipline via a multiple nodes of surveillance 
over free mixed-race and black women’s reproductive lives. First, tithing laws taxed 
black and mixed-race women, but not white women. Therefore, Virginia’s tax laws 
demanded that the court determine any woman’s racial status when her identity was 
in question, calling into question her parentage, her family, and her own birth.
Second, because their marriages often were not recognized, many mixed-race women 
were brought before the court each time they gave birth because their children were 
considered legal bastards. Finally, as we’ve already seen, free mixed-race and black 
women faced the threat of having their children indentured should the mothers be 
determined insufficient parents, either financially or morally. Virginia was never able 
to truly “outlaw” mixed-race people, but the colony sought to discipline their lives as 
much as possible.
435 Foucault, The H istory o f  Sexuality, 83.
436 D ouglas D eal outlines the ever-tightening restrictions on free black fam ilies, beginning in the last 
quarter o f  the seventeenth century. Deal, “A  Constricted W orld,” 276-7.
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Existing outside of the law, free black and mixed-race families carved out 
lives in defiance of legal codes. Their extra-legal marriages formed another 
challenge to Virginia’s legislative authorities. In Virginia, the ability to legally marry 
was a sign of full membership in the community, as defined by religion, status, and 
race.437 In this Anglican colony, community membership was further marked by 
religion. Starting in 1662, only marriages that were publicly announced and 
performed by members of the Anglican clergy were recognized by the colony.438 
These 1662 laws may have been, in part, an attempt to quash marriages that occurred 
without state sanction 439 As racial slavery was institutionalized in the colony, legal 
marriages were even more narrowly defined. Unsanctified by the church, slave 
marriages were officially unrecognized, though it is clear that slaves married using 
their own ceremonies.440 From the 1640s onward, Virginia outlawed the marriage of 
any white servants without the express permission of their master.441 Further,
437 Though she does not analyze racial politics, Mary Beth Norton highlights the importance o f  
marriage as a signifier o f  w hite com m unity m em bership in her analysis o f  the gender identity o f  
seventeenth-century Virginian T. Hall. Norton, “Communal D efinitions o f  Gendered Identity,” 40 -66 .
438 Hening 2: 50-1 . This statute, part o f  the Restoration-era overhaul o f  the co lon y ’s law s, made 
explicit the role o f  the clergy in regulating marriage.
439 For exam ple, in 1648, three married couples were presented to the York County court on suspicion  
o f  fornication because their marriages were not recognized by the church. York D O W  2: 350. It 
seem s likely that the three couples were all D issenters o f  som e form. For another similar case see  
York D OW  2: 387. On sexual perm issiveness in V irginia’s early tobacco econom y, see Lee Gladwin, 
“T obacco and Sex: Som e factors affecting non-marital sexual behavior in colonial V irginia,” Journal 
o f  S ocia l H istory  12, no. 1 (1978), 57-75 . Richard Godbeer has argued that, in the Carolina 
backcountry, many couples married, divorced, and remarried without the benefit o f  clergy. Godbeer 
refers to this as a sort o f  socia lly  ( i f  not legally) sanctioned “serial m onogam y.” Godbeer, Sexual 
R evolution in E arly A m erica , 125-35. For a York county case w hich fits G odbeer’s m odel o f  “serial 
m onogam y,” see the four bastardy charges against Elizabeth Morris in 1738, 1740, 1746, and 1748. 
The father o f  Morris’s children was Jones Irwin, w ho had separated from his w ife in 1727. York 
D OW  16: 353, 4 3 4 ,4 4 1 ; York D OW  18: 414 , 597-8; York WI 18: 562; York D O W  19: 426 , 4 4 2 ,4 4 5 ;  
York O W  19: 330; York WI 20: 108; York JO 1: 80, 100.
440 M asters seem ed to have informally recognized these unions on som e level. See, for exam ple, the 
1674 w ill o f  Peter Tem ple, in which an enslaved wom an, “B esse” is referred to as the w idow  o f  an 
enslaved man, “Old L awrence.” York DOW  5 :8 1 . For other exam ples, see: York D O W  11: 408-11; 
York JO 1768 -1770 :402 .
441 Hening 1 :252 -3 .
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Virginia outlawed interracial marriages in 1691, ordering banishment for any couple 
that refused to comply with the law.442
Legal marriage and its benefits were limited to free white couples. 
Nevertheless, in the York county court records, we see traces of informal marriage 
traditions continuing throughout the colonial period. Interracial couples and free 
black couples lived together, even without a legally recognized marriage.443 Further, 
because they existed outside of and between the black/white racial binary, couples 
made up of two mixed-race people, often informally but not legally married, could 
find their relationships casually recognized by the courts or by the church. For 
example, in 1725, Elizabeth Birdsong was summoned by the court for bastardy; the 
case was never completed.444 Perhaps the case never came to fruition because the 
Birdsongs, members of a large clan of free people of color were understood to be 
married: the clerk of Charles Parish recorded that Elizabeth Birdsong and James 
Birdsong, members of a large York County mulatto family, had two daughters, 
Frances (bom in 1719) and Agnes (bom in 1736).445 The Birdsong family shows one 
of the ways that mixed-race families could transgress the power of colonial 
institutions: while the court did not believe the Birdsongs to be married, the church
442 Hening 3: 86-7.
443 Hening 3: 86-7. The punishment for interracial marriage was banishment from the colony. 
Interestingly, w hile there is much evidence o f  m ixed-race and interracial marriages in York County, I 
have yet to find any exam ples o f  such banishment in the county. This seem s to anticipate Joshua 
Rothman’s argument about 19th century Virginia: interracial relationships were tolerated so  long as the 
couple hew ed to other social expectations. Rothman, N otorious in the N eighborhood, passim.
444 York DOW  16: 321, 325, 334, 343, 347.
445 CPR 51, 52. Considering the w ide span o f  years betw een these births, it seem s likely that this 
couple had more children w hich either did not survive or were not recorded by the Parish. Indeed, the 
1725 bastardy case against Elizabeth Birdsong points to those possibilities. See also the case o f  Sarah 
W hiting: York D OW  11: 554, 580; CPR 193-4.
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listed them as such, and because of that, Elizabeth Birdsong was able to evade the 
court’s discipline.
While lawmakers tried to limit marriage only to free white Anglicans, the 
existence of extra-legal marriages shows both the willingness of people to live outside 
the law and the inability of conventional regulatory frameworks to constrain pleasure 
and desire. It also shows the ways that the marriages of free people of color exploded 
the narrow definitions of marriage in the colony. Indeed, the community seems to 
have informally recognized these marriages as well: Kirsten Fischer points out that 
these relationships “could attain social legitimacy outside the aegis of legal 
authority.”446 The language of the Bruton Parish records, which unlike the Charles 
Parish records include the vital records for some enslaved people and also free people 
of color, shows the ways that free black marriages challenged the standards for 
marriage in the community. Some free black and mixed-race couples are 
unquestioningly listed as married by the Parish: for example, when Matthew, the son 
of “Daniel Harmfield and Elizabeth his wife free negro” was bom in 1746.447 Some 
births of free black children were listed like births of white bastard children: for 
example, the baptism of Thomas, “Son of Elizabeth Stuart a free mulatta” was listed 
only with the mother’s name, as was “John free Negro Son of Barbary.”448 But other 
free black children were listed under only their father’s name, indicating a recognition 
of paternity, if not of legal marriage: for example, in the cases of the birth of 
“Reuben [,] Son of Peter Gillet a free Negro,” and the baptism of “Elston Son of Ned
446 Fisher, Suspect R elations, 114.
447 John V ogt, ed„ R egister f o r  Bruton Parish, Virginia, 1662-1797  (Athens, GA: N ew  Papyrus 
Publishing, 2004), 3, 4. (Hereafter cited as BPR.)
448 BPR, 6.
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Edwards Formerly Majr. Swiney’s Slave.”449 Even the church, tasked with policing 
the boundaries between legal and legal marriages, recorded these marriages and births 
in ways that illustrate both the relationships’ liminal status and the inability of 
colonial institutions to constrain desire. Colonial parish marriage and baptism lists 
stand as a record of couples who were married in practice if not by law; the lists 
recorded these relationships without conferring upon them legality or legitimacy.
The third challenge posed by free black and mixed-race families to Virginia’s 
policy of inherited racial slavery was the casual adoption of matrilineal genealogies 
by free black and mixed-race families in order to prove their freedom.450 As has been 
discussed, by asserting that slavery was inherited from the mother, the law of slavery 
by birth symbolically erased slaves’ fathers and fatherhood itself -  in theorist 
Hortense Spillers’ terms, slavery was a state of enforced “father-lacking.”451 In a 
patriarchal society like the English colony of Virginia, this erasure of paternity was a 
dehumanizing act of epistemic violence. The erasure of paternity extended to free 
people of African ancestry as well. The law required free people of color to 
demonstrate their white ancestry in order to prove their freedom -  specifically, free 
black and mixed-race people had to prove that they were descendents of free 
women.452 The marriages of free black and mixed-race people were not recognized;
450 Kirsten Fischer has recognized a similar pattern in eighteenth-century North Carolina. Fischer, 
Su spect R elations, 127. Perhaps there is irony to be found in the fact that African societies were 
matrilinially organized. Brenda Stevenson em phasizes the W est African roots o f  matrilineality and 
m atrifocality, w hich continued to exist in tension with the enforced matrilineality o f  slavery. 
Stevenson, Life in B lack an d  White, 223. Jennifer Morgan notes the conflict betw een slaveow ners’ 
desire to assert patrilineality onto slaves and slaves’ ow n culture o f  matrilineality. M organ, L aboring  
Women, 107-43.
451 Spillers, “M am a’s Baby, Papa’s M aybe,” 403.
452 The York County records include several exam ples o f  slaves suing for their freedom  based on the 
freedom o f  their mothers or other maternal ancestors. A  m ixed-race enslaved wom an named Sarah 
sued for her freedom in 1694, claim ing that her mother was an English woman. N o result was
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therefore, the supposedly “illegitimate” mixed-race children of free black and mixed- 
race families were recorded in birth registers only with mothers, not fathers.453
Ironically, Virginia’s patriarchal policies of inherited racial slavery created a 
category of families who, by necessity, traced their ancestry to female progenitors. 
Again and again, the courts required free people of color to prove their white 
ancestry. In 1673, Mary Cooke was a servant to Thomas Bushrod when she bore a 
mixed-race daughter, Sarah. When Sarah was twenty-one, she sued for her freedom, 
“alledging herself to be the daughter of an English woman named Mary Cooke.”454 
In another case in 1705, Thomas Danford sued for his freedom when he was twenty- 
one, because he was “borne of a free woman.”455 Essentially, Virginia’s law of 
slavery by birth required that the colony specifically recognize matrilineal 
genealogies as legally binding. Again, we see limit and transgression existing in 
tension with one another, as the erasure of paternity created alternative genealogies 
for free people of color.
These three patterns -  liminal identities, extralegal marriage, and matrilineal 
genealogies -  intertwined in the lives of free people of color. By examining two 
mixed-race families -  the Jewell-Catillas and the Inscows-Bees -  we can begin to 
understand how these forms of transgression existed in tension with the many forms 
of domination in colonialism. The family histories of the Jewell-Catillas and the 
Inscows help to illustrate the ways that, even as Virginia’s lawmakers tried to create 
in slavery an airtight system based on an absolute racial binary, liminal families
recorded for the case (York DOW  9: 318, 352). Other exam ples are discussed in more depth later in 
this chapter.
453 See, for exam ple, the cases o f  Ann H obson (CPR 110) and Ann W hiting (CPR 193).
454 York D OW  5: 47 , 126; York DOW  9: 297, 325, 352.
455 York D OW  12: 2 7 4 ,3 1 9 .
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existed and even thrived. These two family histories begin with the choices and 
actions of individual women -  Katherine Jewell and Joanna Inscow -  but ultimately 
they illustrate the transgressive effects of the lives of mixed-race people.
In 1670, an English servant woman in her twenties named Katherine Jewell 
bore a mixed-race son, whom she named William Catilla.456 Katherine was serving 
an indenture to William and Margaret Booth at the time. Sometime before 1670, 
Katherine had given birth to two more children, Mary Catilla and Matthew Catilla; it 
is unknown whether Katherine served extra time after these births.457 Bom shortly 
after the 1662 passage of the law of slavery by birth, but before the passage of long­
term indentures for mixed-race bastards, the three mixed-race Catilla children faced 
an uncertain future. What would their status be, as the mixed-race children of a white 
servant mother?
We know virtually nothing about the father of the three Catilla children, but a 
few things might be surmised from William’s race and the surname that Katherine
456 Katherine’s birth date is estim ated from a w ill that she w itnessed in 1699. In the w ill, her age is 
listed as “being near sixfty] years o f  A ge.” Jane Merry w ill, York D OW  11: 269-70. Her age at the 
time o f  W illiam ’s birth is estim ated from his 1695 freedom suit, where he is listed as being 24  years 
old. W illiam  Catilla freedom suit, York D O W  10: 137, 153. W illiam  is referred to as a “mulatto” by 
the courts. York D O W  7: 61. W illiam ’s date o f  birth is surm ised from tw o law suits he filed against his 
master. The first, in 1685, lists him as 14 years old, and the second, in 1695, lists him as 24  years old. 
York D O W  7: 61; York D OW  10: 137, 153.
457 It is likely that W illiam  Catilla was the youngest o f  the Catilla siblings; by 1672, tw o years after 
W illiam ’s birth, Katherine was listed as a free woman, married to John Pond. CPR 153. Mary Catilla 
is listed as Katherine Jew ell’s daughter in a 1699 will. In that w ill, M ary’s age is estim ated as “being  
therty years o f  age or thereabout,” placing her birthdate as near 1669. Jane Merry w ill, York D OW
11:269-70. M atthew’s age, and indeed his parentage, is less easily  substantiated. There is no record o f  
his birth, and there is no docum ent that directly links him to Katherine Jew ell. On the other hand, a 
M atthew Catilla is listed in the Charles Parish Records as being married by 1693, and having tw o sons 
o f  his ow n by 1697. CPR 61. W hile Mary and W illiam  are quite clearly siblings, there is no absolute 
evidence that M atthew is their brother. Nevertheless, I assum e that the M atthew Catilla listed  
contem poraneously in the Charles Parish Records is their brother because all three begin to have 
children during the sam e time period (the late 1690s and early 1700s), indicating that they all married 
and at childbearing age at nearly the sam e time. Interestingly, Katharine Jew ell was never charged 
with bastardy in the extant York County records; based on the existence o f  W illiam  C atilla’s indenture, 
it is possible that she and her master cam e to an alternate solution that did not involve the court.
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gave her son. William Catilla is consistently labeled a “mulatto” by the courts; 
therefore, the elder Catilla was of African descent, either an indentured servant or a 
slave. Judging from the surname “Catilla,” it is likely that William’s father had been 
brought to Virginia by Portuguese or Spanish slavers. Ira Berlin has identified a 
generation of slaves (alive in the mid-to-late seventeenth century) whom he labels 
“Atlantic creoles.” 458 These enslaved Africans might have lived in multiple ports of 
call before eventually landing in British North America, were therefore frequently 
multilingual, and often bore Spanish or Portuguese names. For this generation, 
slavery was less of an absolute institution than it would become by the eighteenth 
century: many members of this generation eventually found freedom. Further, many 
had business relationships, friendships, and sexual relationships with whites. Based 
on the time of their relationship and his unusual last name, Katherine Jewell’s partner 
seems to fit this pattern.
Apparent already in the story of the first generation of the Jewell-Catilla 
family are the ways that they transgressed the increasingly calcifying boundaries of 
race and servitude in 1670s Virginia. Like the other women who bore bastard 
children during their indentures, Katherine Jewell’s birth (or births, if the two 
younger children were also born while Katherine was indentured) transgressed the 
expectations of servants’ obedience and deference. This transgression is further 
apparent in the fact that Katherine was freed before 1672: it seems possible that 
Katherine and her master, William Booth, came up with some alternative
458 Berlin, M any Thousands G one , 17-28, 37, 3 9 ,4 4 . Lorena W alsh em phasizes that the first 
generations o f  enslaved Africans in V irginia were treated according to more traditional (and flexible) 
custom s o f  enslavem ent, w hich included customary privileges and manum ission. The amount o f  
respect given to the senior Catilla may indicate that he was enslaved under these more flexible  
conditions. W alsh, From C a la b a r to C a r te r ’s G rove, 32.
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arrangement than extending her service after lying in after the birth of William Catilla 
in 1670.459 This willingness to handle the birth by extralegal means is yet another 
transgression of lines of power in Katherine Jewell’s life. That her children were all 
given the same last name indicates that, regardless of the law that disallowed servant 
marriage, Katherine maintained a long-term relationship with her children’s father. 
That this was an interracial relationship only heightens the transgressive meanings of 
this family’s story. Finally, that the Catilla children took their father’s last name 
shows a remarkable, and fleeting, moment in which black fatherhood was recognized 
by the community and, to a lesser extent, the law. This recognition may be a further 
indication that the Catilla children’s father, though clearly of African descent, was not 
fully enslaved. Yet because their father was of African descent, the Catilla children, 
as legal bastards, could not place themselves in a patrilineal family, and instead were 
attached solely to their mother.460 The Jewell-Catilla family’s matrilineal geneaology 
would be significant to the family for generations.
William Catilla’s indenture, arranged by his mother and her master in 1670, 
illustrates the precarious position of mixed-race children in the colony after the 
passage of the law of slavery by birth. At this point in the colony’s history, mixed- 
race bastard children, like white bastard children, were expected to serve indentures 
until the age of 21. Nevertheless, the indenture negotiated for William Catilla by his 
mother and her master extended to thirty years. In exchange for that service, William 
was promised “his bringing up and Come & Cloathes at the Expiration of his time
459 CPR 153. Katherine was listed as a free woman, married to John Pond, in 1672.
450 For exam ple, W illiam  Catilla was referred to as the “son o f  Katherine Jew ell” in his original 
indenture agreement. York D O W  7: 61.
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and a heifer of a yeare old when he attaines to the Age of fowerteen.”461 In 1685, 
Booth honored his portion of the agreement, and transferred ownership of the heifer 
to the teenaged William.462 In 1691, the law changed in Virginia: mixed-race bastard 
children were ordered to serve 31-year indentures.463 When he was 25, William 
Catilla challenged the original indenture: he sued William Booth’s widow for his 
freedom in 1695, five years before his indenture would have been completed, arguing 
that he should have only served 21 years, as was customary when he was bom 464 
The court ruled in William Catilla’s favor. For the courts, the fact that William had 
already served 24 years, and “was the son of a free woman & was baptized into the 
Christian faith” took precedence over the original indenture agreement.465
By the 1690s, the entire Jewell-Catilla family had seen their statuses improve, 
even as conditions for mixed-race people had deteriorated in the colony. Upon her 
release from her own indenture, Katherine Jewell’s own position would change 
dramatically: by 1672, she was a free woman, had married a white man named 
Stephen Pond, and had given birth to a white son named John Pond 466 Significantly, 
even as Stephen and Katherine’s marriage struggled, the Pond family and the Catilla 
family would remain close over the years.467 Katherine’s children saw their fortunes
461 York DOW  7: 61. It is possible that Katherine Jew ell negotiated similar indentures for Mary Catilla 
and M atthew Catilla. Indentures were private contracts, and were not brought to the attention o f  the 
courts unless they required specific property transfer or they were challenged. W illiam  C atilla’s 
indenture is docum ented because o f  the transfer o f  the heifer and his lawsuit. Sim ilar indentures for 
Mary and M atthew may never have been negotiated or enforced in court. For other cases o f  w om en  
negotiating indentures for their children, see: York D OW  12: 67, 181, 188; York D O W  13: 51.
462 York DOW  7: 61.
463 Hening 3: 71-5 , 86-7.
464 York DOW  10: 137, 153
465 Ibid. Even as late as 1695, Christianity remained a marker o f  freedom in Virginia.
466 CPR 153.
467 M atthew Catilla would testify in court for his white half-brother, John Pond in 1695. York DOW  
10: 141. W hen Mary Catilla was accused o f  bastardy in 1694 (a case discussed in more detail later), 
Stephen Pond paid her fine. York DOW  9: 341. The marriage betw een Stephen Pond and Katherine
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improve as well, though their race would always make them vulnerable. Finally a 
free man, William’s facility in handling his legal affairs would be an advantage; he 
would need those legal skills as his life went on, and Virginia’s free blacks found 
themselves in an increasingly restricted world. By the 1690s, all three Catilla 
children were also freed and had also started families of their own.
Freedom could not protect the Catilla family from the increasing strictures 
placed on free mixed-race families in Virginia. The Catillas’ liminal identities, extra- 
legal marriages, and matrilineal genealogy would both be sites of transgression of and 
protection from colonial power as the years went on. As mixed-race free people of 
color, the Catilla children and their descendents could not enter into fully recognized 
marriages. Because of this, their childbearing would forever be in question. Indeed, 
the historical record makes it very difficult to find conclusive evidence of the 
marriages of many of the Catillas -  lacking recognition by the court, there is often no 
record of their marriages, and we are left surmising the nature of many of the 
relationships in the Catillas’ family tree. While the freedom of William, Mary, and 
Matthew -  negotiated by Katherine Jewell, their white maternal progenitor -  
protected the family from enslavement, it could not protect them from the increasing 
surveillance by the courts over free people of color.
The court’s surveillance was especially focused on the Catilla family’s 
childbearing. Over the course of the eighteenth century, all three branches of the 
Catilla family tree -  Mary’s, William’s, and Matthew’s -  were marked by births that
Jewell was not an uneventful one, though. Stephen was accused o f  adultery in 1693. Cornell Cornute, 
a former English servant o f  Pond’s, accused Pond o f  what can only be understood by a modern reader 
as falsely im prisoning and sexually harassing ( i f  not assaulting) Cornute’s wife: Pond “kept & detained 
[Cornute’s] w ife from him & made it his frequent custom  to lye w / her openly boasting thereof to sd 
Cornute & others together w / diverse other rude behaviors & unjust actions.” Pond’s higher status 
protected him when the court only fined him 100 pounds o f  tobacco. York D OW  9: 202.
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the court deemed illegitimate. Mary Catilla, Katherine Jewell’s daughter, was the 
first to bear the brunt of the court’s scrutiny. Mary’s eldest son, James, was bom in 
1693. James’ birth is recorded in the Charles Parish birth register; no father is listed, 
and James’ last name is listed as “Catilla.”468 James’ father was known to the court, 
though: upon James’ birth, Mary was accused of “comitting the sinn of fornication 
with an English man named John Berry haveing a bastard child bome of her body,” 
for which she was fined 500 pounds of tobacco 469 This bastardy case shows the 
tenuousness of Mary’s identity as a free woman of color and a bastard child herself: 
while the parish register lists her name as “Mary Catilla,” the court summons lists her 
as “Mary Jewell.”470 The Catilla last name would seem to nod at the legitimacy of 
Mary’s birth, but the Jewell last name symbolically conferred upon Mary her 
freedom. Further, while the court did not fully recognize Mary’s family relations, it 
was that family -  specifically, her white relations -  that protected her: her stepfather, 
Stephen Pond, stepped in to pay her fine so that Mary would not be whipped.471
Mary would bear three more children over the next ten years. Patience Jewell 
was bom in 1697; no father was listed in the Charles Parish record of her birth. 
Neither was a father listed for the birth of Matthew Catilla in 1700. In 1703, Mary 
had another daughter, Catherine Catilla, who was named after Mary’s mother.472 
While the court did not accuse Mary of bastardy for the births of Patience or 
Catherine, she was summoned “for her late committing the sin of fornication” when
468 CPR 61.
469 York D O W  9 :3 4 1 .
470 Ibid.
471 Ibid.
472 A ll three births are listed in CPR 61. There is one more possible birth that can be linked to Mary 
Catilla: Ann Catilla, born in 1710, was listed as the daughter o f  Mary Catilla and Christopher 
Robinson.
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Matthew was bom.473 Mary was furious at the indignity: she “refus[ed] to pay her 
fine,” and suffered “25 lashes on her bare back.”474 Did she consider herself to be 
married? It seems possible that the Englishman John Berry was the father of all of 
Mary’s children. Generations later, in 1773, descendents of Mary, Edward and Ann 
“Cottillow,” named their newborn son “John Berry Cottillow.”475 It seems that the 
family had preserved the genealogy of the family, including Mary’s extralegal 
marriage to John Berry, which was recognized by the family, if not by the courts. 
Significantly, the family’s remembered genealogy tied them to their white ancestry: 
whether to Katherine Jewell or John Berry, the tie to whiteness conferred some 
measure of freedom.
The women of the Catilla family would continue to be brought in to court for 
bearing bastard children through the generations, drawing the eye of the court onto 
the entire family. In 1729, Judith Catilla, William’s 26-year-old daughter, was 
accused of bearing a bastard child, and the court took the unconventional step of also 
summoning her father. At Judith’s trial, the court referred to a little-used statute 
which held that, in the case of a bastard birth, the owner of the house where the child 
was bom could be punished as well.476 William was punished because he failed to 
inform the churchwardens of the illegitimate birth. Did he (like his sister Mary in her
473 York D O W  1 1 :4 0 0 ,4 4 4 .
474 Ibid. The court’s language is extraordinary here -  in no other case that I’ve com e across d oes the 
court state that a w om an “refused” to pay a fine. This language would seem  to point to M ary’s 
demeanor.
475 CPR 72.
476 W averley K. W infree, com p. The Law s o f  Virginia, Being a Supplem ent to H en in g’s  S tatu tes a t 
Large, 1700-1750  (Richmond: The Virginia State Library, 1971), 253-7 . Hening 4: 208-15 . This 
statute was applied to only four other cases in York county. York D OW  16: 527, 535; York D O W  17: 
12, 29; York DOW  18: 4 3 -4 ,6 0 , 67, 73, 79, 85, 103, 112; York DOW  18: 349A, 359-60 , 362, 375, 
376, 379, 380, 381. Interestingly, in the 1733 case, Hannah Tavernor was accused o f  bearing “a 
Bastard Child at John [EJton’s house.” The case was struck o ff  the docket, meaning that neither 
Tavernor nor Eton was held responsible. This is quite different from the case o f  W illiam  Catilla and 
Judith Catilla, where both were held to be responsible for the birth.
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relationship with John Berry) believe that Judith was married? The court ordered that 
William Catilla be whipped for his abetting of his daughter, itself a marker of 
Catilla’s tenuous status as a mixed-race free man in Virginia: usually, if a man 
couldn’t pay a fine, the sum was levied against his property.477 Either William did 
not have enough property to make up for his fine of 500 pounds of tobacco, or the 
court singled him out for the racially-charged punishment of whipping. Kirsten 
Fischer argues that whipping and branding servants was prohibited in North Carolina 
(as it was in Virginia).478 The result was that these punishments were reserved for 
slaves by the eighteenth century, and as such “reinforced the idea that the bodies of 
African Americans were inherently different.”479 It seems significant that whipping 
would be used against a free man of color, seemingly to underscore and emphasize 
his race. Further, that the colonial state would reserve whipping as a punishment for 
particular crimes like bastardy indicates the racialization of that crime in eighteenth- 
century Virginia.
The court’s surveillance over the Catilla family lasted for generations, both in 
the form of bastardy cases and tithing cases. Matthew Catilla (Katherine’s son) had 
eleven grandchildren.480 His youngest granddaughter, Martha, was fined for bearing 
a bastard child in 1764.481 The Charles Parish records lists another “bastard child of 
Martha Cutillo,” Nancy, who was bom in 1766. No bastardy case was brought
477 For exam ple, Roger Badget was protected from being whipped when Elizabeth E llyson bore a 
bastard child in his house -  his fine w as “lev y ’d on [his] G oods & Chattels Lands & T enem ents.” York  
D OW  18: 381.
478 Fischer, Suspect R elations, 10.
479 Fischer, Suspect R elations, 10, 167.
480 CPR 61.
481 York JO 4: 1 8 6 ,2 3 7 , 254.
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against Martha for that birth.482 Again, with Martha, we see the possibility for racial 
liminality and extra-legal marriages for the Catilla family: the year before Martha’s 
first child was bom, Thomas Combs was fined for failing to list Martha as tithable.483 
Were Martha Catilla and Thomas Combs married?484
Even with the constant scrutiny by the court, the Catilla family flourished, and 
generations of the Catilla family continued in York county throughout the eighteenth 
century. Their names indicate the tight-knit culture of this family: Mary Catilla 
named her daughter Catherine after her mother, Katherine, an act that may indicate 
both the closeness of the two women and the recognition that it was Katherine’s 
whiteness that insured the family’s freedom. Further, in the four generations 
following Katherine Jewell’s sons, there were three more Matthews and two more 
Williams. These names also link the family back to that first generation of free 
mixed-race Catillas. This attention to the matrilineal genealogy existed in tension 
with the initial assertion of patrilineality by Katherine Jewell: if slavery meant 
erasing fatherhood, it is certainly significant that Katherine Jewell’s children carried 
their father’s last name. When later generations of Catillas were brought into court, 
their memory of their genealogy was a means to maintain their freedom.
We see in the story of Katherine Jewell and her family the ways that free 
people of color, guaranteed a measure of freedom by asserting a genealogy that 
reached back to a white female ancestor, could transgress some of the racial 
assumptions of Virginia’s culture of inherited racial slavery. Even as the court acted
482 CPR 62.
483 York JO 4: 90.
484 York D OW  18: 667. Martha’s father, M atthew Catilla, Jr., had also been fined for failing to pay 
taxes on Martha’s mother, Sarah.
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to discipline the Catilla family -  through fines, surveillance, and physical punishment 
-  the Catillas were able to enjoy some level of independence. As a large free black 
family in the racially dualistic slave economy of Virginia, the Catillas’ freedom 
transgressed the notion that blackness automatically conferred slavery. While their 
marriages were not legally recognized, we see a tension as the courts tacitly recognize 
their legitimacy in most instances even as it refused to recognize them in others. It is 
certainly remarkable that, of the 29 Catilla births for which there is some trace in the 
records, only four were tried in the court as a bastardy case.485 The rest of those 
births were recorded by the Charles Parish clerk as legitimate births bom to married, 
mixed-race couples. Finally, we see how the memory of an English servant woman, 
Katherine Jewell lived on in a family for whom genealogy was a ticket to some 
measure of freedom.
Throughout the generations, the Catilla family was seen as a free black or 
mixed-race family. While their white ancestry granted them freedom, the courts and 
the church always categorized the family as non-white. As we’ve seen, that white 
ancestry offered some measure of freedom, but it did not guarantee a life free from 
the surveillance and harassment by the courts. Thus, the Catilla family, because of 
their racial identity that transgressed the line between black and white, lived in a 
liminal space between free and unfree, legitimate and illegitimate. For some free 
people of color and their white family members, though, their identities themselves 
were liminal and therefore transgressive. Such was the case with Joanna Inscow, a 
mixed race woman whose own racial identity was so uncategorizable, and thus so
485 T hese include the bastardy cases o f  Mary Jew ell/C atilla (1693 and 1700), Judith Catilla (1729), and 
Martha Catilla (1764).
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transgressive, that the courts repeatedly recategorized her as a means of minimizing 
her transgressions. Again, we see the ways that liminal identities, extralegal 
marriages, and matrilineal genealogies were sites of transgression, this time for free 
people whose race was not easily categorized. Joanna Inscow’s transgressive 
identity, rooted in her birth and extending to the birth or her children, existed in 
constant tension with the domination of the colonial state.
Joanna Inscow was the daughter of white woman named Elizabeth 
Rawlinson.486 Elizabeth herself was probably the bastard daughter of another 
Elizabeth Rawlinson, who, as a servant to Ralph Flowers, bore a bastard child in 
1684.487 There is no surviving record of Joanna Inscow’s own birth (or the source of 
her last name), but the circumstance of Joanna’s birth were questionable enough to 
make her racial status suspect for her entire life. Joanna’s identity, down to her 
name itself, was slippery throughout her life -  the court frequently mistook her for 
her mother, even in 1728 summoning “Elizabeth Rawlinson, Elizabeth Rawlinson the 
younger” and “Johanna Inscome” on the same day for the same crime.489 Several 
years later, the court referred to “Rollinson” as Joanna Inscow’s “alias.”490
Inscow’s name was not the only aspect of her identity questioned by the court. 
Over the course of her life, Inscow was called in to the York county court to prove
486 York WI 20: 197. Elizabeth R ollinson’s w ill, dated October 4, 1748, named Joanna’s brother, John 
R ollinson as executor and major inheritor o f  the estate. Joanna inherited “ 1 English Sh illing” from her 
mother. The court spelled “R aw linson” and “Joanna Inscow ” m ultiple ways; for clarity, I w ill use 
“R aw linson” and “Joanna Inscow ” throughout, except when quoting directly from original sources.
487 York D O W  6: 612. In that case, John Hall is named as the father o f  the bastard child. He does not 
appear again in any o f  the records connected to Joanna Inscow  or her mother, E lizabeth R ollinson.
4 N o bastardy case, m iscegenation case or birth record survives that can be tied to the birth o f  Joanna 
Inscow. It is most likely that Joanna Inscow ’s father was o f  African or N ative American descent. It is 
possible that Joanna’s mother, Elizabeth R awlinson Jr. was herself m ixed-race, though no evidence  
survives that confirm s or even suggests that. It is also possible that Elizabeth R awlinson Jr. was the 
baby born in the 1684 bastardy case o f  Elizabeth R awlinson Sr.
489 York DOW  16: 489 , 1727.
490 York DOW  18: 60, 67, 73, 79  86, 103, 112.
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her racial identity no less than four times. In her analysis of Inscow’s life, Kathleen 
Brown emphasizes that Inscow’s marriage to Isaac Bee, a white man, temporarily 
conferred upon her the status of whiteness.491 When Bee died, so did Inscow’s status 
as a white woman. For Brown, Inscow’s story indicates the remarkable intertwining 
of white families and free black families, and the power conferred by whiteness in 
eighteenth century Virginia. I agree with Brown, but my focus here is different: 
while Inscow’s marriage to Bee conferred privileged status, the questioning of that 
status occurred whenever Inscow gave birth.
Virginia law regarding the tax status of black women’s labor shifted back and 
forth throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In a groundbreaking 1643 
law, black women’s labor was taxed the same as men’s labor; as Kathleen Brown has 
argued, this law marked black women as field laborers, and was the first open legal 
enshrinement of racial difference in Virginia law.492 This law was rescinded in 1662, 
with the passing of the law of slavery by birth. Then, in 1668, black women’s labor 
was again deemed taxable.493 Back and forth the law would go, until 1723, when 
black women’s labor was again deemed taxable, following a Northampton county 
petition complaining of the revenue lost from failing to tax that labor.494 The 1723 
law would have a major effect on Joanna Inscow’s adult life, as it was the basis for 
the court’s continued questioning and surveillance of her.
The narrative of Joanna Inscow’s tithing cases points to the transgressive 
liminality of her identity as a mixed race woman: even as the court sought a stable
491 Brown, G ood  Wives, N asty Wenches, an d  Anxious P atriarchs, 238-9.
492 Brown, G ood  Wives, N asty Wenches, an d  Anxious P atriarchs, 118.
493 Hening 2: 267.
494 Hening 4: 131.
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identity for her, Joanna Inscow was always difficult for them to categorize. She was 
first fined for failing to pay her taxes in 1727, four years after the passage of the new 
tithing law. The case was never completed, perhaps because the court was never 
quite sure who Joanna Inscow was: this was the case where they simultaneously 
summoned Joanna, her mother, and her grandmother for the same crime (even though 
Joanna’s grandmother was most assuredly white, being a former English servant).495 
Joanna’s racial identity again was called into question in 1735, when her husband 
Isaac Bee was fined “for not listing Joanna Inscow a Molatto.”496 The court provided 
a mixed ruling on the case: Bee was excused from the fine, but still had to pay the 
taxes in question. Inscow was called in again “for not listing herself as a Tithable” in 
1738 -  this time she “prov[ed] herself not a Molatto” and was excused from paying 
taxes in the future.497 The court’s memory was short, though. In 1746, Joanna was 
again charged with not listing herself as a tithable 498 Joanna defied the court by 
failing to appear, but to no avail: she lost that case, and was heavily fined. Clearly, 
Joanna Inscow’s status as a white woman had lasted just over twenty years.
Inscow’s string of tithing cases was not accidental. Except for the first tithing 
case (Inscow’s first appearance in the record), each summons came on the tail of 
another case (or cases) in which Inscow’s transgressive behavior challenged the 
court’s authority. In 1734, Inscow was charged with bastardy; in 1735, the second 
tithing case occurred.499 Two more bastardy charges came in 1736 and 1738, the
495 York DOW  16: 4 8 9 ,4 9 9 . Elizabeth R awlinson Sr. was treated as a white wom an during her 
bastardy case in 1684. York D O W  6: 562, 612.
496 York DOW  18: 237-8 , 245.
497 York DOW  18: 440.
498 York D O W  19: 498.
499 York D OW  18: 43-4 , 53, 60, 67, 73, 79, 86, 103, 112.
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latter immediately followed by the 1738 tithing case.500 Finally, from 1743 to 1746, 
Inscow was involved in a series of debt cases as she worked to maintain her 
husband’s estate. Following the pattern, these cases were followed by the last tithing 
case, in 1746.
All of these cases -  whether for tithing, bastardy, or inheritance -  were linked 
to Inscow’s extralegal marriage to Isaac Bee, and were thus rooted in questions about 
transgressive reproduction. If racial identity was inherent in birth (and marked by 
particular labor demands), then the tithing cases were about interpreting and 
reinterpreting the legal status of Inscow’s birth well after the fact. Each and every 
case somehow called into question Inscow’s own birth: the circumstances of 
Inscow’s birth determined the legality of her marriage, and thus the legitimacy of her 
own children. Thus, Inscow’s bastardy charges were inextricably linked to the 
questions about her own racial status.
Significantly, Inscow was never actually punished for bastardy. The 1734 
case was “Struck of the Docket,” the 1736-7 case was dismissed, and the 1738 case 
was never completed. The court’s reasoning for dropping all three cases was never 
made explicit, but the circumstances suggest several interpretations. Bom to a free 
woman of some means, Inscow’s children were not likely to become destitute -  the 
court may not have seen further action against Inscow as necessary. Further, it was 
possible, as with the Catilla family, Inscow’s extralegal marriage to Bee was 
informally recognized by the court. Finally, the fact that none of these cases came to
500 York DOW  18: 279, 293, 300, 324, 333. Interestingly, when charged the third time for bastardy, 
Inscow ’s alias again surfaced: the initial charge was brought against both Inscow  and “Betty  
R oleson”. The case against “R oleson” w as dropped when the court realized it had again mistaken  
Inscow  for her mother. York DOW  18: 4 1 4 ,4 3 4 .
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fruition points the possibility that the purpose of these cases was, on some level, 
surveillance: the court was asserting its authority over Joanna Inscow’s transgressive 
reproduction, even as it declined to actually punish her for those births. Ultiamtely, 
these failed bastardy charges indicate that the court was willing to tacitly consider 
Joanna Inscow as white (and thus married and bearing legitimate children), so long as 
she submitted to their domination.
Isaac Bee died in 1740, leaving Inscow and her son, John Inscow, some 
property.501 Upon Bee’s death, the courts ceased to abide Inscow’s transgressive 
liminal identity. Again, we see a tension between transgression and domination, as 
Inscow and the courts each tried to establish Inscow’s identity and her rightful access 
to power. After her husband died, Inscow fought hard to maintain both Bee’s estate 
and her relationship with her son, who was probably no more than six years old at the 
time; considering his young age and Inscow’s questionable status, it was possible that
CM
he could have been indentured out. This process was not easy for Inscow; the court 
was not eager to grant her the authority she demanded. Nevertheless, Joanna Inscow 
had seen the court in action for many years, and her role as a widow would only 
expand her knowledge. Ultimately, and after many failures, Joanna Inscow used the 
courts to win nominal recognition of her relationships, both to her husband and to her 
son.
Following the death of her husband, Joanna Inscow was involved in a series of 
debt cases, all related to Isaac Bee’s estate. In 1743, Inscow sued Thomas Dickson,
501 York D O W  19: 249, 258-9 , 267, 275. John Inscow  is named as Joanna Inscow ’s son in a 1753 
deed. York JO 2: 363. During his youth, Joanna’s son used her last name; as w ill be discussed later, 
as an adult, he would take Isaac B ee’s last name.
502 This age determination is based on the tim ing o f  Inscow ’s earliest bastardy charge in 1734.
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the administrator of Bee’s will.503 After a series of delays due to legal technicalities, 
Dickson died before the case could be completed -  Inscow did not recover the debts 
she felt owed to her. In 1746, Inscow herself was sued, first by Peter Hay, and then 
by Thomas Hornsby.504 Again, Inscow was unsuccessful: she lost both cases. Just 
eight months later, the court, which had in 1738 unequivocally stated that Inscow was 
“not a Molatto,” changed its mind and presented Inscow “for not Listing herself as 
Tithable.”505 When Inscow defied the court by failing to appear for her summons, the 
court levied against Inscow a double fine of 1000 pounds of tobacco. In this series of 
cases, the court whittled away at Inscow’s claims to her relationship with Bee -  she 
was unable to make a claim to his estate, and ultimately unable to make a claim to the 
white status her marriage to him had conferred upon her. In other words, it took just 
six years (between the 1740 death of Isaac Bee and the 1746 tithing charge) for the 
court to recategorize Joanna Inscow from white (or tolerably transgressive) to free 
black (or intolerably transgressive).
After 1747, Joanna Inscow’s name fades from the records. She was involved 
in a few more court disputes, but ultimately the court’s decision to remove her status 
as a white woman, and thus its erasure of her marriage to Isaac Bee, succeeded in 
silencing her to a great extent. Nevertheless, Joanna’s son, John Inscow, would take 
up her battle for recognition of his (and thus his mother’s) relationship with Isaac 
Bee. Sometime before 1747, young John had been placed in the guardianship of John
5UJ York DOW  19: 249, 258-9 , 267, 275.
504 Hay case: York D OW  19: 389. Hornsby case: York DOW  19: 411, 416, 421.
505 York DOW  19: 4 7 2 ,4 8 6 ,4 9 8 .
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Hatherway Carter, a mixed-race relative of Joanna’s mother, Elizabeth Rawlinson.506 
These kinds of guardianships were common in the eighteenth century as a way to 
ensure the support and education of young children. The arrangement was not always 
smooth -  Carter and Joanna Inscow engaged in one court battle that was resolved 
outside of the courtroom -  but it did underscore the closeness of the Inscow’s to their 
mixed-race extended family, as well as Joanna Inscow’s desire to connect with her 
family after the crushing legal defeats of 1743-1746.507
Joanna Inscow died in 1759. Over the course of her lifetime, she was 
summoned to the York county court more than 25 times, just for questions of 
bastardy and tithing. As a free woman of color, Inscow’s status was always in 
question, and her relationships (whether to her husband or to her son) were not legally 
recognized. Yet it was Joanna’s relationship with her son, John, which would, in the 
end, solidify her legacy. Shortly after Joanna’s death, John sued Fips Jackson for 
major debts Jackson owed to the estate of Joanna Inscow. Finally, the Inscow family 
was victorious in court: John Inscow recovered from Jackson well over £100 
Sterling, plus interest.508
John Inscow’s victory in court was significant for a number of reasons. First, 
it indicates that John, even as a very young man of color, had access to power in the 
courts which his mother, as a woman, could not claim.509 Nevertheless, it is 
important to recognize that, while he was male, John Inscow’s access to power was
506 York D O W  19: 400. If John w as born in conjunction with one o f  Joanna Inscow ’s bastardy 
charges, he would have been betw een 7 and 12 years old  at the time o f  this indenture, not an unusual 
age for an educational apprenticeship to begin. On the relationship betw een Carter and Elizabeth  
R awlinson, see Brown, G o o d  Wives, N asty  Wenches, a n d  Anxious P atriarchs, 238.
507 York JO 1:6,  14 ,71.
508 York JO 3: 3 9 ,5 1 ,6 2 ,  72, 133.
509 John Inscow  was likely just over the age o f  majority and recently released from his 
apprenticeship/indenture when he sued Fips Jackson.
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curtailed by both his race and the status of his birth. As a bastard child (legally if not 
practically), John Inscow was legally the “child of no one.” According to Virginia 
law, he was not legally qualified to inherit from Inscow (or from Bee, for that 
matter).510 Yet John was a bastard child only because of a legal technicality -  Isaac 
Bee and Joanna Inscow were not allowed to marry because of Virginia’s law against 
interracial marriage. Yet John Inscow clearly believed that Isaac Bee was his father -  
by 1761, John had even taken on Isaac Bee’s last name.511 But John retained his 
relationship with his mother’s mixed-race family as well.
We see in the lives of Johanna Inscow and her son, John Inscow, the tenuous 
power that could be held by those with transgressive liminal identities in colonial 
Virginia. The Inscows’ story hews particularly closely to Johanna Oksala’s 
description of how limit experiences can transgress boundaries of power, knowledge 
and subjectivity. Joanna Inscow’s questionable birth transgressed lines of power, 
defying the notion that black and white should or even could be sexually separated in 
the colony. Further, her life transgressed lines of knowledge, as she and the courts 
grappled over her identity, which, in the context of Virginia’s racial duality, was 
unintelligible and thus continually problematic both for the courts and for Inscow 
herself. The courts sought to control Inscow’s transgressions, subjecting her to near­
constant surveillance and the humiliation of refusing to recognize the legitimacy of 
either her marriage or her children’s births. Yet, this attempt at domination was met 
by one last transgression by the Inscow-Bee family: a transgression of subjectivity. 
As Joanna Inscow’s life progressed, we see her continually grappling with the
510 V irginia w ould change this law in 1785, ruling that illegitim ate children could inherit from their 
mother “as if  they had been law fully begotten o f  such mother.” Hening 12: 138-9.
511 Brown, G ood  Wives, N asty  Wenches, an d  Anxious P atriarchs, 238.
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meaning of her identity. Bom of a white woman, she was legally free, if not legally
white. She married a white man, Isaac Bee, temporarily cementing her privileged
status. But when Joanna Inscow and John Inscow’s ties to whiteness ceased to
protect them, they strengthened their ties to their free black family. How much did
Joanna Inscow’s understanding of herself, her identity, and her experiences transform
as her transgressions were met with increasing domination?
* * *
We began this chapter with the story of Mary Walters, a free woman of color 
so enraged by her situation that she was considered dangerous enough to banish from 
the colony. We ended with the Catilla and Inscow families, whose transgressive 
identities were met with less violent censure but who likewise met the domination of 
the colonial state. Transgression and domination existed in constant tension with one 
another. Significantly, in multiple ways, reproduction could be a site of transgression 
of the increasingly calcifying lines of power of colonial Virginia. Those 
transgressions were frequently met with the opposition of domination. Childbearing 
offered servant women a respite from their labors; that respite ways paid back in the 
form of years of extra service. Women who bore bastard children transgressed lines 
of knowledge, defying the law and defying the court’s authority, with varying levels 
of success. Single mothers carved out lives of some measure of independence, but 
that independence was always shaky. Enslaved women found ways to instill meaning 
in their reproductive lives, even using their reproductive role to openly defy the 
authority of the master class. Finally, mixed-race families transgressed Virginia’s 
racial order in multiple ways, especially if they were able to trace their genealogies
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back to a white female progenitor. These stories exist in tension with the 
overwhelming domination of the colonial slave economy. Nevertheless, to borrow 
the words of Ania Loomba again, reproduction offers a lens for us to see the women 
“who survived to tell the tale.”
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CHAPTER 3 
Knowledge “not fit to be discust publiquely”: 
Colonialism and the Transformation of Reproductive Knowledge
During the hot Virginia summer of 1646, four days after delivering Anne 
Owle’s baby, 46-year-old midwife Margaret Grimes returned to check in on her 
patient.512 Margaret was horrified by what she saw. Rather than finding Anne in bed 
with her baby, as the lying-in tradition required, Margaret found her patient “walking 
upp & downe the house,” “beare legged” but for a blue linen petticoat.513 Margaret 
urged her patient to go back to bed, telling Anne that “shee did very ill to goe soe 
cold,” and that she worried that Anne “might soune take Could.”514 Anne was 
reluctant to speak, but eventually told her midwife “shee was very ill” : “her water 
scalded hir...and her beareing came downe,” which probably describes what we 
would call a prolapsed uterus or vagina.515 Margaret urged Anne to keep herself 
warm and to “keepe warme Cloathes” against “her faery parts.”516 As she treated 
Anne, the midwife reassured her patient that she, too, had suffered the same ailment: 
“I have been soe myself,” Margaret said, and she believed that Anne’s uterus “would 
goe upp againe.”517
5,2 York D O W  2: 168. Laurel Thatcher Ulrich observes that these postnatal visits from m idw ives were 
most com m on in the cases o f  com plicated births, where m idw ives were more likely to observe that 
their patient needed more medical attention after the birth. Ulrich, A M id w ife ’s Tale, 189-93. Kathleen 
Brown exam ines Anne O w le’s case, arguing that Margaret G rim es’ testim ony show s both her expertise 
and the level o f  trust the court place in her. Brown, G ood  Wives, N asty Wenches, an d  Anxious 
P atriarchs, 97-8 .
513 York D OW  2: 168.
514 Ibid.
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Margaret Grimes’ story of that summer day survives as the only testimony
recorded when Anne Owle reported the “unsufferable abuses” she’d experienced at 
the hands of her husband to the York County Court.518 The Court had difficulty even 
making sense of the tale: Anne’s complaint, they demurred, was “in such secrete 
manner that it is not fit to be discust by the Court publiquely.”519 The court convened 
a group of neighborhood women, including midwife Margaret Grimes, Elizabeth 
Hopkins, and Elinor Coming, to “serch” Anne Owle and make a report of their 
findings.520 The actions of the court would be decided by the women’s testimony:
M 1
the court would “proceed” in the case “as they [the women] shall cause.”
The testimony of Anne Owle, Margaret Grimes, and the other women would 
have extraordinary impact: Anne Owle was, for all intents and purposes, granted one 
of the few marital separations in the colony’s history.522 As the Virginia summer 
cooled to autumn in 1646, Anne prepared to leave Virginia to return to England with 
her baby, where Anne was “desirous to go...to her friends” so that she could “seek 
cure” for her ailments.523 Anne’s estranged husband, Richard Owle, would stay in
518 York D OW  2: 166.
519 Ibid.
520
521 Ibid.
Ibid.
522 O f all the colon ies, only V irginia d isallow ed divorce. Norton, Founding M others an d  F athers, 89- 
95. The only w ay that a divorce could legally be obtained in V irginia was to apply to the H ouse o f  
Lords -  an unlikely scenario indeed. In the absence o f  legal divorce, local courts arranged informal 
separations o f  couples, w ho were not allow ed to remarry after obtaining the separation. Godbeer, 
Sexual R evolution in E arly A m erica , 130-2. See also: Fischer, Suspect R elations, 17n.4. There is one 
other marital separation case in the York County records. In 1691, the court arranged for the division  
o f  the marital property o f  Mary Savory and her husband Henry on the grounds o f  Henry’s physical 
abuse o f  Mary. Notably, as in the O w le case, the agreem ent forged by the court in the Savory case did 
not dissolve the marriage, but it did provide for the division  o f  the cou p le’s property. York DOW  9:
91. Kathleen Brown argues that w om en’s fem e co vert status “ironically may have strengthened the 
legal position o f  w ives” when husbands failed to live up to com m unity standards. Brown, G o o d  Wives, 
N asty Wenches, an d  Anxious P atriarchs, 336. Therefore, w hile divorce w as not legal in the colony, 
som e w ives, such as Anne O w le, were able to find satisfactory alternatives in the courts. Brown, G ood  
Wives, N asty  Wenches, an d  Anxious P atriarchs, 336-40.
523 York DOW  2: 168-9.
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Virginia. This transatlantic journey would fulfill the court’s order that the couple 
“doe not Come togeather,” because “they have & doe dayly goe in danger of there 
lives.”524 Anne’s journey would be funded by a financial settlement in which her 
husband was required to relinquish to Anne 1,200 pounds of tobacco, a pig and her 
shoats, a rug, “all her owne & her childs weareing cloathes,” “A Chest with locke & 
Key,” as well as half of the couple’s flock of chickens.525
This case presents a fascinating window into reproductive practices and 
beliefs in seventeenth century Virginia. Not only that, it shows us the ways that 
knowledge about reproduction worked in this particular space. We see knowledge 
about reproduction emerge in several ways in the case of Anne Owle. First, 
midwives held particular knowledge about childbirth, lying-in, and the medical 
practices that helped to treat childbearing women. Importantly, Margaret Grimes’ 
knowledge about midwifery enabled her to not only treat but to reassure and protect 
Anne Owle. Grimes’ knowledge here was both professional and personal. She knew 
how to treat Anne particular symptoms with “warme Cloathes” and skilled hands.
She also knew how to allay Anne’s anxiety by telling Anne that she, too, had suffered 
the same ailment and been cured. Was it because of this reassurance that Anne 
revealed to Margaret the extent of her husband’s abuse? Or was it that, to Margaret 
and the other women in the neighborhood, the ignoring of traditional lying-in 
practices was simply beyond the pale? For Margaret Grimes, midwifery was not just
524
525
Ibid.
Ibid.
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about medical knowledge: it was about shared experience with the women of one’s 
community.526
Second, that same knowledge about midwifery reveals the gender boundaries 
that constructed and defined bodies of knowledge in this period. While Grimes and 
the other women eagerly conferred with each other about the case, the male public 
sphere of the court treated the case very differently. To the court, Grimes’ knowledge 
about midwifery was not just outside of their purview, but it was literally unspeakable 
-  “not fit to be discust.” Given this, the court had to defer to women’s knowledge to 
determine the facts of Anne Owle’s case. The women’s medical knowledge provided 
both the reasoning and the basis for Anne’s extraordinary separation agreement: 
Richard’s abuse of Anne endangered her life, and Anne was granted the right to go 
back to England (in other words, to truly separate from her husband) in order to “seek 
cure” for her illness. Did the midwife Margaret Grimes (who from her testimony 
seemed confident that she could cure Anne herself) convince the court that Anne’s 
illness was so severe that only a trip to England could cure her? The court was able 
to craft this unprecedented decision precisely because the case relied on women’s 
knowledge: even before the jury of women convened, the court granted that it would 
proceed with whatever the women decided about the case.527 The court’s observance 
of a gender division of knowledge -  where women’s knowledge was private, 
experiential, and medical, and men’s knowledge was public and legal -  allowed for
526 1 do not mean to im ply an essential bond betw een w om en. Instead, I use the phrase “w om en o f  
on e’s com m unity” advisedly, to show  that shared experiences existed only within the boundaries o f  the 
shifting com m unity lines o f  colonial Virginia. The varied experiences and ep istem ologies o f  European 
wom en, N ative w om en, and enslaved and free African-American w om en meant that their 
“com m unities” were increasingly defined by race, status, and coloniality.
527 York D O W  2: 166.
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the “secrette” truths of the women’s testimony to have extraordinary power when 
they erupted into the masculine public sphere.528
Finally, the case reveals the possibilities and limitations of historians’ ability 
to see and understand past systems of knowledge, especially those that are not well 
represented in the archive. We can see that Anne Owle’s case was decided based on 
the knowledge of her midwife, but that knowledge remains elusive to us. We get a 
glimpse of the treatments Margaret Grimes used, and the importance of lying-in 
traditions to seventeenth-century English women, and the relationship between 
midwives and their patients, but the image we get is fragmentary at best. Margaret 
Grimes’ practice was likely steeped in both years of practice and the rules of humoral 
theory; she was deeply concerned that Anne would get too cold or too hot, and her 
choice of treatments were rooted in that concern. Even with that understanding, 
questions remain. Why was Anne’s walking about the house considered so 
dangerous, beyond the fact that it countered long-held lying-in traditions? What 
specific treatments did Margaret offer to Anne? How was Anne’s neglect of the 
lying-in tradition evidence of spousal abuse? This incomplete image is a result of the 
fact that the only evidence we have of this case (and any other similar case) is the 
court’s record. This archive is an artifact of the very gendering of knowledge that 
allowed the court to make its decision: the court recorded only its own version of the 
story because women’s knowledge was “not fitt to be discust by the Court 
publiquely.”529 Ironically, it was the very unspeakable nature of the case that 
demanded that it be recorded. Anne Owle’s outlaw reproduction -  the way her
528 Ibid.
529 York DOW  2: 166.
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failure to observe lying-in was a sign of her abuse by her husband -  was recorded in 
the archive precisely because it broke with tradition. Outlaw reproduction -  
childbearing that became visible because it broke tradition, or because it broke the 
law, or because it, for whatever reason, became public rather than staying private -  is 
often the only reproduction we can see from the distance of centuries.
As the case of Anne Owle makes clear, understanding the ways that 
knowledge about reproduction was constructed in colonial Virginia is no easy task. 
Such a study must not only attempt to reconstruct historical bodies of knowledge, but 
it must grapple with the limitations and blind spots of the knowledge of the historian 
herself. Some of this difficulty is specific to the topic of reproduction, experiences of 
which were rarely recorded. In her cultural history of pregnancy in England, Clare 
Hanson, drawing on E. Ann Kaplan and Ann Oakley, argues, “in such areas as the 
conduct of pregnancy and of child-rearing, subjective experience -  complex, 
contradictory and often unrecorded -  is extremely difficult to recover.”530 For 
Hanson, the solution to the silences in the historical record is a cultural historical 
approach: “ .. .if we cannot recover subjective experiences, we can trace the 
discourses that have framed and inflected pregnancy, and in so doing disclose a 
history of the ideas that have shaped and informed experience.”531 This is particularly 
true for a historical space such as colonial Virginia, where the archive is fragmentary 
or even non-existent concerning the experiences and ideas of English women, and 
especially true for women of Native or African descent. The archival silences 
Hanson outlines are intensified in the colonial archive.
530 Hanson, A C ultural H istory o f  P regnancy, 5.
531 Ibid.
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In this chapter, I attempt to outline the contours of knowledge about 
reproduction in the colonial space of seventeenth and eighteenth century Virginia. As 
the analysis of the case of Anne Owle shows, any examination of historical 
knowledge must address that knowledge in at least two frames. The first is the 
historical project of trying to reconstruct past systems of knowledge, with particular 
attention to the intersections between knowledge and power. In a colonial context, 
this transformation of knowledge was always tied to the ways that colonialism itself 
shaped and reshaped colonized subjectivities in the process of what Robert Blair St. 
George calls “becoming colonial.”532 The second is a self-critical, self-reflexive 
examination of the limitations of such a historical project at all, considering not only 
the limitations of the archive but also the subjectivity of the historian herself. 
Speaking to both of these frames, Gayatri Spivak has described the ways that 
colonialism both created and required “the complete overhaul of the episteme” of 
both the subaltern and the colonialist (though, for her, the subaltern is the particular 
focus).533 In other words, the process of colonialism fundamentally remade the 
knowledge of both colonizer and colonized, so that each needed to understand the 
world in fundamentally new ways, with the colonizer’s knowledge erasing, silencing, 
and remaking that of the colonized. The postcolonial scholar is left searching 
(perhaps futilely) for the voice of the subaltern amidst this silencing process. With 
that in mind, we must not only consider the organization, construction, and 
dissemination of knowledge about reproduction in this particular space, but the ways
532 St. George, “Introduction,” 4-5 .
533 Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 76.
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that the colonial experience shifted, transformed, and reframed knowledge about 
reproduction.
In this chapter, I examine the relationship between reproduction, colonialism, 
and knowledge from a number of angles. First, I lay out the theoretical foundations 
for my examination. A feminist historical reading of postcolonial theory offers a 
grounding here for a discussion of how knowledge about reproduction was steeped in 
gendered, raced, and colonial power relations. While the archive is largely and 
lamentably silent about the knowledge systems of Native American and African 
women, and that same archive presents only glimpses of English women’s knowledge 
systems, it does provide a window into the ways that knowledge about reproduction 
was transformed in a colonial space. After laying out this theoretical foundation, I 
will describe the reproductive episteme of colonial Virginia -  the unspoken 
knowledge about pregnancy, childbearing, and genealogy held by women and men in 
this time and space. The translation of that episteme into experience and medical 
practice is the subject for the next section, which focuses on how knowledge about 
reproduction was used by midwives and women. This knowledge gave midwives 
some specific power in the public sphere, when their knowledge was required by the 
colonial courts. Finally, I will examine the ways that colonialism created new 
intimate relationships that challenged and remade previously held bodies of 
knowledge about reproduction.
Ultimately, I argue that colonialism interrupted and remade the gendering of 
knowledge about reproduction. Specifically, I argue that the intimacies of 
colonialism reframed the relationship between knowledge, gender, race, and power.
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Where knowledge about reproduction was strictly gendered in Anne Owles’ world -  
such that the (elite, male) court simply refused any knowledge over the topic -  the 
continued colonial encounter increasingly empowered masters and patriarchs to claim 
knowledge about reproduction, thereby shifting the meanings of reproduction for all 
involved.
* * *
In 1673, the York County court settled a dispute between the Robert Penrice 
and the wife of Owen Davis. The court’s entire record of the case reads: “Whereas it 
is manifestly apparent that an Indyan through Robert Penrice his meanes caused the 
wife of Owen Davis to miscarry it is therefore ord[ered] that he pay her one thousand 
[pounds of tobacco].”534 In other words, according to the court, Robert Penrice had 
somehow procured an abortifacient from an Indian and gave it to Mrs. Davis. The 
court judged in Mrs. Davis’s favor, and Penrice was ordered to pay damages to her. 
As in the case of Anne Owle, the frustrating silences of the record may hide more 
from us than they reveal. Also like Anne Owle’s case, this case shows us some of the 
ways that the court addressed the intersection between reproduction, power, and 
knowledge. Further, this case (hereafter referred to as the Penrice-Davis-“Indyan” 
case) can be a platform to understand the ways that colonialism complicated and 
transformed gendered systems of knowledge.
I will use the Penrice-Davis-“Indyan” case to outline some of the theoretical 
foundations for this chapter’s discussion of reproduction, colonialism, and the politics 
of knowledge. Four questions emerge (and overlap) in this discussion. First, what are 
the limitations of the colonial archive and, therefore, historical knowledge? Next,
534 York D OW  5: 56.
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how does the position of the historian herself further constrict a historical 
investigation? Then, if historical knowledge is so compromised, then, how is 
knowledge defined in this study? Finally, what was the relationship between 
colonialism and knowledge?
The abbreviated record of the Penrice-Davis-“Indyan” case illustrates in 
particularly intense ways that historian’s knowledge of the past -  especially the 
colonial past -  is limited by the available archive because the textual fragments we 
have are an artifact of the very power relations we wish to uncover and understand.
In her examination of the literature of early colonialism, Myra Jehlen argues that we 
must not limit ourselves to thinking of the archive as a record of its time, but instead 
we must understand that the texts themselves are “self-conscious participants in the 
events they represent.”535 Antoinette Burton takes a similar stance, arguing that 
“ .. .archives do not simply arrive or emerge fully formed; nor are they innocent of 
struggles for power in either their creation or their interpretive applications.” This 
is intensified in the colonial Virginia archive, for which the textual presence of the 
nascent colonial state -  in the form of court records and the written law itself -  is one 
of the richest (indeed, one of the only) archives available.
We see this simultaneous presence and absence of a colonial record in the 
Penrice-Davis-“Indyan” case. Only the court’s decision in the case survives, and we 
have very little sense of the experiences, motivations, and opinions of Penrice, Davis, 
or the “Indyan.” The judgment in Davis’s favor indicates that the court believed that 
she was harmed by the remedy obtained by Penrice from the Indian, but little else can
535 Jehlen, “The Literature o f  C olonization,” 19.
536 Burton, “A rchive Fever, A rchive Stories,” 6. See also Stoler, A long the A rch iva l G rain , passim.
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be surmised. More intensely, the “Indyan” whose reproductive knowledge stands at 
the center of the case -  the miscarriage was supposedly caused by methods this 
person provided -  is not just silenced but unnamed. The court’s record is an artifact 
of its production: what mattered to the court were its own decision in the case and the 
monetary transaction that decision demanded.
Further, because the court’s record is an artifact of its own power in colonial 
systems, it participated in silencing the colonized Other. Part of this silence is a result 
of the abbreviated, recalcitrant nature of the colonial Virginia archive. We know 
nothing about the “Indyan” and the knowledge he/she shared with Robert Penrice. 
Further, we know similarly little about the relationship between the “Indyan”, Robert 
Penrice, and Mrs. Davis. More importantly, though, the silences in this short record 
are in fact revelatory of the colonial construction of race and power, especially in the 
organization of knowledge. For Gayatri Spivak, the colonial historian might well find 
their project reduced to “a task of ‘measuring silences.’”
There are multiple ways that we can measure the silences of this case. In one 
possible reading of the text, Robert Penrice, his motives unknown, contracted an 
Indian to somehow cause Mrs. Davis to miscarry her pregnancy -  whether through 
medicine, magic, or some other way.538 In this reading, the record transmits colonial 
fears about the crossing of racial boundaries: the unnamed “Indyan,” a holder of 
powerful and dangerous knowledge, crosses into English society to sow discord. In 
this reading, the court did not only neglect to record the “Indyan’s” knowledge, it 
refused to do so. In the court’s opinion, Robert Penrice needed to be punished
537 Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 82.
538 O f course, many other possible readings exist. W e can’t know the relationship between Penrice and 
D avis and why he w ould want to procure an abortion for her (or force one upon her).
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because it was through “his meanes” that this knowledge found its way into the 
English settlement. In another reading, the silences point to the ways that the colonial 
court privileged English agency over native agency. In the court’s view, Robert 
Penrice was the only one who could be punished: Penrice was named as defendant, 
despite the fact that the court claims that it is “manifestly apparent” that the 
“Indyan.. .caused” the miscarriage. By naming Penrice as the defendant in the case, 
the court shifts agency from the “Indyan” to Penrice. In this reading, the “Indyan” is 
unnamed because his/her coloniality rendered him/her without agency in the eyes of 
the court. Either way, the silences here -  the refusal to record either the name of the 
“Indyan” or the knowledge he/she held -  reveal the ways that the court tried to police 
colonial boundaries between Indian and English and assert English power, especially 
when threatened by Indian knowledge.
My project here is to allow the silences in the record to reveal what they can. 
This requires being attentive to the ways that the archive specifically erases the 
subjectivities of those at the bottom of various colonial hierarchies, including both 
racial and gender hierarchies. Nevertheless, the exigencies of colonialism meant that 
those hierarchies were constantly being negotiated and renegotiated; the colonial 
archive does not totally silence colonized voices. Therefore, despite the power 
structures etched into the silences in the archive, we can still hope to find the stories 
of women and colonized peoples. Postcolonial theorist and historian Ania Loomba 
argues that historians must look fo r  women -  we must “suppose a presence which at 
first cannot be found.”539 In so doing, we must engage with the ways that race and 
gender intersected in the colonial archive. Jane Haggis urges a reading of colonial
539 Loom ba, “D ead W om en T ell N o T ales,” 319.
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gender relations that recognizes the overrepresentation of white women in the 
archive: she warns that “recuperative histories” of white women “[colonize] gender 
for white men and women rather than gendering colonialism as a historical 
process.”540 Finally, as Ann Laura Stoler argues, colonial spaces -  and colonial 
archives -  were the same spaces where hierarchies of gender and race emerged and 
calcified; the reading of the archive amounts to the observation of the creation and 
policing of hierarchy itself.541
An inquiry into the history of reproductive knowledge provokes a second 
question: what is the position of the historian herself within bodies of colonial 
knowledge and colonial history? The hope to decode stories such as the Penrice- 
Davis-“Indyan” case may reveal as much about the historian’s subjectivity as it does 
the archive itself. In her examination of Chicana histories, Emma Perez warns 
against another kind of recuperative history, one that would assert claims about 
women that we wish were true, rather than acknowledging that our knowledge is 
always incomplete:
Many of us [historians] try with our passions to reconstruct the epics, dramas, 
comedies, and tragedies in a narrative that will echo ‘truth.’ We want so much 
to unearth the documents and organize the ‘facts’ that will disclose the ‘real 
truth.’ And what we know, what we discover as we venture into other worlds, 
is that we can only repeat the voices previously unheard, rebuffed or
540 H aggis, “W hite W om en and C olonialism ,” 163.
541 Stoler, R ace an d  the E ducation o f  D esire , 102-13.
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underestimated as we attempt to redeem that which has been disregarded in 
our history.542
For Perez, this realization of the archive’s silences not only reminds the historian of 
the inevitable limitations of their knowledge, but fuels even more the need to 
acknowledge historical silences. Perez’s approach reminds us that the historical 
project of uncovering knowledge in colonial spaces is complicated not only by the 
limitations of the archive, but by the limitations of the historical project itself.
With this in mind, an examination into the role Mrs. Davis took in this 
particular case can begin to uncover the role of the historian’s subjectivity in the 
creation bodies of historical knowledge. What can we learn about Mrs. Davis and her 
reproductive experiences or her agency in this brief record? The record both erases 
and highlights Mrs. Davis’s agency in this case, blurring the standard application of 
the legal concept of the fem e covert, she is not named (referred to instead as “the 
wife of Owen Davis”), but the court’s judgment is for her alone (Penrice is ordered to 
pay damages to her, not her husband). Was this language intentional in the recording 
of the case, and what did it reveal about what happened, either in the courtroom or in 
the events surrounding Mrs. Davis’s miscarriage? We can hope to find Mrs. Davis’s 
agency, but, ultimately, it is lost to us.
It’s worth noting that while we know little about Mrs. Davis, we at least know 
her name; in the colonial archive, the “Indyan” is even more invisible. Further, the 
invisibility of the “Indyan” is highlighted by my own historical methodology. This 
case only came to my own view because it included some record of the reproductive 
experiences of a woman in colonial Virginia. Admittedly, my interest in the “Indyan”
542 Perez, The D eco lon ia l Im aginary , xv.
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emerged tangentially to my interest in Mrs. Davis; I need to resist a “recuperative” 
history of white women not just because of the limitations of the archive but because 
of the limitations of my own research methodologies. How do historians, through 
recounting white experience in colonial spaces, re-establish the power relationships of 
colonialism? When Spivak asked “can the subaltern speak?”, she was questioning the 
ability of Western intellectuals to adequately hear and be able to understand the 
subaltern, noting that “the intellectual is complicit in the persistent constitution of 
Other as the S e lfs  shadow.”543 The problem was not the subaltern’s silence, but the 
intellectual’s willingness to fill in those silences with his own politics: “representing 
[the subaltern], the intellectuals represent themselves as transparent.”544 Feminist 
theorist Michele Barrett offers a helpful rephrasing of Spivak’s original question:
“can the hegemonic ear hear anything?”545 In other words, Spivak not only critiques 
the colonialist but also requires the historian/intellectual to recognize her own 
position in historical narratives of colonial and postcolonial power relations.
The feminist concepts of positionality and intersectionality are useful in 
helping historians to be self-critical of their own position in historical narratives. 
Knowledge, in these theoretical frameworks, is always defined and constructed within 
the power structures of identity: gender, race, sexuality, class, nation, and so on. 
Donna Haraway argues that we must divest ourselves of the myth of objectivity,
543 Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 75.
544 Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 70.
545 M ichele Barrett, “Can the Subaltern Speak? N ew  York, February 2 0 04 ,” H istory W orkshop  
Journal 58 (2004): 359. Spivak’s approach in “Can the Subaltern Speak?” has been read by som e as 
suggesting that the subaltern can, in fact, not speak -  or certainly cannot be heard. See, for exam ple, 
Sandhya Shetty and Elizabeth Jane Bellam y, “P ostcolonialism ’s A rchive Fever,” D iacritics  30:1 
(2000), 25-48.
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instead adopting a stance of what she calls “situated knowledge.”546 Haraway 
defines situated knowledge:
I am arguing for politics and epistemologies of location, positioning, and 
situating, where partiality and not universality is the condition of being heard 
to make rational knowledge claims.... I am arguing for a view for a body, 
always a complex, contradictory, structuring and structured body, versus the 
view from above, from nowhere, from simplicity.547 
Haraway’s valorization of the self-conscious partial view challenges us not just to 
acknowledge but to embrace the limitations of scholarly knowledge. Such a self- 
conscious positionality, in which we observe the colonial past from our postcolonial 
position (while still embroiled in the neocolonial politics of our own historical 
standpoint), will help us to “translate” (to use Jane Haggis’s term) colonial archives 
while working to avoid recreating colonial power structures.548 We must admit that 
the histories we write are, like the colonial archive itself, fictions. In the Penrice- 
Davis-“Indyan” case, any attempt to recreate the story must be tentative and 
hypothetical. Nevertheless, the very opacity of the record tells us a story about the 
past -  the ways that colonized knowledges were silenced, and the ways that 
individual agency was elided by the colonial state. This act of “translating” the 
colonial record into post-colonial meaning requires refusing the same position of 
power that the court itself claimed.
546 Donna Haraway, “Situated K nowledges: The Science Question in Fem inism  and the Privilege o f  
Partial Perspective,” in F em inist Theory R eader: L ocal an d  G loba l P erspectives, 2nd ed„ ed. Carole R. 
McCann and Seung-K yung Kim (NY: Routledge, 2010), 370-81.
547 Donna Haraway, “Situated K now ledges,” 376. Linda A lco ff presents a similar v iew , arguing for 
the need to see the gendered subject as both “nonessentialized and em ergent from a historical 
experience.” Linda A lcoff, “Cultural Fem inism  versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in 
Fem inist Theory,” in The Second Wave, ed. Linda N icholson  (NY: R outledge, 1997), 348-9.
548 H aggis, “W hite W om en and C olonialism ,” 175-77.
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I have discussed the “Indyan’s” knowledge and how the court erased it; I have 
also inquired how my own view of the court’s knowledge constructs my 
understanding of this moment in the colonial past. This brings me to the third 
question regarding this history of reproductive knowledge: how is knowledge defined 
in this study? Ultimately, knowledge about reproduction in the Penrice-Davis- 
“Indyan” case was about the contours of reproductive control -  abortion, pregnancy 
care, medicine, and magic. My goal here is to define knowledge broadly, to include 
how knowledge about reproduction was learned from sources both oral and written, 
and through education both formal and experienced in everyday life. This must be 
the case, as the period in question -  the seventeenth through the eighteenth centuries 
in both Europe and the American colonies -  witnessed profound shifts in what 
constituted legitimate knowledge about reproduction, specifically about childbirth 
practices. Women’s historians and medical historians have traced in detail the ways 
that women’s knowledge about midwifery, passed down orally from midwife to 
midwife and through the combined experience of witnessing birth upon birth, gave 
way to medical men’s knowledge about medicine and anatomy, transmitted through 
print and formal education.549 As we will see, this debate played out in eighteenth- 
century Virginia, as well. Therefore, my approach to knowledge here must 
encompass both the knowledges of midwives and of doctors. Further, my approach 
must acknowledge the ways that women who were never named as midwives -  
including Native women and enslaved and free women of African descent as well as
549 On shifting bodies o f  know ledge in the history o f  the transition from m idwivery to m an-m idwifery, 
see: C ody, ‘T h e  Politics o f  Reproduction,” 477-495; Donegan, Women an d  M en M idw ives; Duden, 
“The Fetus on the ‘Farther Shore’”, 13-25; Ehrenreich and English, Witches, M idw ives an d  Nurses', 
Hanson, A C ultural H istory o f  P regnancy, Jordanova, “Interrogating the Concept o f  Reproduction,” 
369-386; Leavitt, B rought to Bed', Scholten, C hildbearing in A m erican Society , W ertz and Wertz, 
Lying-In; W ilson, The M aking o f  M an-M idw ifery.
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English women -  had access to the kinds of orally-transmitted, experiential 
knowledge held and shared by midwives.
I am also concerned with uncovering knowledge about reproduction on a 
much broader, deeper, epistemological level. Michel Foucault defined the episteme 
as:
...the strategic apparatus which permits a separating out from among all the 
statements which are possible those that will be acceptable within, I won’t say 
a scientific theory, but a field of scientificity, and which it is possible to say 
are true or false. The episteme is the ‘apparatus’ which makes possible the 
separation, not of the true from the false, but of what may from what may not 
be characterized as scientific.550 
This definition of the episteme mirrors, in some ways, the separation of knowledge 
described in the debates between midwives and physicians. Physicians’ knowledge 
was defined as scientific, and it defined itself against the non-scientific knowledge of 
midwives. But Foucault is getting at something else here: for him, the episteme is 
not just the separation of knowledge into categories, but the very ability to draw 
categories at all. In this way, the episteme can be understood as that which is known, 
if not necessarily questioned or proven -  the fundamental, invisible assumptions that 
organize all knowledge into what is true and what is false.
When considered as episteme, knowledge is fundamentally related to power: 
the power to distinguish that which is true from that which is false, the power to 
determine that which is known versus that which is unknowable. Emma Perez,
550 M ichel Foucault, P ow er/K n ow ledge: S elec ted  In terview s an d  O ther W ritings, 1972-1977 , ed. Colin  
Gordon (N Y: Pantheon B ooks, 1977), 197.
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whose work is rooted in Foucault’s methodologies, makes this clear: “The politics of 
meaning, then, becomes the aim of a history that interrogates the construction of 
knowledges accepted and condoned in society, thus granting power to those who 
make knowledge.”551 Following Perez and Foucault, I am utilizing a different 
framework than scientific vs. unscientific to understand historical epistemes. Instead, 
I am interested in the ways that knowledge was sorted into what might be termed the 
“knowable” and the “unknowable.” The boundary between the knowable and the 
unknowable was often defined via power relations, including gender and race. As we 
saw with Anne Owle’s marital separation agreement, the court simply defined 
women’s reproductive knowledge as unknowable -  they deferred to women’s 
knowledge because such knowledge could not be translated into the court’s episteme. 
In the Penrice-Davis case, the “Indyan’s” knowledge of reproduction and abortion 
was also unknowable and unrecordable by the court. Our knowledge of the past is 
limited by what past recorders understood as possible to be understood.
The fourth and final question about the history of reproductive knowledge that 
I work to answer here is this: what were the precise contours of the relationship 
between colonialism and knowledge? The framing of knowledge as episteme 
emphasizes the ways that knowledge was and is always embroiled in power relations, 
whether gendered, raced, or colonial. The history of colonialism was and is a history 
of changing relationships of knowledge and power. Ania Loomba argues for the 
interdependent relationship between colonialism and knowledge: “Colonialism 
reshaped structures of human knowledge. No branch of learning was left untouched
551 Perez, The D eco lon ia l Im aginary, xvi.
212
by the colonial experience.”552 This is important to our exploration of reproductive 
knowledges, as it begins to reveal one of the connections between the midwifery-to- 
medicine shift and the history of colonialism, one which will be discussed further in 
this chapter. Loomba points out the ways that colonialism’s urge to “discover” -  
whether new lands, new peoples, or new ideas -  was part of the creation of the 
Western mind (the very objective mind that Haraway rejects): “The central figure of 
Western humanist and Enlightenment discourses, the human, knowing subject, now 
stands revealed as a white male colonialist.”553 In the Penrice-Davis case, the 
colonial court did not just refuse to record the reproductive knowledge of the 
“Indyan”: it punished Robert Penrice for the temerity of crossing colonial knowledge 
boundaries.
When knowledge is defined in this way -  as episteme, as the framework of 
knowable vs. unknowable -  we can see the ways that knowledge was embroiled in 
the exercise and distribution of power, especially colonial power. Spivak argues that 
colonialism created and required “the complete overhaul of the episteme.”554 In other 
words, colonialism was defined by the power of the colonialist to remake, erase, and 
silence colonized knowledges. Spivak’s primary concern is the ways that colonialism 
was a process of epistemic violence against the colonized subaltern. That said, 
embedded in her analysis is the understanding that colonialism also transformed the 
episteme of the colonizer, for whom colonialism amounted to what she, drawing on 
Heidigger, called “the worlding of the world.”555 Therefore, Loomba and Spivak
552 Ania Loomba, C olon ialism /P ostcolon ialism  (NY: R outledge, 1998), 57.
553 Loomba, C olon ialism /P ostcolon ialism , 65.
554 Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 76.
555 Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 82.
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together understand colonialism as a knowledge project, and knowledge itself as a 
colonial project.
The transformation of colonial epistemes took place in the intimate zones 
inhabited by both colonizer and colonized. Ann Laura Stoller discusses what she 
calls “the intimacy of empire”: the ways that colonialism was enacted not just in the 
public arenas of conquering and law, but in the most private, intimate of spaces.556 
For Michel Foucault, the “the will to knowledge” about sex was the transformation of 
sex from experience, pleasure, and desire into discourse through the forced intimacy 
of the confession.557 Stoler draws on Michel Foucault’s critique of the multiple 
spaces where confessions demand the transformation of sex into discourse: the ritual 
of confession, which originated in the church, spread to “a whole series of 
relationships,” all defined by the intimacy between those who confess and those who 
hear the confession.558 The kitchen, the bedroom, and the nursery are all spaces, for 
Stoler, where the intimate relationships of colonial power (mistress and maid, 
colonizer and concubine, infant and nurse) were enacted. Drawing on Foucault, 
Stoler argues that these intimate relationships were especially “dense transfer point” 
for the exchange and creation of power.559
I posit that because reproduction involved people’s most intimate relations, it 
becomes an especially potent space to understand the intersections between 
knowledge, power, and colonialism. Therefore, we can add the birthing room to the 
bedroom, kitchen, and nursery as a potent site for the transfer of colonial knowledges.
556 Stoler, ‘T en se  and Tender T ies,” 23.
557 Foucault, H istory o f  Sexuality, 12-13.
558 Foucault, H istory o f  Sexuality, 61-3.
559 Stoler, “Tense and Tender T ies,” 24.
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The reproductive knowledge of Anne Owle and her midwives, of Robert Penrice,
Mrs. Davis and the “Indyan,” was all made, transformed, and communicated in 
private, intimate spaces. Because these intimate spaces became spaces for the 
enacting of colonial power relations, they blurred the boundary between public and 
private, we have a record (however elliptical) of the transactions that happened there. 
The knowledge transactions of colonial spaces created both discourses of sex (and 
reproduction) and discourses of colonialism itself.
My project in this chapter is to attempt to reconstruct the contours and 
boundaries of reproductive knowledge in colonial Virginia, while being attentive to 
the limitations of my ability to do so. The theoretical questions I’ve outlined above 
help to explain the character of my argument herein. The archive upon which I draw 
is limited and fragmentary; therefore, my own knowledge and the conclusions I draw 
must be partial and impressionistic. Surely, the colonial archive reflects the interests 
of colonizers, but even so, the development and creation of that archive was part of 
the process of creating colonial and colonized subjectivities and therefore is neither 
hegemonic nor totalizing. Knowledge and power were co-defined, but neither 
knowledge nor power hierarchies were absolute or concrete in this space and time. 
What I try to uncover here is the colonial reproductive episteme -  the deeply held, 
often unquestioned, assumptions about childbearing and its meanings that colored not 
just childbirth experiences but people’s understanding of the world in which they 
lived. Colonialism shook the foundations of people’s reproductive epistemes as they 
participated in the creation of new hierarchies, new relationships, and new intimacies.
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This transforming and unstable relationship between colonialism, reproduction, and
knowledge is the focus of this chapter.
* * *
In the biblical creation story, after banishing Adam and Eve from Eden for 
eating from the tree of knowledge, God punished Eve and all women thereafter:
“Unto the woman he said, I will greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy conception, in 
sorrow thou shalt bring forth children.”560 Eve’s curse, that biblical stricture that 
seemed to doom women to frequent and painful childbirth, formed the basic 
understanding of women’s reproductive lives in the British American colonies. The 
myth seemed to reflect reality. In Virginia during the eighteenth century, white 
women gave birth to an average of ten or eleven children during their lives, and 
enslaved black women’s fertility rate increased throughout the century to an average 
of nine children.561 For these women, repeated pregnancies, childbirths, and nursing 
defined their adult lives. Understanding how this experience shaped their 
understanding of their lives and of reproduction itself requires seeing childbearing not 
just as the experience of childbirth but as a fundamental organizing principle of 
everyday life -  reproduction as episteme.
Women’s knowledge, especially in the ways that they interpreted their own 
bodily experiences, is difficult, but not impossible, to ascertain. Women’s voices are 
remarkably and frustratingly silent in the Virginia archive. Therefore, lacking sources 
written in women’s own hand, we must read the existing archive against the grain to
560 G enesis 3:16 (K ing James Version).
561 Kulikoff, Tobacco an d  Slaves, 57, 72. Increasing black fertility over the century indicates the shift 
from an immigrant African slave labor force to an American-born slave labor force. For a variety o f  
reasons, not least the physical, mental, and em otional stress o f  the M iddle Passage, immigrant enslaved  
African w om en had a much lower fertility rate than native-born enslaved wom en.
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find women’s knowledge. If we reframe knowledge to include that which is 
knowable -  in other words, as Foucauldian episteme -  we can begin to ask how 
women’s reproductive experiences would have constructed their understanding of the 
world. As Foucault argued, episteme is the knowledge we hold but do not question, 
and therefore this is knowledge that often goes unspoken. Therefore, we cannot 
recreate this episteme in its entirety, but we can trace the outlines where this episteme 
erupted into text and speech. Therefore, a reconstruction of early Virginian 
reproductive episteme requires an examination about the deepest assumptions about 
reproduction, as well as the ways those deep assumptions steered people’s choices 
and colored their interpretations of their lives.
My analysis of the reproductive episteme of early Virginia is based on the 
ephemeral moments when deeply held beliefs about reproduction were articulated. 
First, I try to understand the ways that women themselves understood childbearing as 
a specific process that impacted their lives. I use evidence both of women’s 
description of the reproductive process and of women’s experiences of repeated 
pregnancies. For women, reproduction was a central node of meaning in their lives -  
while much of this meaning is lost, there is some evidence that reveals what 
reproduction meant to women. Next, for all immigrant Virginians, birth and death 
were inherently linked in the colony, especially in a disease environment that pushed 
mortality to extraordinarily high levels. An examination of the discursive linking of 
birth and death shows some of the ways that people made sense of the dangers of 
childbearing. Finally, for men and the state, reproduction was both a challenge and 
an affirmation of patriarchal power: efforts to assert control over reproduction (or at
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least over the impact of reproduction) show the beginnings of the ways that Virginia’s 
patriarchy sought to colonize reproduction. I examine the language of wills to try to 
decode the ways that men tried to make sense of the unpredictability of reproduction. 
Well into the eighteenth century, women controlled knowledge about childbearing; 
nevertheless, ideas about reproduction were still central to patriarchal and colonial 
concerns about the organization of property and power.
In English society in early Virginia, all adult women could be expected to 
have some knowledge about childbearing, women’s reproductive cycle, and fetal 
development. This knowledge was rarely articulated because it was so deeply rooted 
in everyday life and bodily experience. An example of one York County servant 
woman’s pregnancy illustrates this. When Elizabeth Knight was accused of 
fornication in 1659, several witnesses testified to her familiarity with Nicholas 
Taylor. Elizabeth confessed the liaison, saying that Nicholas “did oftentimes solicite 
her to be naught of her body with him,” and that eventually, “his Importunity 
prevailing at last to the getting of hir consent.”562 After meeting several times, the 
couple had sex “by ye spring where ordinarily we fetch water,” and that “at which 
time she conceived by him.”563 Beyond these testimonies, the proof of the 
relationship lay in the fact that Elizabeth was pregnant at the time of her trial.564
562 York D O W  3: 65, 6 7 (1 6 5 9 ) .
563 Ibid.
564 Ibid. Bastardy and fornication charges rarely com m enced w hile the wom an was still pregnant; 
instead, as was discussed in Chapter 2, the court brought charges after the w om an’s lying-in. In York 
County, there are only nine colonial-era cases o f  wom en being charged with fornication w hile they 
were pregnant. S ix  o f  those cases (including the case o f  Elizabeth Knight) are clustered in the years 
1655-1662, indicating a localized  shift in enforcem ent priorities during those years. See, for exam ple, 
the fornication case o f  Rachel Hammon, York D OW  3: 36, 39 (1658).
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Asked to confirm her pregnancy, Elizabeth stated that “ye fruit that taken life this 
fortnight,” and that she “felt it to stirre so long but faintly.”565
When called upon to judge Knight, the court was remarkably lenient in its 
decision: Nicholas Taylor was to pay Elizabeth’s master, Charles Dunne, a small fine 
of 200 pounds of tobacco, and there is no record of Elizabeth being punished at all. 
There are several reasons for the court’s leniency in this case. First, there was no 
child yet bom for the parish to support. Further, as was discussed in Chapter 2, 
because she was relatively early in her pregnancy, Elizabeth had not yet disrupted her 
master’s household with her lying-in. Finally, it is possible that the court believed 
that Nicholas Taylor, a free man, would marry Elizabeth Knight and the child would 
not be bom a bastard.
The 22-year-old Elizabeth Knight’s familiarity with the language of 
conception and quickening points to the ways that even young, single, servant women 
were well aware of the reproductive knowledge held by women. First, Elizabeth’s 
claim that she could pinpoint conception seems to suggest her familiarity with the 
popular medical theory that Thomas Laqueur has called the one-sex model.566 
Laqueur argues that, in the early modem understanding of human reproduction, male 
and female bodies were understood to be homologues of each other: both men and 
women produced “seed” during orgasm, and both needed to orgasm in order for 
conception to occur. In Elizabeth Knight’s testimony, she is able to pinpoint the date
565 York D OW  3: 65, 67.
566 Laqueur, M aking Sex, 63-113; Laqueur, “Orgasm, Generation, and the Politics o f  Reproductive 
B io logy ,” 1-41. This one-sex model had the effect o f  making it im possible for pregnant w om en to 
convince the court that they were raped. See, for exam ple, the case o f  Anne C ollins. York D O W  3: 
144, 148, 161, 167, 169.
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that she “conceived by” Nicholas Taylor.567 If Elizabeth Knight was in fact referring 
to the one-sex model, she was able to identify that day as the date o f conception 
because of the pleasure she felt during intercourse with Taylor. For Elizabeth 
Knight, as well as the court that recorded her testimony, knowledge about 
reproduction was rooted in Knight’s own bodily experience.
Elizabeth Knight’s use of the language of quickening -  “the fruit hath taken 
life” -  also indicates the ways that popular knowledge about pregnancy and fetal 
development was rooted in bodily experience. In the early modem mind, pregnancy 
was considered to be a “period of uncertainty,” in the words of historian Barbara 
Duden:
A woman was truly pregnant when she had felt the ‘quickening’ of her child. 
With its movements, the unborn announced itself as a child. Before 
quickening, a woman whose menses did not come was in an ambiguous 
situation; maybe she was ‘with child,’ maybe not. Perhaps the cessation of 
her ‘monthly’ was due to some blockage, some ‘retention of the menses.’568 
Elizabeth Knight may have believed she experienced “a conception” when she and 
Nicholas Taylor met by the spring; that belief was confirmed when she felt the first 
movements of her fetus. Again, it was bodily experience that formed the basis for 
women’s knowledge about reproduction.
Women’s bodily experience defined their knowledge about reproduction; this 
was knowledge that made sense not only of pregnancy but of women’s adult roles and 
the narrative of their lives themselves. Marriage during the early modem period was
567 York DOW  3: 65 , 67.
568 Duden, “The Fetus on the ‘Farther Shore’,” 16.
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a rite of passage that marked one’s entrance into adult roles, including childbearing.
In some ways, for women, this entrance into adulthood was a biological experience: 
legitimate marriage and childbearing were codefined for women during this period. 
Roy Porter argues that early modem marriage was understood as inherently 
reproductive: during this period, marriage was “the rite of passage that translate[d] 
the biological potential for reproduction into social and moral actuality.”569 Susan 
Klepp points out the ways this conflation of adulthood with reproductivity intersected 
with discourses of feminity. She argues, “pregnancy was the natural condition of
MA
married women...; barrenness was unnatural.” One place we see this conflation of 
marriage, adulthood, and reproduction is in the language of wills. Wills frequently 
stipulated that children would inherit property upon their own marriage -  the 
implication was that the marriage guaranteed future heirs for that property.571 
Nicholas Harrison’s will declared that his mother should inherit his property “if he 
should dye a Singleman,” thereby conflating marriage with the production of heirs.
This sense that adulthood, sexuality, and childbearing were codefined was 
present in Native American and African societies as well. The Powhatan Indians’ 
polygynous marriage structure and matrilineal social organization befuddled English 
observers, who did not bother to record much about that society, but it seems clear 
that motherhood was central to women’s adult roles in the Powhatan community.573 
Indian women had remarkable sexual freedom, especially compared to English
569 R oy Porter, “ ‘The Secrets o f  Generation D isp lay’d ’: A ris to tle ’s M aster-p iece  in Eighteenth-Century 
England,” E ighteenth-C entury Life 9, no. 3 (M ay 1985): 5. On the social im plications and 
enforcem ent o f  this belief, see Norton, “Communal D efinitions o f  Gendered Identity,” 40 -66 .
570 Klepp, “Revolutionary B od ies,” 920.
571 York D O W  2: 366-7  (1648); York D OW  2: 406  (1648).
572 York D O W  1: 1 7 5 (1652 ).
573 Helen Rountree, The Pow hatan Indians o f  Virginia: Their T raditional C ulture (Norman: U niversity  
o f  Oklahoma Press, 1988), 89.
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women. In the early eighteenth century, Robert Beverley observed that Powhatan 
“maidens are entirely at their own disposal, and may manage their persons as they 
think fit.”574 This sense of autonomy undoubtedly inflected Native women’s sense of 
their reproductive role. Evidence from early modem African societies shows the 
centrality of reproduction to adult status and to the community’s ritual life. Jennifer 
Morgan emphasizes the importance of coming-of-age rituals such as circumcision 
(for both boys and girls) in western African societies.575 Further, rituals meant to 
ensure the fertility of marriages show the importance of fertility in understanding 
adult women’s roles in western Africa.576 The survival, erasure, and transformation 
of these rituals through the Middle Passage suggest the ways that colonialism and 
slavery transformed not just women’s lives but their understanding of those lives in 
the cosmos.
Early Virginian women’s experience of childbearing defined their lives in 
ways that are hard to comprehend from our post-birth-control vantage point. If 
marriage and reproduction were conflated during this period, lack of effective birth 
control meant that for fertile married women, pregnancy and childbirth were nearly 
constant experiences. Judith Walzer Leavitt, examining the childbearing patterns of 
middle class and elite New England women in the eighteenth century, has posited 
that, because of repeated pregnancies occurring approximately every 2-3 years, 
women spent up to a third of their adult lives pregnant.577 Paula Treckel shows that 
Southern white women’s birth interval was far more unpredictable than New England
574 Robert B everley, The H istory an d  P resen t S ta te o f  V irg in ia ... By a native an d  inhabitant o f  the 
p la ce  (London: printed for R. Parker, 1705), Eighteenth Century C ollections Online Print Edition, 3: 8- 
9.
575 Morgan, L aboring Women, 65.
576 Ibid.
577 Leavitt, B rought to B ed, 14-20.
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women’s during the colonial period: the south’s disease environment, pattern of later 
marriage, and race and status hierarchy meant that women’s experiences are hard to 
generalize.578 York County’s birth and baptism records from Charles Parish seem to 
suggest a 2-year birth interval.579 For example, Sarah Hawkins’ five children were 
bom 18-24 months apart: Thomas was bom in June 1725, Martha in February 1727, 
Pinkethman in February 1729, William in March 1731, and Rebecca in May 1732.580
Scholars have argued that the two-year birth interval is evidence of women’s 
agency: women used extended nursing to limit their pregnancies, which would 
happen far more frequently in the absence of breastfeeding. Jennifer Morgan argues 
that African women also intentionally used breastfeeding as a form of birth control; 
the practice had the advantage, in the colonies, of bonding women with their children 
and providing support to nutritionally vulnerable babies.581 Examining white 
women’s birth histories, Paula Treckel asserts that the 18-24 month birth interval is 
not accidental or “natural.” 582 Instead, Treckel argues, this birth interval was a result 
of white women’s concerted use of breastfeeding to delay conception. The planter- 
patriarch Landon Carter was well aware of women’s use of breastfeeding to limit 
their fertility when he chided his daughter-in-law, Winifred Carter, for continuing to 
nurse her baby, even when Winifred was herself sick in 1770:
578 Treckel, “Breastfeeding and Maternal Sexuality,” 45-8 .
579 T hese conclusions are im pressions; I have not embarked upon a full statistical analysis o f  the 
Charles Parish birth records.
58° | qq.  | Recorcls for other w om en point to a similar pattern. See, for exam ple, Elizabeth
Hayward, CPR 102-4.
581 Morgan, Laboring W omen , 66.
582 Treckel, “Breastfeeding and Maternal Sexuality,” 42-6 . For a discussion o f  pregnancy limitation in 
Virginia after the Revolution, see L ew is and Lockridge, “Sally  Has Been Sick,” 5-20. Susan Klepp 
argues that w om en’s active limitation o f  their fertility w as an offshoot o f  Revolutionary politics: 
Klepp, “Revolutionary B od ies,” 910-45.
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Mrs Carter taken ill yesterday and was to be seen so before, though she would 
not own it. And the poor little baby Fanny is every time to share her Mama’s 
disorder by sucking her, and this because she should not breed too fast. Poor 
children! Are you to be sacrificed for a parent’s pleasure? I have been a 
Parent and I thought it murder and therefore hired nurses or put them out. 
Winifred Carter had suffered several painful and debilitating miscarriages at this 
point; her wish to limit her fertility may have had as much to do with protecting her 
own health as pursuing pleasure. (Carter’s reference to hiring wetnurses will be 
discussed more fully later on in this chapter.)
Interestingly, women who were accused of bastardy more than once seem to 
follow this pattern of a 2-year birth interval as well: repeat bastardy charges often 
occurred about two years apart. Some of these repeat offenders were, as was 
discussed in Chapter 2, mixed-race women or women involved in long-term 
interracial relationships which were not recognized as marriages. Therefore, for 
women such as Joanna Inscow and Mary Catilla, it makes sense that their births 
would follow the pattern of married women, and occur roughly two to three years 
apart.584 For servant women like Elizabeth Dutchfield, the 2-year window between 
her bastardy charges points to the possibility that servant women may have nursed 
their babies for at least a year.585 Whether intentionally or unintentionally, this 
practice provided some contraceptive effects.
583 Greene, ed., The D iary  o f  C olonel London C arter, 511.
584 Mary C atilla’s births were recorded in 1694, 1697, 1701, 1703, and 1710. Joanna Inscow ’s births 
were recorded in 1733, 1736, and 1738.
585 York JO 1: 141, 145, 157, 365. W hen O live Eaton, an A ccom ac County servant wom an, was 
charged with bearing a bastard child in 1638, she was ordered to keep and nurse her child “until 
w eanable.” Susie M. A m es, ed., County C ourt R ecords o f  A ccom ack-N ortham pton, V irginia: 1632- 
1640  (W ashington, DC: The American Historical A ssociation, 1954), 129-30. (Hereafter cited as
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Enslaved women’s birth interval is hard to ascertain, given the lack of reliable 
documentation, but it seems to reflect a 2-year birth interval as well. The parishes 
were not required to record the births and deaths of enslaved people, and therefore the 
records are spotty.586 Sometimes, in wills, inventories, and probate suits, enslaved 
women were listed with children, along with their ages. In the 1713 record of the 
division of the estate of John Kendall, an enslaved woman, Bety, is listed along with 
her children: Bety (age 11), Johnny (age 6), Dick (age 4), Kate (age 2 V2), and Frank 
(age 7 months).587 The ages of the youngest three children indicate that Bety’s births 
occurred roughly 2 years apart. But, the gap between 6-year-old Johnny and 11-year- 
old Bety indicates that we must not overestimate women’s agency in determining 
their birth interval. That gap could indicate a number of possibilities: intentional birth 
spacing, loss of a partner, miscarriage, stillbirth, infant death, death in early 
childhood, or sale of a child.
The life of Bety points to an important caveat: because birth records include 
only live births, they do not provide documentation of miscarriages or stillbirths. 
Incorporating pregnancy loss into our understanding of birth intervals helps us to 
understand the extent to which pregnancy dominated women’s adult lives. For 
enslaved women like Bety, we are left with only questions about the gap between her 
two eldest children. For other women, more evidence is available, and we can begin 
to understand the impact of pregnancy loss on women’s reproductive lives.
A m es, A ccom ac  1, follow ed by the page number.) Som e other cases o f  servant w om en having 2-year 
gaps between bastardy charges include Margaret Clark, Mary Clay, and Sarah Paskins. York D O W  15: 
124, 137, 523; York D O W  8: 312; York D OW  5: 44 , 56, 91.
586 Charles Parish kept no record o f  enslaved people’s births. Bruton Parish kept scattered records o f  
enslaved peop le’s births and baptisms, but not enough identifying information is included in those 
records to establish birth intervals for enslaved wom en. See: John V ogt, ed., Bruton Parish  R egister  
(Athens, GA: N ew  Papyrus Publishing, 2004).
587 York DOW  14: 309.
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The records of the life of Lucy Parke Byrd provide an opportunity for such an 
analysis. Lucy Parke married William Byrd II in 1706, when she was eighteen years 
old. Over the course of their 10-year marriage (Lucy died of smallpox in 1716), Lucy 
had four live births: Evelyn was bom in July 1707, Parke was bom in 1709, Phillips 
William was bom in 1713, and Wilhemina was bom in 1715. Both Parke and Phillips 
William died before they were a year old. If we count Lucy’s four completed 
pregnancies, she had a long, but not unusual birth interval -  average of 33 months 
between pregnancies.
Nevertheless, William Byrd II’s diary for the period from 1709 to 1712 gives 
us a remarkably detailed picture of Lucy’s reproductive experience -  one that belies 
this 36-month birth interval. In the diary, Byrd habitually noted the state of his own 
health, as well as that of his wife. From the diary, we can get a remarkably clear 
sense of the timeframe of Lucy Byrd’s pregnancies, often pinpointing the date of 
conception with reasonable accuracy. During the period of the diary, Lucy was 
pregnant four times, but only two of these pregnancies culminated in a live birth. The 
first resulted in the birth of her son, Parke. The second ended in an early miscarriage, 
probably in the fifth or sixth week of pregnancy. The third pregnancy also ended in 
miscarriage, sometime between the third and seventh months of pregnancy. Finally, 
the fourth pregnancy ended with the birth of Phillips William, several months after 
the end of the diary.
Lucy’s experiences of repeated pregnancies, miscarriages, and infant death 
force us to rethink the extent to which women could control their fertility, and the 
impact that this lack of control had on their understanding of their lives. It is unlikely
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that Lucy Byrd breastfed her children (there is no mention of nursing in the diary); 
therefore, she did not experience the contraceptive effect of the practice. All told, 
Lucy spent between 20.5 and 24.5 months pregnant during the 43-month period of the 
diary, or, between 47.7 and 57% of this period -  a far greater proportion than the 33% 
suggested by Leavitt. The meanings of this disparity become clearer if, rather than 
calculating Lucy’s birth interval, we calculate her conception interval. In other 
words, by considering the interval between pregnancies, rather than births, we can see 
that Lucy Byrd was pregnant roughly once every 13-14 months during the period of
the diary. 588
588 During the period o f  the diary (c. 1709-1712), Lucy Byrd’s conception interval was about 13.6  
months. This chart attempts to reconstruct L ucy’s Byrd’s conception interval. This calculation does 
not include the interval betw een the births o f  Phillips W illiam  and W ilhelm ina, because w e don’t know  
whether Lucy experienced miscarriages or stillbirths during that time. A ll citations are from L ouis B. 
W right and Marion T inling, eds. The S ecre t D iary  o f  W illiam  B yrd  o fW esto ver , 1709-1712  
(R ichm ond, VA: The D ietz Press, 1941).
Timeline of Pregnancies Date
Interval between 
conceptions (in 
months)
Citation (shaded 
areas are in the 
period included in 
the diary)
A; Estimated conception date c. 1/1709 N /A
A: Birth o f  Parke Byrd 9/5 /1709
B: First mention o f  sex follow ing  
birth o f  Parke (first possible  
conception date)__________________
1/1/1710 12 months
B: M iscarriage 2 /13 /1710
C : Estimated conception date c. 11/1710  
2/1711
10-13 months
C : First m ention o f  pregnancy 
m entioned in diary____________
3/3/1711
C : M iscarriage 6/25/1711
D: Estimated conception date c. 5 /1712 15-18 months
D: Birth o f  Phillips W illiam 2/23/1713
E: Estimated conception date c. 2 /1714 21 months Note: it is possible  
that Lucy 
experienced  
another
miscarriage during 
this longer 
interval.
E: Birth o f  W ilhelm ina 11/6/1715
Death o f  Lucy Parke Byrd 1716
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The idea that Lucy spent over half of her marriage pregnant, while only two of 
her children survived past one year of age, helps us to think about the emotional 
intensity, physical debilitation, and consciousness of the nearness of death that must 
have accompanied women’s reproductive lives. In February of 1710, Lucy 
experienced an early-term miscarriage. Just four months later, her nine-month-old 
son, Parke, died suddenly. For William Byrd, Parke’s death could be explained by a 
sort of theological fatalism: Byrd marked the death in his diary by intoning, “God 
gives and God takes away; blessed be the name of God.”589 For Lucy, the emotional 
toil of repeated pregnancies, miscarriages, and infant death were not so easy to bear. 
Byrd compared his wife’s emotional state to his own: “My wife was much afflicted 
but I submitted to His judgment better, notwithstanding I was very sensible of my 
loss, but God’s will be done.”590 Late that fall, Lucy became pregnant again. This 
pregnancy was marked by fears of miscarriage and mourning for her lost son. In 
February, she “was melancholy of her misfortunes and wished herself a freak.”591 
This pregnancy, too, would end in miscarriage.
Based on this analysis of Lucy Parke Byrd’s reproductive life, we can find 
new insight in the gaps between births, not just for Lucy Byrd but for other women as 
well. For example, seven of Abigail Lamb’s births are recorded in the Charles Parish 
Records: Sarah in September 1713, John in June 1717, William in March 1722, Ann 
in October 1724, Elizabeth in February 1726, Hannah in July 1729, and Elizabeth in
589 W right and Tinling, The Secret D iary  o f  W illiam  B yrd , 186.
590 W right and Tinling, The Secret D iary  o f  W illiam  B yrd, 187.
591 W right and Tinling, The Secret D iary  o f  W illiam B yrd, 301.
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December 1735. This averages to approximately 38 months between births. Such 
an average, though, erases the fact that Abigail Lamb experienced long gaps between 
some births and short gaps between others. These gaps might be explained in a 
number of ways, including separation from her husband, illness, malnutrition, active 
use of sexual abstinence or other methods of pregnancy limitation, or stillbirths and 
miscarriages. It is important to temper our interpretation of these gaps: they may 
indicate not women’s agency, but instead the intensity with which their lives were 
dictated by their reproductive role.
What did this cyclical rhythm of pregnancy, birth, and nursing mean to 
women? How did early Virginians’ experience of reproduction impact their 
understanding of the world? In age determination cases, the court called upon 
mothers, midwives and friends to remember births that had happened long ago. In 
1675, Mary Avery was called in by the York County court to testify to the age of 
Joane Morley, an orphan who was petitioning the court for access to her 
inheritance.594 Mary Avery’s process of recollection reveals much about women’s 
community values in York County in the seventeenth century. Mary Avery recalled 
attending the lying-in of another woman, Mrs. Heyward, in the year 1654. Mary 
Avery was “with child of her son William” at the time, and her friend Mary Morley
592 CPR 123-4.
593 The court needed to determine ages for a number o f  reasons, including determ ining when an heir 
was able to inherit, when an indentured orphan or bastard was rightfully freed, and, m ost com m only, 
when masters were required to pay taxes on slave labor, as enslaved children were not taxable. A ge 
determination cases involving enslaved children were pro forma: the court merely estim ated the 
child’s age, rather than calling in w itnesses.
594 York D OW  5: 117, 119. In the age determination case o f  Mildred M assey, the date o f  M ildred’s 
birth was corroborated by her mother, Ann Brasett: York D O W  9: 314, 328. See also York D OW  5: 
92; York D O W  9: 318, 352; York D OW  14: 70.
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was “with child of her daughter Joan.”595 The two women commiserated, wondering 
who would deliver first. Twenty years later, Mary Avery remembered clearly that 
she had given birth to her son in July of 1654, and that Mary Morley “was brought to 
bed before her.”596 Mary Avery’s memories were both bodily and communal: she 
remembered her life, and her friends’ lives, by recalling the birth of her children. 
Mary Avery’s memories show us the ways that women reckoned time by their 
personal cycle of pregnancies and births, marking the passage of years by 
remembering their own bodily experiences as well as those of their friends.
Even with a dearth of records written by women, there are moments in the 
archive where we get some sense of how mothers and fathers imagined their 
relationship with their children. In 1667, in preparation for marriage to her second 
husband, James Moore, the widow Anne Creighton drafted a will so that she could 
guarantee that her son, Thomas, would be protected after her death.597 For Anne, 
even the idea of leaving her son an orphan filled her with great sadness: she directed 
that her entire estate be willed to “my poore fatherlesse & motherless Child Thomas 
Chreighton.”598 Fathers, too, showed affection not only for their children but for 
those children’s mother. John Overstreet, husband to midwife Sarah Overstreet, 
dictated his will as he lay dying in 1671. When John asserted that his entire estate be 
willed to his wife, Sarah jumped in, “asking him whether hee would give anything to 
his children.”599 Counter to the patriarchal notion that children were the chattel of 
their fathers, John repeated his desire that Sarah have possession over the entire
595 York DOW  5 :1 1 9 .
Ibid.596
597 York DOW  4: 143.
598 Ibid.
599 York D O W  4: 363.
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estate: “Noe. . he said, “they were her children as well as his.”600 We see here two 
trajectories of affection: first, John’s implicit trust in his wife’s financial judgment, 
and second, his belief that her role as the children’s mother was in some way 
equivalent in meaning to his.
These glimpses into peoples’ intimate emotional lives are vanishingly rare in 
the colonial Virginia archive. Yet the provenance of these examples -  both ultimately 
rooted in the fates of orphaned children -  points to another key experience that would 
be central to the construction of the reproductive episteme of colonial Virginians: 
parental and infant death. During this period, birth and death were inextricably linked 
in multiple ways. If women’s lives were organized by a repeated cycle of pregnancy, 
birth, and nursing, then that cycle was punctuated by death, or at least the fear of and 
planning for death. We have seen this already with the understanding that gaps in 
women’s birth intervals might point to pregnancy loss due to miscarriage or stillbirth. 
As we will see, the inherent unpredictability of reproduction -  not just in the threat of 
death but also in the human inability to predict an unknown future -  was a threat to 
patriarchal power. In other words, men’s lack of knowledge about the innumerable 
contingencies of reproduction posed a threat to their control over property and power. 
By attempting to control this unpredictability, the colonial state (embodied by 
property holders) sought to enact epistemic control over reproduction.
Reproduction is by its nature about contingencies: the outcome of 
pregnancies, the sex of children, the health and life of mother and child are all in 
question. Men’s knowledge about and ability to control these contingencies was 
always limited. Recall that pregnancy itself was defined by women’s bodily
600 Ibid.
231
experience: a woman did not consider herself to be truly pregnant until quickening, 
which, in our medical terms, occurs roughly four to five months after conception and 
implantation, or somewhere around the 16-20th week of pregnancy. Further, 
paternity was decided (at least theoretically, if not in practice) based on the mother’s 
own testimony. In other words, women’s knowledge had extraordinary power to 
define and make sense of the experience of reproduction.601 There is a deep irony 
here: patriarchal power and authority in colonial Virginia was rooted in the 
organization and distribution of property, but that patriarchal distribution of property 
was rooted in women’s knowledge about their own bodies. I will spend some time 
examining wills for two reasons: first, they are one of the most extensive archives of 
language about reproduction available for this period, and second, they show the 
ways that property-holding Virginians tried to make sense of the inevitable 
contingencies of reproduction.
Wills are an artifact of the ways that property holders tried to predict every 
possible reproductive contingency in the face of the increased mortality of Virginia’s 
colonial disease environment. Property was willed on the condition that an heir was 
produced. The birth of a new baby might inspire the drafting of a new will. For 
example, Robert Wilkenson drafted his will soon after his youngest son was bom in 
1655. The child had not been baptized yet, and therefore had not even been named: 
the baby is listed in the will only as “my Young sonn unbaptized.”602 If an heir did 
not produce their own heir, alternate paths of inheritance needed to be established:
601 This power seem s even  more potent when w e consider the w ays that modern m edicine defines both 
o f  these experiences today. Pregnancy can be determined just days after unprotected sex. Paternity is 
determ ined by a b lood test. W e can now define pregnancy and paternity w ith remarkable accuracy, but 
the locus o f  authoritative know ledge has shifted from w om en to physicians and m edical testing.
602 York D O W  1:251 (1655).
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John Heyward willed his estate to his eldest son, but “if it shall happen that my eldest 
dye without Issue,” then the estate would go to Heyward’s second son.603 In this way, 
wills were not about transferring property to individuals, but along family lines for 
multiple generations. For example, Thomas Gybson willed his estate not just to his 
son Nicholas, but “to his heirs of [Nicholas’s] body lawfully begotten forever.”604 
Should Nicholas fail to produce his own heir, Thomas’s property would be 
transferred to his daughter Cassandra, and “to her heires lawfully begotten 
forever.”605 William Barbar, a grandfather, willed much of his property to his 
grandchildren and their heirs, ensuring the life of the estate for at least four 
generations.606 By attempting to control the disposition of property not just for 
generations but “forever,” wills attempted to predict reproduction in order to combat 
the impermanence of life itself, an impermanence that was intensified in the deadly 
Virginia colony.
Wills written when women were pregnant attempted to predict all possible 
outcomes for that pregnancy. Testators needed to take into account the possibility of 
maternal and/or infant mortality. Richard Smith considered this in his own will, 
because his wife Alice was “with Childe.”607 Smith willed that his property be 
divided between Alice and the unborn child, “if she [liveth] and the Chyld live.”608 
Sons were given preference over daughters. William Hay’s 1669 will divided his
603 York DOW  3: 177. See also York D O W  4: 327; York D OW  9: 113, 157.
604 York D O W  2: 146.
605 Ibid. See the w ill o f  Thom as Ray for a similar transfer o f  property from one child to another, 
should that child fail to produce their ow n heirs. York D O W  1: 293. See also York D O W  1: 337-9; 
York D O W  3; 117.
606 York DOW  4: 254. See also York D O W  4: 327.
607 York D O W  2: 119.
608 Ibid. See also York D OW  18: 235-6  (1735); Am es, A ccom ac  1: 32 (1634); Susie M. A m es, ed., 
County C ourt R ecords o f  A ccom ack-N ortham pton, Virginia: 1640-1645  (Charlottesville: U niversity  
Press o f  V irginia), 302-4  (hereafter cited as A m es, A ccom ac  2, follow ed by the page number).
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estate equally between all of his children and his wife if his pregnant wife gave birth 
to another daughter, but if she gave birth to a son, that son would inherit half the 
estate.609 The desire for control over reproduction is clear in the 1659 will of Francis 
Hayward, in which he listed conditions for all of the following contingencies: if his 
pregnant wife gave birth to a son rather than a daughter, if that unborn son should die 
before the age of 21, if his already born son should die before the age of 21, if the 
pregnancy ended in miscarriage or stillbirth, and, finally, if it turned out that his wife 
wasn’t pregnant at all.610
These wills remind us of the ways that birth and death were inherently linked 
in the Virginia colony. Childbirth could be dangerous to both woman and child. 
Women and infants died in childbirth.611 Infants and young children were more 
vulnerable to deadly disease. When James Miller wrote his will in 1656, he carefully 
distributed his property between his sons and daughters.612 He made his wife, Mary, 
executor of the estate, instructing her to “improve the Estate to the best advantage for 
the good of my Children.”613 But, in the final lines of the will, Miller acknowledges 
that all of his plans and calculations may come to nothing: “It is my will that in 
Cause of the death of my Children that any land be shared among those that are 
Living but in case all my Children dye then I give all that I have to [my] wife.”614 
Anglo-Virginians accepted that children’s lives in the colony could be cut 
short. Planter William Fitzhugh, writing to console a relative on the recent death of 
two of his children, reveals the ways religion provided both explanation and weak
609 York D O W  4: 229.
610 York D O W  3: 62.
611 York D OW  3: 43.
6,2 York D O W  1:294 .
513 Ibid.
614 Ibid.
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comfort in cases of infant death. The loss of the children, he wrote, could be “easily 
& cheerfully bom, if natural affection be laid aside.”615 While Fitzhugh 
acknowledged the “affection” one had for one’s children, he wasn’t joking when he 
advised his relative to bear his grief “cheerfully.” The bereaved must remember that 
the children “have changed a troublesome & uncertain terrestrial being, for a certain 
& happy Celestial habitation.”616 Indeed, small children were more likely to go to 
heaven, as “their Regeneration in Baptism wash[ed] off all Original Sin, & their 
fewness of years excus[ed] them from all wilfull & obstinate sins.”617 For Fitzhugh, 
life was advantageously temporary, as our life’s sojourn would be mercifully brief: 
as he closed his letter, he congratulated his relative on the recent birth of another 
child, which Fitzhugh referred to a “new bom Guest.”618 The idea that children’s 
lives were but temporary was a sentiment that Fitzhugh repeated in describing his 
own family: “God Almighty hath been pleased to bless me with a very good wife and 
five pledges of our conjugall affection, three of which he has been pleased to call into 
the Arms of his Mercy, and lent me two, a hopefull boy and girle.”619 For Fitzhugh, 
the birth and death of children was an expression of God’s will -  his children were 
merely “lent” to him for a short time. Religion offered Anglo-Virginians a way to 
make sense of the death of the children they loved.
Particular language repeated in many property-holding Virginians’ wills 
points to yet another reproductive contingency: the ever-present question of
615 Davis, W illiam Fitzhugh an d  his C hesapeake W orld, 198.
6,6 Ibid.
617 Ibid. W illiam  Byrd II expressed a similar sense o f  obedience to G od’s w ill when his 9-m onth-old  
son, Parke, died suddenly. W right and Tinling, The Secret D iary  o f  W illiam  B yrd, 186-7.
618 Ibid. On referring to infants and children as “guests” or “strangers,” see Klepp, “Revolutionary  
B od ies,” 928-9 .
619 Davis, W illiam Fitzhugh an d  H is C hesapeake W orld, 170-1.
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paternity. Throughout their wills, property-holding Virginians refer to the “natural” 
birth of their sons and daughters. In 1660, Eleanor Wheeler stipulated that her “owne 
naturall children” would inherit her property.620 In another will, John Clark referred 
to his “natural father John Clark.”621 This discourse of the “natural” in reference to 
reproduction had two meanings, both of which were significant in the relationship 
between property and reproduction. First, the reference to “natural” children and 
“natural” parents points to the way that familial relationships were remade and 
restructured by Virginia’s high adult mortality and low life expectancy.622 Virginians 
used a language of “natural” birth to mark the difference between children and step- 
children, a crucial distinction in the determination of lines of inheritance.
This language of “natural” children and “natural” parents had a second 
meaning as well. In the early modem world, paternity could only be known socially: 
through women’s adherence to marital monogamy, or, in cases of nonmarital sex, 
through women’s naming of the father of her child during childbirth. As I argued in 
Chapter 1, Virginia’s bastardy laws and miscegenation laws were about disciplining 
white married women’s sexuality: legitimacy and illegitimacy were at the root of the 
distribution of property, the organization of labor, and the definition of race itself. 
Again and again, the York County court ruled that bastard children could not inherit 
property, even when a will expressly directed that the child should inherit.624
The threat of illegitimacy lurks in the margins of nearly every colonial 
Virginia will. In 1655 Margery Griggs and William Hay signed a marriage
620 York D OW  3: 77. See also York D OW  2: 405.
621 York D O W  3: 28.
622 Rutman and Rutman, ‘“ N ow -W ives and Sons-In-L aw ’” 153-82.
623 See also York D O W  3: 8.
624 See, for exam ple, York DOW  16: 213, 222; York DOW  16: 461; York J 0 3 : 281-2 , 287.
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agreement that guaranteed that their children from their earlier marriages would keep 
their own property.625 Throughout the document, William Hay refers to children bom 
during this new marriage as “Children of my body by Margery my own wife.”626 
What does this language reveal about assumptions about reproduction, legitimacy, 
and property? Certainly, the language of “Children of my body” shows Hay’s effort 
to distinguish between stepchildren and “natural” children. Further, it reveals the 
ways that Hay sought to assert the legitimacy of his heirs, both in the next generation 
and in future generations. The presence of a discourse of natural children points to 
the threat of children born who were not “of his body.” This language reveals the 
ways that legitimacy was understood not just socially, but bodily -  in some way, the 
process of conception and birth conferred legitimacy. Birth mattered, because it 
defined the boundaries of legitimacy, property, family, and nature.
Knowledge about reproduction -  the colonial reproductive episteme -  made 
sense of bodily experience, organized and determined people’s life narratives, and 
controlled the dispersal of property. Women’s bodily experiences, such as their 
sexual experiences and the physical sensations of pregnancy, were the root of their 
knowledge of reproduction. For women, reproduction was a material reality that 
determined their adult lives, marked always by the threat of loss and death. The 
language of reproductivity in wills shows us something different. Here, knowledge 
about reproduction was always contingent, always ephemeral. This was theoretical, 
not material, knowledge about reproduction, because the result of any pregnancy was 
fundamentally unknowable.
625 York D O W  1:265 .
626 Ibid. See also York DOW  4: 189.
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Within these complex and contradictory epistemologies of reproduction,
midwives’ practice delivered women in their time of travail. Colonial medical
practice traversed the boundary between material and theoretical knowledge. As
such, practitioners of reproductive medicine -  midwives, and, increasingly, man-
midwives and physicians -  had particular power in early Virginia.
* * *
On July 28, 1709, when Lucy Byrd was pregnant with her first child -  before 
all of those miscarriages and infant deaths -  she was visited by her midwife, “Mrs. B- 
t-s.”627 Lucy was uncomfortably pregnant -  her husband described her as 
“indisposed” -  but the birth was not imminent.628 Lucy’s husband, William Byrd II, 
pestered the midwife with questions and worried over his wife’s symptoms. Mrs. B- 
t-s calmed the anxious gentleman by teaching him her method for calculating when a 
woman might give birth: “20 weeks from the time a woman is quick when she will 
seldom fail to be brought to bed. In this reckoning there are seven days in a week.” 
Just a week later, and after several days of “pains” that seemed to William to have 
“no purpose,” Lucy’s labor finally began in earnest the night of September 4.
Several other neighbor women joined Mrs. B-t-s, and they all surrounded the laboring 
Lucy, “full of expectation.”631 William Byrd, perhaps knowing he had outstayed his
627 Wright and Tinling, The S ecre t D iary  o f  W illiam B yrd , 64, 74, 78. Byrd abbreviated many names in 
his diary; though those names have been decoded, som e o f  them, including “Mrs. B -t-s,” cannot be 
connected without question to particular individuals.
628 Wright and Tinling, The S ecre t D iary  o f  W illiam B yrd, 74.
629 Wright and Tinling, The Secret D iary  o f  W illiam B yrd, 77.
630 W right and Tinling, The S ecre t D iary  o f  W illiam B yrd, 78.
631 Wright and Tinling, The S ecre t D iary  o f  W illiam B yrd, 79.
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usefulness, went to bed at 10 o ’clock. When he woke the next morning, Mrs. B-t-s 
informed him that Lucy “was happily delivered of a son.”
What can be known about Virginia midwives like Mrs. B-t-s? There are few 
records of midwives and their practices in colonial Virginia. The diary of William 
Byrd II is the only known record of the work of Mrs. B-t-s. Further, the court records 
are often quite silent and opaque regarding the lives and work of midwives in the 
colony. In this section, I attempt to reconstruct the presence of midwives, whether 
English, Native American, or African in the Virginia colony. This reconstruction 
requires a reading of the silences in the colonial record, and a willingness, in the 
words of Ania Loomba, to “suppose a presence which at first cannot be found.” 633 
Thus, examining the reasons for midwives’ invisibility in the colonial archive might 
offer some understanding or sense of meaning about their work the ways their 
knowledge was constructed. Therefore, this section explores the relationship between 
the limitations of historical knowledge and the construction of bodies of knowledge in 
the colonial past. In this section, I will attempt to outline the knowledge that 
midwives held and the skills that they used in the context of social childbirth; I extend 
this analysis from English midwives to Native American and African midwives and 
healers.
At first glance, midwives are virtually invisible in the court records of York 
County. Of the 53 medical practitioners mentioned in the York County records 
through the Revolution, only 5 are women. Yet the court records provide a surprising 
view of English midwives’ “secret” practices; even if our understanding of midwives’
632 W right and Tinling, The S ecre t D iary  o f  William B yrd, 79-80.
633 Loom ba, “D ead W om en T ell N o T ales,” 319.
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knowledge in the birthing room is limited, we can reconstruct the ways that English 
midwives’ knowledge was understood in the public sphere of the courts. Silences and 
speech in the archive point to the different relationships and power held by women 
and men in the colony: male medical practitioners are plainly visible in the archive, 
where female medical practitioners are often difficult to discover. Nevertheless, 
midwives were far more present in the colony than a cursory reading of the court 
records would attest.
Beginning in 1646, the colony regulated physicians’ and surgeons’ practices 
and fees. These regulations reveal a general mistrust of male medical professionals, 
who were assumed in the 1646 statute to be charging “immoderate and excessive 
rates and prices.”634 Price gouging had a serious impact: apparently, masters had 
been withholding medical care for their indentured servants because they found that 
the cost of medicine outweighed the cost of a new servant. By 1726, the colony 
established an explicit schedule of fees for doctors’ services, with university-educated 
physicians authorized to charge higher fees than other practitioners. Significantly, 
though, only one of these regulations -  one passed in 1761 -  ever mentioned 
midwifery as requiring regulation. It is unlikely, though, that the statute was meant 
to regulate female midwives. Instead, as will be discussed later, by the 1760s, several 
man-midwives were practicing in the colony. In other words, the 1761 statute was 
not intended to regulate female midwives, but male physicians as they expanded their 
practices to include the lucrative new service of man-midwifery.
634 Hening 1 :3 1 5 . This 1646 statute was repeated in 1652, and versions o f  the sam e statute were 
passed again in 1658, 1662, 1692, and 1726.
Hening 4: 509-10 . Fee schedules had previously been enforced on the county level. York D O W  3:
24.
636 M cllw aine, L egisla tive  Journals 3: 1264.
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The disparity in the county courts reveals a fundamental difference between 
the economic relationship between female and male medical practitioners and their 
patients. The regulation of fees charged by physicians and surgeons reveals the ways 
that male medical practitioners acted within a cash (and debt) economy: they 
expected their patients to pay cash or a cash equivalent for their services, and they 
sued patients or patients’ estates to collect on those debts. Thus, Dr. Francis Haddon 
sued Thomas Whitehead for 780 pounds tobacco in 1660 and John Myhill for 310 
pounds of tobacco in 1668; in the Whitehead case, the court recorded each specific 
remedy administered and its costs.637 Midwives, on the other hand, operated within a 
feminine domestic economy that relied on barter rather than cash.638 If these barter 
agreements were disputed, the courts rarely adjudicated them. An exception, from 
Accomac County in 1634, illustrates the varieties of payments that midwives 
accepted for their services. Susan Helline, a midwife and a widow, sued John Major 
for payment of 12 hens “for her paynes and tyme in lookinge to his wife the tyme she 
did lay in Childbed.”639 The court decided in Helline’s favor, awarding her not just 
the 12 hens, but 6 more as well.640 Besides this early case, the midwives that do 
appear in the records are often the ones who, for some cases, arranged cash payments. 
By the eighteenth century, the county court asserted that 10 shillings was “the 
accustomed fee” for midwifery services; significantly, this was far less than what 
would be charged by physicians for their services.641
637 York D O W  3: 82; York D O W  4: 214.
638 Ulrich, A M idw ife's Tale, 75-90.
639 A m es, A ccom ac  1: 15.
640 Ibid.
641 York D OW  11: 105; York DOW  14: 284.
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What can we learn from this economic and archival disparity? Physicians’ 
visibility in the archive is an artifact of their power, and of the ways that their work 
occurred in the public sphere. Physicians are visible in the archive because they are 
named as such. The honorific of “Doctor” may or may not have referred to a 
university education; at any rate, the title marked its bearer as holding particular kinds 
of medical knowledge. There was not only Dr. Francis Haddon, but also thirteen 
other physicians explicitly given the honorific “Doctor” in the York County records, 
and eighteen more whose profession can be surmised from the records. Further, there 
are seven titled surgeons (or “churrurgions”) listed in the records. Meanwhile, just 5 
women are named in the York County records as practicing any form of medicine -  
Sarah Overstreet (1672), Elizabeth Shelden (1691), Mary Whitby (1707), Sarah 
Smith (1711), and Ann Brooke (1713) -  and only two of those, Ann Brooke and 
Sarah Smith, are clearly named as midwives or as practicing midwifery. All of them 
are white women. These disparities in the court records demonstrate that while 
physicians practiced in a public, cash-based, professional economy, midwives 
practiced in a private, barter-based, personal economy.
Because midwives like Overstreet, Shelden, and even Mrs. B-t-s, who 
attended Lucy Byrd, operated in a private, barter-based, personal economy, our 
knowledge of their practices are abbreviated. This is even more the case for non­
white midwives, of whom there are no mentions in the York County records. Even 
so, births like Lucy Byrd’s -  attended by a trusted midwife and the women of the 
community -  were likely repeated again and again in the Virginia colony. The calm 
and knowledgeable presence of the neighborhood midwife, aided by other local
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women, brought Lucy to bed as part o f a community of women. Lucy’s husband 
William -  a man known for his well-developed sense of his own importance -  
willingly retreated from the scene. Midwives’ invisibility in the public records was a 
result of the privacy of their practice; the tradition of social childbirth, when births 
were ordinary and uncomplicated, occurred outside of the view of the courts.
Medical historians and women’s historians have reconstructed this model of 
social childbirth, forms of which lasted well into the twentieth century in some parts 
of the United States and in some segments of the population.642 Focusing on Maine 
in the late eighteenth century, Laurel Thatcher Ulrich describes the way that 
midwives learned their craft:
This was the era of ‘social childbirth,” when female relatives and neighbors, 
as well as midwives, attended births. Most midwives began as observers, 
gradually assuming a more active role, until one day, when the old midwife 
was delayed or willing, they ‘performed.’643 
The learning process that Ulrich identifies was deeply rooted in the practice of early 
modem midwifery in Europe and the colonies: this was a practice learned by women 
through experience, informal apprenticeship, and observation of the many births that 
occurred all the time.644 This learning process was informal, and therefore mostly 
undocumented; reconstructing colonial midwives’ knowledge requires weighing the 
existing textual evidence, while remembering that midwives’ knowledge was rooted
642 Leavitt, B rought to B ed, 171-95.
643 Ulrich, A M idw ife's Tale, 12. The term “social childbirth” was coined by Richard and Dorothy 
W ertz, who saw  colonial-era childbearing as a proto-fem inist space w hich was “the primary occasion  
on w hich w om en expressed their love and care for one another and their mutual experience o f  life .” 
W ertz and W ertz, Lying-In, 2. M y concern here is less with identifying social childbirth as a 
specifically  fem inist space and more with understanding the way know ledge was constructed within 
and outside o f  that space.
644 Leavitt, B rought to B ed, 38; W ilson, The M aking o f  M an-M idw ifery, 30-33.
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in experience, not in books. Women’s knowledge about reproduction was part of 
their basic understanding of the world; sometimes, the distinction between formal 
midwife and everyday woman was not an easy or useful one to draw.
The social nature of childbearing in the early modem world extended to 
African and Native American women in Virginia as well. As in the English 
community, African and Native American midwives or medicine women in may have 
held positions of honor, even as all reproduction was central to the episteme of all 
women in those communities. Because the historiography of social childbirth has 
focused on white women, Native and African women’s childbirth traditions have 
been excluded from that narrative. This exclusion is a result of silences in the archive 
as well as persistent colonial tropes of gendered and racialized bodies.
Early colonial records are mostly silent about Powhatan knowledge of 
childbearing. Much of the particular knowledge and skills held by Native midwives 
is hidden from the records, as English observers did not record any information about 
Powhatan childbearing rituals. In the absence of direct observation of Powhatan 
birthing practices, English colonialists, like William Strachey, asserted that Powhatan 
women had an easy time in childbirth, even giving birth unassisted.645 Responding to 
this colonialist myth, ethnohistorian Helen Rountree argues that the Powhatans “must 
have had means, practical and magical, of assisting difficult deliveries,” even if the 
English didn’t record those means.646 The assertion that native women gave birth 
unassisted had more to do with English beliefs about civilization and savagery -  that 
“civilized” Christian women were subject to Eve’s curse, where “savage” Indians
645 Rountree, The P ow hatan Indians o f  V irginia , 94.
646 Rountree, The P ow hatan Indians o f  Virginia, 94.
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were not -  than any actual observation of Powhatan birthing traditions. It is 
dangerous to assume that English men’s observations of Powhatan women’s birth 
experiences were accurate.647 Powhatan women’s reproductive knowledge was 
colonized by these tales of easy childbearing -  replaced in the archive by a colonial 
myth.
The secondary literature makes clear that Virginia women of African descent 
were heirs to their own tradition of midwifery knowledge and skills. As with the 
Powhatans, African women’s midwifery traditions often escaped English observation, 
and, like Native women, African women were assumed to bear children with ease 
(the easy transferability of this trope from one set of colonized bodies to another 
exposes its role as a colonialist narrative rather than a reflection of observed 
behaviors).648 Despite these silences, Ywone Edwards-Ingram’s survey of the 
archaeological evidence of the medical practices of enslaved Africans shows that, 
even in the conditions of slavery, enslaved midwives’ held a similarly broad skill-set 
as English midwives, including using plants as remedies, caring for not only pregnant 
women but also the sick and the dying, and serving as spiritual leaders within the 
slave community.
Both African and Native American midwives were able to cross the cultural 
boundaries established via colonialism. First, the slave trade itself transformed 
African women’s knowledge, as ethnic differences were elided in the face of
647 For exam ple, Theda Perdue’s study o f  nineteenth-century Cherokee w om en show s that w hile som e  
observers o f  the Cherokee continued this colonialist myth o f  unassisted childbirth, others reported that 
Cherokee w om en had their ow n tradition o f  skilled m idwifery. It seem s likely that Powhatan w om en  
had similar traditions that were sim ply overlooked by English observers. Theda Perdue, C herokee  
Women: G en der an d  Culture C hange  (Lincoln: U niversity o f  Nebraska Press, 1998), 32.
648 Morgan, Laboring W omen , 3 0 -1 ,4 0 -2 .
649 Edwards-Ingram, “African American M edicine and the Social Relations o f  Slavery,” 34-53.
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institutional slavery. Jennifer Morgan emphasizes the ways that the transatlantic 
slave trade involved a collision not just between African and European cultures, but 
specific and varied African ethnic groups.650 For Morgan, the traditions around 
childbearing, including childbirth practices, pregnancy spacing techniques, and 
breastfeeding traditions, would have been shared and transformed by the women 
caught in the midst of the transatlantic slave trade. Further, Morgan argues that this 
process of creolization waxed and waned, as importation of African slaves increased 
and decreased.651 Further, the evidence seems to suggest that Native women and 
African women crossed not just ethnic but racial boundaries, sharing medical 
information with each other. Archaeologist Laurie Wilkie emphasizes the Native 
American roots of antebellum slave midwifery, quoting nineteenth-century slave 
midwives whose knowledge, passed down through generations, originated with “the 
old home remedies, mostly come from the Indian remedies.”
Most of the knowledge held by early modem English and Anglo-Virginian 
midwives -  the techniques they used to deliver babies, the herbal remedies they 
created, the rituals they performed -  is also lost to us. Some textual evidence of 
English midwifery technique exists from the period, but it needs to be read critically. 
A few book-length midwifery manuals exist, but it is unlikely that they were intended 
for a female audience, so it is unclear how much their contents actually reflect 
midwifery practice during this period. The most popular of these manuals -  
Aristotle’s Master Piece and Eucharius Rosslyn’s The Byrth ofMankynde -  were 
intended for a masculine audience, as both purport to “display” information that had
650 Morgan, L aboring Women, 64, 123-8.
651 Morgan, L aboring Women, 142.
652 M idw ife O ssie Logan, quoted in W ilkie, The A rch aeology o f  M othering, 126.
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been held “secret” by women.653 The goal of these texts was to make public, via text, 
knowledge that had been held private by women. It is unlikely that midwives used 
these texts to learn their craft. At its heart, midwifery was an art learned through 
story and experience; recipes and remedies might be shared, but the knowledge about 
how to handle the processes and complications of childbirth could only be learned by 
doing.
Other texts seemed to have been aimed at a female audience. For example, 
recipe books such as Eliza Smith’s The Compleat Housewife, or Accompleshe’d  
Gentlewoman's Companion included numerous herbal remedies to improve women’s 
reproductive health. Smith’s text, originally published in England but reprinted in 
Williamsburg in 1742, included several recipes intended to ease women’s suffering in 
childbirth. ‘T o  procure easy Labour,” women were instructed to drink a tincture of 
figs, raising, licorice, and anise.654 If labor stalled, Smith recommended borax 
dissolved in white wine with sugar and cinnamon.655 Smith’s cure for Anne Owle’s 
ailment -  a prolapsed uterus -  involved sitting over heated ginger.656 These recipes 
offer a tantalizing glimpse not only into the remedies available for laboring women,
653 C opies o f  Eucharius R osslyn ’s Byrth o f  M ankynde, were available in private libraries in Virginia 
during the seventeenth century. Edward W. James, ed„ The L ow er N orfolk County Virginia A ntiquary, 
vol. 1 (NY: Peter Smith, 1951), 122-3. Som e inventories from York County include references to 
medical books. See, for exam ple, York D O W  2: 343; D O W  4: 430. A ris to tle ’s M aster-p iece  was 
published dozens o f  tim es from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries. See Porter, “ ‘The 
Secrets o f  Generation D isp lay’d ’,” 1-21. Lynn Hunt has written o f  the w ays that texts about w om en’s 
bodies blurred the lines betw een science, politics, and pornography in the eighteenth century. Lynn 
Hunt, ‘T h e  M any B odies o f  Marie Antoinette: Political Pornography and the Problem o f  the Fem inine 
in the French R evolution,” in E roticism  an d  the B ody P olitic , ed. Lynn Hunt (Baltim ore, MD: The 
Johns Hopkins U niversity Press, 1991), 108-130.
554 E[liza] Smith, The C om pleat H ousewife, o r  A ccom plesh e’d  G entlew om an's C om panion  
(W illiam sburg, VA: 1742), Early American Imprints no. 5041 ., 188-9.
655 Smith, The C om plete H ousewife, 189.
656 Smith, The C om plete H ousewife, 192.
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but a sense of the overlap between the knowledge held by midwives and the 
knowledge held by all housewives.
Nevertheless, there are limitations to our application of such texts. First, 
much of the knowledge that informed Smith’s recipes has been lost, and the text 
contains only echoes of that knowledge. Smith’s recipes are full of ingredients that 
are mysterious to modem readers: it is unknown, for example, what Smith meant 
when she called for “dragon’s blood” and how that ingredient might help to “prevent 
Miscarrying.”657 Second, the audience for such a text was limited to the literate 
women who could afford to purchase not only a book but the imported ingredients for 
the recipes -  it is not coincidence that the text is explicitly aimed at “gentlewomen.” 
Indeed, Smith herself emphasized the gentility -  and thus the power -  of her intended 
audience:
[The recipes] are very proper for those Generous, Charitable, and Christian 
Gentlewomen that have a Disposition to be serviceable to their poor Country 
Neighbours, labouring under any of the afflicted Circumstances mentioned; 
who by making the Medicines, and generously contributing as Occasions 
offer, may help the Poor in their Afflictions, gain their Good will and Wishes, 
entitle themselves to their Blessings and Prayers, and also have the Pleasure of 
seeing the Good they do in this World, and have good Reason to hope for a 
Reward (though not by way of Merit) in the World to come.
In other words, Smith intended her elite audience to use the recipes to minister to 
their poor neighbors; the practice of housewifery here is tied up with a genteel
657 Smith, The C om plea t H ousewife, 192. Laurel Thatcher Ulrich offers a list o f  ingredients used by 
m idw ife Martha Ballard -  it too includes “dragon’s b lood.” Ulrich, A M id w ife ’s Tale, 360.
658 Smith, The C om plea t H ousewife, preface.
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noblesse oblige rooted in England’s stratified system of class and status. How well 
that translated to Virginia’s colonial hierarchies of race and status is unclear. Smith’s 
emphasis on the knowledge of elite women -  and the apparent backwardness of those 
this mistress would treat -  makes clear that the text likely has little to tell us about 
non-elite women’s medical knowledge. While the book did have some audience in 
Virginia, it is unknown how the recipes had to be transformed to fit local ingredients 
and conditions. How did the experience of colonialism transform even elite women’s 
use of such texts?
Even lacking textual evidence of their techniques, it is clear that midwives’ 
oral and experiential education endowed them with estimable skills, not just in 
delivering babies, but in fostering women’s reproductive health, ministering to the 
sick, and even burying the dead. As Ulrich makes clear in her biography of midwife 
Martha Ballard, a single midwife might deliver hundreds, or even thousands, of 
babies in her career, and might have a very low maternal mortality rate.659 A 1774 
notice published in the Virginia Gazette suggests that Martha Ballard’s expansive 
practice was not an anomaly: “Mrs. Catherine Blaikley, of [Williamsburg], in the 76 
years of her Age, and eminent Midwife, and who, in the course of her practice, 
brought upwards of three thousand children into the World.”660 The vast majority of 
women who practiced midwifery never earned public accolades, but the lack of such 
records does not mean that other women did not have similarly successful practices in 
the colony.
659 Ulrich, A M id w ife ’s T ale , 171-3.
560 Virginia G azette , Purdie and D ixon # 1 056 , Oct. 24, 1771, page 2.
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Midwives’ skills extended beyond attending women in childbirth. As Ulrich 
makes clear, midwives also held a vast array of medical knowledge, and treated not 
just pregnant women, but sick people as well, offering medicines both homemade and 
purchased.661 The York County records include several examples of women 
practicing medicine. In 1707, John Hilliard paid Mary Whitby a debt “due for 
medecines & visits in the time of his families sickness.”662 Further, midwives
f s f \ \attended to the dying, participated in autopsies, and prepared bodies for burial. For 
example, in 1672, York County widow Sarah Overstreete was awarded the costs of 
“funeral chardges” from the estate of Thomas Kelton “for her trouble & pains” in 
caring for him as he died.664 Significantly, the court’s records do not explicitly name 
either Mary Whitby or Sarah Overstreete as midwives -  the source of their expertise 
goes unmentioned. Nevertheless, their recognized skills in the medical arts suggest 
the distinct possibility that their expertise was rooted in training in midwifery.
The skills and knowledge of midwives were recognized in the masculine 
sphere of the courts. When Margaret Grimes testified to the court about Anne Owle’s 
illness and her treatment by her husband, she was translating the epistemology of 
social childbearing into the public sphere of the court. Midwives like Margaret 
Grimes held knowledge about the most private (or as Aristotle’s Master Piece termed 
it, “secret”) aspects of women’s lives: their reproductive cycles, their sexualities, 
their bodies. Midwives’ legal role required them to use that knowledge in public 
spaces: testifying in court in cases of illegitimacy or births that were otherwise
661 Ulrich, A M id w ife ’s Tale, 1 1 ,4 9 -5 8 , 249-50. W ilson, The M aking o f  M an-M idw ifery, 36-8.
662 York DOW  13: 31.
663 Ulrich, A M id w ife ’s Tale, 54, 250-1 .
664 York D O W  4: 363; York D OW  5: 27.
250
suspicious. Further, non-midwives, in the form of juries of women, could also be 
called upon to speak of women’s reproductive knowledge in court. In these cases, the 
private, intimate realm of reproduction exploded into the public sphere -  and their 
anomalous presence in public is the only reason why we have any record of them at 
all.
Midwives were the chief witnesses in court cases involving extramarital 
childbearing and other suspicious births. When the York County court issued 
summons for women accused of fornication and bastardy, they were ordered “to 
appeare...with Midwives and other Evidences.”665 Women’s knowledge about 
childbearing had several purposes within the walls of the courtroom. First, it is 
important to distinguish between juries of women, midwives’ testimony, and 
women’s personal testimony. Juries of women were formed when the court needed to 
examine the body of a woman, be she a plaintiff or a defendant. These juries were 
called by the court not only to protect modesty but to capitalize on women’s 
particular knowledge about anatomy and reproduction. Recall that a jury of women 
was called to examine the body of Anne Owle when she accused her husband of 
abuse; we can assume the women looked for signs of injury and also corroborated the 
testimony of the midwife Margaret Grimes about Anne’s prolapsed uterus. Juries of 
women were also impaneled to determine whether women were pregnant. In 1633, 
when Margaret Hatch was convicted of infanticide, she attempted to delay or escape
665 York D OW  3: 167.
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her execution by claiming to be pregnant. When a “jury of Matrons [found] her not 
pregnant,” the execution went forward as scheduled.666
Unlike juries of women, midwives were called as witnesses by the court to 
provide testimony about particular births. These might include the recognized 
midwives who were the main attendants at a particular childbirth, or any of the
f.f.n
women who were present at the birth. Midwives’ testimony was called for in 
births that were in some way questionable: either because paternity was in question, 
or because of the death of the fetus/infant. Midwives also provided corroborating 
evidence to support (or question) women’s own testimony about the progress of their 
pregnancies. Often, when the woman herself testified, the court did not require any 
further expert opinion.
Midwives’ primary form of testimony was attesting to the paternity of the 
infant. It was believed during this period that paternity could be determined by 
questioning a woman during childbirth: whomever she named must be the father, 
tradition averred, because a woman simply could not lie when in the pain of 
childbirth. In this way, midwives acted as interrogators even as they cared for 
women during childbirth.669 In 1662, midwife Dorothy Bullock recalled attending 
servant Ann Roberts during childbirth. “In [the] extremity of paine,” Bullock 
“demanded of [Roberts] who was the father of hir said Child,” and Roberts named
666 Hening 1:209. For another similar exam ple occurring in 1711, see W right and Tinling, The Secret 
D ia ry  o f  W illiam B yrd, 542-3 .
667 For exam ples o f  a single m idw ife providing testim ony, see: York D OW  3: 166, 168; York D O W  6: 
28, 32; York D O W  5: 117, 119; York DOW  6: 444 , 606. For exam ples o f  several w om en providing  
testim ony, see: York D O W  3: 28; York D OW  4: 313, 342.
668 Pagan, Anne O rth w o o d ’s B astard , 79-83; Ulrich, A M id w ife ’s  Tale, 149. Som e mothers named the 
fathers o f  their children in open court. B ecause they were under oath, this confession  carried legal 
w eight as w ell. See, for exam ple: York DOW  8: 205.
669 Pagan, Anne O rth w o o d ’s B astard , 81-3.
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John Reason.670 In another example, the fact that Margery King “in the tyme of her 
travaile & labor” named Andrew Dudden to be the father of her child was evidence 
enough to determine that Dudden was the father of her child.671 Women’s refusal to 
name the father during labor could hamper a paternity investigation. When Francis 
Pressee categorically refused to name the father of her child, either during labor of 
after labor, she was committed to jail until she confessed.672
Midwives’ expertise in childbearing, rooted in their witnessing of multiple 
births, made them invaluable witnesses in cases of suspicious births, especially when 
the court suspected infanticide. In 1678,60-year-old midwife Susanna Evans 
testified that servant Mary Beckett had given birth to a “still borne” child.673 Virginia 
law construed infanticide as a servants’ crime -  committed by “leud mothers” who 
wished to “conceal” the birth of bastard children.674 Therefore, infanticide cases such 
as the case against Mary Beckett came to light because her birth was suspect from the 
beginning.
Across race and status, women acted as interlocutors, translating the 
epistemology of reproduction into the practice of everyday medicine and midwifery 
in the Virginia colony. For English midwives and elite women, this gave them 
considerable power in the public sphere -  their testimony was essential to 
determining illegitimacy, infanticide, and pregnancy. This public role points to the
670 York D O W  3: 169. For other cases, see: York D O W  4: 159, 164, 169, 209, 214, 273; York D OW  
4: 313, 342; York D O W  12: 414, 424, York D O W  13: 17; York D OW  14: 83. S ee also A m es, 
A ccom ac, 1: 129. Clear-cut cases o f  childbed confessions drop o ff  in the eighteenth century. The 
court records becam e more streamlined in the eighteenth century, and often contain no transcriptions 
o f  testim ony, including m idwives.
671 York D O W  4: 3 8 ,4 3 .
672 York DOW  14: 493.
673 York D O W  6: 28, 32. For similar cases see: York D O W  6: 4 4 4 ,6 0 6 ; York DOW  13: 181, 182, 
187.
674 Hening 4: 133. On bastardy being a servants’ crim e, see Chapter 1.
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ways that the reproductive episteme of women could unsettle established boundaries, 
hierarchies, and structures. David Cressy argues that midwives’ power stemmed 
from their ability to cross boundaries, both physical and social:
Midwives were summoned as servants but performed as officiants. They 
crossed social boundaries and entered homes of all sorts.... The midwife’s 
office allowed her to pass thresholds and open doors, to reach day and night to 
the heart of material matema.615 
Social childbirth blurred and transgressed boundaries of class and status. Adrian 
Wilson emphasized that, in the birthing room, the midwife had power that defied her 
status: “It was even possible for a young and inexperienced midwife, probably of no 
higher than yeoman status, to defy a mother who was a lady, that is, the wife of a 
gentleman, a member of the ruling class.”676 In Virginia (and the other English 
colonies), midwives also crossed the boundary between the intimate spaces of 
women’s lives and the public space of the court. Midwives acted as mediators 
between women and the moral authority of church and court. Lisa Foreman Cody 
posits that this public role for midwives was an “alternative public sphere,” a space 
where midwives occupied “a necessary public position seemingly unavailable to 
men.”677 Women’s knowledge, borne of the intimate sphere of childbearing, gave 
them some authority in the public sphere. As colonialism challenged, shifted, and 
remade boundaries and hierarchies, women’s reproductive authority would be called 
into question.
675 Cressy, Birth, M arriage, an d  D eath , 61. Cressy em phasizes the “priest-like” pow er o f  m idw ives, 
w hose rituals were so  similar to religious officiants’ practice o f  baptism and last rights.
676 W ilson, The M aking o f  M an-M idw ifery, 26.
677 Cody, “The Politics o f  Reproduction,” 481.
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In the afternoon of Monday, April 5,1658, Elizabeth Dunne, Elizabeth 
Taylor, and Mary Sevill were summoned by two servants to help attend a birth at the 
home of Elizabeth and Ralph Hunt.678 The Hunts’ servant, 30-year-old Margaret 
Barker, was having her baby. Dunne and Sevill got to the Hunts’ house too late -  it 
had been “a quick delivery,” and Barker had already given birth.679 But something 
was terribly amiss. The infant was dead: “the head bruised to pieces & the Child
bleeding very fresh att ye nose.” Further, Elizabeth Hunt refused to let the women
£Rn
see Margaret Barker, who she said was “in a very weake condicon.”
What the women had seen troubled them, and they reported it to the constable. 
The next day, Dunne and Taylor returned to the Hunt home, along with the constable 
and several other neighborhood women, including Elizabeth Rooksby, Elizabeth 
Johnson, and Margaret Bouth. They found Margaret Barker weak and reluctant to 
speak to them, and the dead infant buried in the yard. The women exhumed the tiny 
body, and their examination confirmed what Seville and Dunne had seen the previous 
day: “they found ye head of ye said Child much bruised & ye skull.. .broken in 
pieces.”681 The women pressed Margaret Barker -  how had the newborn come to be 
in this condition? Barker finally answered: “she knew not unless it were by blowes 
rec’d from her [Mistress].”682
The women’s interrogation revealed that Margaret Barker had been brutally 
beaten by her mistress multiple times in the days preceding the birth. After first
678 York D O W  3: 28.
making “some refusal either to take knowledge of any hurt either to ye child or 
herself,” Barker reluctantly revealed her injuries to the women.683 Her body, from the 
thighs upward, was “full of cruell blowes & stripes,” and her belly was “very black & 
blew.”684 Elizabeth Rooksby and Elizabeth Johnson commented that Barker’s body 
was “in a sad condicon from ye Knees upwards all her body full of stripes & black & 
blew,” with apparently only Bakers arms spared from the beating.
As the four women examined her, Barker revealed the details of the terrible 
beatings she received from her mistress 686 Three weeks previously, Elizabeth Hunt 
had beaten Barker with a peach rod. The Friday before the birth, Hunt had 
“grievously whipped & kicked her.”687 Then, on the morning of her delivery, Hunt 
found Barker while she was doing the washing. Hunt whipped Barker with a tobacco 
stick -  a particularly cruel punishment that sliced the skin, creating harsh welts that
zoo
swelled and numbed from the tobacco juice. The women postulated that perhaps it 
was this final beating that caused Barker’s labor to begin, and to proceed so quickly 
that Barker was attended only by her mistress and tormentor who “did .. .take ye
C. O Q
Childe from her,” “cursing” her the entire time.
Upon hearing this testimony, the York county court charged Elizabeth Hunt 
“of the supposition of the Death of an Infant bom of her husbands woman servant &
683 Ibid.
684 Ibid.
685 Ibid.
686 Ibid. Throughout the testim ony, Barker “acknow ledged” her master, Ralph Hunt, “to be cleare” o f  
the injuries -  it was Elizabeth, not Ralph, who beat her.
687 Ibid.
688 On the racial and sexual sym bolism  o f  different punishments, see Kirsten Fischer, Suspect 
R elations, 159-90.
689 York D O W  3: 28.
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in hir house.”690 Ultimately, though, the court found “noe cause of binding her over” 
to the Governor and Council -  in other words, the court ruled that Hunt was not guilty 
of infanticide. The court did make some effort to check Hunt’s violence against 
Barker. The court ordered Elizabeth Hunt’s husband, Ralph Hunt, to enter into a 
bond of 5,000 pounds of tobacco to guarantee “his said wifes good behavior.”691 He 
was required to guarantee that Elizabeth Hunt would “[keep] the peace towards all 
[persons] especially towards the said Margarett [Barker.]”692 In other words, while 
Elizabeth Hunt was not guilty of killing the infant outright, the court agreed that her 
treatment of Barker was egregious. Their solution: greater discipline over Elizabeth 
Hunt by her husband.
The harrowing story of Margaret Barker shows us the ways that the relations 
of colonialism -  here, the intense intimacy and violence of the mistress-servant 
relationship -  interrupted, transformed, and reconstructed knowledge and practices 
concerning reproduction. In some ways, the precolonial model of social childbirth 
was upheld in Barker’s case. When she went into labor, neighborhood women were 
called to attend the birth. When questions arose, the court deferred to women’s 
knowledge -  it was women who examined the dead infant, and it was women who 
both questioned Margaret Barker and inspected her injuries. And, when the court 
made its decision, it deferred to the women’s knowledge and authority in assigning 
some punishment (however weak) to Elizabeth Hunt.
The actualities of the case, though, reveal the ways that colonial conditions 
fundamentally remade these relationships between gender, knowledge, and authority.
690 York D O W  3: 20.
691 York DOW  3: 27.
692 Ibid.
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First, it is significant that the women never actually made it to the birth. Instead of 
being attended by a midwife, Margaret Barker’s birth was attended by her mistress.
As we will see, colonialism fundamentally reshaped social childbirth. Second, the 
court’s decision shows the ways that status, rather than experience, conveyed 
authority in colonial spaces, ultimately causing the court to craft a decision that 
contradicted the women’s testimony. The women’s testimony did not outweigh the 
fact that Elizabeth Hunt’s status gave her the right to beat (though not to kill) her 
servant. Further, the court’s check on Hunt’s violence -  disciplinary surveillance by 
her husband -  shows the ways that the court relied on patriarchal power to keep 
women in check.
Colonialism cemented old power structures like gender even as it created and 
enhanced new power structures, like status and race. Ultimately, these two colonial 
trajectories -  the reshaping of the tradition of social childbirth and the assignment of 
hierarchy, rather than experience, as the locus of authority -  would fundamentally 
reshape reproduction in the colony. Ann Laura Stoler argues that it was in intimate 
spaces -  like the birthing bed -  that colonialism was enacted, as it was in those spaces 
that “relations of power were knotted and tightened, loosened and cut, tangled and 
undone.”693 Colonialism demanded new kinds of categories, and new kinds of 
knowledge, as race, status, and servitude created and enforced a hierarchical structure 
of all colonial bodies. Yet, intimate zones were spaces in which people at multiple 
points in those hierarchies came into contact with each other. This contact could be 
threatening, as it was within intimate zones that colonized people could “transgress
693 Stoler, “Intimidations o f  Empire,” 3.
258
the protected boundaries” of race and status upon which colonialism was build.694 
Therefore, colonizers looked for ways to reenact their power and their worldview in 
those intimate zones.
We see these competing trajectories of colonial intimate zones in the case of 
Elizabeth Hunt and Margaret Barker. The mistress-servant relationship between Hunt 
and Barker required and created intimacy: they lived and worked alongside one 
another, far enough from neighbors that it took hours for help to come during 
Barker’s labor. Barker’s pregnancy complicated this already explosive situation. As 
we saw in Chapter 2, servant women’s pregnancies can be seen as a transgression of 
social norms and a rebuke to the absolute power of masters and mistresses. If this is 
the case, Hunt’s torture of Barker might be seen as an effort by Hunt to reassert her 
power over Barker in order to realign the status hierarchy.
This final section of this chapter will attempt to use this understanding of 
intimacy as a crucial element of colonial relations to outline the ways that colonialism 
transformed reproductive knowledge in early Virginia. Previously, we’ve seen that 
knowledge about reproduction imbued English women with authority in Virginia’s 
colonial culture. How did the colonial categories of status, race, and servitude 
fundamentally remake that authority? First, I will examine cases in which, as in the 
Barker-Hunt case, relations of colonialism fundamentally transformed the social 
childbirth model. Next, I will discuss the ways that colonialism diminished 
midwives’ power. Finally, to close the chapter, I will discuss the ways that, as 
midwives’ authority was diminished, master-patriarchs stepped in to claim medical 
authority over reproduction.
694 Stoler, “T ense and Tender T ies,” 35.
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As we’ve discussed, English women brought to Virginia a centuries-old 
tradition of social childbirth led by an experienced midwife. The exigencies of 
colonial life in the seventeenth century, though, could interrupt and complicate that 
ideal, especially in colonial Virginia, where plantations could be far-flung, and 
women might not have the close contact they enjoyed in England or New England. In 
Virginia, it was sometimes impossible to summon a community of women for births. 
When Ann Roberts, a servant, gave birth to her baby in 1662, the midwife Dorothy 
Bullock attended the birth.695 No other women were present. Instead, when Dorothy 
Bullock questioned Ann Roberts about the paternity of her child, two men, 47-year- 
old Lewis Griffith and 50-year-old John Gaiford, stepped in to repeat the question.696 
It is unclear what role Griffith and Gaiford took in the birthing room, but the lack of 
any other women’s testimony besides the midwife indicates two interpretations: first, 
that men had entered into what had been seen as a strictly women-only spaces, and 
second, that even if there were other women in the room, the men’s testimony was 
seen as most convincing or believable. What did it mean to Ann Roberts that her 
birth was so different from the expected norm? It is difficult to say how many births 
saw these kinds of gendered interruptions and transformations of social childbirth.
The evidence presented previously shows the persistence of the social childbirth 
model, even with challenges. Nevertheless, it should be noted we are aware of these 
cases because they involved servant women giving birth to bastard children. How 
many births saw a similar complication of the social childbirth ideal, but were not 
recorded because legal births did not warrant documentation by the colonial courts?
695 York D O W  3: 168.
596 Ibid. For an exam ple o f  a male servant w itnessing a birth, see York DOW  5: 92.
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Besides gender, colonial hierarchies of status and race remade social 
childbirth. Adrian Wilson argues that, in England, social childbirth was an 
expression of the “collective culture of women.”697 The hierarchies of colonialism 
fundamentally remade that collective culture. First, status relationships were 
intensified in a colonial space, and those status relationships found their way into the 
birthing room. As we saw in the Barker-Hunt case, when servant women gave birth, 
their mistresses took an active role in the childbirth process. For example, when 
Mary Margerum gave birth to her child, her midwife, Elizabeth Tindall, was assisted 
by Mary’s mistress, Sarah Townsend.698 In this case, Sarah Townsend took an active 
role in questioning her servant Mary about the father of her baby -  an interrogation 
that must have been inflected by the hierarchy in Mary and Sarah’s relationship. On 
the other hand, as was discussed in Chapter 2, the lying-in tradition overturned the 
relationship between servant and mistress, as new mothers took a traditional month­
long period to rest and heal. The point here is that the meanings of the servant- 
mistress relationship were thrown into relief by the intimacies forced by the childbirth 
experience.
Even “normal” social childbirth -  a birth attended by women, with an 
experienced midwife as the authority -  was transformed by Virginia’s colonial 
culture. Specifically, as hierarchies of status and race intensified and cemented, social 
childbirth created moments of intimate contact that crossed, complicated, and 
crystallized both status and racial boundaries. Social childbirth depended on clear 
relationships between women; the race and class hierarchies of the eighteenth century
697 W ilson, The M aking o f  M an-M idw ifery, 25-33 , 185.
698 York D O W  444 , 606.
261
made social childbirth both a space of enacting those hierarchies and of expressing 
elite anxiety over the maintenance of those same hierarchies.
In the colonial racial and status hierarchy of early Virginia, social childbirth 
could become a space where hierarchies were intensified, not ameliorated by a so- 
called “women’s culture.” Social childbirth, in the extant records, became a space to 
serve the needs of elite women. Women servants were “loaned out” by one 
household to help with the births of elite women. For example, when John 
McDearman’s wife went into labor in 1775, Lucy Gaines, an indentured housekeeper 
at Belvidera, the plantation of the Frazer family, was immediately sent to offer 
assistance.699 Lucy was a young single woman -  her role was not to offer assistance 
in the birth or to join the other women in the birthing room. Granted, such events 
provided space for sociability and a change in a servant’s day-to-day responsibilities. 
Nevertheless, for Lucy, participating in this iteration of social childbirth was just an 
extension of her own responsibilities; it would simply mean serving Mrs. McDearman 
and her friends.
Race inflected social childbirth as well, as white midwives were hired by 
masters to attend the births of slaves. William Byrd occasionally recorded slave 
births in his diary. Notably, he was not interested in recording all slave births -  this 
was not an accounting of his slave property -  but only those that occurred which 
disrupted his domestic space. We see this blending of slave women’s reproductive 
experience with Byrd’s personal interests in a typically terse entry from 1709: “Our
700
maid Jane began to cry out. I danced my dance. Jane was brought to bed of a boy.”
699 Riley, ed„ The Journal o f  John H arrow er, 124.
700 W right and Tinling, The S ecre t D iary  o f  William B yrd, 19.
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When another enslaved woman, Jenny, “threatened to be brought to bed,” Byrd 
attempted to call the local white midwife to attend her.701 The midwife wasn’t home, 
so Jenny was able to depend on the women in her community for support.702 We can 
only imagine the power relationship between the white midwife and the enslaved 
woman; suffice it to say that this relationship was much different from a relationship 
built on common experience upon which social childbirth was built.
Planter Landon Carter’s fundamental mistrust of black midwives underscores 
the ways that social childbirth (in this case, the practices of enslaved women) was 
interrupted by colonialism. A reader of Carter’s diary can feel his palpable contempt 
for the “old midwife” at Nomini Hall. The relations of slavery and colonialism 
remade the relationship between gender and authority in the colony. Carter saw a 
conflict between the midwife’s work as a health care provider and his expectation that 
she contribute in terms of the agriculture of the plantation. The “old woman” who 
served as plantation midwife also tended Carter’s turkeys; Carter grew angry when 
four turkeys (of the total 86) died because the midwife “was obliged to attend 
Manuel’s daughter Peg.”703 Carter was eager to call in his friend Dr. Mortimer when 
he doubted a black midwife’s call, but he still complained that the doctor charged 
fees.704 Landon Carter need not even pretend he had any respect for the knowledge or 
authority of the plantation’s midwife, even as he benefitted from her skills.
Servants and slaves were also called upon to act as wetnurses and baby nurses 
for their mistresses’ children. As early as 1690, “The Trappan’d Maiden,” an English
701 W right and Tinling, The Secret D iary  o f  W illiam B yrd, 549-50 .
702 For another exam ple o f  a white m idw ife being hired to assist an enslaved w om an’s labor, see York 
D OW  18: 271-2.
703 Greene, The D iary  o f  C olonel Landon C arter, 306.
704 Greene, The D iary  o f  C olonel Landon C arter, 514.
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ballad that lamented the poor treatment experienced by indentured servants in 
Virginia, listed child care as a burden held by servants:
When the Child doth cry, I must sing ‘By-aby!”
In the land of Virginny, O;
No rest that I can have, whilst I am here a Slave,
When that I am weary, weary, weary, weary, <9.705 
Amidst complaints about starvation rations, illness, and abuse, it was caring for 
children which was likened to slavery.
Infant care was a site of conflict and anxiety for masters, mistresses, servants, 
and slaves. While Philip Vickers Fithian expressed surprise at the use of slaves as 
wetnurses -  “I find it is common here for people of Fortune to have their young 
Children sucked by the Negroes!” -  it was an accepted practice throughout the 
colony.706 Yet Fithian showed little more respect for Mrs. Oakley, the free white 
woman who acted as a nanny and baby nurse. He eagerly recorded a rumor that “the 
Nurse, a short Stump of a [wom]an,” had been seduced when young and bore an 
illegitimate child: she “felt the difficulties of being a Mother, several years before 
She enjoyed the Pleasures of being a Wife.”707 Paula Treckel has found that 
wetnursing would have been most common in elite families, as it was in England.708 
White wetnurses were hard to find, they were expensive to hire, and their morality
705 C. H. Firth, ed. An A m erican G arland: B eing a C ollection  o f  B allads R elating to A m erica, 1563- 
1759  (Oxford: B.H. B lackw ell, 1915), 53.
706 Hunter D ickenson Farish, ed. The Journal an d  L etters o f  Philip Vickers Fithian 1773-1774: A  
P lantation  Tutor o f  the O ld  D om inion  (Charlottesville, The U niversity Press o f  Virginia, 1957), 39.
707 Farish, Journal an d  L etters o f  Philip Vickers Fithian, 133. Fithian’s concern with the nurse’s 
morality does not stop there. Later in his journal, Fithian hinted that Mrs. Oakley had a relationship  
with an enslaved man, and he jokes that her taste in clothing reveals her desire to reach beyond her 
station. Farish, Journal an d  L etters o f  Philip  Vickers Fithian, 134, 142.
708 Treckel, “Breastfeeding and Maternal Sexuality,” 31.
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was always in question, as parents feared that the woman’s moral character would be 
communicated through her milk.709 Thus, enslaved women were considered ideal 
wetnurses. Landon Carter expressed frustration at the role that enslaved women 
played in raising his children: “I have none but negroes to tend my children nor can I 
get anyone.”710 He had little better opinion of white wetnurses. When a friend 
complained to him about the health of her white wetnurse, he replied to her, “these 
creatures may be ladies of the Game, and possibly may have got foul that way.”711 
For Carter, wetnursing was one step away from prostitution. Despite his discomfort 
with slaves caring for his children, he recommended a slave wetnurse, whose morality 
might be more easily guaranteed: “I there wished little Paculet rather at some cleanly 
negro bubby, but that as she pleased.”712
The intense intimacy of the relationship between masters, mistresses, and the 
women who cared for their children could become explosive. Lucy and William 
Byrd’s children were provided care by two women in particular: Mrs. Joanna Jarrett 
(or Mrs. G-r-t, as it appears in the diary), a white widow hired by the family since
William himself was a child, and Anaka, an enslaved women who cared for the older
children. From the snippets of Byrd’s diary that discuss the two women, it appears 
that they had a rapport, even a true friendship. At least one time, Anaka protected 
Mrs. Jarrett from William’s rages, refusing to disclose to her master any details about
709 Treckel, “Breastfeeding and Maternal Sexuality,” 26-8 . See also Perry, “C olonizing the Breast,” 
302-332 . Sally M cM illen, exam ining the antebellum period, argues that w e should not overstate the 
prevalence o f  slave wetnursing. M cM illen, M otherhood  in the O ld  South, 126-8. This may be the case, 
but, as both Treckel and Perry argue, the eighteenth century saw  widespread debates around the 
morality and healthfulness o f  wetnursing. B ecause o f  this, slave wetnursing was much more 
acceptable am ong elite fam ilies in the eighteenth century.
710 Greene, The D iary  o f  C olonel Landon C arter, 194.
711 Greene, The D iary  o f  C olonel Landon C arter, 811-2.
712 Ibid.
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Mrs. Jarrett’s relationship with an enslaved man, Daniel.713 Once, Anaka and Mrs. 
Jarrett were caught stealing alcohol together.714
The relationship between William Byrd, Lucy Byrd, Mrs. Jarrett, and Anaka 
was marked by violence bred by suspicion, anger, and recriminations. The Byrds 
were unhesitant to discipline the two other women with violence for the smallest 
infractions. Once, when 2-year-old Evelyn Byrd wet the bed, William Byrd blamed 
Anaka and beat her.715 Another time, when Mrs. Jarrett arrived home late after 
attending a wedding, Lucy Byrd flew into such a rage at the woman that “she could 
not forbear beating her.”716 Lucy was 5 months pregnant at the time. Eventually, 
William’s suspicions of Mrs. Jarrett meandered to familiar grounds: he began to 
suspect her of being morally insufficient. William was all too eager to believe a 
rumor that Mrs. Jarrett had had a baby and abandoned the child in Williamsburg.717 
Mrs. Jarrett protested, and even threatened to quit this family for whom she had 
worked for decades.718 Six months later, William Byrd fired Mrs. Jarrett when she 
and Anaka broke into the cellar to steal beer, cider, and wine.719 Byrd did not record 
what punishment he meted out to Anaka.
While the discord between the Byrds and the women who raised their children 
seemed to be peripheral to the women’s work, it was the intimacy of their 
relationships that provided the fuel for the conflicts. Byrd’s anger at Mrs. Jarrett 
stemmed from his intimate knowledge and suspicions of her intimate life -  her sexual
713 Wright and Tinling, The Secret D iary  o f  W illiam B yrd, 7.
714 Wright and Tinling, The Secret D iary o f  W illiam B yrd, 42 , 337.
715 Wright and Tinling, The Secret D iary o f  W illiam B yrd, 84-5.
716 W right and Tinling, The Secret D iary  o f  W illiam B yrd, 34-5.
717 Wright and Tinling, The Secret D iary  o f  W illiam B yrd, 198.
718 W right and Tinling, The S ecre t D iary  o f  W illiam B yrd, 221.
719 Wright and Tinling, The Secret D iary  o f  W illiam B yrd, 337, 339.
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partners, her reproductive history. There is a tit-for-tat aspect to Byrd’s accusations: 
Anaka and Mrs. Jarrett must have known extraordinary detail about the Byrds’ life 
and marriage -  a marriage that even we know was explosive. Ultimately, given the 
chance to exert his power as master and mistress over these women, William and 
Lucy Byrd did, either through physical violence or removal of their livelihood.
As an intimate space, social childbirth was transformed by colonialism. In 
some cases, Virginia’s geography of far-flung plantations made the neighborhood 
model of social childbirth impossible to uphold. Further, social childbirth, 
wetnursing, and infant care were all intimate zones where the status, race, and gender 
of the participants were constantly being negotiated and renegotiated. We see in the 
anxiety over wetnursing the ways that the master class expressed discomfort over the 
cross-race and cross-class intimacies of that relationship. Upholding colonial 
hierarchies meant asserting that status -  defined by class, by race, by gender -  was 
the basis of authority. As we will see, this meant a diminishment of midwives’ 
authority in the public sphere at the same time that a new authority arose to take their 
place: master-patriarchs asserted themselves as the new authority in medicine and 
reproduction. Lisa Foreman Cody, analyzing the shift from midwifery to man- 
midwifery in England, argues that we must focus on the causes for this shift: “ .. .even 
if we are right to grasp the story as both interesting in itself and standing for much 
larger shifts in gender relationships, the mechanics of the tale -  how men conquered 
the midwives -  seem much more elusive.”720 I argue here that the experience of 
colonialism does much to explain how midwives lost their authority in the public 
sphere.
720 Cody, “The Politics o f  Reproduction,” 477.
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By the eighteenth century, midwives and juries of women were no longer so 
present in the York County court records. For the historian, it becomes more difficult 
to use that archive to illuminate experiences of reproduction -  the stories, testimonies, 
and depositions of the seventeenth century disappear quite precipitously at the end of 
the seventeenth century. What caused this shift in the archive? After the 1660s, the 
Burgesses consciously Anglicized the Virginia court, both in terms of proceedings 
and record keeping. As a result, the cases in which women’s testimony was recorded 
in the early seventeenth century either were not tried (such as defamation cases), or 
were recorded in only the most cursory ways (in the case of bastardy and fornication 
cases).721 Therefore, the eighteenth-century recording of bastardy cases -  the cases in 
which midwives were most frequently deposed -  focused on the verdict in the case, 
and as a rule included no testimony at all.
Anglicization of the courts also meant that cases were decided using new 
standards of proof. The childbed confession, so powerful in the seventeenth century, 
was supplanted by sworn courtroom testimony as the most potent proof of paternity. 
As early as 1689, paternity was decided in Elizabeth Hambleton’s bastardy case when 
Hambleton “did this day declare in open court upon her corporall oath that Mr. John 
Child of James Citty parish and county is the father of a man child begotten of her 
body.”722 Similarly, in 1706, Mary Hanson “declared] on oath” that the father of her
721 John Rustin Pagan offers a clear discussion o f  the causes, processes, and consequences o f  
A nglicization in Virginia, especially  focusing on bastardy law. Pagan, Anne O rth w o o d ’s  B astard. On 
the w ays that A nglicization specifically  silenced w om en’s voices, see Dayton, Women before the Bar. 
For a gender analysis o f  A nglicization in Virginia, see Sturtz, Within H er P ow er. Finally, for an 
Atlantic v iew  o f  A nglicization not just as legal process but as cultural transformation, see Bernard 
Bailyn and Philip D. Morgan, eds. Strangers Within the R ealm : C ultural M argins o f  the F irst B ritish  
E m pire  (Chapel Hill: U NC  Press, 1991).
722 York D O W  8: 205, 220.
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child was an enslaved man named Dick.723 Another space of midwives’ authority -  
the inspection both infant and maternal bodies in cases of suspected infanticide -  was 
eroded in the eighteenth century. When Ann Tandy, a free woman was charged with 
killing the “bastard male child borne of her body” in 1701, the investigation was led 
by the coroner and a “jury of inquest,” not a jury of women.724
This shift in authority was not just about a shift in legal procedures. Instead, it 
was about a shifting epistemology of reproduction -  as midwives’ public authority 
was being eroded in the courts, experience was also being eroded as a reliable font of 
knowledge. Instead, male physicians and text-based scientific knowledge were 
supplanting the authority of women in matters of reproduction. By the eighteenth 
century, the shift to man-midwifery -  or, in other words, the employment of male 
physicians in normal births, not just emergency surgeries -  was well underway in 
both Britain and in Virginia. By the 1760s, several man-midwives were practicing in 
the colony, and they specifically advertised themselves as experts not only in 
midwifery but in surgery and general medicine as well. For example, in a 1766 issue 
of the Virginia Gazette, Dr. William Coakley advertised his skills “in every branch of 
SURGERY, MIDWIFERY, and PHYSICK.”725 This shift was not absolute -  the 
Gazette even ran an essay criticizing man-midwifery as an affront to female modesty
723 York D O W  12: 4 1 4 ,4 2 4 ; York D OW  13: 17. See also York DOW  14: 83; York JO 3: 224-5 .
724 York D O W  1 1 :5 1 8 , 526; York D OW  12: 73.
725 Virginia G azette , Purdie and D ixon #790 , July 11, 1766, page 2. Further advertisem ents and 
mentions o f  m an-m idw ives in the G azette  were published throughout the decade. See: V irginia  
G azette , Purdie and D ixon # 7 9 5 , A ugust 15, 1766, page 3; V irginia G azette , Purdie and D ixon # 901 , 
D ecem ber 4 , 1766, page 3; Virginia G azette, Rind, N ovem ber 27, 1766, page 2; and Virginia G azette, 
Purdie and D ixon, February 2, 1769, page 3.
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in 1772 -  but, as we will see, it was indicative of a larger shift in framing elite men as 
medical authorities.726
The shift to man-midwifery was a result of a larger epistemic shift in the 
Anglo-Virginia world. First and foremost, medical authority became increasingly 
couched in the discourses of science and the Enlightenment, which were 
communicated and learned through text rather than through orality and experience.
As Lisa Foreman Cody argues, “the language and logic of midwifery fundamentally 
differed from the rational-critical debate of the scientific revolution and 
Enlightenment.”727 Adrian Wilson echoes this view, arguing that not only were man- 
midwives seen as newly authoritative due to the scientific discourse of the 
Enlightenment, but that elite women were more likely to accept man-midwives as 
attendants in normal births precisely because those women were themselves 
participants in the newly emergent bourgeois culture of literacy.728
While, as discussed before, midwifery texts were vanishingly rare in the 
colony, elite planters often included medical texts as an essential part of their 
libraries. As early as the 1660s, Matthew Hubard, a York County planter, had several 
medical books in his library, including “[Riverews?] Body of Physick, Phisitiens 
Library; Culpepps Dispensatorys; [...] Sennuatory Institution of Physick; [...] [and] 
Culpeppers Alchomy.”729 By the eighteenth century, planters’ libraries included
726 Virginia G azette , Purdie and D ixon #1105 , October 1, 1772, page 1.
727 C ody, ‘T h e  Politics o f  Reproduction,” 480.
728 W ilson, The M aking o f  M an-M idw ifery, 185-192; C ody, “The Politics o f  Reproduction,” 489.
Judith W alzer Leavitt also m akes a class-based argument for why elite w om en chose male physicians 
to attend their births. Leavitt, B rought to Bed, 64-86. W ilson’s and C ody’s arguments are especially  
useful here because they couch that c lass consciousness in questions o f  literacy, know ledge, and 
epistem ology.
7 9 York D O W  4: 430. For York County, see also York D OW  2: 344. For outside o f  York County, 
see: James, ed., The L ow er N orfolk County V irginia A ntiquary  1: 104-6, 122-3; Lyon G. Tyler, ed.,
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stacks of medical books. For example, John Parke Custis’s library included 42 
medical titles -  he was a planter and an attorney, not a physician.730 Rhys Isaac has 
argued that inventories like these might actually underestimate the importance of 
medical texts in a gentleman’s library. The inventory of Landon Carter’s extant 
library includes not a single medical book -  which is simply impossible as an 
accurate snapshot of his actual reading, as he frequently referred directly to multiple 
medical texts in his diary. Instead, Isaac argues, the most useful books -  medical 
books, especially -  were simply “culled from the collection” over the generations.731 
Undoubtedly, medicine was part of any learned gentleman’s personal education and 
private library.
Along with seeing medicine as a necessary area of knowledge for any 
gentleman, medicine was claimed as a sphere of influence and authority for planters. 
The laws that regulated physicians were rooted in the understanding that masters were 
responsible for providing medical care to their families and white servants: prices 
needed regulation so that masters would not be “swayed by profitable rather than 
charitable respects.”732 In fact, white servants used the courts to guarantee their 
access to medicine. In 1657, Robert Crouch was ordered by the court to find and pay 
a surgeon to treat the “very soare & much perished Legg” of his servant, Robert 
Crouch. Captain Daniel Parke, a wealthy and influential York County planter, saw
“N otes from County Records,” T yler's Q uarterly H istorica l an d  G en ea log ica l M agazine  7 (1926): 59- 
67; Lyon G. Tyler, ed., “Arthur Spicer’s Inventory,” T y le r’s Q uarterly H istorica l an d  G en ealogica l 
M agazine  10 (1929): 163; “Carter Papers,” Virginia M agazine o f  H istory an d  B iography  6 , no. 1 
(1898), 145-52.
730 Lyon G. Tyler, ed., “The Library o f  John Parke Custis, Esq., o f  Fairfax County, V irginia,” Tyler's  
Q uarterly H istorica l an d  G en ea log ica l M agazine  9 (1928): 97-103.
731 Isaac, Landon C a r te r ’s U neasy K ingdom , 87.
732 Hening 2: 109-10.
733 York D OW  3: 2.
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his medical authority as extending not just to his servants but also to his neighbors.
In 1665, Parke was paid the considerable sum of 1,450 pounds of tobacco “for 
physicke administered to & attendance about” his neighbor Thomas White.734 Elite 
planters’ responsibility for providing medical care extended not only to paying for 
physicians, but also to acting as a physician oneself.
By the eighteenth century, planters’ interest in medicine extended to 
midwifery. Two eighteenth-century Virginia planter diaries -  those of William Byrd 
II and Landon Carter -  show the ways that planters saw themselves not only as 
responsible for the medical care of their “people” but ultimately claiming authority 
over knowledge of childbearing as well. Both diaries represent their writers well.
7 * jc
Byrd was a secretive and suspicious man, ever anxious about his power. His 
medical techniques were rudimentary, at least as expressed in his diary. Carter, on 
the other hand, was truculent and cranky, confident in his knowledge and authority, 
and forever feeling slighted by others when they failed to live up to his 
expectations. Carter fashioned himself as a man of learning, and for him, medicine 
was an area where he could both prove and expand his knowledge. For both men, 
medicine (especially midwifery) was an intimate space in which they enacted their 
power as colonial patriarchs. And for both men, medicine was a sphere in which their 
various patients -  slaves, neighbors, wives, daughters -  found ways to resist that 
power.
William Byrd II’s approach to medical and reproductive knowledge bridged 
between the world of midwives and the world of man-midwives. Byrd himself
734 York D OW  4: 37. See also York DOW  3 :4 1 .
735 Lockridge, On the Sources o f  P atriarchal R age, 85-90 . Treckel, “The Empire o f  M y Heart,” 135-6.
736 Isaac, Landon C arter's  U neasy K ingdom , passim.
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imagined himself as a Biblical patriarch, and his medical expertise was part of that 
role. In 1726, he famously wrote to a friend: “Like one of the patriarchs, I have my 
flocks and my herds, my bond-men, and bond-women, and every soart of trade 
amongst my own servants, so that I live in a kind of independence on every one, but 
Providence.”737 Byrd saw doctoring his slaves as one of his responsibilities to his 
“bond-men and bond-women.” When slaves were sick, he applied the techniques of 
the heroic medicine of his era, giving vomits, bleeding veins, and prescribing 
medicines made from local herbs.738 For Byrd, his role as plantation doctor was in 
keeping with his identity as a patriarch. When a wave of smallpox swept through the 
slave quarters, Byrd interpreted the event as his punishment from God: “These poor 
people suffer for my sins; God forgive me all my offenses and restore them to their
7TQhealth if it be consistent with his Holy will.” Even when admitting his faults, Byrd 
imagined himself to be at the center of the universe, the cause and consequence of all 
events.
Byrd extended his medical authority from his slaves to his wife. Recall that 
when Lucy Byrd was brought to bed in 1709, she was attended by an experienced 
midwife to whose knowledge William unflinchingly deferred. Over time, though, 
that deference would be undermined, first by Byrd’s desire for intimate knowledge of 
his wife’s reproductive health, and second by his decision to trust physicians over the 
expertise of his wife’s midwife. The intimate detail of Byrd’s diary extended to his 
wife’s health: Byrd recorded Lucy’s mood, her symptoms, and her menstrual cycle 
throughout the diary. For Byrd, this surveillance was not just his right as a husband,
737 Tinling, C orrespondence o f  Three W illiam B yrds , 354-5.
738 W right and Tinling, The Secret D iary  o f  W illiam B yrd , 188, 2 9 3 ,4 9 0 .
739 W right and Tinling, The S ecre t D iary  o f  W illiam B yrd , 278.
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it was a necessity to make sure that Lucy stayed healthy. As has been discussed 
previously, Lucy Byrd suffered greatly from miscarriages, illness, and depression 
after the birth of her son, Parke. These only intensified when Parke died as an infant. 
Throughout Lucy’s 1711 pregnancy, William recorded her symptoms, recording that 
Lucy was “sick,” or “indisposed” more often than not.740 As Lucy’s condition 
faltered, Byrd recommended that Lucy allow him to bleed her. Again and again,
Lucy refused. On June 22: “I persuaded her to be let blood but she would not 
consent.”741 The next night: “My wife was indisposed and was threatened with 
miscarriage. I again persuaded to bleed but she would not be persuaded to it.”742 
Finally, Lucy relented the next morning: “My wife grew worse and after much trial 
and persuasion was let blood when it was too late.”743 Lucy’s condition worsened 
through the day, until she finally miscarried: “she was delivered of a false conception 
and then grew better.”744 The narrative of resistance, refusal, and eventual 
acquiescence marks many of the medical interactions between William and Lucy 
Byrd.745
Alongside this narrative of William Byrd treating his wife by letting blood 
(and also prescribing purgatives and other remedies), we see the gradual destabilizing 
of Lucy’s connection to the feminine knowledge of social childbirth. When Lucy 
gave birth to Parke in 1709, her birth and her lying-in were attended by a group of 
midwives and female friends. The 1709 birth was attended by Mrs. B-t-s, the 
midwife, and also by William Byrd’s cousin, Betty Harrison, and Lucy’s friend, Mrs.
740 Wright and Tinling, The S ecret D iary  o f  W illiam  B yrd, 342, 344, 345.
741 Wright and Tinling, The S ecret D iary  o f  W illiam  B yrd, 363-4.
742 Wright and Tinling, The S ecret D iary  o f  William B yrd, 364.
743 Wright and Tinling, The Secret D iary  o f  W illiam B yrd, 365.
744 Ibid.
745 Wright and Tinling, The S ecret D iary  o f  W illiam B yrd, 141-2, 565.
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Hamlin, plus whatever unnamed servants and slaves attended the group.746 After the 
birth, Lucy was cared for by Anaka and Mrs. Jarrett, and Betty Harrison and Mrs. 
Hamlin visited several times.747 When Lucy miscarried in 1710, she was again 
attended by Mrs. Jarrett, Mrs. Hamlin, and Betty Harrison, as well as a new friend, 
Mrs. Anderson.748 When little Parke died a few months later, Mrs. Anderson and 
another friend, Mrs. Baker, came to be with Lucy in her grief.749
After Parke died, though, Lucy’s social circle shrunk, and she was 
increasingly attended by her husband and his chosen physicians, Dr. Cocke and Mr. 
Anderson. It was during the next pregnancy, in 1711, that William Byrd fired the 
nurse, Mrs. Jarrett. It was also during this pregnancy that William tried multiple 
times to convince Lucy be bled, either by him, or by his new ally Dr. Cocke, or by 
their friend Mr. Anderson. This time, when Lucy miscarried, only one friend, Mrs. 
Dunn, was with her.750 William and Mrs. Dunn clashed over Lucy’s care -  William 
wanted to call Dr. Cocke, but Mrs. Dunn insisted that the physician’s care wasn’t 
needed.751 When the doctor arrived, he prescribed a tincture of chamomile, and 
William paid him four gold pieces for his services.752 When Lucy was pregnant again 
in 1712, Dr. Cocke was a near constant presence, prescribing medicines and 
bleedings throughout the pregnancy.753
746 W right and Tinling, The S ecre t D iary  o f  W illiam B yrd, 79-80.
747 W right and Tinling, The S ecre t D iary  o f  W illiam B yrd, 84-5 , 87-8.
748 W right and T inling, The S ecre t D iary  o f  W illiam B yrd, 141, 142.
749 W right and T inling, The S ecre t D ia ry  o f  W illiam B yrd, 186-88.
750 W right and Tinling, The S ecre t D iary  o f  W illiam B yrd, 365-6.
751 W right and Tinling, The S ecret D iary  o f  W illiam B yrd, 366-7.
752 W right and Tinling, The S ecret D iary  o f  W illiam B yrd, 367-8.
753 W right and Tinling, The S ecret D iary  o f  W illiam B yrd, 565-86. The diary ends before the end o f  
that pregnancy; it is unknown w ho attended that birth.
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We should be reluctant to interpret too broadly the experiences of Lucy Byrd 
-  she was, after all, an extremely elite woman whose frail health, both physical and 
mental, required considerable medical attention. That said, throughout the period of 
the diary, William and Lucy’s opposing medical epistemes come into constant 
conflict. William cajoled Lucy to accept his heroic medical techniques; Lucy resisted 
again and again. It was only when her connection to the authority of other women 
was broken -  when she, for whatever reason, was no longer attended by a group of 
neighbor women, midwives, and friends -  that William was able to convince her to be 
seen by a physician. When women’s community faltered, men’s medicine stepped in.
Even more than William Byrd, Landon Carter epitomized the model of the 
master-patriarch as medical authority. Like Byrd, Carter regularly practiced medicine 
on his slaves, seeing doctoring as an essential aspect of mastery. Unlike Byrd, who 
relied on just a few medical techniques, Carter approached these cases with a 
scientific eye: he carefully listed the various treatments he tried, measuring their 
outcomes so that he might improve his practice. In 1757, smallpox spread throughout 
Carter’s population of enslaved people. One case, that of Betty Oliver, was especially 
interesting to Carter because Oliver was pregnant at the time of her infection. She 
had first gotten sick in the summer:
.. .She was releived [sic] as others were by evacuants, but her pregnancy 
preventing a repitition of them she relapsed with the Season into an
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inflammatory disorder for which she was twice blooded and recovered so as to 
imploy herself about light works.754 
Here, we see the entanglement of Carter’s interests all in one case: the proper method 
of curing an illness, the measuring of success of one method over another, and, 
finally, the guarantee that a slave might still do labor, even when sick and pregnant. 
After Oliver had her baby, Carter redoubled his medical interventions, prescribing 
“Nervins,” purging with rhubarb and castor oil, treatment with “Sal Ammoniae,” 
drinking a concoction of wine, whey and chamomile, taking a “hysteria medicine” 
prescribed by Dr. Flood, and finally treatment with opiates.755 Despite all of these 
interventions, Betty Oliver died. It took three days for Carter to remember to record 
her death in his diary.756
This attention to sick slaves, and this ready use of heroic treatments such as 
purges, bleeding, and vomits, is a source of considerable similarity between Landon 
Carter and William Byrd II. One difference, though, is Carter’s willingness -  even 
eagerness -  to assert himself into cases of reproduction, including childbearing, 
miscarriage, and stillbirth. Where Byrd’s influence over his wife’s childbearing was 
gradual, Carter had no hesitation in claiming his authority over reproductive 
knowledge. In 1776, Carter was visited by a neighbor, Vincent Garland, “about his
754 Greene, The D iary  o f  C olon el Landon C arter, 144-5. Carter’s treatment o f  another sick  and 
pregnant slave, W inney, also included many different rem edies, including herbs, physicians’ 
prescriptions, bleeding, tinctures, and purges. Greene, The D iary  o f  C olonel Landon C arter, 214-21.
55 Greene, The D iary  o f  C olon el Landon C arter, 144-5, 146, 154, 155. This experim entation on slave 
w om en brings to mind a later master-physician, Alabam a planter J. Marion Sim s, w hose  
experim entation on slave w om en led to breakthroughs in fistula treatment, but amounted to torture o f  
the w om en whom  he ow ned. Sim s is considered the “father” o f  American gynecology . Kapsalis, 
P ublic P riva tes, 33-59. See also M cM illen, M otherhood  in the O ld  South, 99.
756 Greene, The D iary  o f  C olonel Landon C arter, 156.
277
poor wife dangerously ill, as he thought, with the labour of her first Child.”757 Rather 
than deferring to the midwife (who was likely present with the wife), or even to a 
physician, Carter eagerly expressed his own opinion, having never seen the patient in 
question:
I enquired into Particulars and found nothing amiss there [illeg.jted the man 
and administered a mild provoken of Pains and bid him be satisfied his wife 
might to very well, and he returned well satisfied. I cautioned him against all
7SRhot Cordials for fear of increasing the Natural fever which would attend....
For Carter, knowledge about reproduction was a token of his status as a man of 
authority and gentility: as he sent Garland home, he hoped to himself that the man 
would be impressed by his “good advice.”759
Carter’s medical authority extended to his own family, especially his 
daughter-in-law Winifred Carter, who experienced three miscarriages (or stillbirths -  
it is unclear how far along in pregnancy Winifred was) in 1766, 1771, and 1774. For 
all of these events, Carter was not just an active participant in the diagnosis and 
treatment of Winifred’s ailments -  he was her primary attendant. In these cases, we 
see two themes. First, Carter’s knowledge about reproduction was deeply rooted in 
the textual basis of man-midwifery: he refers often to midwifery texts and the science 
of man-midwifery. Second, we see the ways that Winifred resisted Carter’s claim to 
authority by finding ways to block his view of her reproductive experience.
Landon Carter’s diagnosis of Winifred Carter’s 1766 miscarriage shows his 
devotion to the new scientific accounts of pregnancy and childbirth. Even so, as
757 Greene, The D iary  o f  C olonel Landon C arter, 980.
758 Ibid.
759 Ibid.
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enlightened as Carter imagined himself to be, he held some patently unscientific 
views. When Winifred Carter miscarried her pregnancy in 1766, he blamed the 
unfortunate event on her dishonesty and apparent belief (however joking) that women 
chose when to go into labor: Winifred was “in labour the 3d time without a midwife 
so punctual are women or rather obstinate to their false accounts.”760 Finding that 
“the child was dead and the womb was fallen down and what not,” Carter stepped in 
an acted as man-midwife to his daughter in law.761 He forwarded several possible 
diagnoses, including a prolapsed uterus and a “swelled and inflamed” vagina, before 
finally concluding that what he saw “proved only the protuberance of the waters 
through the thickness of the membrane.”762 The fetus, “much squeezed and indeed 
putrified was delivered,” but without any “lochial discharge.”763 He struggled to find 
the cause of the lack of fluid, since the circumstance he saw “I never read of...in  any 
Author.”764 Days later, Carter still struggled to find an explanation for the lack of 
fluid in one of his books: “Indeed Smellee says that is various in women some more 
some less, some of one Colour some another.”765 Here, Carter is referring to William 
Smellie’s influential text, A Sett o f Anatomical Tables, with explanations, and an 
abridgement, o f the practice o f midwifery, first published in London in 1749. Carter 
concluded that, since his reading could not find an absolute diagnosis, that he had in 
fact discovered a new scientific phenomenon: “If she should continue so books and 
experience have not yet amounted to all the particular cases in Midwifery,” he
760 Greene, The D iary  o f  C olonel Landon C arter, 315-6.
761 Ibid.
762 Ibid.
763 Ibid. It’s unclear here what Carter means by “lochial discharge,” and why it caused him such  
concern. A  possibility is that he is referring to a lack o f  am niotic fluid, indicating that W inifred’s 
water had broken som e time before the miscarriage.
764 Ibid.
765 Greene, The D iary  o f  C olonel Landon C arter, 316-7.
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exclaimed.766 For Carter, midwifery was not something to be learned from 
experience -  he was a knowledgeable authority because of his immersion in the 
scientific literature, and the fact that he had never seen anything like Winifred’s 
miscarriage before was a moment of scientific discovery, not a sign of his lack of 
knowledge.
Despite his confidence in his knowledge and authority, or perhaps because of 
it, Landon Carter grew ever more furious with Winifred Carter when she strived to 
keep her reproductive experiences to herself. When Winifred miscarried again in 
1771, Landon Carter complained:
She is a strange woman. I suspected her being with child some months ago, 
and advized her to be carefull in many things, particularly to get timely 
blooded, as she always knew how fatal the want of [s]uch a thoughtfulness 
had been [tom] a laughing matter, both in her husband and herself.767 
Instead of telling her father-in-law about the pregnancy, Winifred had kept it a secret. 
Even on the day of her miscarriage, she hid her trauma from her father-in-law, her 
husband, and their guests: “ ...she was taken with very suspicious complaints, 
concealed] from everybody, for she went about as Usual, and after the Company was 
gone she would only be blooded in the morning.”768 When Winifred finally admitted 
her symptoms to her father-in-law, he called Doctor Mortimer to tend to her.
Winifred repeated the same pattern on an autumn morning in 1774. After 
refusing to come to breakfast, she finally admitted to her husband and her father-in- 
law that she was “in labour and now it comes out: she had not felt her child these 2
766 Ibid.
767 Greene, The D iary  o f  C olonel Landon C arter, 620.
768 Ibid.
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months; a thing she had never spoak of to one soul.”769 In fact, Winifred insisted, she 
had told her father-in-law the truth: she told him she “was not with child,” because “a 
woman with a dead Child in her, could be thought much more said not to be with 
Child.”770 Winifred was hearkening to the belief that she was not pregnant until she 
felt the fetus stir within her at quickening. For Landon Carter, a man of the new 
scientific mind, women’s experience was no longer a compelling definition of 
pregnancy. Therefore, we can suggest two reasons why Winifred Carter might want 
to hide her pregnancy from her father-in-law. First, perhaps she was seeking out 
some modicum of privacy in a household in which the patriarch had such 
overwhelmingly invasive power. If this was the case, Winifred’s silence was a form 
of resistance against the intimacies of her father’s patriarchal authority. Second, 
perhaps she was holding on to an understanding of reproduction in which her 
knowledge was rooted in her bodily experience. If this was the case, Winifred’s 
silence was a way of resisting her father-in-law’s demands to be the arbiter of all 
knowledge in the household.
We see in the diaries of Byrd and Carter not only an expansion of planters’ 
authority and influence, but a significant epistemic shift in the understanding of 
reproduction. First, we see an increased willingness to observe, interfere, and even 
control the processes of childbirth -  this is a far cry from the justices at Anne Owle’s 
case claiming that knowledge about reproduction was “not fit to be discust 
publiquely.”771 Second, this claiming of authority in the birthing room amounted to a 
claiming of a new kind of cultural power: the power of abstract knowledge over
769 Greene, The D iary  o f  C olonel Landon C arter, 859-60.
770 Ibid.
771 York D OW  2: 166.
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experiential knowledge. |As Lisa Foreman Cody argues, the expansion of physician’s 
authority to midwifery had profound social and cultural meaning: “Man-midwives 
ultimately worked in the interests of the developing bourgeois public sphere to 
articulate the natural, physiological, psychological, and moral constitution of both 
female and male individuals.”772 In other words, the expansion of physicians’ 
authority to female bodies involved a fundamental shift in how the gendered and 
sexed body was scientifically understood, from rooting knowledge about childbearing 
in women’s experience to rooting that knowledge in text and abstract education. The 
man-midwife -  and, in Virginia, the layman planter-physician-midwife -  colonized 
female knowledge about women’s bodies. By extension, by claiming authority over 
medicine, and then over reproduction, planters engaged in their own epistemic 
colonization.
For both William Byrd II and Landon Carter, knowledge and authority were 
claimed by virtue of their status. That status was rooted in their identities as planter- 
patriarchs: they were empowered as caretakers of their neighborhoods, masters of 
slaves, scientists of the Enlightenment, and patriarchs of families to be the bearers of 
knowledge, power, and authority. This was the consequence of colonialism: the 
fundamental transformation of knowledge and power.
* * *
One day, watching his charges play about him, the tutor Philip Vickers Fithian 
observed the little girls imagining their lives as adults: they ran about, “stuffing rags 
and other Lumber under their Gowns just below their Apron-Strings,... .prodigiously
772 Cody, ‘T h e  Politics o f  Reproduction,” 489.
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charmed at their resemblance to Pregnant Women!”773 What did these little 
eighteenth-century girls imagine for their futures? Did they look at the women 
around them -  their mothers, sisters, aunts, grandmothers, and also the slaves and 
servants who labored for them -  and assume that adult womanhood and pregnancy 
went hand-in-hand? What did they think their pregnancies and childbirths would be 
like? These little girls were born into a new world, where those questions were no 
longer decided by tradition, but instead were expressions of power, status, authority, 
and knowledge in their colonial context.
773 Farish, ed. The Journal an d  L etters o f  Philip  Vickers Fithian, 193.
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CHAPTER 4
“She lives in an infant country that wants nothing but people”: 
Discourses of Reproduction, Print Culture, and Virginia’s Colonial Project
In a 1729 letter to his sister-in-law, Anne Taylor Otway, William Byrd II 
offered, amidst standard family news, his detailed fantasy of how the colonial 
government could better encourage marriage amongst its people. Byrd opined that 
every man should be required to marry or else suffer public whipping by “2 of the 
oldest virgins in the neighbourhood.”774 Further, engaged couples should “view each 
other stark naked thro’ an iron grate,” so that they wouldn’t be “surprised” by their 
spouse’s body on the wedding night. To ensure legitimate births, Byrd proposed that 
fornicators be sentenced to a diet of “thin water gruel...to quench the excessive heat 
of their constitutions.”775 Why enact these policies? Byrd hoped that “many unhappy 
matches will be avoided, to the great peace of familys.”776 His greater purpose was 
“the propagateing a strong and vigorous posterity,” so that the next generation of 
children “wou’d be all six feet 4 inches without their shoes.”777 In case mandatory 
marriage didn’t achieve Byrd’s procreative goals, he suggested that people with ten 
children should be exempt from all taxes, and that “those who are fumblers and have 
no children” pay double taxes.778
774 Tinling, ed ., The C orrespondence o f  The Three W illiam B yrds, 1: 401-2 .
775 Ibid.
776 Ibid.
777 Ibid.
778 Ibid.
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William Byrd II is notable to historians, of course, for often making explicit
77Qthe thoughts that his peers kept to themselves or left abstract. Byrd’s fantasy was 
notable in its varied imaginings of the corporeal body, which he envisioned publicly 
displayed, tortured, examined, starved, and sexually joined. Byrd’s procreative fancy 
reveals his beliefs about the role of marriage and reproduction in the creation of a 
civil society. For him, reproduction should be unfettered, so long as it occurred 
within the bounds of marriage. He imagined only positive effects to this pronatalist 
policy, including happier families and haler progeny. For William Byrd II, since 
reproduction should ideally be copious, the state’s role was to encourage even more 
childbearing: procreation, he believed, “was ever for the publick good.”780
Just over eighty-five years later, Thomas Jefferson wrote a (now famous) 
letter to Francis Gray. Seeking to define absolutely the legal and racial status of 
mixed-race people, Jefferson turned to algebraic equations to determine race:
...one-fourth of negro blood, mixed with any portion of white, constitutes the 
mulatto. As the issue has one-half the blood of each parent, and the blood of 
each of these may be made up of a variety of fractional mixtures, the estimate 
of their compound in some cases may be intricate; it becomes a mathematical 
problem of the same class with those on the mixtures of different liquors or 
different metals; as in these, therefore the algebraical notation is the most
7 0 1
convenient and intelligible.
779 On Byrd’s frankness, see: Smith, Inside the G rea t H ouse, 199-204; Treckel, ‘“ The Empire o f  my 
heart’,” 125-6. On the w ays that that frankness was “coded” in Byrd’s diary, see: Kenneth A. 
Lockridge, The D iary, an d  Life, o f  W illiam B yrd  II o f  Virginia, 7-8.
780 Tinling, C orrespondence o f  The Three W illiam B yrds, 1: 402.
781 Albert Ellery Bergh, ed. The W ritings o f  Thomas Jefferson  (W ashington, DC: Thom as Jefferson  
M emorial A ssociation, 1903), 13: 268.
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Jefferson went on for several pages of equations, imagining generation after 
generation of people “cohabit[ing],” until he was satisfied that “two crosses with pure 
white, and a third with any degree of mixture, however small, as clearing the issue of 
negro blood.”782 In an aside, Jefferson remarked that even that person, who was 
white according to his equations, might still be legally enslaved, because of the law of 
slavery by birth. Jefferson’s calculations were aimed not just at defining racial 
categories but about literally erasing blackness, if not the institution of slavery.
Jefferson’s reproductive calculations could not be more different from Byrd’s. 
Byrd espoused a vision of prolific reproduction, where fertile bodies combined in 
marital sexual bliss to birth innumerable strong and healthy children. For Jefferson, 
on the other hand, reproduction was rationalized, reduced to a series of equations. 
There are no bodies in Jefferson’s mathematical modeling, only “crossings” who 
“cohabit” in order to produce “issue,” who then themselves cohabit and cross. For 
Byrd, reproduction was a public good that should be encouraged by any means; for 
Jefferson, reproduction was rational, scientific, mathematical, and predictable, and the 
state’s role was to categorize births according to hierarchical labels of race and 
servitude. For Byrd, reproduction was a bodily phenomenon, inextricably linked to 
marriage and sexuality (which for him ought to be co-defined). For Jefferson, 
reproduction -  especially the reproduction of black, mixed-race, and enslaved people
-  was an abstract process divorced from human relationships. Finally, for Byrd, 
reproduction was a means of growing an implicitly white colonial population. For 
Jefferson, reproduction and state policy regarding reproduction was always about race
-  racial categories, hierarchy, and domination.
782 Bergh, ed., The W ritings o f  Thomas Jefferson, 270.
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The purpose of this chapter is to explore the transition between the prolific 
reproduction promoted by Byrd and the rational reproduction calculated by Jefferson. 
The period bookended by these two men’s lives was one of tremendous political, 
cultural, and social change ranging from the Enlightenment to scientific and 
democratic revolutions. As Western society lurched into modernity, even the most 
basic intimate relations were altered: gender ideology transformed, birth rates fell, 
and elite marriage relationships were redefined. Michel Foucault posited that, with 
the combined changes that pushed the Western world into modernity came a new 
organization of the state’s power over people’s intimate lives: “the ancient right to 
take life or let live was replaced by a power io foster  life or disallow it to the point of 
death.”783 This new power, which Foucault termed biopower, involved “the set of 
mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became 
the object of a political strategy... [in which] modem Western societies took on board 
the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species.”784 For Foucault, 
capitalism required wholly new understandings of the relationship between the body 
and society: the basic biological processes of life (e.g., birth, sex, death) were to be
• J O C
regulated in order to produce the most profitable outcomes. Therefore, into this 
new modem world came a new, scientific understanding of the reproductive body, 
and supervision and intervention in order to develop an ideal population.786 In short, 
biopower was the state’s modem project of developing rational population strategies.
783 M ichel Foucault, H istory o f  Sexuality, 138. Emphasis in original.
784 M ichel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population , trans. M ichael Senellart (N Y : Picador, 2009), 1.
785 Foucault, H istory o f  Sexuality, 140-1.
786 Foucault, H istory o f  Sexuality, 139.
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Foucault’s understanding of biopower helps us to understand how Byrd’s lusty 
reproducing bodies were replaced by Jefferson’s coldly abstract equations.
This chapter will use a postcolonial reading of Foucault’s concept of biopower 
to examine competing reproductive discourses in colonial Virginia. The English 
colonial project was first understood within the discourse of prolific reproduction. 
Within this discourse, reproduction was understood to be inherently natural and 
godly. Taking seriously the biblical command to “be fruitful and multiply,” this 
discourse saw profuse reproduction as the ideal, and the state’s role concerning 
reproduction was to encourage population growth. Within this discourse, Virginia 
was imagined as a fertile garden waiting to be exploited -  and peopled -  by English 
colonizers. This discourse, though tenacious, was challenged by the actual 
experience of colonialism. Alongside the discourse of prolific reproduction came a 
new discourse, which saw unchecked fertility as threatening to colonial order.
Instead, reproduction was reimagined as rational -  orderly, predictable, abstract, and 
adhering to the laws of science. Even as the colonial state continued to prioritize 
populating the “empty” land of the colony, managing that population -  creating an 
ideal colonial population -  arose as a new priority. Central to the discourse of 
rational reproduction were concern about racial purity: reproduction became a tool to 
separate, categorize, and define races. While these two discourses would exist 
simultaneously, they bore fundamentally different relationships to the colonial 
project: while the discourse of prolific reproduction was one of the earliest 
justifications for English colonialism, the discourse of rational reproduction was itself 
a product of the colonial project.
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* * *
From their first voyages to the New World, English colonizers idealized 
America as an exceptionally fertile, fruitful land uniquely suited for the development 
of English colonies. Well into the eighteenth century, the English colonial project 
mirrored English views o f reproduction, where colonialism depended on and would 
be accomplished by the creation of a large population for this new fertile land. The 
discourse of prolific reproduction would be remarkably tenacious, surviving for 
several generations, well into the eighteenth century. We see it not only in the early 
documents of colonialism (such as colonial booster texts and Virginia’s earliest 
statutes) but also in the 18th century letters of the planter William Byrd II, and in the 
Virginia Gazette, the Williamsburg newspaper that served the colony beginning in 
1736.
The English vision of a fertile, virgin land meshed perfectly with the discourse 
of prolific reproduction, which demanded childbearing that would answer the Biblical 
commandment that man “be fruitful and multiply.” Susan Klepp has argued that, in 
the early modem period, women’s reproductive role was defined by frequent 
childbearing: women’s bodies were described both in print and in private as 
“teeming,” “breeding,” “flourishing,” or “fruitful.”787 One print example of the 
discourse of prolific reproduction was Aristotle’s Master Piece (the most popular 
medical book in England and the colonies during the eighteenth century), which
788purported to discover to the reader the “secrets” of sex, generation, and childbirth.
787 Klepp, “Revolutionary B odies,” 917.
788 R oy Porter, ‘“ The Secrets o f  Generation D isp lay’d ’,” 4; Otho T. Beall, Jr., “A ristotle’s Master Piece  
in America: A  Landmark in the Folklore o f  M edicine,” W illiam  an d  M ary Q uarterly  20 , no. 2 (1963): 
209.
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In his exegesis of Aristotle's Master Piece, Roy Porter described the book as 
remarkably positive (if “pronuptialist and pronatalist”) in its approach to sexuality 
and reproduction: so long as it took place within marriage, sex and its pleasures were 
“portrayed as nature’s way of ensuring generation and safeguarding the life of the 
species within the wider rhythms of the cosmos.”789 That connection between nature 
and human reproduction can be seen in seventeenth-century Virginia wills in which 
testators requested a Christian burial by metaphorically “bequeathing” their bodies 
“to my Mother the earth from whence it came.”790 Even in these explicitly Christian 
documents (the same wills make clear that the testator’s soul was bequeathed to God 
or to Jesus), an explicit connection was drawn between nature, fertility, earth, and 
motherhood. In some ways, the discourse of prolific reproduction was positive for 
women: it embraced a certain form of women’s sexuality, even affirming that 
sexuality as reflective of nature and God’s plan.
Nevertheless, the early modem connection between reproduction and nature 
should not be idealized. First, the discourse of prolific reproduction was deeply 
essentialist, defining women’s lives by their childbearing. Second, the discourse of 
prolific reproduction, while it embraced women’s reproductive role, defined that role 
in masculine terms. Early modern theories of human generation defined the human 
body as inherently masculine, with the female body being a lesser version of the 
male.791 This idea of reproduction as inherently masculine was not just academic; it 
permeated popular medical texts as well. Mary Fissell has noted the ways that early
789 Porter, ‘T h e  Secrets o f  Generation,” 13, 15.
790 York D O W  1: 277; York DOW  2: 154.
791 Laqueur, “Orgasm, Generation, and the Politics o f  Reproductive B io logy ,” 1-41; Jordanova, 
“Interrogating the Concept o f  Reproduction,” 369-386.
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modern English domestic medical texts, while deeply ensconced in the discourse of 
prolific reproduction, increasingly used male-centered metaphors for human 
reproduction. Metaphors of arable land, craft labor, and formal gardening -  all rooted 
in nature, but also all masculine professions and pursuits -  were used to describe 
female reproductivity. As Fissell argues:
[These metaphors] played upon images of the female, making landscape 
highly gendered. The land was a woman, a woman tamed and controlled, 
alluring and erotic. Men planted, constructed, and enclosed her in ways
7Q?
congruent with cultural expectations of women’s behavior.
In this way, the discourse of prolific reproduction imagined a feminine natural world 
upon which men must act in order to fulfill God’s plan.
The discourse of prolific reproduction found a conceptual match with the 
early modem British colonial project. That colonial project, as exemplified in 
colonial booster texts, emphasized the unbounded fertility of American spaces; this 
was a “virgin” land just waiting to be exploited by British agriculture and industry. 
Kathleen Brown makes clear the connections between the British characterization of 
Virginia as “virgin,” empty land and their gendering of Native Americans as 
feminine, ineffectual stewards of that land. These twin discourses, both rooted in the 
belief that prolific reproduction and large populations were the ideal, provided the 
basis for English conquest.793 Joyce Chaplin makes a similar argument, 
demonstrating the ways that English colonizers justified their conquest by claiming
792 F issell, “Gender and Generation,” 437 . On the gendered connection betw een fem ininity and nature, 
see Sherry Ortner, “Is Fem ale to M ale as Nature is to Culture?” in Woman, C ulture an d  Society, ed. 
M ichelle Zim balist R osaldo and Louise Lamphere (Stanford, CA: Stanford U niversity Press, 1974), 
67-87.
793 Brown, G ood  Wives, N asty  Wenches, an d  Anxious P atriarchs, 56-64.
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that Natives had insufficiently populated American lands.794 Jennifer Morgan argues 
that these colonial metaphors of fertility originated in early travel writings which 
viewed African women’s bodies as simultaneously savage and fertile; this fertility, 
Morgan argued, provided a discursive basis for the exploitation of both colonial 
colonized lands and colonized bodies.795
According to these discourses of reproduction and colonialism, much as a 
pregnant body grows, or a family multiplies, the British commonwealth would 
expand with colonialism through conversion of the Indians and expansion to 
American lands. This connection between fertility and expansion can be seen in both 
the texts that advertised and boosted the colonial project, and in the Virginia legal 
archive as well. The Virginia writer John Hammond put this succinctly in the 
opening of his 1656 book, Leah and Rachel, or the Two Fruitfull Sisters Virginia and 
Mary-land: “It is the glory of every Nation to enlarge themselves.”796 Throughout 
his text, Hammond emphasized that the success and growth of the colony would rest 
on the fertility of Virginia’s land itself. Virginia’s founders, who continued to believe 
that the colony would grow even after the disaster at Roanoke, embraced this 
pronatalist mission. In the first and second colonial charters (in 1606 and 1609), they 
pledged that not only settlers but “every of their children, which shall happen to be
794 Chaplin, S u bject M atters, 157-200. See also: Gordon Sayre, “N ative American Sexuality in the 
E yes o f  the Beholders 1535-1710 ,” in Sex an d  Sexuality in E arly  A m erica , ed. Merrill D. Smith (N Y: 
N ew  York U niversity Press, 1998), 35-54.
795 M organ, L aboring Women, 12-49.
796 John Hammond, Leah an d  Rachel, or, the Two Fruitfull S isters V irginia an d  M ary-L and: Their 
P resen t Condition, Im partially sta ted  an d  re la ted  (London, 1656), Early English B ooks 131: E .865, 1. 
For another exam ple, see Edward Bland, The d iscovery  o f  N ew  B rittaine  (London, 1651), Early 
English B ooks 3155: 307.3. For a reading o f  Hammond that (uncritically) em phasizes Ham m ond’s use 
o f  metaphors o f  fertility, see Robert D. Arner, “A N ote on John Ham m ond’s ‘Leah and R achel,” ’ 
Southern L iterary Journal 6:1 (1973), 77-80.
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797bom” in Virginia would enjoy the rights and privileges of English subjects. That
the colony should be home to a growing English population was implicit.
The experience of actual colonization interrupted this idealized vision of a 
fertile, yielding Virginia, but English colonizers still embraced the discourse of 
prolific reproduction. Virginia’s early years were marred by much-publicized deaths 
from starvation, sickness, and war with the not-so-docile Indians, which would seem 
to interrupt the belief that America was a lush Eden just waiting to be settled by 
fertile English bodies. But from Virginia’s founding, English colonizers believed that 
births would always outweigh inevitable deaths. This notion that births cancelled out 
deaths can be seen in seventeenth century ballad titled “Newes from Virginia,” which 
recounts the deaths of two people on the voyage to the colony:
And for the loss of these two soules,
Which were accounted deere,
A sonne and daughter then was bome,
And were baptized there.798 
While the death of two people at sea was a “deere” loss, they were providentially 
replaced by two children bom and baptized in the colony, thus literally expanding the 
realm of Christendom into the new colony. As Joyce Chaplin has argued, in a culture 
that had only recently survived the plague, the birth of children was needed to 
outmatch a dying population, and marriage and childbearing took on dual meanings 
in the colonies, both as replacing that lost generation and in populating the new
797 Hening 1: 64, 95.
798 “N ew es from V irginia,” in An A m erican G arland: Being a  C ollection  o f  B allads R elating to  
A m erica, 1563-1759, ed. C. H. Firth (Oxford: B.H. B lackw ell, 1915), 9.
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land.799 The first births in the colony -  including the famous Virginia Dare of 
Raleigh’s colony at Roanoke -  had deep cultural resonance.800
Therefore, even in the face of the hardships that colonization brought, English 
colonizers continued to embrace the pronatalist discourse of prolific reproduction, 
seeing fertility as a providential gift from God and a sign of God’s approval for the 
colonial project. John Hammond, who referred to Virginia and Maryland as “fruitfull 
sisters,” claimed that it was only Virginia’s natural fertility that had kept it solvent 
through the difficult early years: the two colonies were “in danger to moulder away,” 
and there was not “any thing but the fertility and natural gratefulnesse of them, left to 
remedy to prevent it.”801 Hammond averred again and again that “the Country is 
fruitfull, apt for all and more then England can or does produce,” tying Virginia’s 
natural fertility to the success of the colonial venture.802 The fruitfulness of Virginia 
was recognized by Virginia’s government when it passed the 1646 Act for Binding 
Out of Children, which set up an apprenticeship program for poor children: “God 
Almighty, among many his other blessings, hath vouchsafed increase of children to 
this colony, who are now multiplied to a considerable number.”803 Like those two 
births that outweighed the deaths at sea, the “increase of children” in the colony was 
sign of God’s providence.
The discourse of prolific reproduction, rooted as it was in deeply held 
religious beliefs, gender ideology, and nascent colonialist and racial discourses, 
would survive into the eighteenth century. William Byrd II’s letters provide us with a
799 Chaplin, Subject M atters, 127-9.
800 Chaplin, Subject M atters, 155.
801 Hammond, Leah an d  Rachel, 1-2.
802 Hammond, Leah an d  Rachel, 6, 10.
803 Hening 1: 336-7.
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remarkable account of the ways that the discourse of prolific reproduction impacted 
this elite planter’s thoughts on both the colony at large and his wife’s own 
pregnancies. Not only did William Byrd II espouse the belief in a fertile Virginia, he 
proposed that women in Virginia were similarly fertile. For Byrd, Virginia was a new 
Eden, where “men evade the original curse of hard labour,” and women “bring forth 
children with little sorrow, and hardly any danger.”804 Native women, Byrd claimed, 
had no need for assistance of any kind at their births: “They retire to some lonely 
place, when they find their pains comeing on, and leaning upon a crutch, leave all to 
the midwifery of nature.”805 According to Byrd, easy childbearing was facilitated by 
Virginia’s climate and was thus available to English women as well. When Byrd’s 
wife, Lucy, was pregnant for the fourth time, Byrd posited that her frequent 
pregnancies were “certainly oweing to the climate,” in which, he believed, even
R06elderly women could easily get pregnant.
Throughout his letters, Byrd expressed admiration and amazement at 
extraordinary reproductive events, which he understood within the discourse of 
prolific reproduction. He marveled at the reproductive cycles of plants, which 
(unlike human generation, hidden as it was in the female body) were “by a good 
microscope.. .plainly discovered.”807 Human reproduction, on the other hand, could 
be made visible only through one’s numerous progeny, something he hoped for
804 Tinling, The C orrespondence o f  The Three W illiam B yrds, 356-8.
805 Ibid.
806 Tinling, The C orrespondence o f  The Three W illiam  B yrds, 402.
807 Tinling, The C orrespondence o f  The Three W illiam B yrds, 536-7 . On the centrality o f  sexualized  
and gendered metaphors in the developm ent o f  the science o f  botany in the late seventeenth century 
and early eighteenth century, see Schiebinger, N a tu re ’s B ody, 18-23. Interestingly, Schiebinger argues 
that such metaphors o f  reproductive marital sexuality were fundamentally conservative, em phasizing  
marital, reproductive sexuality over more modern, com panionate marriage. Schiebinger, N a tu re ’s 
B ody, 25-8.
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himself. His fondest recollection of York in England was “a tomb-stone in the 
minster of Dr. Honywood, upon which it is recorded that his grand mother livd to see 
367 persons of her legitimate posterity namely 16 children 114 grand children, 228 
great-grandchildren, and nine of the 4th generation.”808 He later hoped that his wife 
would “live to see as many of her descendants as my Lady Honiwood.”809 
Sometimes, Byrd’s comments tested the boundaries of eighteenth-century gentility, 
but his adherence to the discourse of prolific reproduction (and his love for bawdy 
jokes) won out over social propriety. For example, Byrd commented on Lucy’s best 
friend Mary Jeffreys Dunn’s pregnancy by mentioning that “there goes a prophecy 
about, that in the eastern parts of Virginia a parson’s wife will, in the year of our 
Lord, 1710, have four children at a birth, one of which will be an admiral, and another 
archbishop of Canterbury.”810 He hoped that his joke would not be rejected because 
Mrs. Dunn had become “too demure a prude, now she is related to the church.”811 
For Byrd, prolific reproduction was not just desirable, but magical and prophetic.
Ultimately, Byrd saw prolific reproduction -  and, specifically, Lucy Byrd’s 
prolific reproduction -  as a necessary boon to the colony. In a 1729 letter, Byrd 
complained that Lucy would not be travelling soon because of pregnancy, and, 
anticipating many future pregnancies, Byrd declared that Lucy “will hardly be in a 
travelling condition till she’s towards 50.”812 Byrd saw Lucy’s frequent pregnancies 
as a humorous sign of her animalistic nature (which he ascribed to all women): “I
808 Tinling, The C orrespondence o f  The Three W illiam B yrds, 214.
809 Tinling, The C orrespondence o f  The Three W illiam B yrds, 402.
810 Tinling, The C orrespondence o f  The Three W illiam B yrds, 271.
811 Ibid.
812 Tinling, The C orrespondence o f  The Three W illiam B yrds, 391-2.
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know nothing but a rabit that breeds faster.”813 His attempts to slow down her 
childbearing, he complained, were for naught: “I know no remedy but to make a trip 
to England some times, and then she must be content to lye fallow til I come back. 
But then she’ll be revenged of me, and redeem her lost years by having 2 at a time 
when I return.”814 Byrd’s characterization of his wife’s childbearing exemplifies the 
complications of the discourse of prolific reproduction. Byrd forgave Lucy her 
fertility (even as he claimed he wished he could “disswade her from it”) because 
childbearing fulfilled the goals of the colonial project: “The truth of it is, she has her 
reasons for procreateing so fast. She lives in an infant country that wants nothing but 
people.”815 For Byrd, childbearing was necessary for the colonial project, yet 
women’s fertile bodies, like the land of the colony itself, were wild, fecund, and 
unpredictable (or predictable only in their fertility). Unlike plants, women’s 
reproductive cycles were not “plainly discovered”; Byrd’s only means of controlling 
Lucy’s childbearing was to flee to the other side of the Atlantic. While Byrd 
idealized prolific reproduction, there is ambivalence here: what did it mean that the 
future of the colony, of mankind itself, was dependent on fickle women and their 
mysterious bodies? Further, what did it mean that Byrd, who saw himself as a 
paragon of modernity and gentility, embraced prophecy, magic, and his own 
powerlessness because of his belief in the necessity and desirability of prolific 
reproduction?
813 On Byrd’s view  o f  w om en, see: Lockridge, The D iary, an d  Life, o f  W illiam B yrd  II, 95; Lockridge, 
On the Sources o f  P a triarch a l R age, 30-45; Kenneth A. Lockridge, “C olonial Self-Fashioning: 
Paradoxes and Pathologies in the Construction o f  G enteel Identity in Eighteenth-Century A m erica,” in 
Through a  G lass D arkly: R eflections on P ersonal Identity in E arly A m erica , ed. Ronald Hoffm an and 
Fredrika Teute (Chapel Hill: U niversity o f  North Carolina Press, 1997), 287-301; Treckel, “The 
Empire o f  my heart,” 137.
814 Tinling, The C orrespondence o f  The Three W illiam  B yrds, 391-2.
815 Ibid.
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William Byrd II inhabited a different world than the founders of the colony, 
yet he, like that first generation, adhered to the belief that the colonial project required 
prolific reproduction. This belief found a wider colonial audience in the form of the 
readership of The Virginia Gazette, which began publication in 1736 and continued to 
be published under several different editors. Among the news reprinted from British 
newspapers and gathered from private correspondents, advertisements, and reprinted 
essays from magazines like The Spectator, were ephemeral notices of unusual events 
that occurred throughout the British Empire. Many of these notices told stories of 
extraordinary births. Stories of successful multiple births (such as twins, triplets, and 
quadruplets), large multi-generational families (like the Honiwoods so admired by 
William Byrd), and elderly parents successfully having babies showed up frequently 
in the pages of the Gazette. These stories show a continued fascination with prolific 
reproduction by Virginia’s gentry (the prime readership of the newspaper). Another 
category of extraordinary birth stories, which recounted the births of royalty, filled a 
significant amount of column space in this weekly, 4-page newspaper. These stories 
point to the political meanings of extraordinary births and prolific reproduction. Even 
so, as we will see, the discourse of prolific reproduction did not fit perfectly into this 
new medium.
Successful multiple births were newsworthy because they tend to be relatively 
rare and they likely challenged the medical abilities of birth attendants in eighteenth
o *
century Virginia. Therefore, examples of successful multiple births pepper the 
pages of the Gazette. These notices typically included two pieces of relevant
816 There are three mentions o f  successful multiple births in the York county records. York DOW  14: 
348; York D OW  16: 267, 280, 287; York JO 3: 358, 384.
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information: first, the event of the birth, and second, the health of the mother and 
children. One such example is this short notice of an English birth in 1739: “They 
write from Wells in Sommersetshire, that a Woman of that Place was delivered of 
Four Sons and a Daughter at a Birth, and that they are all Christened and likely to 
live.”817 Women who had experienced more than one multiple birth were especially 
remarkable. In a 1736 notice, a woman who had given birth to quadruplets was 
doubly fascinating because of her history: ‘T he Woman has been married but 4 
Years, and lain in 3 Times; at First she had 2 Female Children, at the Second 2 Males, 
and the Third 4.. .”818 Multiple births, rare as they were, pointed to a remarkable and 
tantalizing fertility. Readers were invited to imagine multiplying sets of twins, all 
marked by the auspiciousness of their births. For example, a remarkable baptism in 
Marblehead, Massachusetts, invited the reader to imagine the coincidence of many 
multiple births: “Last Lord’s Day were bro’t to Baptism in the new Meeting-house 
here, 2 Children, which were the Third Pair of Female Twins of the same Parents: 
They were brought out by the first Pair, who are now Women grown, were held up to 
Baptism by their Father, who was a Twin, and Baptiz’d by a Minister who was a 
Twin.”819 Such a baptism was a blessed event, indeed.
Along with multiple births, large families were celebrated in the pages of the 
Virginia Gazette as examples of prolific reproduction. Some notices resembled the 
Honiwood tombstone that William Byrd II so admired. In 1739, the Gazette reprinted 
a Rhode Island obituary from 1739 for Mrs. Mary Hazzard, who was praised for her
817 Virginia G azette, Parks #151 , June 22, 1739, page 1. For other similar exam ples, see Virginia  
G azette  Parks #53 , Sept. 9, 1737, page 3 and Virginia G azette , Hunter #9 , Feb. 28, 1751, page 3.
818 Virginia G azette , Parks #15 , N ovem ber 12, 1736, page 4. For another exam ple, see Virginia  
G azette , Hunter #61 , Feb. 27, 1752, page 2.
819 Virginia G azette , Parks #82 , Feb. 24, 1737/8, page 3.
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huge family: “This Gentlewoman has had Five Hundred Children, Grand-children 
and Great-Grandchildren; and has now left behind her living Two Hundred and Five 
of the aforesaid Number.”820 Other examples highlight elderly people who survived 
to see numerous generations of their progeny. In one such example, the birth of a 
baby girl whose maternal great-great-great grandmother was still living inspired the 
following riddle: “Rise up Daughter, and go to thy Daughter, for her Daughter’s 
Daughter hath a Daughter.”821 The said great-great-great grandmother is described as 
“about 92 Years of Age, is in perfect Health, has all her Senses clear, and hopes to see 
five Generations more.”822 These celebratory stories showed the aspirations of people 
who believed that prolific reproduction was a measure of a life well lived.
Another category of extraordinary births, births by elderly parents, frequently 
found its way onto the pages of the Gazette. These stories show not only how the 
discourse of prolific reproduction embraced births that challenged social and 
biological norms, but also the extent to which marriage and fertility were codefined. 
One such story recounted the birth of a “Lusty Boy” by a 64-year old woman, 
echoing the biblical story of Sarah giving birth to Isaac.823 More common were 
stories of elderly men who married young wives. An Irish man, who died at the age 
of 112, was celebrated for his marriage, when he was 84, to a 14-year-old girl, “by
820 V irginia G azette, Parks #140 , April 6 , 1739, page 2. For more exam ples, see Virginia G azette, 
Hunter # 20 , M ay 16, 1751, page 2; Virginia G azette , Hunter # 69 , April 24, 1752, page 2; Virginia  
G azette, Hunter #87 , Aug. 28, 1752, page 2
821 Virginia G azette , Parks #155 , July 20, 1739, page 2. For more exam ples, see Virginia G azette, 
Hunter #4 , Jan. 24, 1751, page 3; Virginia G azette, Royle, Feb. 12, 1762, page 2.
822 Ibid.
823 Virginia G azette , Parks #100 , June 30, 1738, page 2. For another exam ple, see Virginia G azette, 
Parks #36 , April 8, 1737, page 4.
300
whom he had about twenty Children, she bearing a Child every year.”824 This fertile 
marriage was credited, along with exercise and an appetite for alcohol, for his 
longevity. While these stories were sometimes jocular in tone, they uniformly 
expressed the sense that such unions should be sexual and fertile ones -  and readers 
were implicitly invited to imagine the sexual habits of the people whose lives were 
recounted in the Gazette. For example, when an 84-year-old Philadelphia man 
married “a young vigorous Nymph of Twenty-five,” the editor wished the couple “all 
possible nuptial Felicities!”825 This same issue of the Gazette devoted space to two 
other similar marriages, which show both that marriages between old men and young 
girls were not considered abnormal, and that those marriages were expected to be 
fertile. A local marriage announcement celebrated that “on Tuesday, the 3d 
Instant, was married, Mr. ROBERT FERGUS, of AMELIA County, aged 83, to Miss 
ANNE JONES, a Girl between 14 and 15, being his third Wife.”827 Printed alongside 
the Philadelphia notice, readers are implicitly invited to imagine the “nuptial 
felicities” of this local marriage. Another marriage, between an 89-year-old man and 
a 72-year-old woman, on the other hand, was derided because of the advanced age of 
the bride: the marriage “promises little Hopes of Success in the more common 
Effects of the matrimonial State.”828 A reader would easily pick up the subtext here:
824 V irginia G azette , Hunter # 73 , M ay 22, 1752, page 1. For another exam ple, see Virginia G azette, 
Parks # 73 , D ec. 23, 1737, page 2.
825 V irginia G azette , Rind #44 , March 12, 1767, page 2. In another reading, the em phasis on the word
“possib le” may be a jok e about age-related male im potence. This reading still supports the notion that
marriage -  even marriages with a wide age gap -  were expected to be sexual and fertile.
826 Brewer, B y Birth o r  Consent, 297-300 . Notably, child marriages were property arrangements, 
aim ed at consolidating property, and thus were more com m on am ong the m ost elite V irginians. For 
anyone serving out an indenture, o f  course, marriage would be delayed. Smith, Inside the G rea t 
H ouse, 127-8.
827 Virginia G azette, Rind # 44 , March 12, 1767, page 2.
828 Virginia G azette, Rind #44 , March 12, 1767, page 4.
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marriages were meant to be fertile, and marriages that did not (or would not) produce 
children were suspect.829
These extraordinary births -  multiple births, large families, and elderly parents 
-  all illustrate the continuing power of the discourse of prolific reproduction in the 
eighteenth century. Not only that, their placement in the Gazette underscored the 
importance of prolific childbearing to the colonial project. Note that these stories 
originated across the British empire: from the London metropole and the English 
countryside to Ireland to Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. 
Significantly, these were English births and marriages that were celebrated: there are 
no similar accounts of multiple births, large families, or elderly childbearing by 
Native women or women of African descent in the Gazette. In this way, we see the 
unspoken racial implications of John Hammond’s dictum that “It is the glory of every 
Nation to enlarge themselves.”830 Within the discourse of prolific reproduction, the 
success of colonialism depended on and celebrated the multiplying of white colonial 
bodies.
Another category of extraordinary reproduction -  births in the English royal 
family -  made this connection between prolific reproduction and national identity 
explicit for English readers of the Virginia Gazette: with the prolific reproduction of 
the royal family, the nation grew and survived. Throughout the eighteenth century, 
the Virginia Gazette ran frequent announcements of royal pregnancies, births, 
baptisms, and birth celebrations. These announcements were readers’ primary
829 A s Mary Beth Norton has argued in her reading o f  the seventeenth-century A ccom ac County 
Thom as/Thom asine Hall case, marriage and fertility were so co-defined that Hall was prohibited from  
marrying because the county court believed Hall was unable to have children. Norton, “Communal 
D efinitions o f  Gendered Identity,” 60-61.
830 Hammond, Leah an d  Rachel, 1.
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window into royal events. When Princess Augusta gave birth to Prince George (who 
would become King George III) in 1738, the Gazette ran six separate announcements 
of the birth. The news first arrived in Williamsburg via the passengers of the ship 
Forward, and then was more formally announced via a reprint from the London 
Gazette:
On Wednesday Se’nnight, at half an Hour past Seven in the Morning, her 
Royal Highness the Princess of Wales was safely deliver’d of a Prince, who 
was immediately christen’d by the Name of GEORGE; which was occasion’d 
by some dangerous Symptoms that appear’d at first, though they are now
O ')  I
happily over, and the Princess likewise is in a very good way.
Other royal births were similarly chronicled in the Gazette.*32 Indeed, 
coverage of royal reproduction often began well before the actual birth, as 
pregnancies were carefully recorded in the pages of newspapers across the Empire. 
For example, in 1736, the Gazette reported, “Yesterday the News that her Royal
Q-)-)
Highness the Princess of Orange is with Child, came confirmed.” Birth 
announcements also extended to the lesser British aristocracy. Soon, Virginians 
began imitating these birth announcements, as local gentry planters began publishing
831 Announcem ent from the F orw ard : Virginia G azette , Parks 109, Sept. 1, 1738, page 3. 
A nnouncem ent from the L ondon G aze tte : V irginia G azette , Parks # 110 , Sept. 8, 1738, page 3. Other 
announcements: Virginia G azette , Parks #111 , Sept. 15, 1738, page 3; Virginia G azette , Parks #113 , 
Sept. 29 , 1738; V irginia G azette , Parks #114 , Sept. 29, 1738, page 3.
832 Virginia G azette , Hunter #  13, March 28, 1751, page 2; Virginia G azette, Hunter # 41 , Oct. 11, 1751, 
page 3; V irginia G azette , Hunter #47 , N ov. 21, 1751, page 2; Virginia G azette, R oyle, Oct. 25 , 1765 
supplement, page 2; Virginia G azette, Rind, D ec. 11, 1766, page 1.
833 Virginia G azette , Parks #10 , Oct. 8, 1736, page 4. Other similar pregnancy announcements: 
Virginia G azette , Parks # 122 , D ec. 1, 1738, page 2, 4; Virginia G azette , Parks # 170 , N ov. 29 , 1739, 
page 3, 4; Virginia G azette , Parks #177 , D ec. 21, 1739, page 3.
34 V irginia G azette , Parks #87 , March 31, 1738, page 3; V irginia G azette, Parks #110 , Sept. 8, 1738, 
page 3; Virginia G azette , Parks #111 , Sept. 15, 1738, page 4; Virginia G azette, Parks # 129 , Jan. 19, 
1739, page 3.
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similar messages regarding their own growing families: “We hear from Goochland 
County, That Mrs. Randolph, Wife of William Randolph, of Tuckahoe, Esq; was 
safely delivered of a Daughter, on New-Year’s Day, to the great Joy of the Family; 
they having been marry’d about 4 Years, and had no Child before.”835
While the Randolph birth was undoubtedly important to the local gentry, 
births within the British royal family had profound political significance and thus 
were part of constructing eighteenth century British nationalism in a colonial space. 
These births cemented the alliances between royal families that governed war and 
peace in Europe. For example, the announcement of the pregnancy of the Duchess of 
Lorraine (which coincided with birthday celebrations for the Austrian Empress) was 
embedded in a report of a Russian treaty that had recently been negotiated in 
Vienna.836 More viscerally for Virginia readers, though, these announcements 
offered English colonials a chance to participate in nationalistic celebrations. While 
the actual announcements were quite concise, considerable column space was 
devoted to detailed descriptions of celebrations of these royal births. Upon the birth 
of Princess Augusta, the Gazette provided descriptions of celebrations both at the 
palace and throughout the British Isles, including London, Edinburgh, and Dublin. 
These accounts provided exhaustive detail of royal visitors to the family, gifts offered 
to the new baby, and lavish public celebrations.837 As if to play up the nationalist 
intent of these notices, descriptions of the celebrations of royal births in other 
countries were depicted as wasteful and even harmful to those countries. Fires and
835 Virginia G azette , Parks #80 , Feb. 10, 1738, page 3.
836 Virginia G azette , Parks # 1 7 , N ov. 26, 1736, page 3.
837 Virginia G azette , Parks # 67 , N ov. 11, 1737, page 1, 3; Virginia G azette, Parks #69 , N ov. 25, 1737,
page 3, 4; Virginia G azette , Parks #71 , D ec. 9 , 1737, page 3.
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deaths marred the celebrations of the birth of the Duke of Burgundy in France, at 
which the starving populace held banners which read, “Amidst our Sufferings we
;  • »838rejoice.
These descriptions of public celebrations provided Virginians an opportunity 
to witness from afar the rituals of the British crown, and thus to affirm their own 
Britishness. Public speeches celebrating the births were reprinted in the Gazette, 
inviting the reader to participate in the patriotism that the birth events inspired. 
Lengthy speeches given by government officials in honor of the births were reprinted 
in full in the Gazette. These speeches not only celebrated the birth, but spoke to the 
political meanings of royal reproduction. For example, a 1738 statement by the Lord 
Mayor of London drew an explicit connection between the “very happy Event” of the
D ’l Q
birth of Prince George and the continued “Welfare and Prosperity of this Nation.” 
The Lord Mayor’s 1751 statement, reprinted in the Gazette, makes clear that the 
survival of the nation depended on the survival of the royal family’s line:
...we are truly sensible of the Blessings we enjoy under Your Majesty’s 
Government, and are convinced, that the Security of our Rights and Liberties, 
in Time to come, depends on the Protestant Succession established in your 
illustrious House; it is, at this Time, a peculiar Satisfaction to us, that we have 
once more the Honour of congratulating Your Majesty on the Increase of 
Your Royal Family.840
838 Virginia G azette , Hunter #52 , D ec. 19, 1751, page 2. For other similar exam ples, see Virginia  
G azette, Hunter #47 , N ov. 21, 1751, page 2; Virginia G azette , Hunter #71 , M ay 8, 1752, page 2.
839 V irginia G azette , Parks # 1 10 , Sept. 8, 1738, page 3.
840 V irginia G azette , Hunter #47 , N ov. 21, 1751, page 2. For other exam ples o f  similar speeches, see: 
Virginia G azette , Parks #68 , N ov. 18, 1737, page 3; Virginia G azette , Parks #131 , Feb. 23, 1739, page 
3-4; Virginia G azette, Parks # 145 , May 11, 1739, page 3; Virginia G azette , Parks #154 , July 13, 1739, 
page 3.
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Speeches delivered at birthday celebrations for the King also drew this connection. 
When the Mayor of Bath in England proclaimed that he was “truly sensible how 
auspicious the Birth of His Majesty [the Prince of Wales] was to this Nation,” he 
explicitly tied that birth to the survival of the nation and English liberty:
A Birth, to which we owe the Continuance of those invaluable Blessings, 
which our successful Struggles for Liberty have procur’d us in that glorious 
Act of Succession; A Birth, to which we are indebted, Sir, for your royal 
Person, in whose Presence we enjoy all possible Happiness...841 
An “ODE for his Majesty’s Birth-Day, 1736” exaggerated its subject’s qualities, but 
it also drew this connection between the birth of royalty and the success of the nation. 
In the “Ode,” King George II is credited with bringing peace and prosperity to 
Britain; George’s reign promised to British subjects that “Your Commerce, your Arts, 
/ Shall all flourish and sing.”842 The birth of the King -  “the happy Day / That gave 
the Godlike Hero life” -  was the origin of this blessed time.843
Virginians participated in these birth-centered displays of nationalism in 
multiple ways. Local celebrations imitated the glory of English fetes. King George 
II’s birthday in 1739 was celebrated in Williamsburg by the display of flags, three 
cannon volleys, illumination of public buildings and private homes, and a ball at the 
Governor’s house: “ .. .the Night was concluded with great Demonstrations of Joy, 
suitable to the happy Occasion, and agreeable to the distinguish’d Loyalty of this
841 Virginia G azette, Parks #135 , March 2, 1739, page 3. For other celebrations o f  royal birthdays, see: 
Virginia G azette , Parks #122 , D ec. 1, 1739, page 3; V irginia G azette , Parks #135 , March 2, 1739; 
Virginia G azette , Parks #156 , July 27, 1739, page 2; Virginia G azette, Parks #181 , Jan. 18, 1740, page 
1- 2 .
842 Virginia G azette , Parks #28 , Feb. 1 1 ,1 7 3 7 , page 1 -2.
843 Ibid.
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Colony in general, to His Majesty, and His Illustrious Family.”844 Significantly, 
though, the primary means of observing royal births -  both in the sense of witnessing 
the birth, and of marking their importance -  was through print. Virginians, unable to 
participate in the rebirth of the British nation in Britain itself, could do so 
imaginatively through the consumption of these numerous stories printed in the 
Virginia Gazette.
These print-based celebrations of royal births show the complex and 
sometimes tenuous nationalist connection that Anglo-Virginians felt to the mother 
country. Benedict Anderson has argued that newspapers provided the basis for 
modem nationalism through the development of “imagined communities.”845 
Specifically, Anderson emphasizes that colonial spaces -  because they were far-flung 
and connected to the metropole only through print -  were the first crucible for these 
imagined communities. Anderson focuses on the ways that creoles imagined 
themselves as communities, separate from the metropole; he does not examine the 
ways that, prior to democratic revolutions, creoles may have adhered to the metropole 
in forging their national identities. Further, while Anderson concentrates on creole 
identities as defined by their geographic placement, he is not concerned with the 
development of creole subjectivities or coloniality as such. Kathleen Wilson has 
argued that Anderson’s argument, while correctly focused on “cultural 
representations,” fails to recognize the relationship between colony and metropole: 
British print elided the “crueler aspects” of colonialism in favor of a more patriotic
844 V irginia G azette , Parks #170 , N ov. 2 , 1739, page 4. For other exam ples, see: V irginia G azette, 
Parks # 66 , N ov. 4 , 1737, page 4; V irginia G azette , Parks #118 , N ov. 3, 1738, page 5.
845 Benedict Anderson, Im agined Com m unities: R eflections on the O rigins an d  S pread  o f  N ationalism , 
2nd Edition (N Y: V erso, 1991), 5 0 ,6 2 .
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vision of empire.846 Wilson argues that British nationalism developed in part in order 
to exclude colonized and feminized bodies.847 Wilson’s formulation of British 
nationalism helps us to understand the competing nationalisms that were in play for 
colonial subjects: were they part of a creole imagined community, or were they part 
of the patriotic British empire marked by masculinity and whiteness?
We see, therefore, in the Virginia Gazette's celebration of royal reproduction 
a tinge of colonial anxiety. Kathleen Brown argues that, in the eighteenth century, 
Virginia elite masculine identity was marked by significant anxiety: “Conscious of 
being colonials whose dependent and marginal relationship to London diminished 
their status, [elite planter men] could never achieve enough success to reassure 
themselves that the foundation of their identity would not collapse.”848 Royal 
reproduction would seem to fit the discourse of prolific reproduction, where 
numerous royal births guaranteed the survival of the nation. Nevertheless, this 
constant attention to the celebrations of royal births only served to underscore the 
distance, both geographical and cultural, between Virginia and London. Virginians 
did not learn of royal births the way that people in London did, through the sound of 
cannon volleys and ringing church bells on the day of the birth; they learned through 
sketchy reports provided by sea captains months after the event. Celebrations of 
these births, no matter how heart-felt, paled in comparison as well. How could 
Williamsburg’s illuminated houses compete with the official celebrations that were so 
copiously described in the Gazette?
846 W ilson, “C itizenship, empire, and modernity,” 160-1.
847 W ilson, “C itizenship, empire and modernity,” 167-9.
848 Brown, G ood  Wives, N asty  Wenches, an d  Anxious P atriarchs, 319. See also Lockridge, The D iary, 
an d  Life, o f  W illiam B yrd  11, 29-31; Lockridge, “C olonial Self-Fashioning,” 287-290.
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If the meaning of royal reproduction stories shifted depending on the colonial
context, becoming not just about the rebirth of the British nation but about the
distance between colony and metropole, then do we need to re-examine the meanings
of the other prolific reproduction stories in the Virginia Gazette? Specifically, if the
colonial print context for stories of royal reproduction was significant in
understanding the meanings of those stories for Virginia readers, then how does that
context shift our understandings of other stories of prolific reproduction?
Newspapers were not simply repositories for text; as Anderson’s and Wilson’s
discussions of newspapers and nationalism make clear, colonial print culture did not
just reflect but created new and different ways of understanding the world. These
new understandings would inevitably impact colonial reproductive discourses -  as we
will see, the discourse of prolific reproduction was in competition with other
reproductive discourses more suited to the modem era.
* * *
The discourse of prolific reproduction had fueled the English colonial project, 
where English bodies, urged to “be fruitful and multiply,” would populate Virginia’s 
wilderness. As we have seen, that ancient discourse survived well into the eighteenth 
century in newspapers, letters, laws, and pamphlets. Yet the anxieties exposed by the 
Virginia Gazette's coverage of royal births begins to reveal the ways that the 
discourse of prolific reproduction faltered in the face of colonial subjectivities. Print 
representations of royal reproduction underscored the differences and distances 
separating Virginia and the mother country. That separation was further emphasized
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as Virginians began to reframe prolific reproduction not as an ideal, but as a curiosity 
or even a threat.
In the pages of the Gazette, alongside announcements of multiple births and 
royal celebrations came more disturbing stories of monstrous births. Where the 
discourse of prolific reproduction celebrated extraordinary births, monstrous births 
presented the possibility that prolific reproduction could go very wrong. In one such 
story, an English farmer “having a Cow that had been ill for some Time, [...] knock’d 
her o’th’Head; and when she was open’d, there were found in her Five Calves, all 
hair’d, and One Four Feet long.”849 Here was a multiple birth, albeit by an animal, 
that proved deadly and terrifying, or at least bizarre. Another story recounted the 
story of a “casual Poor” woman who miscarried three fetuses: “the first time with a 
Male Child, the next Day with a Female Child, and the third Time with a Monster, 
which had a Head and Body like a Toad, and a Tail like a Rat.”850 Other stories 
recount tales of monstrous births that challenged normal categorization. A monstrous 
calf bom in England was described as “about the Size of a Child of ten Years old,” 
with a face like “an old Man,” a chest that resembled female genitals, a “Spanish 
Mustacho,” and a complexion “equal to a French Foot soldier after a Summer’s
a c  i
Campaign.” This monstrous calf blurred the boundaries not only of human and 
animal, but of nation, age, and sex.852
849 Virginia G aze tte , Parks #92 , May 5, 1738, page 1. V irginia planter Landon Carter recorded a 
similar birth o f  a deform ed sheep in his diary in 1770. Greene, ed„ The D iary  o f  C olonel Landon  
C arter , 1: 353.
850 Virginia G aze tte , Parks #101 , July 7, 1738, page 3.
851 Virginia G azette , Hunter #90 , Sept. 29, 1752, page 2. For a description o f  a local tw o-headed calf, 
see: Virginia G azette , Parks # 132 , Feb. 9 . 1739, page 4.
852 On monsters in colonial discourse, see Chaplin, Subject M atters, 55, 137. On monstrous births as 
signs o f  fem ale fertility gone awry, see Parrish, A m erican C uriosity, 34-40.
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How were these stories of monstrous births read, and what do they reveal of 
Virginians’ ideas about reproduction in the eighteenth century? First, they must be 
put into the context of Virginia’s nascent print culture. For a colony that prided itself 
on its Englishness and modernity, Virginia was very late in developing a local print 
culture. A royal order specifically prohibited printing beginning in 1682, and that ban 
stayed in effect until 1730, when William Parks brought a press to Williamsburg. He 
began publication on the Virginia Gazette in 1736; by contrast, Boston had had a 
local newspaper since 1704.853 When the Gazette finally did begin publication, 
genteel readers needed instruction on print culture -  how newspapers should be read, 
consumed, and discussed. Newspapers were meant not just to report current events, 
but also to be both didactic and diversionary. An early letter to the printer of the 
Virginia Gazette offered this praise of the infant newspaper:
The Design you have undertaken of adding to the Instruction of your Readers, 
while you entertain them, and of mixing their Improvement with their 
Diversion; and the candid Reception, I understand, your Endeavours meet 
with from Gentleman of the highest Distinction, as well for their good, as 
great Qualities; and the natural Propensity we have to believe what we wish, 
give a solid and well-grounded Hope to all Lovers of Humanity, that we may 
see, in these our Days, Virtue and Good Manners encouraged, Vice and Folly 
depressed, and Mankind reformed.854
853 Lawrence C. Wroth, The C olon ia l P rin ter  (N Y : D over Publications, 1938, 1994), 38-9 , 60; D avid  
D. Hall, “The Chesapeake in the Seventeenth Century,” C ultures o f  Print: E ssays in the H istory o f  the 
B ook  (Amherst: University o f  M assachusetts Press, 1996), 110-1.
854 V irginia G azette , Parks #13 , Oct. 29, 1736, page 1.
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This letter, in characteristically baroque eighteenth-century prose, outlined this 
reader’s hopes for the Gazette: that it should be instructive yet entertaining, and that 
it should improve readers’ virtue. That the newspaper should entertain and divert was 
of particular importance: newspapers were a key prop in the display of genteel wit
oee
and conversation.
Another early entry in the Gazette offered readers a demonstration of exactly 
how newspaper stories should be used in genteel conversation. Apparently, a 
“romantick” story of an Alligator eating three sailors had made its way from India 
back to London, and was then reprinted in the Gazette. The story “had furnish’d all 
our Coffee-House Connisseurs with Discourse” and inspired various reactions, from 
“the Jocular and Gay,” to “Horor and Surprize.” One young man doubted the story’s 
veracity, comparing it to an “old English Ballad” about “the Dragon of Wantley,” 
which also ate three victims at a time. The debate continued, with some in the 
coffeehouse siding with the young man, and others trusting “the Probability of the 
Narration.”856 This “romantick” story had several purposes. On the surface, it was 
merely a repetition of a tall tale for a new audience, but it also provided readers with 
some instruction on how to read similar tall tales found in the pages of the Gazette. 
These stories were to be debated and discussed, regardless of their veracity, in a 
genteel display of wit. Significantly, the debate over the alligator was never resolved 
in the Gazette; obliquely, the story invites new readers to take their own positions in 
the dispute. Further, genteel debates placed readers in a reading community that 
spanned the empire: the alligator story originated in India, travelled to London, and
855 David Shields, C ivil Tongues an d  P olite  L etters in B ritish A m erica  (Chapel Hill: University o f  
North Carolina Press, 1997), 20-2.
856 Virginia G azette , Parks #115 , Oct. 13, 1738, page 3.
312
eventually made it to Virginia. Therefore, readers of the new Virginia Gazette were 
participating in a global colonial conversation. Ultimately, it did not matter if the 
stories in the Gazette were factual -  what mattered was the conversation that they 
could inspire.
It was in this context -  where newspaper stories were published as curiosities, 
not necessarily as facts -  that the stories of extraordinary reproduction found their 
home. Alongside stories of monstrous births in the Gazette came other accounts that 
reframed prolific reproduction -  and the bawdy marital sexuality that supported it -  
as threatening, violent, and immoral. A notice about an especially fertile woman 
illustrates how subtle this shift was: “We learn from the Head of Timber-Creek in the 
Jerseys, that a Woman there has lately had 5 Children, all bom alive, within the Space 
of 11 Months, by 2 Husbands.”857 On one hand, this notice reports yet another 
multiple birth and could be seen as celebrating the woman’s extraordinary fertility. 
Yet, within the context of genteel coffeehouse culture, readers were expected to read 
between the lines here. While the obvious reading is that the woman was widowed 
and swiftly remarried, having one set of triplets with one husband and one set of 
twins with the other, the vagueness of the prose invites other readings: was she a 
bigamist? How many pregnancies were there? Was it possible for a woman to have 
so many pregnancies in such quick succession? While seemingly fitting into the 
discourse of prolific reproduction, this story invites the possibility that prolific 
reproduction was the result of aggressive female sexuality or the threatening 
unpredictability of the female body.
857 Virginia G aze tte , Parks #136 , March 9, 1739, page 3.
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Another form of threatening reproduction emerged in the colonial context: 
English colonialism had always depended on the prolific reproduction of white 
bodies. A “dream” recounted by an anonymous Virginia writer in the Gazette in 
1738 reveals the ways that reproducing black bodies did not fit into the discourse of 
prolific reproduction, even as white Virginians’ demand for slaves rose to a fever 
pitch in the early eighteenth century.858 In this dream, the writer recounts the 
possibilities and problems facing the colony: the foremost threat was slavery, 
specifically the multiplying black bodies imported to Virginia. The writer envisions 
slave ships as monstrous mothers whose “Bodies were of a dark Hue” with 
“exposed...Bellies” from which they “discharg’d their Spawn upon the Shore.”859 
That “pernicious Spawn” was “innumerable black Creatures, not unlike Monkies.”860 
In an orgy of trading, white Virginians buy up the “filthy Creatures,” and the slave 
ships depart, newly filled with coffers of gold.861 Virginia’s economic dependence on 
slavery clashed with a nascent white terror of black bodies -  this conflict was 
represented as a horrifying nightmare of prolific reproduction. Significantly, after 
decades of reliance on the international slave trade, beginning in the 1730s, the slave 
population was majority creole in the colony.862 This fantasy of slave ships as a form 
of monstrous reproduction masked the reality that most slaves were acquired by 
biological, not metaphorical, reproduction.
These various monstrous births pushed at the boundaries of prolific 
reproduction: how could this old ideal make sense of deformed calves, oversexed
858 Virginia G azette , Parks #91 , April 28, 1738, page 1-2.
859 Ibid.
860 Ibid.
861 Ibid.
862 Berlin, M any Thousands G one, 126-30; Kulikoff, T obacco and S laves, 70-74; Parent, Foul M eans, 
86-95.
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mothers, or, most importantly, the proliferation of other bodies which, through 
colonization, English bodies must contact? The discourse of prolific reproduction, 
while still present throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, failed to fully 
make sense of the relationship between colonialism and reproduction. Ultimately, the 
colonial project itself necessitated new ways of thinking about reproduction. These 
examples of monstrous reproduction, or prolific reproduction gone wrong, stand in 
opposition to a new reproductive discourse that emerged in the colonies: rational 
reproduction.
Before examining Virginia legal and print culture to demonstrate the rise of 
rational reproduction as a new discourse and reproductive ideal, it is necessary to 
situate this analysis within particular theoretical and historiographical frameworks. 
Michel Foucault’s concept of biopower is especially useful in mapping the competing 
discourses of prolific reproduction, monstrous reproduction, and rational 
reproduction. As discussed above, for Foucault, one of the defining qualities of the 
modem state was unprecedented surveillance over and involvement in individuals’ 
private lives. Foucault’s published work focused on the European -  specifically the 
French -  case, sidestepping the twin issues of colonialism and race. Yet, as Ann 
Laura Stoler has argued, Foucault’s transitions are more convincing when we interject 
race and colonialism into his framework. I will outline the major chronological 
transitions that Foucault posits, and then discuss Stoler’s interjections in order to 
show how a postcolonial reading of Foucault’s concept of biopower can be especially 
useful in understanding discourses of reproduction in colonial Virginia.
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As Foucault argues in The History o f  Sexuality, premodem state power was 
rooted in “the deployment of alliance,” where power was organized via family lines 
and inheritance, and the state’s role in regulating sex was “built around a system of 
rules defining the permitted and the forbidden, the licit and the illicit.”863 Within the 
constraints of the deployment of alliance, sex was about the transmission of wealth 
from one generation to another. In this framework, the people of the nation were the 
embodiment of the king’s power -  the crown had absolute power of life and death 
over the people, and the nation survived in the body of the king.864 The discourse of 
prolific reproduction, which we have seen in Virginia print culture, fits well within 
the deployment of alliance. In the deployment of alliance, sex acts were defined as 
basically licit or illicit; we see this in the embracing of marital, procreative sexuality 
in Aristotle’s Master Piece and William Byrd’s letters. Further, at its root, the 
discourse of prolific reproduction was about the production of many heirs (think of 
the Virginia Gazette's admiring descriptions of multiple births and large families). 
The colonial project, within the discourse of prolific reproduction, was one of 
peopling: the creation of more British bodies would expand the glory of the British 
empire. We can see as well how print culture representing royal reproduction was 
indicative of the deployment of alliance: the reproduction of royal bodies literally 
reproduced the nation and its power.
Foucault’s focus in The History o f  Sexuality is understanding the rise of 
modernity, specifically the deployment of the modem discourse of sexuality which
863 Foucault, H istory o f  Sexuality, 106.
864 In D iscip line an d  Punish, Foucault focuses on the king’s power o f  death, specifically  through 
torture and execution. D iscip lin e an d  Punish  and The H istory o f  Sexuality  are parallel arguments, 
where the former exam ines the state’s power o f  death, and the latter discusses the state’s pow er over 
life. M ichel Foucault, D iscip lin e an d  Punish: The Birth o f  the Prison , transl. Alan Sheridan (NY: 
Vintage, 1977), 48.
316
replaced the deployment of alliance as the basis of state power. The discourse of 
sexuality justified increasingly intrusive state power over people’s sexual behaviors 
by “proliferating, innovating, annexing, creating and penetrating bodies in an 
increasingly detailed way, and in controlling populations in an increasingly 
comprehensive way.”865 In this new power regime, the people of the nation -  the 
population -  became a resource to be managed and controlled. This management of 
the population occurred through the deployment of biopower -  whereas the king had 
previously held power over life and death, now the state held the power to maximize, 
grow, control, and shape populations through the deployment of sexuality and the 
organization of people’s most intimate lives. Biopower demanded rethinking the 
nation not as a people but as a population:
Governments perceived that they were not dealing simply with subjects, or 
even with a ‘people,’ but with ‘population,’ with its specific phenomena and 
its peculiar variables; birth and death rates, life expectancy, fertility, state of 
health, frequency of illnesses, patterns of diet and habitation.... At the heart of 
this economic and political problem of population was sex: it was necessary 
to analyze the birth-rate, the age of marriage, the legitimate and illegitimate 
births, the precocity and frequency of sexual relations, the ways of making 
them fertile or sterile, the effects of unmarried life or of the prohibitions, the 
impact of contraceptive practices.. .866
865 Foucault, H istory o f  Sexuality, 107.
866 Foucault, H istory o f  Sexuality, 25-6. In D iscip lin e an d  Punish, Foucault show s how  the state’s 
pow er over intimate lives expanded to the disciplining o f  all people in institutions, from prisons to 
schools to hospitals. Foucault, D iscipline an d  Punish, 135-194. Foucault w ould expand on his ideas 
about biopow er in Security, Territory, an d  P opulation , where he made clear that the state’s power over 
intimate lives extended not just to sexuality (in other words, the coupling o f  particular bodies) but to
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In other words, biopower required a new, rational approach to reproduction: in order 
to develop and manage a population, childbearing became differently politicized.
The remainder of this chapter will examine the rise of a new discourse of rational 
reproduction in colonial Virginia that strikingly mirrors Foucault’s model of 
biopower and its attendant focus on population.
To be clear, though, the point here is not merely to apply Foucault’s model to 
the colonial Virginia context. Instead, this Foucauldian reading of colonial Virginia 
print culture is an intervention not only into Virginia history but into Foucault’s 
model as well. Ann Laura Stoler has argued that the transitions that Foucault outlines 
can be understood only if placed in the context of colonialism and colonized spaces: 
according to Stoler, it was in the colony that Foucauldian modernity took shape, 
specifically via the creation of race.867 Indeed, Stoler argues that Foucault, in his later 
lectures, himself recognized and discussed the importance of race in the deployment 
of sexuality. Stoler’s intervention into Foucault’s narrative is in part an attempt to 
reconstruct his chronology; this intervention is not about quibbling with dates, but 
instead to argue that the discourse of sexuality “was situated on an imperial landscape 
where the cultural accoutrements of bourgeois distinction were partially shaped 
through contrasts forged in the politics and language of race.”868 Stoler argues that 
colonial spaces “anticipated” the rise of sexuality that he describes in The History o f
other biological functions, including access to food and water, the egress o f  waste, and even  the air w e  
breathe. Foucault, Security, Territory, P opulation , 23.
867 Stoler, R ace an d  the E ducation o f  D esire , passim . W hile she does not exam ine colonial spaces with 
specificity , philosopher Ladelle M cW horter has argued that race and sexuality were identically  
defined, em erging at the sam e time and in the sam e ways. M cW horter, “Sex, Race, and B iopow er,” 
38-62.
868 Stoler, R ace and the E ducation o f  D esire , 5. Indeed, Stoler intervenes in her ow n chronology in her 
later work. W hile R ace an d  the E ducation o f  D esire  focused on the high im perialism  o f  the nineteenth 
century, in later work, Stoler expanded her analysis specifically  to colonial North Am erica. Stoler, 
“T ense and Tender T ies,” 23-67.
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Sexuality,869 For example, colonial spaces were deeply concerned with recording, 
studying, and quantifying populations before that impulse was witnessed in Europe. 
This concern with population was rooted in colonial race relations: the colonial 
project focused on defining racial boundaries and policing sexual relations in 
thoroughly modem ways well before Foucault recognizes it happening in France.870 
Specifically, Stoler sees Virginia’s seventeenth-century laws forbidding interracial 
sex as a moment when both alliance and biopower coexisted in a colonial space: 
“While these injunctions were clearly legal and concerned with the conjugal couple -  
features that Foucault attributes to the apparatus of alliance -  they also linked 
individual desires to social reproduction in ways that he dates for Europe a century 
later.”871 Therefore, Stoler argues, transitions that Foucault sees as happening 
chronologically in Europe (e.g., first the deployment o f alliance, then the deployment 
of sexuality) may have been far more blurry in colonial spaces, as the colonial project 
demanded both new ways of thinking and adherence to deeply held beliefs from 
home. We see in colonial spaces the first rumblings of process that would become 
manifest later in Europe.
To summarize, Foucault’s understanding of modern state power as biopower 
is tremendously useful in understanding reproductive discourses in colonial Virginia 
print culture. With the rise of biopower and the discourse of sexuality, the modem 
nation state became focused on managing its population as a resource. Reproduction 
was central to national interests not just in terms of creating a large population (as in 
the discourse of prolific reproduction) but in managing that population. Ann Laura
869 Stoler, R ace and the E ducation o f  D esire , 42.
870 Stoler, R ace and the E ducation o f  D esire , 40.
871 Stoler, R ace and the E ducation o f  D esire , 41.
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Stoler’s interjection of race and colonialism into this framework helps us to see that it 
was in colonial contexts like Virginia that this idea of managing a population would 
become especially important -  colonial contexts became the proving ground for the 
rise of biopower. Colonial populations would be managed both in terms of policing 
racial categories (as we saw in chapters 1 and 2) and in terms of creating a colonial 
population in a so-called “empty” land. The colonial project required new, modem, 
scientific, and rational attention to reproduction in the interest of growing and 
managing a colonial and colonized population. Even so, Stoler’s recognition of the 
simultaneity of some discourses that Foucault saw as chronological helps remind us 
that this transition to rational reproduction would not be complete, sudden, or 
absolute. We will not see here the emergence of the full-blown bureaucratic state that 
Foucault describes. Instead, following Stoler, we will see in colonial Virginia a space 
where Foucauldian biopower could emerge in its earliest form. That said, as we will 
see, from nearly the inception of the Virginia colony and inspired by the exigencies of 
colonial life, a discourse of rational reproduction emerged parallel to the older 
discourse of prolific reproduction.
The earliest attempts at creating a stable colonial population in Virginia show 
the new reproductive discourses that colonialism inspired and required. As early as 
1620, colony’s leaders used their power to shape the English colonial population not 
just in terms of growth but in terms of specific moral and economic concerns. During 
its earliest history, Virginia’s emerging colonial society was perceived as inherently 
immoral or amoral: one writer described the colony as “an unhealthy place, a nest of 
Rogues, whores, desolute and rooking persons; a place of intolerable labour, bad
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usage, and hard Diet, etc.”872 These pronouncements countered the popular notion of 
Virginia as a fertile new Eden. In these harsh conditions, English settler men weren’t 
contributing to the colonial project: rather than participating in the “Noble worke” of 
creating a colony, these men were “esteeminge Virginia, not as a place of habitation
Q ‘1 '1
but only of a short sojouminge.” In other words, by failing to settle permanently, 
these male colonists were working towards their own profits, not towards enriching 
the colony as a whole -  these settlers were insufficiently colonial. A group of English 
investors resolved to send “young, handsome, and honestlie educated Maides to 
Virginia” to marry the reluctant colonists, and in 1621, 57 young women were sent to 
the colony.874 Significantly, there was no belief that the women themselves would 
provide a moral compass (this was an idea that would emerge much later). Instead, 
the investors hoped that the presence of women would help Virginia to approximate a 
civil society because it would “tye and roote the Planters myndes to Virginia by the 
bonds of wives and children.” In other words, by intervening in the private lives of 
the colonists through the encouragement of patriarchal family forms, the nascent 
colonial state hoped to engineer a more compliant colonial population and therefore a 
more profitable colony. While the goal was the birth of children, this was not prolific 
reproduction for its own sake (or for the glory of God); instead, patriarchal planter 
families were seen as the proper foundation for building a moral, permanent, lucrative 
colonial society. For example, when two unmarried “maids” got pregnant at sea in 
1632, they were summarily “sent back again” to England -  bastard children were not
872 Hammond, Leah an d  R achel, 3.
873 David R. Ransom e, “W ives for Virginia, 1621” W illiam an d  M ary Q uarterly  48 , no. 1 (1991): 7.
874 Ransom e, “W ives for V irginia,” 7, 10.
875 Ransom e, “W ives for V irginia,” 7.
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an acceptable addition to the colony’s new moral order. In Foucauldian terms, 
these are remarkably modem goals: the colonial state was implementing biopower, 
achieving economic goals through the organization and management of the 
population’s private, sexual, and moral lives.
The 1621 importation of women to the colony was not the only, or even the 
first, instance of the exercise of biopower in Virginia, but it gives a sense of how we 
must rethink the colony’s approach to reproduction, where prolific reproduction 
might help the colony grow, but rational reproduction would help the colony survive. 
Indeed, examining the laws of early Virginia reveals the ways that a modem, rational 
approach to population growth was present even in the early seventeenth century. 
From its inception, Virginia’s laws reflected the colonial state’s interest in exercising 
biopower to not just maximize the colonial population, but to rationalize that 
population through careful counting and record keeping. Where the discourse of 
prolific reproduction emphasized population growth for its own sake, the discourse of 
rational reproduction fundamentally reshaped the relationship between reproduction 
and the state. Rather than idealizing unfettered reproduction, the discourse of rational 
reproduction understood childbearing as measureable and controllable. In both the 
discourse of prolific reproduction and the discourse of rational reproduction, 
childbearing served the interests of the colonial project. But where the earlier 
discourse had simply idealized population growth, this new discourse saw 
reproduction as something over which humans and the state could and should exert 
control. This control came in many forms, but the most prominent was population 
measurement.
876 Hening 1: 552.
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In The History o f  Sexuality, Foucault argues that demography became a 
central tool in modernizing the state’s approach to population -  in order for the state 
to enact biopower, it would first have to measure and understand its population. 
European states transitioned from the “crudely populationist arguments of the 
mercantilist epoch” (such as Hammond’s exhortation that nations must “enlarge 
themselves”) to “much more subtle and calculated attempts at regulation that tended 
to favor or discourage -  according to the objectives and exigencies of the moment -  
an increasing birthrate.”877 In the modem epoch, a population that simply multiplied 
was no longer ideal. Instead, the concept of population emerged as “an economic 
and political problem: population as wealth, population as manpower or labor 
capacity, population balanced between its own growth and the resources it 
commanded.”878 The rational and measured growth of population required deep 
attention to sexuality and reproduction because national strength was “tied not only to 
the number and uprightness of its citizens, to their marriage rules and family
R7Qorganization, but to the manner in which each individual made use of his sex.” For 
Foucault, the regulation of sexuality was key to the accurate measuring of population, 
and thus the strength of the nation as a whole.
Two interventions into the Foucauldian framework are necessary, though: a 
rethinking of reproduction in the Foucauldian narrative and an understanding of the 
centrality of race and colonialism in this chronology as well. Foucault elides 
reproduction here -  it is understood, but barely stated by him, that the birth of 
children is the means by which populations grow. Yet, the regulation of not just
877 Foucault, H istory o f  Sexuality, 26.
878 Foucault, H istory o f  Sexuality, 25.
879 Foucault, H istory o f  Sexuality, 26.
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sexuality but of reproduction as well lies at the center of the rise of biopower. 
Demographer S. Ryan Johansson reminds us that “nations, provinces, counties, 
communities, occupational groups, households, or couples do not have babies, except 
by courtesy of metaphor.”880 Further, if we recall Ann Laura Stoler’s argument that 
colonial spaces saw both of those epochs simultaneously, we can see how Virginia 
was beginning to focus on rational reproduction even as Europe continued to embrace 
prolific reproduction. By examining the legal discourses of early Virginia, we can 
see not only how reproduction fits at the center of the new modem view of 
population, but also how that modem view emerged in this particular colonial space. 
This modem view of population emerged in Virginia’s attempts to regulate the 
tobacco market (in Foucault’s terms, balancing population growth against “the 
resources it commanded”), as well as the colony’s continued attempt to enumerate its 
laboring population (in Foucault’s terms, assessing its “manpower or labor capacity”).
From the moment the tobacco economy took hold in Virginia, the colony’s 
welfare was tightly linked to wildly fluctuating commodity prices. In 1630, the 
Burgesses attempted to regulate the tobacco market by deliberately trying to shrink 
the supply and thus raise prices, which had dropped precipitously following the boom 
of the 1620s.881 Planters were ordered to limit their crops to 2,000 tobacco plants “for 
every heade within his family including weomen and children.”882 Simultaneously, 
planters were ordered to plant and tend 2 acres of com “for every head that worketh
880 S. Ryan Johansson, “ ‘Im plicit’ P olicy and Fertility during D evelopm ent,” P opulation  an d  
D evelopm en t R eview  17 (Septem ber 1991), 392, qtd. in Klepp, “Revolutionary B od ies,” 913.
881 Morgan, A m erican S lavery, A m erican F reedom , 108.
882 Hening 1: 152.
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the ground.”883 Along with these laws were regulations on merchants, as well as a 
requirement that planters make their own potash and saltpeter.884 Edmund Morgan 
argues that these regulations were necessary in a boom economy in which “men
O O C
would risk both prosecution and hunger in order to put their time into tobacco.”
Yet these regulations reveal more than just an attempt to force planters to diversify 
their crops: the regulations were explicitly linked to population. Com -  the staple 
food crop in the colony -  was needed to feed the laboring population, those who 
“worketh the ground.” Tobacco, on the other hand, was the purview of planters, who 
were implicitly rewarded by the law for marrying and having children. The colonial 
economy rationalized resource distribution by linking it to population. These new 
laws sought a balance between resources and population: planters were enjoined to 
supply enough resources to support the laboring population, and were rewarded for 
raising the families that were believed to provide the colony with stability and 
permanence. Further, population growth was rewarded within particular moral and 
colonial parameters: the law limited tobacco production to legitimate, marital 
reproduction by landowners who participated in the plantation economy.
As the tobacco economy became more entrenched, Virginia used biopower 
not only to encourage families but to encourage the expansion of the laboring 
population through both importation and reproduction. The colony would continue to 
use the law to link population growth with economic growth, rewarding planters for 
the importation of servants and slaves. The headright system, first put into effect in 
1617, promised 50 acres of land to any planter who paid for an indentured servant’s
883 Hening 1: 152.
884 Hening 1: 150-1.
885 Morgan, A m erican S lavery, A m erican F reedom , 112.
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passage to the colony. The headright system quickly allowed planters to consolidate 
their holdings into large plantations.886 According to Anthony Parent, planters took 
advantage of the headright system to fund their importation of slaves and consolidate 
their own interests.887 As discussed in chapter 1, these interests were further 
consolidated by the decision to enact the law of slavery by birth, wherein the colony’s 
economic future was specifically tied to the reproduction of the enslaved colonized 
population. At its root, the creation of a colonial population in Virginia was about 
more than just advocating prolific reproduction -  the colonial population in Virginia 
was a product of deliberate economic policies that were focused on managing 
population growth in the interests of the colonial planter elite and the colonial state.
Rationalizing colonial population growth required bureaucratic record 
keeping. From the beginning of the colony, Virginia’s attempts to enumerate its 
population functioned as a means of measuring the expansion of colonial power. 
During the earliest years of the colony, population estimates focused on English 
immigrants and their children -  those who could be considered full members of the 
colonial community. Nevertheless, as the colony grew, more detailed population 
records were needed precisely because the colonial project involved more than just 
English settlers. As we will see, detailed bureaucratic records provided a means to 
make sense of a population that included both colonizer and colonized. Virginia used 
an existing bureaucratic structure -  the church -  to enforce a careful and constant 
calculation of the colony’s population. Benedict Anderson argues that the census was 
a central tool of colonization, one which “profoundly shaped the way in which the
886 Parent, Foul M eans, 26-30; M organ, A m erican Slavery, A m erican F reedom , 405-7 .
887 Parent, Foul M eans, 40-54.
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colonial state imagined its dominion.”888 In short, the colonial project required 
counting bodies and categorizing them according to race and servitude.
Empowered by the House of Burgesses, the Anglican church was the 
institutional record keeper in Virginia. Starting in 1619, complete church records of 
births, marriages, and deaths were required by law, and a keeping those records was a 
major component of ministers’ work.889 Ministers were fined for failing to comply 
with the law.890 The logic behind these laws seems simple: to provide an accurate 
record of the inhabitants of the colony. Nevertheless, these records wove into 
numerous aspects of colonial life. Feminist political theorist Jacqueline Stevens 
argues that because demographic records document our most intimate relationships, 
“the state’s relation to normal and deviant forms of being is not stenographic, but 
pornographic.”891 Marriage and birth records expose the state’s interest in defining 
what it considers normal kinship forms, while still meticulously recording kinship 
relationships that contest the norm. Therefore, the Virginia birth, marriage, and death 
records were not mere lists. They were central tools in enforcing legitimacy, the 
distribution of wealth, and emerging racial categories. In Chapter 1 ,1 argued that 
Virginia’s miscegenation laws made every birth suspect, since the circumstances of 
one’s birth determined one’s life-long inherited status; it was in the church records
888 Anderson, Im agined Com m unities, 164.
889 The law s requiring m inisters to keep records o f  births, baptisms, marriages, and deaths were 
reiterated throughout the seventeenth century. These law s were passed in 1619, 1632, 1643, 1652, 
1658, and again, in m odified form, in 1713. H.R. M cllw aine, ed., Journals o f  the H ouse o f  B urgesses 
o f  Virginia, 1619-1658 /59  (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1915), 13; Hening 1:155; Hening 1; 
158; Hening 1: 182; Hening 1: 241; Hening 1: 290; B illings, ed. “Som e A cts N ot in H ening’s 
Statu tes,” 31; Hening 1: 433; Hening 4: 42.
890 There were no such cases in the York County records, but ministers in other counties were fined 
for failing in their duties. A m es, A ccom ac  1: 78-9; James, ed., The L ow er N orfolk C ounty Virginia  
A ntiquary, 2: 12.
891 Jacqueline Stevens, R eproducing the State  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton U niversity Press, 1999), xv.
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that these births were recorded. Thus, in the Charles Parish (York County) records, 
illegitimate births and births of free mixed-race infants were meticulously 
recorded.892 Birth, marriage, and death records were also necessary for regulating 
inheritance and taxation. Taxes were levied based on gender, race, and age, and 
accurate birth records were needed to insure accurate taxation; in the absence of good 
records, midwives could be called in to testify about births that happened years 
previously.893
Ultimately, birth records were central to the policing of racial categories in the 
colony, as can be seen with the evolution of Virginia’s taxation records. Prior to the 
passage of the law of slavery by birth in 1662, tithing lists had included the ages of all 
male servants, so that servants under the age of 16 would not be taxable.894 With the 
passage of the 1662 law, and the shift from indentured to slave labor as the dominant 
form of labor in the colony, these lists were no longer sufficient. Therefore, in 1672, 
the counties were required to keep lists of “all negro, and molatto children, and slaves 
that shalbe borne in this country,” so that taxes could be collected from their 
masters.895 In 1680, this law was determined to be “too hard and severe” on masters, 
since small children were taxable “before they are capable of working.”896 The new 
law, which exempted masters from paying taxes on enslaved children until the child 
turned 12, required even more accurate accounting: all birthdates should be recorded,
892 See, for exam ple, the birth o f  Abraham Com bs or George James in CPR 67, 96.
893 For exam ples o f  age determination cases, see: York D O W  5: 92; York D O W  5: 117, 119; York  
D OW  9: 314, 328; York D OW  14: 70.
894 Hening 1: 361.
895 Hening 2: 296.
896 Hening 2: 479-80 . In the sam e law, white indentured servants were determined to be taxable at the 
age o f  14 years.
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and any imported enslaved children would have their ages judged by the county 
courts.
This meant that ministers were required to keep comprehensive lists of 
enslaved and free people in the colony. Ann Laura Stoler argues that race is a 
“crucial colonial sorting technique,” and that these sorts of records were part of a 
colonial project set on devising clear lines between categories of people.897 Since 
1619, ministers had been required to keep records of all christenings, marriages, and 
burials that they performed. Starting in 1713, those lists of christenings were 
expanded to include information on “every child which shall be bom free,” as well as 
“every child which shall be bom a slave.”898 This law makes clear that the ministers 
were not just to perform their religious duties, but to act as agents of the colonial 
state. The blurring of the religious and the governmental can be seen the 1714 
accounting of births and burials in one parish: the minister categorized the births and 
burials as “Crist’d Males,” “Crist’d Females,” “Negro Slaves Males & Molatoes,” 
and “Negro Slaves ffemales & Molatoes.”899 For this minister, and arguably for the 
colony as a whole, whiteness (“Crist’d Males” and “Crist’d Females”) became a 
defining identity, as slavery and race coalesced to form a category of a colonized 
Other. Yet, that category of colonized Other required its own subcategorization -  
slaves, “Negroes,” “Molatoes” -  which, though not fully sorted (to use Stoler’s term) 
by this minister, hints at the beginnings of this kind of colonial thinking.
Virginia’s approach to population and demography, then, was more complex 
than simply advocating for prolific reproduction. This is not to say that population
897 Stoler, “Intimidations o f  Em pire,” 2.
898 Hening 4: 42.
899 Palmer, ed., C alendar o f  V irginia S tate P apers, 1: 176.
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growth was not a goal for the colony. When Governor William Gooch reported to the 
Board of Trade about the status in the colony around 1730, he proudly declared that 
“without all doubt the Inhabits are greatly increased & in all likely hood will continue 
to do so.”900 As with other advocates of prolific reproduction, Gooch credited 
Virginia’s environment for easy reproduction: the colony was a place “where Nature 
furnishes the requisites of Life wth less Labour & vexation than in many other 
Places.”901 But when it came to reporting the actual population of the colony and 
proposing policies to increase that population, Gooch shifted into the discourse of 
rational reproduction. “The Rules for computing” the colony’s population, Gooch 
explained, was “by a List of Tithables,” which included all white men older than 16 
years old and all black men and women older than 16 years old.902 He then moved on 
to calculate that since there were 85,000 tithable white men and 40,000 tithable black 
men and women, then “therefore ye white women married & unmarried, & ye white 
& black children under 16” should be “treble [triple] the no. of ye white Tithables.” 
Using this method, he asserted that the population of the colony “will be about
Q A T
135,000.” As much as prolific reproduction was natural in Gooch’s Edenic 
Virginia, actual population estimates depended on the colonial language of biopower. 
This colonial language required categorization of bodies: blacks were separated from 
whites, men from women, and children from adults. Further, it assumed that 
reproduction was rational: total populations could be estimated based on a sample. 
Colonial power required not just population growth, but state knowledge of not only
900 “Virginia Under Governor Gooch: Queries from the Board o f  Trade to Governor G ooch, n.d. 
(probably 1730),” V irginia M agazine o f  H istory an d  B iography  3, no. 2 (1895): 119.
1 “V irginia Under Governor G ooch,” 119.
902 “V irginia Under Governor G ooch,” 118.
903 “V irginia Under Governor G ooch,” 118-9.
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the size, but the racial composition of that population. While “a malignant Fever” 
had recently “occasioned a Mortality in whites and Blacks,” he hoped for population 
growth both through importation of slaves and “the early marriages of the males & ye 
aptness of ye Females for generation in both complexions.”904 In other words, the 
governor was confident that the colonial state both should and could encourage 
childbearing -  and the breeding of more slaves. Insofar as Gooch assumed easy 
reproduction in an Edenic Virginia, he was confident that he could safely produce a 
mathematical estimate of the population and the use of the power of the colonial state 
to decrease deaths and increase births. The discourses of prolific and rational 
reproduction were not only simultaneous, but mutually defined.
By the eighteenth century, this colonial discourse of rational reproduction was 
reflected in the colony’s print culture. As with Virginia’s legal culture, the discourse 
of rational reproduction existed in newspapers simultaneously with the previously 
examined discourse of prolific reproduction. As we will see, the Virginia Gazette 
participated in this new discourse, with its attendant focus on population and racial 
categorization, but it did so within the particular context of colonial genteel print 
culture. We’ve examined how the Virginia Gazette's content both reflected and 
destabilized the discourse of prolific reproduction, where stories of multiple births 
and large families were offset by stories of monstrous births. The discourse of 
prolific reproduction was further destabilized by the same discourse of rational 
reproduction that was present in Virginia’s legal documents as the colony enacted an 
early form of biopower. Within eighteenth-century print culture, rational
904 “V irginia Under Governor G ooch ,” 119.
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reproduction reflected racialized ideas about population and colonialism, and it was 
central to the development of new gender ideologies.
The discourses of prolific and rational reproduction existed simultaneously in 
the Virginia Gazette; therefore, one place to see the discourse of rational reproduction 
was in stories of prolific reproduction gone wrong. As has been discussed, 
colonialism required categorization or sorting of people, and the records of the 
colonial state served as a means to enact this sorting. Therefore, some stories in the 
Gazette reframed prolific reproduction as threatening specifically because it could 
challenge categorization of births. For example, some stories of large families played 
up confusing familial relationships for their humor value. A 1752 story announced 
the double wedding of a Spanish ambassador and his son to the two daughters of a 
Danish baron. The marriages inspired the following “enigmatical Conundrum”: “My 
Father is father of my Father: My Father Is Brother of my Sister: My Mother is 
Daughter of my Mother: My Mother is Sister of my Brother: My Wife is Daughter of 
her Sister: I am the Son of her Brother, and she is Great-Aunt of my Children.”905 
The announcement concludes, “All this is true without any Body being guilty of 
Incest,” thereby raising the specter of incest while simultaneously denying it.
Here, marriages that reflected the old world of alliance -  royal marriages, arranged 
marriages, and marriages that too deeply intertwined family and politics -  existed on 
the edge of propriety. Even as the Virginia gentry class itself was deeply embroiled
905 Virginia G azette , Hunter #60 , Feb. 20, 1752, page 3
906 For another exam ple o f  confusing fam ily relationships, see Virginia G azette, Hunter #4 , Jan. 24, 
1751, page 3. For another exam ple o f  foreign royal births as being ridiculous, see Virginia G azette , 
Parks #34 , March 25, 1737, page 2.
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in such arranged marriages and family alliances, the practice was made unfamiliar by 
making it literally foreign here.
Another story, printed in one of the very first issues of the Gazette, similarly 
trades on the idea that prolific reproduction was foreign and boundary-crossing. It 
seemed that the dean of the cathedral at Orihuela, Spain, was not a man at all -  the 
dean had “brought to Bed of Two Daughters.”907 Upon investigation, it was found 
that “this Lady for long Time disguised herself under the Ecclesiastical Habit, and 
embracing that State had several Benifices conferr’d on her, ‘til she was promoted to
the Deanery.”908 Indeed, she seemed in line to become Pope! This story of gender-
bending served several purposes. First, it certainly fit into the Gazette's project of 
entertaining its audience with titillating stories that would inspire debate and 
conversation. That same issue of the Gazette was full of titillating notices: the pages 
included stories of cannibalism and murder as well. More importantly, the tale of the 
dean served a political purpose. On the page facing the story of the pregnant priest 
was an analysis of European politics, which reports a new alliance between “the 
Catholick Princes [of France and Spain, who] shall join their Forces, in order to drive 
the Turks out of Europe, and enlarge their Dominions on that Side.”909 These two 
stories, taken together, trade on English fears and derision of Catholicism -  Spain and 
France were still considered threats to Virginia and to the entire British Empire.910 
Here, prolific reproduction was reframed as something ridiculous and foreign, but 
also threatening to the colony itself.
907 Virginia G aze tte , Parks #6 , Sept. 10, 1736, page 2,
908 Ibid.
909 Virginia G azette , Parks #6 , Sept. 10, 1736, page 3.
910 Morgan, A m erican S lavery, Am erican F reedom , 28-30.
333
The most potent boundary crossing in colonial Virginia was transgressing the 
racial boundary. While racial slavery and the law of slavery by birth would seem to 
require prolific reproduction, we’ve already seen some of the ways that the growing 
slave population provoked anxiety among elite white readers. The discourse of 
rational reproduction helped to make sense of prolific childbearing that challenged 
the colony’s emerging racial order. In 1752, the Gazette reprinted an account from 
the London-based Gentleman’s Magazine of a “dissimilar Birth” that had occurred 
locally in Virginia: “A young Negroe Wench of Col. Mason’s began to breed early, 
and had at the first Birth a Negroe Child. Soon after she was delivered of two, a 
Mulatto Girl, and a Negro Boy, named Austin.”911 Births like this one posed a threat: 
what did it mean that racial boundaries were so easily blurred? By way of 
explanation, the Mason family believed the babies to be “of different fathers”: the 
girl’s “Negro Husband,” and an overseer named Thomas Plum, who “kept Company 
with her, to the no small Uneasiness of her black Husband.”912 The family explained 
the extraordinary birth by calling on their beliefs in black women’s hypersexuality, 
black men’s ineffectual and even feminine lack of control over black women, and a 
class-based suspicion of the overseer’s access to black bodies. The writer of the 
Gazette article, J. Mercer, concurred with the family’s conclusions about the 
children’s parentage, but he offered a different set of evidence as his proof: scientific 
observation. He argued that “the Appearance of the Children was a Proof stronger 
than any Witness” that the twins had two different fathers.913 The boy, Austin, “was 
as black a Negro as I ever saw, and had short, curled, woolly Hair,” while his twin
911 Virginia G aze tte , Hunter #99 , D ec. 1, 1752, page 1.
9.2 Ibid.
9.3 Ibid.
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sister was “white, with blue Eyes, and long black Hair, that reached to her Waist.”914 
According to Mercer, the new scientific language of racial categorization (focused on 
the specifics of skin color, hair texture, and eye color) provided the most potent 
explanation so that this “dissimilar birth” could be explained in a rational way. It was 
more important to Mercer to assert the absolute heredity of racialized body 
morphology than to entertain the possibility that racial categories could be imprecise. 
The discourse of rational reproduction defused the threat of prolific reproduction and 
reasserted racial binaries.
In these examples, prolific reproduction was refigured as a threat because it 
blurred the very categories that colonialism demanded be clearly separated. Rational 
reproduction stood in opposition to the ways that prolific reproduction signified loss 
of control, boundary crossing, and category blurring. Essentially, rational 
reproduction offered a way to reinterpret the world, and thus rethink the meanings of 
prolific reproduction. But, as we’ve seen with Virginia’s governmental language, the 
discourse of rational reproduction also stood on its own as an alternative to the 
discourse of prolific reproduction. J. Mercer’s reliance on scientific observation to 
interpret this cross-race birth reveals the ways that scientific language reframed 
understandings of birth and parentage and thus was central to the discourse of rational 
reproduction. Scientific language and changing ideas about marriage combined to set 
up rational reproduction as a new ideal for elite childbearing.
The discourse of rational reproduction could be seen clearly in eighteenth 
century scientific and medical culture. Numerous scholars have pointed to the ways 
that the scientific revolution reframed European and Euro-American understandings
9,4 Ibid.
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of reproductive processes. For Michel Foucault, the rise of scientific language about 
sexuality -  a scientia sexualis, as opposed to the ars erotica of an earlier age -  was 
part and parcel of the rise of sexuality as a discourse and the emergence of the 
modem era.915 Susan Scott Parrish has shown that, with the rise of scientific 
thinking, nature itself was fundamentally reconsidered, as both nature and the human 
body (including especially its reproductive functions) were reframed as rational, 
organized, and fundamentally understandable.916 Ludmilla Jordanova echoes this 
notion of rational reproduction, arguing that scientific discourses of reproduction (as 
opposed to earlier patriarchal discourses of generation) framed reproduction as 
rational and natural, thereby divorcing reproduction from religious frameworks and 
instead connecting it to nascent capitalism.917 The rise of rational reproduction had 
mixed impacts on women. Lisa Foreman Cody points to an interesting tension in the 
rationalizing of reproductive knowledges: even as print culture made reproduction 
“an area of knowledge available to all, attainable through ‘rational-critical’ means 
rather than personal bodily experience,” that “rational-critical” knowledge model 
explicitly excluded older, women-centered bodies of knowledge.918 On the other 
hand, Susan Klepp has argued that rational reproduction gave women unprecedented
915 Foucault, H istory o f  Sexuality, 53-70. Notably, Foucault firmly dates the em ergence o f  a French 
scien tia  sexualis in the nineteenth century, though its roots are found in the m edieval form s o f  the 
confession . Yet, as Laura Stoler argues, Foucault’s framework is itse lf colonialist, contrasting the 
W est’s scien tia  sexualis  with the ars ero tica  o f  an im agined East. Stoler posits instead that the 
em ergence o f  a scien tia  sexualis  was itse lf a product o f  the colonial project and colonial subjectivities. 
Stoler, Race an d  the E ducation o f  D esire , 14. The em ergence o f  a scientific discourse o f  sexuality in 
eighteenth-century colonial spaces indicates again the w ays that colonial spaces served as crucibles for 
the discourses o f  modernity. Foucault’s observation o f  the em ergence o f  a scientific language about 
sexuality holds, yet the colonial limitations o f  his argument must be observed.
916 Parrish, “The Fem ale O possum ,” 475-514 .
917 Jordanova, “Interrogating the C oncept o f  Reproduction in the Eighteenth Century.” See also  
Duden, “The Fetus on the ‘Farther Shore’,” 13-25.
918 Cody, “The Politics o f  Reproduction,” 482.
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control over their fertility as new reproductive discourses allowed women “to de- 
emphasize bellies and to stress head and heart.”919
The new focus on head and heart fundamentally transformed marriage in the 
eighteenth century. This transformation required a rethinking of the relationship 
between marriage and childbearing. As elite Virginians began to be suspicious of the 
examples of prolific reproduction that threatened the colonial order, these same elites 
were adopting a new gender ideology and concomitant marital practices that made 
their own lives hew more closely to ideal presented by the discourse of rational 
reproduction. Specifically, the new elite ideal of companionate marriage idealized 
limiting fertility in favor of prioritizing the marriage relationship. Scholars have 
outlined the rise of a companionate marriage ideal within both the upper and middle 
classes throughout the Anglo-American world. Daniel Blake Smith argued that 
“sentimental and sometimes passionate male-female relationships reflected the 
growing importance in marriage during the eighteenth century of companionship and 
the declining significance of property and lineage.”920 The companionate marriage 
ideal, which demanded that women be sexually pleasing to men, existed in tension 
with the demands of reproduction and motherhood, possibly contributing to a drop in
Q 91fertility at the end of the eighteenth century.
By emphasizing romantic love over financial bonds as the basis for marriage, 
the companionate marriage ideal hews to the transition Foucault described from the 
premodem deployment of alliance to the modem deployment of sexuality; thus we 
see the connection between marital forms and political economy. A locally-produced
919 Klepp, “Revolutionary B odies,” 910-45.
920 Smith, Inside the G rea t H ouse, 135.
921 Klepp, “Revolutionary B odies,” 928.
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anonymous essay, published in the Gazette in 1738, argued that marriages should be 
based on romance, not property: . .the Reason why there are so many unhappy
Matches, is not because Marriage is a miserable State in itself, or that the other Sex is 
less pleasant and agreeable than our own; but that Money is often married instead of 
the Person; that is, in other Words, Persons marry where they do not love.”922 In the 
deployment of alliance, marriage upheld society by providing an orderly means to 
transmit wealth from generation to generation -  these were the marriages that the 
writer in the Gazette critiqued when he opined “Money is often married instead of the 
Person.”923 Within the new context of modem sexuality, marriage had a more 
complex, though still deeply political, set of purposes. Foucault argued that marriage 
and sex themselves were simultaneously disciplined and romanticized, as a new focus 
was trained on “the sensations of the body, the quality of pleasures, and the nature of 
impressions.”924 Companionate marriage still had an economic basis -  specifically, 
the reproduction and disciplining of more consuming bodies in capitalism -  but that 
basis was less explicit than in the deployment of alliance. In other words, marriage 
gained new importance as it became the idealized, and sole, acceptable site for 
pleasure. The nuclear family became the place, in Foucault’s terms, “to anchor 
sexuality and provide it with a permanent support.”925
What we see in the actual deployment of the companionate marriage ideal in 
eighteenth century Virginia print culture is the conscious emphasis on romance, 
friendship, and pleasure coupled with the remarkable invisibility of childbearing and
922 Virginia G azette , Parks #89 , April 14, 1738, page 1-2.
923 Foucault, H istory o f  Sexuality, 106-7.
924 Foucault, H istory o f  Sexuality, 106.
925 Foucault, H istory o f  Sexuality, 108.
338
parenthood. An anonymous author in the Gazette proclaimed that “agreeable 
Conversation” is “one of the greatest Pleasures of a married Life,” and that men who 
deny women’s intelligence “over value themselves.”926 If witty conversation was 
essential to a happy marriage, perhaps children were not: the essayist never mentions 
children at all. The absence of any discussion of parenthood in that essay was not a 
fluke. Another description of an ideal wife (which ends with the plea, “O give me 
such a Wife -  or give me none”) depicts a woman with every positive quality, 
including being “A gay Companion and a Friend sincere” -  but never mentions 
children or motherhood.927 An essay reprinted from the Universal Spectator in the 
Gazette praised marriages that were rooted in sobriety, rather than passion, yet never
(V } 0
mentioned parenthood as part of a happy marriage.
How does this invisibility of childbearing reflect the discourse of rational 
reproduction? Where children were mentioned, they were made abstract, and they 
were never numerous. The anonymous local writer of one long poem, entitled “The 
Wish,” described his ideal wife and family.929 The wife is described extensively and 
extravagantly: she was to be “witty, good natur’d, ever prompt to please,” have 
“Judgement,” and “converse with Ease.” She should “love” and “Desire” her 
husband “as Angels feel.” That love and desire would produce a “Brace” (or pair) of 
ideal children, in whose faces “bloom the Parental Grace.” In the companionate 
marriage ideal, women and children were meant to be a flattering reflection of the 
man. This sense that marriage should reflect upon the husband had some impact on
926 Virginia G a ze tte , Parks #89 , April 14, 1738, page 1-2.
927 Virginia G azette , Parks #64 , Oct. 21, 1737, page 3.
928 Virginia G azette , Parks #168 , Oct. 26, 1739, page 1.
929 Virginia G azette , Parks #48 , July 1, 1737, page 2.
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how Virginians understood their own relationships. For example, in the few 
obituaries published in the Gazette memorializing local women, the women were 
remembered primarily for their relationships with men.930
By making parenthood secondary to the marriage relationship, the 
companionate marriage ideal imagined that reproduction could be placed in human 
control, rather than in the control of God or nature. As a result of companionate 
marriage, English colonial women’s fertility rates dropped during the eighteenth 
century, especially among elite white women.931 Examining Virginia women’s letters 
from the end of the eighteenth century, Jan Lewis and Kenneth Lockridge posit that a 
drop in fertility among middle class and elite white women was precisely the result of 
new marital forms that prioritized the marital relationship over the parental one. 
Nevertheless, the new model had its costs: fertility dropped only when women and 
men began to believe that pregnancy was “pathological.”932 Literary historian Ruth 
Perry argues that the sentimentalizing of marriage in the eighteenth century served 
masculine interests by separating maternity and sexuality, and thus robbing women of 
their sexuality: “In the eighteenth century, maternity came to be imagined as a 
counter to sexual feeling, opposing alike individual expression, desire, and agency in 
favor of a mother-self at the service of the family and the state.” Historian Cynthia 
Kiemer makes clear the continuing patriarchal impulses of companionate marriage: 
companionate marriage “combined a new appreciation for feminine sensibility, or 
improving emotion, with the more traditional assumption that the sole function of a
930 See, for exam ple, Virginia G aze tte , Parks #150 , June 15, 1739, page 3; Virginia G a ze tte , Parks 
#480 , Oct. 10, 1745, page 2.
931 Klepp, “Revolutionary B odies,” 914-7.
932 L ew is and Lockridge, “Sally Has Been S ick ,” 12-13.
933 Perry, “C olonizing the Breast,” 305.
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wife was to serve her husband’s needs and interests.”934 The new ideal of 
companionate marriage enabled rational reproduction by pathologizing childbirth and 
reasserting in new ways patriarchal control in marriage. Foucault points out that “it 
was around and on the basis of the deployment of alliance that the deployment of 
sexuality was constructed.”935 In other words, while the deployment of alliance did 
give way to the deployment of sexuality, this was not a total or sudden replacement.
If idealized marriage was set apart from childbearing, this made the stories of prolific 
reproduction suspect -  prolific childbearing was, in a word, something other people 
did.936
Thus, stories of prolific reproduction gone awry -  the dark-hued bodies of 
ships spewing their “Spawn” onto the shore, the cross-racial births of slaves, the 
cross-gender births of Spaniards, and the monstrous reproduction of both human and 
animal -  were meaningful precisely because they contrasted so fully with the rational, 
even invisible, reproduction of the emerging ideal of the bourgeois, white, married 
couple. For Foucault, the legitimacy of the married couple was inextricably linked to 
silence, privacy, and domesticity:
The legitimate couple, with its regular sexuality, had a right to more 
discretion. It tended to function as a norm, one that was stricter, perhaps, but 
quieter. On the other hand, what came under scrutiny was the sexuality of 
children, mad men and women, and criminals; the sensuality of those who did
934 Kierner, B eyond the H ousehold, 28.
935 Foucault, H istory o f  Sexuality, 107.
936 Foucault, H istory o f  Sexuality, 126.
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not like the opposite sex; reveries, obsessions, petty manias, or great
937transports of rage.
A focus on discourses of reproduction in colonial spaces shows that to that list of 
scrutinized sexualities must be added the slave, the servant, the colonized body. 
Jennifer Morgan traces the ways that black women’s bodies, sexualities, and 
reproductivity stood “as evidence of a cultural inferiority that ultimately became 
encoded as racial difference.”938 Haunting the margins of the discourse of rational 
reproduction safely ensconced in companionate, bourgeois, legitimate marriages was 
the prolific reproduction of the colonized body.
The discourse of rational reproduction exposed the limitations of prolific 
reproduction in a colonial space. The colonial project required more than just 
population growth -  that population growth needed to foster the long-term economic 
goals of the colony. Colonial population growth needed to adhere to categories of 
race and servitude. It needed to be measurable, so that colonial expansion and 
colonial success could be assessed. Within this new colonial context, prolific 
reproduction began to be seen as suspect, especially when it challenged colonial 
racial categories. A new ideal for marriage even went so far as to introduce rational 
reproduction within elite households, as fertility was limited in favor of a focus on the 
marriage relationship. Vestiges of the discourse of prolific reproduction remained, 
but the discourse of rational reproduction, which originated in colonial law, had made 
inroads into colonizers’ intimate lives. Prolific reproduction had become a sign of 
colonial inferiority, rather than a strategy for colonial domination.
937 Foucault, H istory o f  Sexuality, 38-9.
938 Morgan, Laboring Women, 49.
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*  *  *
By way of conclusion, a comparison between two eighteenth-century natural 
histories of Virginia will crystallize the distinctions between the discourses of prolific 
reproduction and rational reproduction, while still showing the threads that connected 
those two discourses. Robert Beverley’s 1705 book, The History and Present State o f  
Virginia, presented his version of the colony’s history to that point, along with a 
description of the colony’s “Works of Nature,” a “true Account o f  the Indians,” and 
an account of the colony’s laws.939 The History is one of a long line of colonial texts 
that emphasized the colony’s natural fertility as a means to attract more immigrants. 
Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on the State o f  Virginia, first printed in 1785 and more 
widely published in 1787, was Jefferson’s attempt to catalogue his knowledge about 
the new state.940 Jefferson’s Notes, like Beverley’s History, offers to the reader a 
description of Virginia’s natural resources, people, and government. Where Beverley 
hoped to attract new immigrants, Jefferson hoped to advocate for his home state’s 
worth to the scientific community.
For both Beverley and Jefferson, the question of population, and thus the issue 
of reproduction, was a central concern in their representation of Virginia. Beverley’s 
text is steeped in the discourse of prolific reproduction: Virginia is a fertile, if 
underused, promised land, and the colony’s strength could be measured by the growth 
of its population. Jefferson’s book, on the other hand, is emblematic of rational 
reproduction: for Jefferson, ideal reproduction is measured, predictable, and 
controllable, and therefore the new state should manage and measure its population in
939 B everley, The H istory an d  P resen t S ta te o f  V irginia , preface.
940 Thom as Jefferson, N otes on the S tate o f  Virginia, ed. W illiam  Peden (Chapel Hill: U niversity o f  
North Carolina Press, 1954), xvi-xviii.
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order to grow. For both Beverley and Jefferson, their ideas about reproduction were 
deeply entwined with their colonial vision: where Beverley would advocate 
population growth through intermarriage between English settlers and Native 
Americans, Jefferson placed sexuality and reproduction at the center of his ideas 
about the racial differences between colonized bodies.
Beverley’s History, like so many other colonial booster texts, presents 
Virginia as an abundant garden, teeming with resources waiting to be harvested. 
Within the discourse of prolific reproduction, fertility was a natural expression of 
God’s favor. This fertility emerged from Virginia’s soil and was intrinsically devoted 
to the support and happiness of human civilization: “The Soil is of such Variety, 
according to the Difference of Situation, that one Part or other of it, seems fitted to 
every sort of Plant, that is requisite either for the Benefit or Pleasure of Mankind.”941 
With this soil as its foundation, Virginia exploded with such a “great Abundance” of 
wild fruits and other plants that Beverley confessed “I may not mention one half of 
what the Country affords.”942 Fish swam so thickly in the rivers that Indian “Boys 
and Girls wou’d take a pointed Stick and strike the lesser sort, as they Swam upon the 
flats.”943 Virginia’s “extream fruitfulness” extended to crops: “No Seed is Sowed 
there, but it thrives.”944 Beverley’s description of the fertility of the colony slipped 
easily into an eroticization of nature. Nature’s creations themselves unabashedly 
displayed the workings of reproductive sexuality: Beverley offered a description of 
an “extraordinary” flower that “resembled the Pudenda of a Man and Woman
941 Beverley, The H istory an d  P resen t State o f  Virginia, 2: 6.
942 Beverley, The H istory an d  P resen t State o f  Virginia, 2: 13.
943 B everley, The H istory an d  P resent State o f  Virginia, 2: 32.
944 Beverley, The H istory an d  P resen t State o f  Virginia, 4: 77.
344
lovingly join’d in one.”945 These natural wonders were placed in Virginia for 
mankind’s enjoyment. To any observer of nature, the colony was a pleasure garden 
where “all their Senses are entertain’d with an endless Succession of Native Pleasures 
[and] Their Eyes are ravished with the Beauties of naked Nature.”946
This eroticism coexisted with Beverley’s view that Virginia was the promised 
land -  a new Jerusalem marked by God’s extraordinary blessings. Beverley noted 
that Virginia was “very near the same Latitude with the Land of Promise”:
As Judea was full of Rivers, and Branches of Rivers, So is Virginia. As that 
was seated upon a great Bay and Sea, wherein were all the conveniencies for 
Shipping and Trade; So is Virginia. Had that fertility of Soil? So has 
Virginia, equal to any Land in the known World. In fine, if any one 
impartially considers al the Advantages of this Country, as Nature made it; he 
must allow it to be as fine a Place, as any in the Universe.947 
For Beverley, the teeming, sexualized fertility of Virginia’s natural environment was 
an expression of God’s will, a garden given to mankind. Even the Powhatans 
themselves seemed to anticipate this comparison of Virginia to Judea. Again linking 
fertility and Christianity, Beverley remarked, “children are not reckon’d a Charge 
among [the Powhatans], but rather Riches, according to the blessing of the Old 
Testament.”948 He further imagined that English settlers would also follow the path 
of the Biblical patriarchs. He tells the story of a remarkable English settler family
945 B everley, The H istory an d  P resen t S tate o f  Virginia, 2: 25.
946 B everley, The H istory an d  P resen t S tate o f  Virginia, 4 :6 1 .
947 B everley, The H istory an d  P resen t S tate o f  Virginia, 4: 59.
948 B everley, The H istory an d  P resen t S tate o f  Virginia, 3: 8.
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comprised of “an ancient Woman” and her elderly husband who, like Sarah and 
Abraham, had a 12-year-old son.949
The success of the English colony in Virginia depended on population growth 
that could take advantage of the extraordinary riches of the land. Colonial successes, 
for Beverley, were inextricably connected to reproductive successes. The birth in 
Roanoke of Virginia Dare, “the first Child there bom of Christian Parentage,” is 
linked in the text to the expansion of the colonial project.950 That birth occurred “on 
the same Occasion” as the baptism of Manteo, who Beverley claims was “the first 
Indian that was made a Christian in that Part of the World.” These two auspicious 
events signaled the success of the colony: “This seem’d to be a Settlement 
prosperously made, being carry’d on with much Zeal and Unanimity among 
themselves.” For Beverley, the birth of English settlers, the Christianization of 
Indians, and consensus among the settlers all signaled the success (however 
premature) of the Roanoke colony. Less tinged with later mystery is the first 
marriage performed in Jamestown. Beverley links this marriage to the growth of the 
colonial population: “Anno 1609, John Laydon and Anna Burrows were marry’d 
together, the first Christian Marriage in that Part of the World, and the Year following 
the Plantation was increased to near Five Hundred Men.”951 Within the discourse of 
prolific reproduction, these two facts -  the marriage and the growth in a colonial 
population -  are not distinct, but instead inextricably linked.
Beverley’s main concern was that Englishmen were failing to adequately 
make use of Virginia’s many blessings. In the book’s preface, Beverley states his
949 Beverley, The H istory an d  P resen t S ta te o f  Virginia, 1: 97.
950 Beverley, The H istory an d  P resen t S ta te o f  Virginia, 1: 9.
951 B everley, The H istory an d  P resen t S ta te o f  Virginia, 1:19.
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hope that his book would inspire future English immigrants to Virginia to make the 
most of “the Excellencies o f my Country,” if only they (unlike their predecessors)
*952would approach their work with “a due Spirit o f Industry, and Management.”
Unlike the English settlers, Virginia’s natives did not need to rely on industry. They 
lived in an enviable and perfect state of nature, relying on the land for their 
sustenance:
This and a great deal more was the natural Production of that Country, which 
the Native Indians enjoy’d, without the Curse of Industry, their Diversion 
alone, and not their Labour, supplying their Necessities. The Women and 
Children indeed, were so far provident, as to lay up some of the Nuts, and 
Fruits of the Earth, in their Season, for their future Occasions. But none of the 
Toils of Husbandry, were exercised by this happy People, except the bare 
planting a little Com, and Melons, which took up only a few Days in the
Q C - l
Summer, the rest being wholly spent in the Pursuit of their Pleasures.
Berkeley worried, though, that exposure to the beauties and luxuries of the Virginia 
environment had made English settlers, like the Indians, averse to industry. Virginia 
Englishmen, he complained:
.. .depend altogether upon the Liberality of Nature, without endeavouring to 
improve its Gifts, by Art or Industry. They spung upon the Blessings of a 
warm Sun, and a fruitful Soil, and almost grutch the Pains of gathering in the 
Bounties of the Earth.954
952 B everley, The H istory an d  P resen t S tate o f  Virginia, preface.
953 Beverley, The H istory an d  P resen t S tate o f  Virginia, 2: 40.
954 B everley, The H istory an d  P resen t S tate o f  Virginia, 4: 83.
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Beverley idealized Native Americans, but he did not imagine that Englishmen should 
reduce themselves to a state of nature. Instead, he hoped that his writing would 
inspire English settlers in Virginia to “make the most of all those happy Advantages 
which Nature has given them.”955
Ultimately, only the presence of women in the colony would guarantee the 
growth of the population. Once Englishmen were “settled [in Virginia] in a 
comfortable way of subsisting a Family, they grew sensible of the Misfortune of 
wanting Wives.”956 The men “excepted against the Indian Women, on account of 
their being Pagans."951 This decision Beverley finds unfortunate, and it is on this 
point that he embarks on a fascinating counterhistory: he suggests that intermarriage 
between English men and Indian women would have been a boon to the struggling 
colony in its early years. Beginning with the marriage of Pocahontas and John Rolfe 
as his starting point, Beverley suggest that the English should have followed the 
Indians’ suggestion of further intermarriage between the two societies: “I can’t but 
think it wou’d have been happy for that Country, had [the English] embraced this 
Proposal.”958 Because it would have defused “the Jealousie of the Indians,” 
intermarriage would have prevented “most of the Rapines and Murders [the Indians] 
committed.”959 Ultimately, Beverley’s argument for intermarriage rested on his belief 
that intermarriage would increase the colonial population. First, Virginia could have 
avoided deaths by wars. The colonial mission of spreading Christianity would have 
been more successful, and therefore the wars of 1622 and 1644 could have been
955 B everley, The H istory an d  P resen t State o f  Virginia, 4: 83.
956 Beverley, The H istory an d  P resen t State o f  Virginia, 4 :5 1 .
957 B everley, The H istory an d  P resen t State o f  Virginia, 4 :5 1 .
958 Beverley, The H istory an d  P resen t State o f  Virginia, 1: 25.
959 B everley, The H istory an d  P resen t S ta te o f  Virginia, 1: 25-6.
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avoided: “the Country would have been full of People, by the Preservation of the 
many Christians and Indians that fell in the Wars between them.”960 Second, these 
Christianized Indians could have been absorbed into the colonial population, and their 
numbers increased rather than decreased. Third, immigrants would have been 
attracted to the colony by “so much Success and Prosperity,” rather than repelled by 
“Frights and Terrors.”961 Finally, Beverley hoped the colony “wou’d have been 
encreasing in Children to its Advantage.”962 That these children would have ties to 
both the Indian and the English communities did not concern Beverley; by 
Christianizing the Indians, the English colonial presence and civilizing influence 
would override any vestiges of Indian culture.
While published in the eighteenth century, Beverley’s History was rooted in 
reproductive discourses of the earlier era. Beverley’s depiction of a hyper-fertile 
Virginia landscape reveals his adherence to the discourse of prolific reproduction, in 
which reproductive sexuality was godly and natural. Prolific reproduction fueled the 
colonial project and was a marker of colonial success. It was Beverley’s imagining of 
the colonial project that most reveals his commitment to the discourse of prolific 
reproduction. Rather than advocating separation of colonizer from colonized, 
Beverley imagined a colony that could absorb colonized people and thereby increase 
its numbers not only through avoiding wartime deaths but by embracing 
intermarriage and its resulting births. For Beverley, the noble Powhatans, who lived 
in a perfect state of nature, wanted only Christianization and civilization; the English, 
who brought both, wanted only greater numbers to truly tame the fertile Virginia
960 B everley, The H istory an d  P resen t State o f  Virginia, 1: 26.
961 B everley, The H istory an d  P resen t State o f  Virginia, 1: 26.
962 B everley, The H istory an d  P resen t State o f  Virginia, 1: 26.
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wilderness. Prolific reproduction, then, achieved multiple colonial goals: subduing 
of native populations, spreading Christianity through intermarriage, and increasing 
numbers of English-identified settlers.
Thomas Jefferson’s vision of Virginia’s environment and its population was 
radically different from Beverley’s. For Beverley, fertility, nature, and God were all 
equally boundless and outside of his comprehension -  plants were too numerous to 
name, animals too numerous to count. Jefferson’s approach to nature is that of a 
scientist in the age of Enlightenment: God’s plan was fundamentally orderly, and 
science provided man with the ability to understand the natural world.963 Contrary to 
Beverley’s effusive prose admiring the fertility of the colony, Jefferson provides 
succinct catalogs of the observed plant, mammal, and bird species native to 
Virginia.964 These lists include common names and Linnaean designations for each 
species; the goal here was to both present an impressively long list of species and to 
fit those species into European scientific discussions that were deeply engaged in the 
categorization of knowledge.965 The fertility of Virginia did not result in 
innumerable creatures -  instead, those newly discovered plants and animals simply 
needed to be studied, understood, and categorized.
Jefferson’s lists of species place his discussion within the larger field of 
history. While Jefferson’s natural history did argue for the fundamental fertility of 
Virginia and America at large, he does not make this argument by pointing to the 
teeming fecundity of its wildlife. Instead, within the discourse of rational
963 Parrish, A m erican C uriosity, 15; Parrish, “The Fem ale O possum ,” 476.
964 Jefferson, N otes on the S ta te o f  Virginia, 38-43, 50-2 , 66-70.
955 Parrish, A m erican C uriosity, 9. On the extension o f  this urge to categorize to the categorization o f  
humans into races, see Schiebinger, N a tu re ’s B ody, 143-83.
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reproduction, Jefferson’s focus was on the relative size of animals. Jefferson took 
exception to the Comte de Buffon’s claim that animals in the New World were 
smaller than those in the Old. Jefferson dismantles de Buffon’s argument point by 
point, arguing that American animals, both wild and domestic, were either equal or 
greater in weight than their European counterparts. Jefferson found what he 
considered the most convincing evidence in the fossilized remains of the mammoth 
(an animal he was convinced was not extinct), which he noted was “the largest of all 
terrestrial beings.”966 The existence of the mammoth proved the fertility of the 
American climate: “[The mammoth] should have sufficed to have rescued the earth it 
inhabited, and the atmosphere it breathed, from the imputation of impotence in the 
conception and nourishment of animal life on a large scale....967 Like his predecessor 
Beverley, Jefferson was arguing for the fundamental fertility of the American 
environment. Yet, rather than making a claim about the mere numbers of animals, 
Jefferson focused on the better quality (here, the increased size) of those animals. In 
his one lapse into the discourse of prolific reproduction, Jefferson allows that goats 
“are very prolific here, bearing twice or three times a year, and from one to five kids 
at a birth.”968 Yet he immediately shifts to a discussion of sheep, and how sheep in 
Virginia weigh much more than sheep in Europe. Jefferson may still have been 
impressed by prolific reproduction, but he built his argument around rational 
reproduction. Jefferson continued to imagine Virginia as uniquely fertile, but that 
fertility was channeled into more efficient, rational reproduction than the prolific 
reproduction advocated by Beverley.
966 Jefferson, N otes on the S tate o f  Virginia, 47.
967 Jefferson, N otes on the S tate o f  Virginia, 47.
968 Jefferson, N otes on the S tate o f  Virginia, 57, 87.
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How did this reimagining of the fertility of Virginia impact Jefferson’s 
discussion of Virginia’s human population? It is here that we see most clearly 
Jefferson’s immersion in the discourse of rational reproduction, in terms of his 
understanding of reproduction itself, the role of the state in managing it, and 
Virginia’s continued colonial project. For Jefferson, human reproduction was 
fundamentally measurable and predictable, and thus controllable or manageable by 
the state. Not satisfied with simply calculating the current total population of the 
state (which he estimated at 567,614 in 1782), Jefferson focused his attention on the 
rate of population increase over time, which he was confident that was able “to 
calculate, with a considerable degree of precision.”969 Jefferson allowed that the 
colony’s population fluctuated greatly in the early years, but that it quickly became 
very predictable:
By the year 1654, however, it becomes tolerably uniform, importations having 
in a great measure ceased from the dissolution of the company, and the 
inhabitants become too numerous to be sensibly affected by Indian wars. 
Beginning at that period, therefore, we find that from thence to the year 1772, 
our tythes had increased from 7209 to 153,000. The whole term being of 118 
years, yields a duplication once in every 21lA years.... Should this rate of 
increase continue, we shall have between six and seven millions of inhabitants 
within 95 years.970
This is a remarkable assertion, for Jefferson was claiming that Virginia’s population 
growth -  which included free and enslaved immigration as well as births -  was so
969 Jefferson, N otes on the S ta te  o f  Virginia, 82-3.
970 Jefferson, N otes on the S tate o f  Virginia, 82-3.
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fundamentally uniform that it could be reduced to a rather simple calculation that 
could be used to predict future population growth, and thus inform state policy.
Population was inextricably connected with political representation in the 
republic, and therefore the state’s interests lay in the proper management of 
population growth. Jefferson tacitly agreed that Virginia’s population should grow, 
not least to provide enough people to work the land: “In Europe the object is to make 
the most of their land, labour being abundant; here it is to make the most of our labor, 
land being abundant.”971 But by what means should the population grow, 
immigration or birth? Using his equation for estimating the rate of population 
increase, Jefferson theorized that it would take about 30 years longer for the 
population to reach 4.5 million through birth rather than through immigration.972 
Even with this delay, Jefferson advocated population growth through “natural 
propagation” rather than rapid immigration.973 Jefferson opined that immigrants from 
monarchical Europe lacked the natural love of liberty held by native-born Americans. 
Suddenly exposed to Americans’ “temperate liberty,” immigrants and their children 
would mire themselves in “unbounded licentiousness.”974 And, because these 
licentious immigrants would have representation in the population-based republican 
government, their presence would be disastrous to the republic: “They will infuse 
into [the legislature] their spirit, warp and bias its direction, and render it a 
heterogeneous, incoherent, distracted mass.”975 For Jefferson, managing population 
growth had profound consequences in the post-Revolutionary world -  consequences
971 Jefferson, N otes on the S tate o f  Virginia, 85.
972 Jefferson, N otes on the State o f  Virginia, 83-4.
973 Jefferson, N otes on the State o f  Virginia, 84.
974 Jefferson, N otes on the S tate o f  Virginia, 85.
975 Jefferson, N otes on the S tate o f  Virginia, 85.
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that could threaten or strengthen the republic itself. Because native-born bodies were 
needed both to work the land and to outweigh non-native-born votes, Jefferson’s 
pronatalist, anti-immigrant policy implicitly depended upon white women’s 
childbearing to advance his economic and political vision for the nation. Jefferson 
was not making an argument for “republican motherhood,” in the sense of mothering 
being essential to the creation of republican-minded citizens.976 Instead, he was 
arguing for white women to birth citizen bodies in order to populate the nation: he 
was arguing for republican breederhood.
Implicit in Jefferson’s discussion of the effects of population growth on the 
republic was that his analysis was limited to the white population. This is a 
fundamental logical flaw in his argument. His estimate of the total current population 
of Virginia included both free people and slaves, but his discussion of future 
population growth and its impact on the republic took into account only full citizens 
and their dependents. Jefferson participated in a sort of colonial blindness here: he 
saw only white bodies when he imagined his ideal republic, but the development of 
that republic depended on the colonization and exploitation of colonized peoples, 
both African American and Native American.977 The expansion of the white 
population was necessarily embroiled in the growth of the enslaved population and 
the shrinking of the Native American population. When Jefferson did include 
enslaved and Native American peoples in his vision of Virginia, he did so within the 
discourse of rational reproduction by using fertility and population as a justification
976 Kerber, Women o f  the R epublic.
977 A s Edward Said argued, the presentation o f  the colonial Other -  “the Orient” in Said’s framework -  
was alw ays about reflecting back the self-presentation o f  Europe itself. In this way, Europe was 
created by its colon ies. Said, O rientalism , 12.
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for racial hierarchy and separation. Fertility was fundamental to Jefferson’s theory 
of racial difference, and thus his vision of Virginia’s continued colonial project.
Contrary to his plan for white population expansion, Jefferson presented black 
sexuality and fertility as threats to the state. In concluding his discussion of the 
growth of Virginia’s population, Jefferson attempted to calculate the relative numbers 
of enslaved versus free people in the state. He found that slaves outnumber free 
people “nearly as 11 to 10.”978 The growth in the slave population was a result of 
their “mild treatment” and inherent fertility: “Under the mild treatment our slaves 
experience, and their wholesome, though course, food, this blot in our country 
increases as fast, or faster, than the whites.”979 What was the source of this 
hyperfertility? Jefferson described black sexuality, and thus black reproduction, as 
utterly opposed to the rational reproduction of modem sexuality: “They are more 
ardent after their female: but love seems with them to be more an eager desire, than a 
tender delicate mixture of sentiment and sensation.”980 Masters exacerbated this 
uncontrolled sexuality: unlike the slaves of ancient Rome, who were segregated by 
sex, ‘Their situation and manners place the commerce between the two sexes almost 
without restraint.”981 Jefferson praised the end of the international slave trade as one 
means to limit the growth of the black population in Virginia, and he advocated a 
never-adopted plan to emancipate the slaves through colonization. The goal of this 
emancipation plan was racial separation -  specifically, avoiding mixed-race births
978 Jefferson, N otes on the S tate o f  Virginia, 87.
979 Jefferson, N otes on the State o f  Virginia, 87.
980 Jefferson, N otes on the State o f  V irginia, 139.
981 Jefferson, N otes on the S tate o f  Virginia, 141.
982 Jefferson, N otes on the S tate o f  Virginia, 87, 137-8.
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that would mar white families.983 Again comparing Virginia slavery to Roman 
slavery, Jefferson emphasized the whiteness of slaves in Rome:
Among the Romans emancipation required but one effort. The slave, when 
made free, might mix with, without staining the blood of his master. But with 
us a second is necessary, unknown to history. When freed, [the slave] is to be 
removed beyond the reach of mixture.984 
Jefferson’s advocating of the end of slavery was intertwined with his adherence to the 
discourse of rational reproduction. The growth and survival of the republic depended 
on the birth of virtuous white citizens, which was being outpaced by the birth and 
importation of slaves. Managing the white population required removing this threat 
to its purity and dominance.
Jefferson treated the decline of the Native American population as a scientific 
curiosity that absolved English colonization and American expansion of 
responsibility for that decline. Like Beverley, Jefferson idealized the Indians as 
living in a perfect state of nature: “Their only controuls are their manners, and that 
moral sense of right and wrong, which, like the sense of tasting and feeling, in every
Q O C
man makes a part of his nature.” That very connection to nature was the source of 
the Indians’ demise, as it was insufficient to protect them from the ravages of
983 The irony o f  this stance is hard to ignore, considering Jefferson’s ow n long-term  relationship and 
fathering o f  seven children with the enslaved m ixed-race woman Sally H em ings. H em ings was herself 
the half-sister o f  Jefferson’s w ife, Martha W ayles Jefferson, and H em ings’ mother, Elizabeth Hem ings, 
was the daughter o f  an English sea captain and an African woman. N eed less to say, Jefferson’s 
personal life w as marked in very real w ays by interracial sex and interracial reproduction. Annette 
Gordon R eed’s work plum bs the breadth and depth o f  the relationship between Jefferson and Hem ings, 
its meanings in their time, and its continued resonance. Annette Gordon-Reed, ‘“ The m em ories o f  a 
Few  N egroes’: R escuing A m erica’s Future at M onticello ,” in Jan Ellen L ew is and Peter S. Onuf, eds., 
Sally H em ings an d  Thom as Jefferson: History, M em ory, an d  C ivic Culture (Charlottesville: University 
Press o f  Virginia, 1999), 236-254; Annette Gordon-Reed, The H em ingses o f  M onticello: An Am erican  
Fam ily (N Y : Norton, 2008).
984 Jefferson, N otes on the S tate o f  Virginia, 143.
985 Jefferson, N otes on the S tate o f  Virginia, 93.
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European colonization. Observing the tremendous drop in the Native American 
population in Virginia since the seventeenth century, Jefferson blamed “spirituous 
liquors, the small-pox, war, and an abridgment of territory,” which “to a people who 
lived principally on the spontaneous productions of nature, had committed terrible 
havock among them, which generation, under the obstacles opposed to it among 
them, was not likely to make good.”
These “obstacles” to generation, for Jefferson, are illustrative of the primary 
differences between the races. Jefferson believed that reproduction answered to 
rational human intervention: Indians’ failure to intervene to increase their own 
reproduction was the root of their failure to compete against the ravages of European 
colonization. While Jefferson rejects the Comte de Buffon’s characterization of the 
Indians as feminine and desexualized, he blames Native culture for failing to
Q 0 7
prioritize and facilitate sufficient reproduction to continue the population. Native 
women, Jefferson opined, “are submitted to unjust drudgery,” and therefore were less 
fertile than European women. Further, Native women actively sought to end their 
pregnancies: “they have learnt the practice of procuring abortion by the use of some 
vegetables and that it even extends to prevent conception for a considerable time 
after.”988 Like Beverley, Jefferson imagined intermarriage between Indians and 
English colonizers as facilitating population growth; unlike Beverley, Jefferson saw 
this boon as benefitting the Indians, not the English. When exposed to white culture 
-  through the marriage of Indian women to white men, or the enslavement of Indian 
women -  Indian women proved able to “produce and raise as many children as the
986 Jefferson, N otes on the S tate o f  Virginia, 96.
987 Jefferson, N otes on the S tate o f  V irginia, 58-60.
988 Jefferson, N otes on the S tate o f  Virginia, 60.
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white women,” and, presumably, less likely to limit births through contraception or 
abortion.989 Ultimately, while Jefferson allowed that colonization had some effect on 
Native American populations, he placed blame for the drop in population on Native 
women’s bodies and actions:
To the obstacles then of want and hazard, which nature has opposed to the 
multiplication of wild animals, for the purpose of restraining their numbers 
within certain bounds, those of labour and of voluntary abortion are added 
with the Indian. No wonder then if they multiply less than we do.990 
For Jefferson, the drop in Native population was rooted in their racial difference, 
which he interestingly constructed as both natural and cultural. While Indians were 
too much like “wild animals,” and thus too exposed to the dangers of the natural 
world, their culture did not just fail to protect them from those dangers, it exacerbated 
them through abortion and contraception.
Jefferson’s analysis of the Native American population, along with his 
opinions about Indian fertility, was part of his adherence to the discourse of rational 
reproduction, and thus the American colonial project. In the chapter of Notes titled, 
“Aborigines,” Jefferson placed Indians into the narrative of natural history and 
anthropology, and thus the Enlightenment scientific imaginary. In that chapter, 
Jefferson provided a general description of Indian culture, but he also attempted to 
catalogue and define Native American tribes. Like his charts of animal, plant, and 
bird species, Jefferson attempts to catalogue all past and remaining Virginia Native 
American tribes. Here, we see the most modem iteration yet of Ann Laura Stoler’s
989 Jefferson, N otes on the S tate o f  Virginia, 61.
990 Jefferson, N otes on the State o f  Virginia, 61.
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contention that race was a “crucial colonial sorting technique.”991 Stoler argues that 
“racial thinking secures racial designations in a language of biology and fixity and in 
the quest for a visual set of physical differences to index that which is not ‘self- 
evident’ or visible -  neither easy to agree on nor easy to see.” Jefferson’s 
categorization of Native groups both asserts their racial difference and places that 
difference into the discursive framework of biology. Jefferson argued that his main 
categories of Indians -  the Powhatans, the Mannahoacs, and the Monacans -  were 
illustrative of an ancient racial difference within the Native population. Observing 
the linguistic differences between the groups, Jefferson argued that “very possibly 
there may have been antiently three different stocks, each of which multiplying in a 
long course of time, had separated into so many little societies.”992 Within those 
three main ethnic categories, Jefferson lists those tribes, or “little societies,” whose 
names were recorded by the English. Jefferson’s charts of Native ethnic groups, so 
similar to his charts of plant and animal species, placed Native American political 
groups into the same discursive field as biological categorization. Yet where 
Jefferson’s biological charts attempted to demonstrate the fertility and strength of 
Virginia’s natural world, the charts of Indian tribes were part of a colonial narrative 
of population disaster.
Beyond sorting Native Americans into discrete ethnic groups, Jefferson 
attempted to provide estimates of their populations. The information is laid out in 
two separate charts; the charts themselves are documents of the impact of 
colonization. The first chart includes a list of the tribes first encountered by the
991 Stoler, “Intimidations o f  Empire,” 2.
992 Jefferson, N otes on the S ta te o f  Virginia, 92.
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English, along with “their numbers when we first became acquainted with them” and 
again in 1669, “when an attempt was made by the assembly to enumerate them.”993 
Jefferson described the marked decrease between those two columns as “the 
melancholy sequel of their history...by which we discover that the tribes therein 
enumerated were, in the space of 62 years, reduced to about one-third of their former 
numbers.”994 As to their current (1787) numbers, the Indians were marked by their 
disappearance. Of the Mattaponi, “there remain.. .three or four men only, and they 
have more negro than Indian blood in them.”995 The Pamunkies were similarly 
devastated: they “are reduced to about 10 or 12 men.”996 The Nottoways were the 
worst hit: “not a male is left. A few women constitute the remains of that tribe.”997 
Following this narrative of colonial population devastation, Jefferson’s second chart 
of Native Americans provided “the nations and numbers of the Aborigines which still 
exist and a respectable and independent form.”998 If Jefferson’s charts served two 
purposes -  racial categorization of Natives and a narrative of colonial population 
devastation -  then this second chart would seem to imply that those projects were yet 
unfinished. Jefferson regretted the lack of specificity in this second chart, blaming 
“imperfect information, and sometimes...a greater or less comprehension of 
settlements under the same name.”999 He did not mention the ways that America’s 
colonial westward expansion would wreak similar devastation on these uncharted 
tribes. The collapse of the Native American population was the unspoken basis for
993 Jefferson, N otes on the State o f  Virginia, 93-5.
994 Jefferson, N otes on the S tate o f  Virginia, 93-6.
995 Jefferson, N otes on the State o f  Virginia, 96.
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360
Jefferson’s plan for the white population expansion that would fuel his vision of a 
republican nation.
For both Beverley and Jefferson, reproductive discourses were deeply 
intertwined with Virginia’s colonial project. For both, Virginia’s fundamental natural 
fertility was the root of the success of the colony and the state. For both, expansion 
of the white population was central to their understanding of Virginia’s history and 
their vision of Virginia’s future. For both, white fertility was embroiled in the 
colonial encounter between Europeans and colonized peoples, whether the removal of 
Native Americans or the enslavement of African Americans. In some ways, then, The 
History and Present State o f Virginia and Notes on the State o f Virginia were deeply 
similar texts. Yet by distinguishing between the competing discourses of prolific and 
rational reproduction, we see profound differences between the texts and their 
relationships to the Virginia colonial project. Where Beverley saw in Virginia a 
teeming Eden, Jefferson tamed that Eden with the scientific tools of Enlightenment 
rationality. Where Beverley celebrated population growth and saw in that growth 
Virginia’s colonial success, Jefferson sought to harness population growth in order to 
best serve the needs of the republic. And, finally, while Beverley’s version of 
colonialism would absorb Indians into the colony, Jefferson’s colonial vision was one 
of strict racial division.
The most significant difference between these two texts was the relationship 
between reproductive discourses and the colonial project. Where Beverley brought 
the discourse of prolific reproduction to his understanding of the colonial project, 
Jefferson’s use of the discourse of rational reproduction was shaped by the colonial
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project itself. For Beverley, colonization was, at its most fundamental level, a 
process of populating empty lands -  prolific reproduction would accomplish that task, 
and the goal of the colonial project was to facilitate population growth. The 
relationship between colonialism and reproduction for Jefferson was far more fraught. 
The process of colonization had decimated one colonized population -  Native 
American -  while multiplying another -  enslaved Africans and African Americans. 
The white population was in danger of being infiltrated by immigrants who had little 
invested in the republican experiment. Simple population growth could no longer 
sustain what was now America’s colonial project. Instead, for Jefferson, reproduction 
must be rationalized -  tamed by science and managed for the sake of the future of the 
republic.
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CONCLUSION 
Revisiting the Concept of Outlaw Reproduction
This dissertation began with the stories of three women and the babies they 
bore: the widow Mary Hubbard and her baby daughter, the enslaved woman Sarah 
and her unnamed child, and the servant Judith Clarke and her interracial baby. My 
methodology privileges stories like these: faced with an archive that is frustratingly 
silent about women’s experiences of pregnancy and childbearing, any glimpse of a 
moment of childbearing emerged as potential evidence of experiences lost over time. 
These stories serve not as mere illustration of my ideas, but as a foundation for my 
argument itself. Surely such stories offer glimpses of women -  especially of non-elite 
women -  whose voices might be silenced by the colonial archive. But the stories that 
populate this dissertation, with their multiple interpretations, their silences, and their 
evoking of the shifting power relations of the colonial world, also reveal the 
complexities of interrogating the history of women in the colonial past.
Why were these stories -  bastard births, enslaved women’s births, interracial 
births -  the ones that emerged from the archive? The reproduction that is visible in 
the colonial Virginia archive is the childbearing that was somehow understood to be 
extraordinary or troublesome. These were births that created problems that needed to 
be solved -  the bastard child who needed support lest he or she become a burden on 
the community, the enslaved child who embodied both a profit and an expense to his 
or her master, the interracial child who defied colonial racial binaries. To explain this 
sense of colonial anxiety around such births, I introduced the concept of “outlaw
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reproduction,” which I used not just to label these births as occurring outside of the 
law, but to begin to explicate the complex relationship between reproduction, 
colonialism, and the colonial archive.
As outlined in the introduction, I define outlaw reproduction in three ways. 
First, we can consider outlaw reproduction in the literal sense: juridical outlaw 
reproduction included those births which the law defined as criminal. The people 
involved in this juridical outlaw reproduction were subject to punishment or censure. 
The concept of juridical outlaw reproduction allows for the possibility that such 
lawbreaking occurred in defiance of community rules and strictures -  juridical outlaw 
reproduction encompasses both transgressive reproduction and the disciplining of 
those transgressions. The archival traces of these illegal or transgressive births lead 
us to the second definition of outlaw reproduction: archival outlaw reproduction 
refers to the ways that some births made their way into public view, despite the 
intimacy of birth and the fact that so much of women’s lives, not just birth, is 
invisible in the archive. The concept of outlaw reproduction, then, encompasses the 
ways that births that broke the law (especially, but not exclusively, when the law was 
broken by non-elite women) would be recorded and thus available for historical 
analysis. This leads to the third and final definition of outlaw reproduction: colonial 
outlaw reproduction reflects the ways that the intimate relations embedded in 
reproduction could transgress colonial boundaries and hierarchies, thereby 
destabilizing the colonial project even as it was being constructed. In this 
conclusion, I trace the ways that all three of these definitions of outlaw reproduction 
wind their way through each chapter of the dissertation. I close with a defense of the
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concept of outlaw reproduction as a revelatory way to understand not just the history 
of reproduction but the history of colonialism as well.
In Chapter One, I examined the centrality of discourses of reproduction to the 
solidification of race-based chattel slavery. I argued that Virginia’s colonial 
lawmakers capitalized upon juridical outlaw reproduction in establishing the law of 
slavery by birth: lacking a direct precedent for inherited racial slavery in English 
common law, Virginia law was built on a precedent that linked fornication and 
bastardy law with servitude. The result was that enslaved women’s births were 
reframed as outlaw by definition: fatherless and thus outside of patriarchal culture, 
inheritance, and power, enslaved children could now be understood as the chattel 
property of their masters. This reading of colonial law connects to the idea of 
archival outlaw reproduction -  the moments when reproduction, normally silent, 
emerges in the archive. I argued that the amassing of discourse about enslaved 
women’s reproductivity shows the centrality of childbearing to the construction of a 
colonial slave economy. It was childbearing that allowed masters to imagine not only 
that enslaved children were fatherless but that enslaved women’s reproductivity made 
them fundamentally like livestock, and thus able to be treated as property. Further, 
because slavery and servitude rested on a foundation of reproduction, we are able to 
reconstruct some abbreviated glimpse of the cost of reproduction upon women’s lives 
which would otherwise be invisible to us: the repeated extension of servant women’s 
terms as punishment for their outlaw reproduction, and the vulnerability of enslaved 
women’s lives and connections to their children because their reproduction was 
constructed as outlaw as well.
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The overwhelming power of masters emerged in a slow process, of which the 
establishment of the law of slavery by birth was a major part. Thus, colonial outlaw 
reproduction -  reproduction’s role in the construction and negotiation of colonial 
boundaries -  allows us to see the ways that the discursive power of the master class 
was constructed and therefore never absolute. The conflation of race, servitude, and 
illegitimacy took decades to emerge in law and practice; a long period of competing 
practices predated the establishment of slavery by birth in law. Further, the attempt to 
police a binary definition of race would always fail, as interracial children lived as 
testimony to the permeability of that boundary. Finally, well after the 1662 law of 
slavery by birth was passed, masters had to deal with the consequences of their 
appropriation of enslaved women’s reproduction: the extended debate over how 
slaves should be categorized as property hinged, in part, on masters’ inability to fully 
rationalize and control the reproduction of enslaved people. In other words, even as 
Virginia’s master class worked to capitalize upon reproduction in service of colonial 
racial absolutism, outlaw reproduction destabilized those goals.
Outlaw reproduction is located more obviously at the center of Chapter Two, 
which investigated the transgressive possibilities of childbearing in a colonial space. 
There, I examined the destabilizing effects of juridical outlaw reproduction, 
especially bastard and interracial births. With its focus on the transgressive effects of 
reproduction, this chapter serves as a balance to the first chapter, which focused on 
the ways that reproduction could be disciplined and appropriated in the interests of 
the colonial project. This chapter expanded on juridical outlaw reproduction, 
allowing it to encompass not just births which were deemed illegal, but the ways that
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entire lives could be constructed as “outlaw” due to reproductivity: interracial 
families, single mothers, and women who repeatedly committed bastardy all created 
lives for themselves outside of the narrow confines of colonial legality. Thus, we also 
see archival outlaw reproduction in this chapter -  the ways that the colonial archive 
made some kinds of reproduction visible due to its outlaw nature. Therefore, 
interracial families and single mothers, because they were under the surveillance of 
the colonial courts, left considerable traces in the colonial archive. Colonial 
authorities needed to keep tabs on reproductive outlaws; because of this, we are able 
to understand the lives of those outlaws and their families, sometimes for generations.
This focus on transgressive reproduction emphasizes transgressive effects 
over resistant intents; in this, colonial outlaw reproduction helps us to see the ways 
that the colonial project could be undermined or destabilized. We would be remiss to 
see the colonial courts as hegemonic, or even internally consistent, institutions. 
Instead, throughout this chapter, we see the ways that colonial institutions like the 
courts changed courses, reconsidered cases, and even tolerated some outlaw 
reproduction, so long as these actions served the interests of the colonial project at 
large. The attempt, explored in the first chapter, to create an airtight system of race- 
based chattel slavery and attendant racial hierarchy, was undermined by the existence 
of individuals and families that gave the lie to such absolutism. Interracial children, 
free black families, and single mothers all transgressed the racial and status 
hierarchies so essential to the colonial project.
Chapter Three examined the meanings of power and knowledge in our 
understanding of outlaw reproduction. Again, we see the interplay of all three
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definitions of outlaw reproduction. The epistemic knowledge that I explored in this 
chapter concerns the unspoken knowledge that women and men held about 
reproduction; this knowledge emerged from and reflected daily life and bodily 
experience. As such, the chapter is mostly concerned with archival outlaw 
reproduction, in which the private, intimate sphere of childbearing was recorded in 
court records, personal papers, and printed texts. The recording of such moments is 
doubly significant here: first, because the gender politics of childbearing meant that 
the birthing room was rarely open to the public eye, and second, because, by 
definition, episteme is the unquestioned, unspoken knowledge that is rarely put into 
words, much less recorded for posterity. Even the knowledge of midwives, the 
respected community experts in matters of reproduction, was learned via experience, 
not text, and therefore was rarely recorded. Therefore, any scraps of the reproductive 
episteme that survive in the archive are fleeting and must be read with deliberation 
and care.
With these caveats about the colonial archive in mind, the third chapter 
examined the other two definitions of outlaw reproduction as well. Because of their 
role as arbiters of knowledge about childbearing and reproduction in general, 
midwives’ and women’s expertise gave them a public role in adjudicating cases of 
juridical outlaw reproduction, especially bastardy, infanticide, and other questionable 
births. Thus, juridical outlaw reproduction allowed women to engage in the colonial 
outlaw reproduction that unsettled hierarchies and transgressed boundaries. 
Reproduction was a singular area in which women’s knowledge gave them public 
authority, and institutions like the court deferred to that knowledge. The intimate
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relations of colonialism would transform and undermine this public role: childbirth 
became an intimate space for the negotiating of colonial power relations between 
mistress and servant, master and slave, and patriarch and dependant. The production 
of knowledge itself was itself a colonial endeavor in this instance, so that access to 
knowledge about childbearing was yet another way for planter-physicians to 
discipline the bodies of various colonial others.
The final chapter engaged with outlaw reproduction as a discourse of colonial 
power. In another framing of archival outlaw reproduction, here the colonial archive 
preserved particular stories and images of reproduction because that reproduction was 
central to representing the colonial project in both law and in print -  stories of 
monstrous births fell alongside attempts to enumerate the colonial population as 
colonizers sought to make sense of the meanings of reproduction in a colonial space. 
Ultimately, this archive existed to frame and reframe colonial discourses as a form of 
colonial outlaw reproduction. In this chapter, the ways that colonial outlaw 
reproduction remade both understandings of reproduction and colonialism, as 
reproduction informed colonial discourses, and the experience of colonialism remade 
reproductive discourses. While early colonialism prized prolific reproduction to 
populate colonized spaces, a later colonial discourse emphasized the ways that 
rational reproduction could be used to discipline and enforce colonial hierarchies.
The key difference between these two discourses was that the experience of 
colonialism reframed the meanings of outlaw reproduction: where the discourse of 
prolific reproduction imagined that the colonial project amounted only to populating 
an “empty” land, the discourse of rational reproduction saw that the outlaw
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potentialities of reproduction needed to be contained and controlled in the service of 
the colonial project. Unrestrained reproduction -  especially the reproduction 
nonwhite, colonized bodies -  could sate the plantation economy’s demand for labor, 
but unchecked, such outlaw reproduction could undermine racial hierarchies, and, 
after the Revolution, threaten the infant republic. Therefore, we see the underlying 
reasons for the need to police and discipline juridical outlaw reproduction: bastard 
births, interracial births, and even prolific reproduction could destabilize the colonial 
project as a whole.
It is the multiplicity of the concept of outlaw reproduction that makes it a 
useful tool for understanding the colonial past. The juridical sense of outlaw 
reproduction encompasses both the efforts of the law to discipline bodies, and the 
ways those bodies transgressed lines of power and knowledge. The archival sense of 
outlaw reproduction points to both the limitations and the opportunities of the 
colonial archive: reproduction was a space of silence in the archive, so when stories 
of childbearing were spoken, they are potent textual ruptures. The colonial sense of 
outlaw reproduction emphasizes the ways that reproduction was central both in the 
creation of colonial projects, and in moments when that project was undermined. In a 
sense, reproduction became visible in the colonial archive by necessity: moments of 
outlaw reproduction transgressed boundaries, destabilized epistemic frameworks, and 
unsettled the colonial project.
It is so obvious as to be virtually unspoken that the British colonial project in 
Virginia utterly depended on the reproduction of peoples for its success. The 
settlement of a permanent colony, the displacement of the native population, the
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creation of a labor force for the emerging plantation economy -  these could not 
happen through the transport of bodies alone. Colonialism happened via the 
reproduction of bodies, and via the disciplining of those bodies within colonial 
hierarchies of status, servitude, and race. It goes without saying that colonialism 
happened via women’s bodies -  this dissertation strives to interrupt that silence.
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